As the Iraqi government struggles to retake the city of Ramadi from the Islamic State and to maintain control over the strategically important position, a good deal of attention remains focused on the question of how the city was lost to a relatively small Islamic State force in the first place.
U.S. Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter famously criticized the Iraqi army for showing little to no willingness to fight. But on May 25, the Christian Science Monitor reported that some critics of the United States have thrown those accusations back, saying that Washington is in a like way unwilling to engage in a credible strategy to solve crises where its own national interests are at stake.
It is not just American policy that should be put to question. Plenty of policymakers throughout Europe share Washington's impulse to look the other way as Iran extends its influence across the Middle East, in hopes that the mullahs will do some of the heavy lifting against other extremist groups.
This perspective is shortsighted; it is downright dangerous. Partnership with Tehran - whether explicit or merely tacit - can never be counted on to curtail the growth of Middle Eastern extremist groups. Iran is recognized throughout the West, and by President Barack Obama himself, as a state sponsor of terrorism that leads and directs Shiite extremist groups and proxy militias. If that were not bad enough, Tehran also backs Sunni extremism of the very sort that we are hoping to defeat by proxy in Iraq.
The U.S. intelligence community recently released a vast assortment of documents from Osama Bin Laden's former compound in Pakistan. The intelligence trove revealed among other things that al Qaeda had been considering opening a branch office in Iran. For those who have been paying attention to Iran's activities in the region over the past three and a half decades, this only highlights what was already known.
The regime has a deeply entrenched network of Shiite militias and terrorist groups including Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, and a variety of forces in Iraqi including the Badr Organization, Asaib Ahl al-Haq, Kataib Hezbollah and the Popular Mobilization Forces. At the same time, it has developed strong ties with Sunni groups to further solidify its regional status. These include Hamas and Islamic Jihad, as well as counterparts in Sudan through which it channels weapons to the Gaza Strip.
Even in absence of an al Qaeda branch office, Tehran has harbored members of the Sunni terrorist organization for years, allowing them a base out of which to operate.
While Tehran's desire to defeat the Islamic State may be sincere, the motive behind that effort is not to defeat extremism, but rather to promote an alternative brand of extremism. In other words, the fact that Iran may be the enemy of our enemy should not put Western countries in the untenable situation of pursuing contradictory goals, and leave our security dependent on a regime that has never behaved as a friend.
Fighting fire with fire is a concept all policymakers surely understand. But to fight extremism with another form of extremism is nothing of the sort: It is more like fighting fire with gasoline. If the defeat of the Islamic State leads to the empowerment of the above-described network of Iranian proxies and supporters, it will be no victory at all.
Neither the United States nor any other Western power can stay out of this conflict and expect an outcome that safeguards their interests. This is not to say that they should throw their own militaries onto the Iraqi battlefield. A good start would be simply to recognize the foolishness of turning a blind eye to Iranian influence and treating the future of the Middle East as if it naturally belongs to one set of extremists or another.
That is only true if we make it so. Europe and the United States have it in their power to promote and support the marginalized moderate voices in the region - voices that would naturally disrupt the networks of extremism currently dominating Iraq, Iran, Syria, and beyond.
If it seems difficult to find these moderate voices amid the noise of transnational sectarian conflict, it does not need to be. Western policymakers will have the opportunity to form partnerships with many of them on June 13 when the National Council of Resistance of Iran holds its annual gathering in Paris. Iranian expatriates and their international supporters will rally against Islamic fundamentalism and outline their vision for freedom and democracy in the future of Iran and the broader Middle East.
Many dignitaries from the United States and Europe have already committed to attending, myself included. But there ought to be more. The region's moderate movements continue to be needlessly marginalized, which only contributes to a deteriorating situation underpinned by the West's backward conception of the Middle East as a place divided between two classes of zealots. A strong presence of key European and American policymakers in Paris on June 13 would highlight that the West is not only willing to fight against the Islamic State, but is also willing to stand behind all the courageous people who can actually win this conflict and bring freedom, democratic values, respect for human rights, and democracy to the Middle East.
(AP photo)
