The communique announcing Xi’s reforms, however, stated that the party “must consolidate Marxism’s leading position in the ideological sphere”, and “strengthen public opinion guidance” – hardly a recipe for greater personal freedom. There were no really bold reforms, such as extending voting for local officials to the county level, or creating independent courts to pursue corruption, or dropping internet censorship. Rather, Xi’s proposals consist of tweaks of existing policies that are designed to be eye-catching and sound impressive but that in fact reinforce the party’s grip on Chinese life.
For example, much excitement greeted the relaxation of the one-child policy. But in fact, this reform only affects urban single children who marry a spouse with one sibling. Rural households, minorities, and urban single-children who married other singletons were already permitted to have two children. Since the one-child policy has been in force for decades, the number of these special unions of single children to spouses with siblings is modest.
What’s more, there is no indication that urban Chinese families really want to have more children. Let us say that Chinese women are now freed to have as many children as their counterparts in South Korea or Japan; in China fertility is 1.66 children per woman while in Japan it is 1.41 and in South Korea 1.32. In Hong Kong, where the one-child policy did not apply, fertility is just 1.11.
In any case, the cost of raising children and the lack of affordable space in urban China are two further constraints unaffected by this change. So even with a more relaxed one-child policy, it seems likely that Chinese fertility will continue to decline, converging with levels seen in other industrialising Asian nations.
Planned reforms to give farmers greater control of their land are promising. But without details, we do not know how this policy will be reconciled with the vital need of indebted local governments to continue to sell and develop rural land to generate income.
Market reforms suggest that more prices will be allowed to find their natural levels; but the major firms providing key goods and services will remain under state control, so will likely find their way around any price changes. Eliminating the gulags is long overdue, but will not fundamentally free intellectual life in China if house arrests, loss of jobs and internet censorship continue to impede free speech.
In short, despite the reforms, the party will still stifle all other political voices, still control the major firms and banks, and still limit migration to the major metropolitan areas. This is timid change; hardly the reform China truly needs to change course and resolve its crises.
Jack Goldstone is a Professor of Public Policy at George Mason University. He does not work for, consult to, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has no relevant affiliations.
This article was originally published at The Conversation. Read the original article.
(AP Photo)
