Prominent Cuban exiles and internal dissidents have broadly criticized Washington's move to restore diplomatic relations with Havana. Their skepticism is understandable: Concessions and gestures of goodwill from leading democracies have never led the Castro regime to soften its totalitarian grip on Cuban politics. All too naturally, many of those who have endured the yoke of that ruthless dictatorship fret that the re-establishment of relations with the United States may serve the interests of the Cuban regime and will not help create the conditions for a democratic opening in Cuba.
Thus apprehensions are built from experience. Yet past experience should not obscure present reality: The Castro regime does not approach this new phase of its tumultuous relations with the United States from a position of strength.
In the past, Cuban President Raul Castro has emphatically asserted that "Cuba prefers to disappear rather than to accept blackmail from the United States" on human rights issues, adding that so-called political prisoners in Cuba were merely "common criminals." This time, however, he released 53 political prisoners as part of the agreement to re-establish diplomatic relations.
There is a reason for such a notable change. The Cuban regime sorely needs to establish links with the loathed "empire" after political obstinacy and confrontation left not only its economy, but also that of Venezuela, in tatters.
It is indeed a secret to no one that the Castro regime exerts a marked influence on Caracas. By ideological inertia, however, it has mishandled that influence and probably encouraged the Venezuelan government to commit the same catastrophic mistakes that already sunk the Cuban economy. Now, the chaos overtaking Venezuela's economy has put to risk the boundless economic largesse Venezuela extends to Cuba. Hence Castro's willingness - indeed, eagerness - to normalize diplomatic relations with the United States as a step toward securing the economic support that Venezuela shortly will be unable to provide.
In addition, Cuba is betting big on a $1 billion deepwater port at Mariel. This venture will reach its full potential only if commercial relations with the United States expand significantly - all the more reason for Castro to seek a rapprochement with Washington.
From now on, it will be difficult for Castro to condemn and demonize the United States, as has been his wont.
Let us assume that the future U.S. embassy in Havana engages in a dialogue with Cuban dissidents and with representatives of Cuban civil society. Will Castro be willing to assume a hard diplomatic line against such efforts, if doing so undermines the prospects for closer commercial, financial and technological ties with the "empire?"
And should Castro decide to react in such a way, how will he compensate for a renewed deterioration of Cuba-U.S. relations? Will he turn to near-bankrupt Venezuela? To Brazil, which suffers the triple handicap of rampant inflation, deep-in-the-red public accounts and a protracted trade deficit? To Russia, which is struggling with stagflation? To say the least, these are not the most attractive benefactors.
There remains Beijing. But China is already massively invested in Cuba, and it would be willing to invest more only if it sees a promising economic outlook for the island, something that a relapse of diplomatic ills between Cuba and the United States would seriously damage.
For opponents of the thaw, an eventual improvement of living conditions in Cuba as a result of normalized relations with the United States would not create a basis for the advent of democracy on the island. China is presented as conspicuous proof that prosperity can actually enable a dictatorship to survive.
This argument can be countered by recalling that isolating a totalitarian dictatorship does not guarantee the collapse or even the weakening of that type of regime.
Take North Korea. Here you have a country that is closed to the outside world, that has been devastated by multiple famines, and where destitution is widespread. And yet, the regime sticks it out.
It would therefore be more appropriate to look at the Cuban case, not through the prism of far-away examples, but in light of Cuba's specific situation. What one sees then is an embattled regime that has long lost its initial glow - its false certitudes and illusions - and whose economic model is an utter fiasco. The regime now is ready to appease its stronger adversary in order to ensure its economic survival.
Even the timing of the announcement of the restoration of diplomatic relations indicates the high priority that Castro attaches to the enterprise. Indeed, he didn't ignore that U.S. President Barack Obama was about to approve sanctions against high-ranking members of the Venezuelan government. Castro must have known that the announcement would create discomfort in Venezuela's ruling class. But he went on anyhow, showing that he preferred to unsettle a critical alliance rather than delay the rapprochement with the United States.
All these considerations indicate that Washington, and even Obama himself, will be able to exert political leverage over the Castro regime in the period ahead.
The hostility to the thaw manifested by the GOP-led Congress could strengthen the U.S. position in the upcoming tussle over human rights issues. Obama could indeed use the Republicans as a foil and demand the Castro regime take concrete and meaningful steps toward the democratization of the island - otherwise, Congress would be tempted to harden legislation on Cuba. Looking beyond the current administration, Cuba's ruling caste cannot ignore that Obama's successor might be inclined to toughen U.S. policy toward Cuba if the thaw doesn't lead to a true democratic opening. President Castro, therefore, had better respond favorably to requests Obama may make, if only to pre-empt aggressive moves by the next U.S. president.
The path toward democracy in Cuba will be fraught with obstacles and marked by mischief. Its success is not assured. Be that as it may, the incipient normalization of diplomatic relations between Cuba and the United States creates opportunities for a democratic opening in Cuba that five decades of rupture simply failed to bring about.
