Policywatch 2471
Given Tehran's noncompliant track record and the UN Security Council's imperfect arms restrictions, the nuclear deal could allow Iran to offer its allies a growing range of weapons systems designed to increase survivability and lethality in asymmetric warfare scenarios.
The nuclear deal will open up opportunities for Iran to export arms, though exactly when and under what conditions is a matter of dispute. This raises the question of how the upsurge in arms exports could affect the Islamic Republic's allies and proxies in the Middle East and beyond. In the past, UN Security Council resolutions have done little to prevent Iranian arms deals; in February 2014, for example, Tehran signed a $195 million agreement to sell arms and ammunition to Iraq, in clear violation of Resolution 1747 (2007). It is therefore important to assess what types of weapons Iran might export and to whom -- whether it decides to exploit gaps in Resolution 2231 (the Security Council document approving the nuclear deal and extending the arms embargo), flout the UN entirely, or simply wait until sanctions and other restrictions are lifted in the coming months and years.
A SIZEABLE INDUSTRY
Iran's military-industrial complex has been growing rapidly since the mid-1990s. Today, it reportedly exports weapons to fifty-seven countries, many in conflict areas, in violation of UNSCR 1747. According to the arms-transfer database maintained by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Iran exported at least $200 million worth of arms and ammunitions between 2010 and 2014; the real figure is probably much higher and is expected to rise even further as various restrictions are relaxed and eventually lifted. Iran's traditional arms customers are believed to be Middle Eastern, African, and South American countries, but its market share may grow gradually in emerging markets if it can keep offering cheap, reliable weapons.
For obvious reasons, Iran closely guards its annual military export figures and customer identities, and very little is reported about them. Yet the Islamic Republic has been identified as a major exporter in most available databases, and ten separate independent investigations have found Iranian weapons and ammunition in service with a variety of nonstate entities, including foreign-backed insurgents, rebel forces, Islamist armed groups, and warring civilian communities in Cote d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Guinea, Kenya, Niger, Nigeria, South Sudan, Sudan, and Uganda, not to mention primary beneficiaries such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and Iraqi Shiite militias. While encouraging Tehran to disclose details of its arms exports once international sanctions are lifted would be ideal, there is no guarantee that it would comply.
Iranian military equipment suitable for regional proxies and other customers includes but is not limited to small arms and ammunition, explosively formed penetrators (EFPs), communications equipment, night-vision goggles, thermal scopes, high-power sniper rifles, long-range mortars, man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS), and artillery rockets. A more detailed review of this product list reveals major potential threats to regional security if such equipment ends up in the wrong hands -- such as terrorist and extremist groups in the Middle East, West Asia, and Africa -- once Iran is allowed to more freely export its arms.
MISSILES AND ROCKETS
Iran currently produces advanced antitank guided missiles, some of which have been used in conflicts in Lebanon and Gaza. Yet its newest missiles and guided projectiles have more advanced tandem warheads and guidance systems, making them more lethal against up-armored vehicles and even low-flying helicopters. These include an increasing array of electro-optical and laser-guided missile systems such as the Sadid (which appears to be based on the Israeli Spike), Tondar, Qaem, Dehlaviyeh, and Toufan-5 (a copy of the American TOW-2A), with 4-5 km maximum range. These missiles can be difficult to counter if used effectively. Iran has also begun manufacturing its own version of the versatile RPG-29 rocket-propelled grenade, used during Hezbollah's 2006 war with Israel. Named "Ghadir" in Iran, this weapon uses either a thermobaric or armor-piercing warhead and has a range of 500 meters.
Also manufactured in Iran are local versions of the Chinese QW-1 and QW-1M MANPADS, which go by the names Misaq-1 and -2 and are capable of quickly engaging aerial targets flying up to 4,000 meters high from a range of 5 km. Iran can offer even more in terms of mobile guided antiaircraft defense. The so-called "Herz-e-Nohom" is a relatively compact radar and electro-optically guided mobile air-defense system mounted on a medium truck chassis and capable of operating in densely populated urban areas. Such systems can set up air-defense ambushes and engage low-flying aircraft as far away as 10 km. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the army are also attempting to develop three rapid-fire Gatling guns -- the three-barrel 23 mm Assefeh, and the six-barrel 7.62 mm Akhgar and 12.7 mm Moharam and Nasir -- to shoot down cruise missiles. Obviously some of these are just research projects, but others could eventually end up in militant hands somewhere in the Middle East. Iranian defense officials are very hopeful that they can export their indigenously developed air-defense systems in the coming years once sanctions are lifted.
Mortars can also be very useful in urban warfare and other asymmetric environments, and they are not covered by the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) or UNSCR 2231. In addition to smaller versions, Iran manufactures the 120 mm Razm and 160 mm Vafa mortars with claimed ranges in excess of 16 and 20 km respectively. If true, this is a formidable capability for mortar systems; compared to field artillery, mortars are easier to move and operate from concealed positions, making them suitable for asymmetric scenarios.
Iran also famously produces and proliferates the Fajr family of artillery rockets. Iranian rockets are spreading all over the world in both legal and illicit ways, according to the Geneva-based Small Arms Survey. Iranian military leaders have already spoken about supplying friendly countries and "resistance movements" with rocket manufacturing techniques that use local materials and tooling. For example, recent reports from Yemen suggest that Houthi forces have produced and used their own Shooting Star-1 and -2 rockets with claimed specifications similar to the Iranian Fajr-3 and -5.The Fajr-3 has a range of 43 km, and its 85 kg warhead can cause considerable damage to a radius of 50 meters. The larger Fajr-5 can reach 75 km with its 178 kg warhead; Iran has also tested a newer two-stage version with a range of 180 km and a destructive radius of 100 meters, as well as a guided version resembling a miniaturized Fateh-110.
Other widely exported Iranian rockets are the shorter and very flexible 240 mm and 333 mm Falaq-1 and -2, which can be fired from small pickup trucks against targets up to 10 km away. These rockets have been seen in widespread use by Iranian-backed militias in Iraq and Syria.
