America's global influence is in decline; so say numerous politicians, policy intellectuals, and academics. But there are two kinds of decline - absolute and relative. The former stems from a loss of strength, while the latter accomodates the rise of other powers. A power might rebuild its foreign policy prowess - say by strengthening its military forces - but even then, a relative decline in influence may occur as other powers grow stronger, faster.
Relative and absolute declines may also occur at the same time, and this seems to be the American reality. In some respects you could argue that overall U.S. military power has fallen on some absolute scale, but what is certain is that other powers are rising and, above all, the challenges facing America's capacity to dominate are greater than at any time since the height of the Cold War. U.S. geo-strategic primacy is under siege in several regions at once, and in this sense it is globally stressed.
Washington's challenge is not only to deal with the biggest adversary states and regional problems - China, Iran, Russia, and the Middle East - it also relates to strategic overload. The United States has to deal with every crisis at once and troubleshoot their many connections: An action in one theater creates secondary and tertiary effects in the others.
China's challenge to American influence is now multifaceted, a combination of international economic competition as well as limited strategic conflicts in East Asian seas that pose the question of who ultimately will organize future Asian geopolitics - Beijing, or the United States and its allies. A growing debate in American policy discussions is asking whether Beijing's long-term goal is in fact to replace America as the world's pre-eminent power.
Iran is an American dilemma in two ways: through its nuclear program and through its rising influence in Middle East geopolitics. Negotiations for an agreement limiting Iran's nuclear program are at this point inconclusive. On the other hand, Tehran's rising regional influence within the morass of overlapping Middle East conflicts is evident. America's allies feel themselves under threat, and they believe that only the United States can guarantee their security. Yet with its growing energy independence, the U.S. national interest in the region - outside of its alliance with Israel - seems less compelling than it once was.
Russia challenges America with territorial aggression against Ukraine and with its implied, though improbable, designs on the Baltic States. Washington's need here is to motivate more resolute reactions from the NATO/EU countries, since the United States has no interest in a war with Russia. A strong U.S.-Europe coalition could deal with Russian President Vladimir Putin from a position of strength while reducing demands on American strategic capabilities.
The Arab Sunni Middle East today is a morass of overlapping and intertwined wars; geopolitical rivalries; questionable governments; and the plague of jihadism. Unquestionably Washington, although still significantly involved, has stepped back from intervening as it once might have. Biding one's time is not the worst option when military or other decisive action looks so unpromising at the same time as humanitarian aid is fundamental.
Less Is Often More
America is anything but isolated in the world's major areas of geostrategic conflict. To the contrary, Washington is solicited by the Europeans, the Asian allies and various actors in the Middle East whose very survival might depend on American help. In the conflicts created by Chinese expansion into the East and South China seas, more willing and able allies are present (Japan, South Korea, Vietnam, perhaps Taiwan) because their own national interests are threatened, and they possess military capabilities.
What should U.S. President Barack Obama do? The primary goals of American foreign policy are to serve the national interest and to foster international peace and security. The definition of a national strategy, and the specific goals it pursues, therefore begins with analyzing circumstances in a broad arc to measure what Washington can and should try to achieve.
What are the most serious problems of world order? Who is involved, and what are their policies? An American grand strategy does not develop in the abstract - it emerges out of the challenges of a given structural situation. A strategy of containment and nuclear deterrence, for example, would have made no sense absent the Soviet threat. Putting liberal internationalism first makes sense only if international circumstances permit it. Then come decisions about how much to try to change unfavorable circumstances, and what actions to take regarding any one problem - not alone, but in the context of the various problems that are on the president's desk. Today the American strategic position faces all the major challenges outlined above.
