There may be some merit in sending in 450 more advisors and support personnel to Iraq - raising the U.S. total to some 3,550 - and focusing on creating Sunni forces in Anbar. There may be some merit in deploying U.S. combat aircraft more forward to an Iraqi air base at Al Taqqadum in Anbar, and there may be some merit in trying to directly integrate more Sunnis into the Iraqi 7th and 8th divisions - the two divisions that will have to try and drive ISIL forces out of Anbar.
But, creeping incrementalism is rarely a way of correcting a failed or inadequate strategy, and this approach certainly is not a new strategy or a way of addressing the problems that the existing strategy does not address. The announcements of the last few days do not, by any means, reflect a new strategy, they do not address the problems in the existing strategy, and some proposals seem to be of questionable effectiveness.
A Grand Strategic Vacuum at Every Level
The recent announcement to send 450 more military advisers to Iraq does nothing to address several key strategic issues in which the existing "strategy" - if there is one - clearly fails to address. It does not address the steadily deteriorating situation in Syria, and the disintegration of Syria into three parts: Assad dominated territory, ISIL dominated territory, and territory dominated by other Islamists (including the Al Nusra Front, which is tied to Al Qaeda).
The boost in advisors and shift to Anbar seems to be decoupled from any overall strategy for dealing with the Iraqi security forces, and providing security and stability in liberated areas. There does not seem to be any conditionality in terms of reform of the Iraqi military or the kind of National Guard legislation that could give lasting meaning to training Sunni tribal forces. The focus on Anbar seems to exclude a new focus on the far more populated and strategically important areas in Mosul and Ninewa.
This approach does not address the general pointlessness of training 5,000 supposedly moderate rebels a year when our key Arab allies are supporting the non-ISIL rebel forces, when the last report on recruits for the 5,000 man force totaled all of 90, when there is no clear political goal or way of dealing with Russia and Iran, when Syria's economy has collapsed, and when more than 11 million of some 19 million people are refugees or internally displaced persons within homes or jobs of their own.
The announcement does nothing to address the critical issue of Iran's role in Iraq and Syria, or of countering its growing influence in Iraq and Syria. It could lead Iran to try to use Shi'ite militias and its advisory efforts to block U.S. efforts to reach Iraq's Sunnis, and they certainly seem unlikely to have an end game where the United States creates an Iraq independent enough to stand up to Iran, or do anything to address the role of Iran and the Hezbollah in Syria. It also does nothing to strengthen the weak to non-existent bridges between the Iraq government and our major Arab allies, or raise their flow of aid to Iraq, as a counter to Iran.
