But Iran's government still stands after years of persistent ratcheting up of economic punishment. Its foreign policy fundamentals remain unchanged. The interim agreement is not worthless, but $7 billion in sanctions relief seems like relatively small potatoes in view of Iran's broader ambition.
The interim agreement is actually strong on its face. An advantage is increased verification and reporting on Iran's declared program. With better access to Iran's program comes better opportunity to discover anomalies that may lead to undisclosed activities, including research. This dynamic can be expected to cause many irritants in this nascent process. Iran will resist more intrusive measures. But as a side effect of the process, the IAEA confirms Iran's own bragging about its nuclear prowess. Membership in the eminent club of 14 or so countries that can enrich uranium is confirmed.
As Joe Cirincione, president of the Ploughshares Fund, observed, "Its officials have long held that transparency-rather than reduction of capabilities-is the key to assuring the world that its program is peaceful." Iran's rhetoric in defense of its rights to technology not only sets up expected conflict over what capability it may retain in any long-term agreement; it also provides opportunity to build confidence already recognized by its own negotiators through greater transparency.
As a reward for a verified freeze on most current activities, a rollback of others yet to be determined, dilution of its stockpile and more intrusive IAEA inspections, Iran gains greater access to the global financial system and overseas technology in the short term, with perhaps more to follow. It also begets willingness on the part of the international community to consider the nation more "normal" rather than the predictable spoiler it's been since the 1979 revolution. The multifarious business delegations headed to Tehran and the reputed oil deal with Russia bear this out.
The charges of Iranian nuclear weapons and nuclear-capable missile research cannot be dismissed. But like Iran's centrifuge expertise, whatever knowhow has been obtained can never be walked back to some earlier state. International experts have developed a healthy respect for Iran's capabilities. Ali Akbar Salehi, former IAEA ambassador, foreign minister, and current head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, received his PhD in nuclear engineering from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Many other Iranian scientists have the wherewithal, too, despite assassinations of several predecessors.
Iran's breakout capability will remain - even with a freeze and possible future reduction in the number of spinning centrifuges, reduction in the enrichment of uranium from the current 20 percent to 5 percent, and slowdown or redesign of the Arak reactor. Analysts continue to provide a time horizon based on fuzzy information. If the agreement succeeds, Iran will still retain the capability to build nuclear weapons, no matter how many centrifuges remain spinning. If this nonproliferation experiment goes awry, the time horizon for a breakout will shorten considerably.
Much time will be spent trying to figure out what breakout scenario is acceptable. Whatever is agreed, Iran becomes another Japan or Brazil, and quite possibly that's the goal for now. Iran has made its point: fait accompli. Inspectors or others may catch Iran in prohibited activity which would lead to another dustup and another round of recrimination. But as Iran continues to refine its nuclear narrative, especially with a pause or rollback in place, only a drastic downturn in political relations with the big powers will provide timely warning of an Iranian nuclear weapons program.
Of course, everything is in play during the period of the interim agreement. No one has a crystal ball. But Iran may have hit its nuclear groove for the moment, and if so, can better engage with the rest of the world and turn its attention to more pressing problems, confident that its nuclear position is secure.
