What Israelis Want

When discussing and debating the decisions and deeds of other states, we far too often make the mistake of anthropomorphizing entire countries. We tend to give a country one voice, one face, and one worldview.

The tiny Mideast nation of Israel is no exception. While lobbying on the world stage against the recent nuclear agreement between Iran and world powers, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was often treated as a proxy for his public. And though most Israelis continue to oppose the Iran deal by wide margins, a recent survey of foreign policy attitudes by the Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies, or Mitvim, suggests that Israelis hold a far more nuanced, and indeed skeptical, view of their government's handling of foreign affairs.

The Mitvim survey found that a majority of Israelis believe their nation's global standing is in poor shape, and that most view their prime minister's yearlong fight against the Iran deal as a defeat for the country, and one that damaged its special relationship with the United States.

Spun another way, the poll in fact reveals a great deal of sophistication on the part of the Israeli public regarding foreign policy. While the country knows what it wants, it also knows that to overreach on a security matter and lose could be far worse than not reaching at all, especially for an oft-embattled government in a hostile region. This sort of strategic conservatism, writes Natan Sachs in Foreign Affairs, is fairly common in Israeli foreign policy, and it has yielded both positive and negative results in the past:

"What lies behind the absence of a constructive Israeli national security agenda ... is neither illogic [sic] nor confusion but rather a belief that there are currently no solutions to the challenges the country faces and that seeking quick fixes to intractable problems is dangerously naive. Kicking problems down the road until some indefinite future point at which they can be tackled more successfully therefore does not reflect a lack of Israeli strategy; rather, it defines Israeli strategy. This strategy is at times wrong, but it is not absurd."

Its handling of the Iran nuclear negotiations thus marked a departure of sorts from this traditional approach. As Sachs notes, Netanyahu "is deeply pessimistic about change and believes that Israel, a small country in a volatile region, has a minuscule margin for error." But on the Iran deal, the prime minister picked a fight with his country's most important ally and lost, and the mood in Israel reflects that sense of defeat.

Israel, Sachs goes on to explain, is a country with a mixed record on unilateral action, and one that is well aware of its geography and reliance on its friends. Indeed, most Israelis, as the Mitvim report reveals, are interested in better relations with neighboring Turkey, and they welcome a larger role for Arab nations in the Mideast peace process.

It's a useful lesson, perhaps, for Israel's current and future leaders: Keep your friends close, and keep plenty of them.

Around the Region

With friends like these... Israel might wish to consult with its European friends before making too many overtures to Istanbul, however. With the ruling AKP reportedly poised to regain its majority in the Turkish parliament, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan will have even more leverage over Turkish policy, and, as such, greater influence over Turkey's European allies. Deutsche Welle explains:

"Of late, [European Commission President] Jean-Claude Juncker has been addressing the Turkish president as ‘Dostum' -- my brother. When Erdogan visited the president of the EU Commission in Brussels at the beginning of October, the relationship between the two politicians displayed at their joint press conference was markedly cordial.

[...]

"Apart from Juncker, it is primarily the German chancellor who wants to involve Turkey more fully. At the end of October, Angela Merkel made a trip to Istanbul to specifically deliver this message. For Gareth Jenkins, a Turkey expert at the Institute for Security and Development Policy in Istanbul, Merkel's aim was clear: ‘(She) wants to keep as many refugees as possible outside the EU (and within Turkey) for the foreseeable future,' Jenkins told DW. One thing, however, became quickly evident during the Bosporus talks: support from Ankara will not come cheap for its ‘European friends.' It requested the EU to provide it with 3 billion euros ($3.3 billion)."

America's PYD problem. The Financial Times' Erika Solomon and Geoff Dyer report on recent efforts by the United States' Kurdish allies to exploit the presence of Russian forces in Syria:

"As the U.S.-led coalition tries to step up its offensive on Islamist militants Isis, Syria's dominant Kurdish faction is making its own plans. In recent weeks, it announced a new autonomous district in northern Syria, a decision that has riled neighbouring Turkey, a coalition partner that hosts airbases for US jets.

"More worryingly, observers say, the Democratic Union party (known by its Kurdish acronym PYD) is also discussing its ambitions for greater self-rule in diplomatic meetings with Russia -- America's rival and President Bashar al-Assad's international backer."

The Financial Times goes on to report that Kurdish overtures to Moscow are likely an attempt to leverage Washington for more supplies and support, and the timing is no coincidence: Kurdish forces have become an invaluable ally on both sides of the Iraq-Syria border in the United States' efforts to deprive the Islamic State group of vital logistical routes between the Iraqi city of Mosul and the Syrian city of Raqqa.

"They feel this is their moment, and they're not going to take orders," Aaron Stein, a non-resident fellow at the Atlantic Council, told the Financial Times. "They're going to make history, not just accept it."

Feedback

Questions, comments, or complaints? Feel free to send us an email, or reach out on Twitter @kevinbsullivan.