Lessons from the Yom Kippur War

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On this date in 1973, Egypt and Syria, with the support of several other Arab nations, launched a joint attack against the young nation of Israel. Embarrassed by a swift and stunning defeat at the hands of the Israelis in 1967, the Arab world, led by Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Syrian President Hafez Assad, pushed to regain territories occupied by Israel in the Six-Day War.

Lasting no more than a month, the October War -- more widely known as the Yom Kippur War, named after the Jewish day of atonement, on which the war was launched; or the Ramadan War, after the monthlong season of prayer and fasting in the Islamic faith during which the war was also fought -- quickly escalated into a Cold War proxy battle between the world's two superpowers, the Soviet Union and the United States.

With Moscow aiding and supplying its Arab clients in Cairo and Damascus, and Washington doing the same for its ally Israel, the conflict soon escalated into a naval face-off over logistical routes and means of material movement. Tensions rose in the Mediterranean and crescendoed into a near-nuclear standoff. American forces were placed on DEFCON 3, and direct confrontation seemed imminent.

But then it wasn't. Throughout the entire conflict, channels of dialogue between all warring parties remained open, even as each side resupplied and encouraged its own allies, proxies, and clients. More importantly, the terms of the cessation of violence were designed so as to offer everyone involved a means of saving face, even those facing defeat. For Egypt, this meant the eventual return of the Sinai Peninsula; for Israel, this meant relative recognition from several of its most immediate Arab neighbors, and calm on its still fluid borders.

War set the table for Israeli-Egyptian rapprochement via the Camp David Accords, and changed the dynamic of the Israeli-Arab conflict. It created a model of compromise in the region, and, as Israeli historian Benny Morris put it, did away with "the rejectionism that had over the decades achieved very little for the Palestinians or anyone else."

The war is viewed through a different lens, however, in Russia. Although ostensibly given a role in resolving the Yom Kippur conflict, detente between Israel and the Arabs signaled the death knell of Russian influence in the Middle East. Though outmatched militarily, it was its defeat in the diplomatic arena, at the hands of the likes of Henry Kissinger, that cost Russia its footing in the region.

"When Sadat reopened the Suez Canal in 1975," writes National Review's Mario Loyola, "he insisted that an American aircraft carrier lead the first ceremonial convoy through it, rubbing the Soviets' noses in America's ascendancy. The Soviets would never again play more than a marginal role in the Middle East."

Russia, however, appears once again ascendant in the region, as it pushes to shore up one of its last remaining clients in the region -- Bashar Assad, son of Hafez -- and reestablish itself in the eastern Mediterranean.

"The Russians ... are yearning to return to their role as Cold War players, as owners of a Mediterranean fleet capable of going eyeball-to-eyeball with America's," wrote former Israeli ambassador to the United States, Michael Oren, in reflection of the 40th anniversary of the Yom Kippur conflict. "Though it signaled the end of the Soviets' Middle Eastern empire, 1973 remains the high watermark which Moscow still aspires to regain."

Such admonishments read ominously now, however, as news of potential confrontation between Russia and a NATO ally over the skies of Syria, and the possible addition of Russian volunteer forces to the Syrian battlefield, evoke memories of a bipolar era long believed over.

But if the October War taught us anything, it's that there is almost always a way back from the abyss. It is believed that Russian Premier Alexei Kosygin, once faced with the realities of American military might and his own nation's diminished standing in the region, said toward the war's conclusion that "it is not reasonable to become engaged in a war with the United States because of Egypt and Syria."

Let us hope that this quote, whether accurate or apocryphal, rings at least half true to the statesmen of today. But to make it so will require superb diplomacy, and a clear sense of what all of the involved actors can hope to achieve from Syria's seemingly intractable civil war.

Neither, unfortunately, appears to be in abundance at the moment.

Around the Region

Europe's weak hand. As the United States struggles to articulate a response to a resurgent Russia in the Middle East, Judy Dempsey of Carnegie Europe argues that American half measures in the Mideast, coupled with more recent Russian aggression, have left European leaders in an impossible situation:

"Europe (after Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey) is now picking up the pieces of these military ventures. Precisely because there are no stable, functioning state institutions -- let alone the faintest hope of peace and freedom in several Middle Eastern countries -- refugees are on the move.

"And if any European government believes or hopes that Russia's bombing campaign will end the flow of refugees, they are deceiving themselves. This is the new reality that European governments will have to accept."

Khomeini meets Hilfiger. Hanif Kashani profiles Ahmad Khomeini, the social media-savvy great-grandson of the Islamic Republic's founding father, Ruhollah Khomeini:

"Ahmad is part of the large segment of Iranians aged 15-24, who make up roughly a quarter of the 80-million population. As a third of 55 million eligible voters, their political views will be important in future elections.

[...]

"Ambitious and curious, Ahmad wants to relate to his young countrymen and women, perhaps to become a symbol for them. With his father already established politically and popular, Ahmad knows he bears a heavy responsibility as Ayatollah Khomeini's great-grandson, which is why he is selective with each photo he shares on Instagram, and why he uses nuanced language in the accompanying captions. He is methodically creating his own version of the Khomeini brand."

Trump talks Mideast policy. And finally, U.S. presidential hopeful, and Republican poll-leader, Donald Trump discussed U.S. policy in the Middle East over the weekend in an interview with NBC News' Chuck Todd:

"TODD: Well, let me button this up. If Saddam and Gadhafi [were left in power], you think things would be more stable?

TRUMP: Of course it would be. You wouldn't have had your Benghazi situation which is one thing which was just a terrible situation. But, of course, it would. Libya is-- is not even-- nobody even knows what's goin' on over there. It's not even a country anymore.

TODD: So you welcome Putin's involvement.

TRUMP: I like that Putin is bombing the hell out of ISIS -- and it's going to be ISIS. I'll tell ya why. Putin has to get rid of ISIS 'cause Putin doesn't want ISIS coming into Russia."

Historian Juan Cole, however, takes issue with Mr. Trump's understanding of Mideast instability:

"Iraq was anything but stable under Saddam Hussein ... The country invaded two neighbors, Iran and Kuwait, in wars that killed perhaps a million Iraqis out of then 16 million! Thousands were bulldozed into mass graves for belonging to opposition parties. Does this sound stable to you?"

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