On the eve of the referendum, either outcome seems possible. On one hand, the Salafist Nour Party, the political wing of the Alexandria-based group al-Dawa al-Salafiya, has strongly supported a "yes" vote: it has aggressively campaigned in support of the constitution, including through public conferences featuring its most prominent sheikhs. Given the party's nationwide mobilizing capabilities and social services networks, as well as its relative freedom under the current government, Nour's advocacy could have a strong impact on Salafist turnout. By contrast, the major Salafist parties advocating a boycott lack these advantages: the Watan Party, whose chief was a Morsi advisor, formed only a year ago and does not have a strong nationwide presence, while the government has curtailed the political activities of al-Gamaa al-Islamiyah, a U.S.-designated terrorist organization.
On the other hand, the Nour Party's backing of the referendum puts it at odds with many influential Salafist sheikhs, most notably Abu Ishaq al-Heweny, who issued a fatwa calling for a boycott. Nour's support for a government that is cracking down on other Islamists has also catalyzed a steep decline in its support, as reflected in recent polls. And in stark contrast to the rigidly hierarchical Brotherhood, Salafist parties exert no control over their rank and file; accordingly, some mid-level Nour leaders have indicated that they might not follow the party's decision to support a "yes" vote.
To be sure, measuring precise Salafist turnout will be difficult. There will be no exit polling, and the fact that the Egyptian government will permit only around 6,000 observers to monitor over 30,000 polling locations may undercut the credibility of the results. But media reports and comparisons of governorate-level turnout data between this week's referendum and the 2011-2012 parliamentary elections might provide some insight into Salafists' acceptance of the current political process, or lack thereof.
U.S. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Since Morsi's ouster, the Obama administration has charted a contradictory policy toward Egypt. Despite repeatedly acknowledging its inability to shape Egypt's tumultuous domestic politics, it seemingly attempted to do just that in October, when it partially suspended military aid to Egypt "pending credible progress toward an inclusive, democratically elected civilian government through free and fair elections."
This week's referendum gives Washington an opportunity to recalibrate its Egypt policy, emphasizing the strategic interests it can promote rather than the domestic political outcomes it cannot. More to the point, no matter how well or how poorly the military is intervening in Egypt's politics, neither country's interests are served by allowing violent extremism to grow stronger. Washington should thus resume its normal relationship with the Egyptian military in order to counter the emerging jihadist threat, which has increasingly hit targets west of the Suez Canal. In this vein, Washington should reopen discussions with Cairo over the nature of U.S. military aid, restructuring that assistance to better help Egypt bolster its counterinsurgency capabilities.
At the same time, Washington should continue signaling its displeasure with the military-backed government's undemocratic behavior. Cairo's broad assault on opponents and critics, which has targeted political actors well beyond the Muslim Brotherhood, reduces the chances of political consensus and makes further upheaval more likely. Washington should therefore pursue a balanced approach -- one that emphasizes U.S. strategic interests through resumption of military assistance, but without looking clueless about Egypt's autocratic political trajectory.
