All too naturally, Iran’s mullahs sense they are regarded in Washington as indispensable actors in the fight against ISIS and, accordingly, feel that they can afford dragging their heels in the international negotiations on their nuclear program.
Thus, as recently as last August, Iran refused UN nuclear inspectors access to the Parchin military base – even though the director of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Yukiya Amano, had declared that access to that site was essential for assessing the real nature and intentions of Iran’s nuclear program.
The stakes are sky high. As pointed out by Washington Post columnist Zachary A. Goldfarb, whether or not Iran manages to obtain the nuclear weapon will be the defining issue of this administration’s legacy in the realm of foreign policy.
This is not to say that the U.S. should tone down the intensity of its attacks against ISIS. What this paper contends is that an effective anti-ISIS strategy must be accompanied by a harsher stance vis-à-vis both Tehran and the Syrian regime.
The U.S. can achieve this twofold objective – eliminate ISIS and thwart the Iran-Syria axis – through three mutually-reinforcing means.
One is to intensify the pressure on Iran in the negotiations on its nuclear program – reinforcing the sanctions if need be – so as to make it clear to Tehran that the time of prevarication is over.
Another is to strike not only ISIS’s installations in Syria but also those of Bashar al Assad. Bluntly put: bomb both ISIS and Assad, as foreign-policy columnist Michael Weiss has convincingly called for.
Last but not least, the U.S. could select its military targets and bomb ISIS in the areas where this terrorist group would be fighting against the Kurdish militia (Peshmerga) and the Iraqi army, as well as against strategic sites in Syria (where ISIS command may be retrenched), but leaving the field free for ISIS to turn its guns against Assad’s forces and pro-Iran militias.
Said in other words, push ISIS and Assad’s regime to fight against each other.
As a matter of fact, pushing enemies to compete against each other is how the Syrian regime has managed to survive. That regime reportedly took the calculated decision to free imprisoned jihadists, and let ISIS forces make some territorial gains[6], so as to enable them to fight the moderate, West-compatible insurgency.
As reported by the Wall Street Journal, the Syrian ambassador to Lebanon, Ali Abdel-Karim, boastfully pointed out: “When these groups [ISIS and the moderate rebels] clashed, the Syrian government benefited. When you have so many enemies and they clash with each other, you must take advantage of it. You step back, see who is left and finish them off”.
By selecting the target zones of its airstrikes against ISIS installations, the U.S. can successfully play the same cynical game that Assad’s regime has been employing to cling to power.
True, Iran is not deprived of countervailing cards. Pro-Iran militia Badr Corps contributed to dislodging ISIS from the strategic town of Amerli[8] and may once again be useful for future U.S.-supported military action against ISIS. But the course of action proposed in this paper wouldn’t prevent pro-Iran militias to continue their combat against ISIS. Quite the contrary, it will force them to do so in order to ensure their own survival.
So much for what a coherent, consequences-minded strategy would embody. Regrettably, President Obama’s televised address left unanswered a number of critical questions in this regard.
