Some Shiites later soured on him after he joined U.S. forces in an offensive against cleric Muqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army militia in the southern city of Basra. But the move helped bolster al-Maliki's image as a national, rather than solely sectarian, leader.
His political bloc, which grouped Dawa and other smaller parties into the State of Law coalition, faced a strong challenge from the Sunni-backed but largely secular Iraqiya bloc in 2010 elections. Although Iraqiya won two more seats, al-Maliki stayed in power by a court ruling that the largest bloc of parties cobbled together - not the largest single party - had the mandate to form a government.
But opposition grew to his governing style, and questions arose over whether he was unfairly consolidating power and intimidating or sidelining political opponents.
Al-Maliki oversaw efforts - too slow for many - to rebuild Iraq and normalize its relations with the outside world. He struggled to balance ties with the United States and neighboring Shiite powerhouse Iran. Critics said he was too cozy with Tehran, but he argued it was vital to maintain good relations.
He and Bush talked frequently, but they failed to secure terms to allow a continued U.S. military presence in Iraq beyond 2011. The last American troops left in December 2011, except for a small number that stayed under the control of the U.S. Embassy to provide training and facilitate arms sales.
The departure of U.S. troops marked a turning point that al-Maliki swiftly sought to exploit for political gain.
His governing style alienated many in parliament, as well as his own deputies and ministers. Al-Maliki contended he was acting in the best interest of Iraq and doing what he could in the face of an uncooperative opposition.
By late 2012, he faced renewed challenges to his authority. Iraq's self-rule Kurdish region rushed troops to its disputed internal border with the rest of Iraq, where they faced off against the Iraqi army. Anti-government protests erupted in Anbar province and other largely Sunni areas that lasted for months.
Although violence had declined from its peak in 2006-07, mass-casualty attacks continued. In January 2014, militants with the group known then as the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant swept in from neighboring Syria and mounted an offensive in Anbar province, taking Fallujah and parts of Ramadi. These became the base for a wider, more violent campaign that included the second-largest city, Mosul.
That prompted uncharacteristically outspoken criticism from Iraq's most revered Shiite authority, Ayatollah Ali Sistani, causing many to believe al-Maliki's days were numbered.
"The Mosul events made it very difficult for al-Maliki to remain prime minster," said Ayham Kamel, an Iraq expert with Eurasia Group. "But Sistani's direct involvement is really what made a difference here."
Mahmoud Othman, an independent Kurdish lawmaker, said al-Maliki was not solely to blame for failures in leadership.
"The parliament and the presidency also failed," Othman said. "He made the lawmakers his enemies instead of making them his partners. Under al-Maliki's rule, the judicial authorities and the army have lost their independence and neutrality and were turned to tools in the political games in Iraq."
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Associated Press writers Vivian Salama, Qassim Abdul-Zahra and Sameer N. Yacoub contributed from Baghdad.
