The risk of confrontation in each of these zones matters to all the nations of Indo-Pacific Asia.
China has huge stakes in the Indian Ocean, the highway for most of its imported oil.
In the long run, securing the sea lines of communication in the Indian Ocean will likely be as much a strategic priority for China as the assertion of its maritime claims in the western Pacific.
In sending ships through the Indonesian straits, Beijing is telling Jakarta, Canberra and ultimately New Delhi that they should be prepared to see more of the Chinese navy in their proximity.
No sensible strategist would reject China's right to deploy capabilities to protect its interests, providing this is done in consultation with local powers and does not damage their interests or the stability of the regional order.
So the challenge is not about keeping China out of the Indian Ocean. It is about integrating China as a partner in a rules-based system, and one that equally accepts India's growing maritime links with the Pacific.
What the region cannot afford is for the expanding economic and strategic interests of great powers to translate into destabilising activities that occur unilaterally and without warning.
Indonesia is conscious of this challenge, given its Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa's initiative of an Indo-Pacific treaty for peace and co-operation, as well as his efforts to build Southeast Asian solidarity on a code of conduct in the South China Sea.
Australia does not seek a confrontation with China, its largest trading partner. But given Australia's dependence on maritime trade and regional stability, and the security importance of the continent's northern approaches, the Chinese exercise is likely to influence Australia's defence debate as the drafting of a new white paper gets under way.
There will be a renewed focus on the need for the best possible maritime domain awareness, in partnership with the US but perhaps third parties, too.
At a time when Australia-Indonesia relations are strained over short-term differences, it is important not to lose sight of the longer-term strategic logic of these two countries learning to share information about all maritime activity in the waters between them.
The idea of a three-way security dialogue between Australia, India and Indonesia has evolved quietly across the past five years.
Its logic is now becoming compelling. And this should go further, to lead to practical maritime and naval co-operation.
While Australia-Indonesia ties are in limbo, it would make sense to deepen the Australia-India side of the triangle. Here the potential areas for action are maritime domain awareness, naval intelligence sharing, providing access to each other's naval facilities, and working together to improve the capacity of smaller states in the Indian Ocean.
China has the right to advance its interests in the Indian Ocean just as the Indian Ocean's resident powers have every right to work together to monitor and manage the changes ahead.
