An eight-month-long diplomatic standoff between Qatar and Saudi Arabia came to a sudden end in November during a snap meeting in Riyadh that took even Middle East experts by surprise. Back in March, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates withdrew their ambassadors in concert from Qatar. The three states accused Doha of malicious interference in their internal affairs and of compromising regional security through Doha's support of the Muslim Brotherhood. In the immediate aftermath of this summit, however, the Gulf Cooperation Council promised in a terse press release that envoys to Qatar would return.
How relations went bad
Bilateral relations between Saudi Arabia and Qatar soured in the wake of the Arab Spring as Qatar lent its diplomatic support, along with some $8 billion, to President Mohammed Morsi's Islamist government in Egypt. Saudi Arabia, fearing a potential outbreak of Islamist discontent within its own borders, and aware of the Muslim Brotherhood's strong following in the Kingdom - Riyadh itself sheltered and financed the movement for more than 40 years - supported the July 2013 coup that ousted Morsi and eventually brought then-Field Marshal Abdel Fattah al-Sisi to power. Qatar not only cut off its support of Egypt once Morsi was deposed - it refused to recognize the new government. The newly agreed deal seems to have solved this impasse, as Cairo issued a statement on Nov. 19 hailing the rapprochement between Qatar and the Saudis as a "huge step forward" and offering its full support to the reconciliation.
While easy to overlook, the normalization of diplomatic relations in the Gulf will have far-reaching consequences for regional stability. The rapprochement also sheds light on the rational foreign policy agenda embraced by Qatar in the Peninsula as it aspires to become a diplomatic powerhouse.
As a token of newfound trust, Cairo plans to release two of the Al Jazeera journalists it jailed months ago on charges of undermining the regime. In return, al-Sisi expects Qatar to provide much-needed investment to restart the flailing Egyptian economy. Cairo's softened stance quite apparently is born of necessity, not out of any idealistic desire to bring together the Arab world.
This latest rift falls far short of the lowest ebb in Qatar-Saudi relations. Qatar was annexed by Saudi King Abdul Aziz from 1913-1915, until British pressure forced the Saudis to recognize Qatar's current borders, and bilateral relations have been on a knife's edge ever since. In 1992, Riyadh invaded Qatar, and in 1996, the Qatari government blamed Saudi Arabia for plotting to oust Doha's leadership.
Gulf dynamics in the key of Islam
In many respects, international relations work like economics - simplified assumptions and variables are used to anticipate and explain behavior. In the Gulf, one such variable is the role of religion in prescribing the behavior of actors keen to promote and project their interests in the region. More particularly, the specific type of Islam practiced by individuals in power is deemed important. But here's the catch: Even if Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar are Sunni-majority countries that adhere to ultraconservative Wahhabism, their behavior on the international stage could hardly be conditioned less than that reality. The latest dispute also demonstrates that we are witnessing a drawn-out struggle between Qatar and Saudi Arabia to exert leadership over and provide a beacon for the Arab world.
Qatar embraces a more moderate strand of Wahhabism, devoid of the religious fervor and expansionistic impulses seen from Riyadh. This peculiarity has extensive implications that have more than once put the two countries at loggerheads. Qatar is also more open and tolerant than many of its regional counterparts, which explains, for example, the better status of women in Qatari society and the country's generally forward-looking policies.
The same can be said about Qatar's foreign agenda. Seeking to ensure first and foremost its own security, Qatar has aligned itself with the West, functioning like a Swiss knife of international mediation to forge relationships in all corners of the world. Indeed, from South Sudan and Djibouti, to Afghanistan, Iraq, Israel and Gaza, Qatar is deeply involved in efforts to broker agreements between deep antagonists. The emirate has worked to become a trusted "brand" when it comes to crisis management by seizing on the geopolitical fluidity of the Middle East. It has spent has spent some $2.2 billion in foreign aid over the last five years directed at some 100 countries - not too shabby for a country with a population of 278,000.
Such outsized diplomatic reach has repeatedly brought Qatar to clash with Saudi Arabia's global ambitions. This is Qatar's diplomatic two-step: Doha does what it can to maintain regional stability (read: appease Saudi Arabia) while striving for broader political influence. Doha's interests are therefore best served by acting as a counterweight to its larger neighbors.
The diplomatic standoff with Saudi Arabia over the Muslim Brotherhood's role in Egypt shows that Doha will set aside Islamic ideals when necessary in favor of a Kissinger-inspired realpolitik. This should be kept in mind before accusing the country of being a vector of terrorism. With Egypt asking for financial assistance, and with Saudi Arabia's worries alleviated, Qatar is now in position to follow its pragmatic agenda and exert regional influence on key security matters. Above all else, the new deal will help the United States, which needs its allies to be on the same page in the ongoing fight against radical extremism in the Middle East.
