The regime conducts largely defensive operations in provinces where it is unwilling or unable to carry out significant offensives. In these areas, it focuses on defending key locations such as major cities, airfields, and important military installations (headquarters, major unit garrisons, weapons and ammunition storage). From there, it conducts military actions to harass, wear down, and disrupt rebel activity while controlling the civilian population. The regime presence in the provinces is buttressed by an extensive network of strong points (the so-called "barriers"), which serve as artillery fire bases, help to secure lines of communication, and broaden the regime's area of control/influence. These kinds of defensive operations have been largely successful in Deir al-Zour and Raqqa provinces in the east and Idlib in the north.
The regime is losing ground in some provinces, including Quneitra and Deraa in the south and Hama in the center. In these areas, regime forces are not strong enough to protect their network of positions and appear hard pressed to hold even some important towns. Nevertheless, much of the rebel success in these areas has been over less important territory, with the regime retaining control of key military facilities and major cities. When rebel success becomes too significant, the regime steps up its military activity via small-scale reinforcement, airstrikes, artillery bombardment, and other offensive actions.
The situation is more difficult to characterize in some provinces. In Homs, the regime has largely reverted to either defensive or population-control operations after its successful spring 2013 offensive around al-Qusayr and Talkalakh. At the same time, however, it is carrying out a slow offensive against rebel-held towns on the Lebanon border. And in Hasaka province in the east, the regime seems satisfied to let the Kurds of the Democratic Union Party (PYD) do most of the fighting against Islamist rebels, though it still maintains and occasionally employs its own regular forces there. As a result, the province is not under regime or rebel control at the moment.
REASONS FOR REGIME SUCCESS
A number of factors have contributed to the regime's recent successes. First, the presence of allied forces is crucial, especially in offensive operations. The involvement of Hezbollah forces and Iraqi militants is not a guarantee of success, but it significantly increases the regime's chances.
Second, offensive and defensive actions are more successful when the regime is able to mass its forces and firepower, control the situation (i.e., isolate the battlefield and employ siege tactics), operate against weak rebel forces (i.e., units that are small in number, lightly armed, and/or poorly coordinated), and sustain operations. In other words, it is successful when it deems the situation important enough to invest significant resources.
Terrain and casualties are influential factors as well. Syria's rugged terrain and urban areas favor the defender, and both the regime and the rebels have exploited this fact. The regime must also be concerned about the casualties it is taking. The number of regular and irregular personnel killed and wounded appears to be increasing due to the heightened intensity of the fighting and the emergence of better armed and coordinated rebel forces. Damascus cannot ignore losses among its allies either, especially Hezbollah, which has a domestic support base in Lebanon to worry about. Hezbollah and Iraqi militant units appear to be taking significant casualties in the Qalamoun-Yabroud fighting, even when rebel claims are significantly discounted.
OUTLOOK
The Assad regime's recent successes are by no means sweeping -- its offensive operations sometimes progress very slowly or fail altogether, and in some places it has lost ground. But it is having incremental success on key fronts in Aleppo and the Damascus area. If it prevails there, the war's real and perceived direction would shift strongly in its favor -- Bashar al-Assad and his allies, buoyed by success, would press their "military solution" harder and become even less inclined to negotiate.
Accordingly, many are concerned about the rebels suffering potentially substantial defeats in Aleppo and Damascus. While this is unlikely to happen overnight, there is always the possibility of a quick collapse of resistance through the cumulative effects of casualties, logistical problems, loss of will to fight, and declining popular support. The rebels have fought long and hard on many fronts, but their determination may not last indefinitely. It is an open question whether they can respond effectively to the regime's challenge without greater internal unity and significant outside military assistance, including arms, training, advice, and intelligence.
