realclearworld Newsletters: Mideast Memo
News that Kurdish and Yazidi forces have launched an operation to reclaim the northwest Iraq city of Sinjar from the Islamic State group shouldn't come as a complete surprise to Memo readers. Kurdish peshmerga forces -- along with the United States -- have been laying the foundation for the assault for weeks now.
Moreover, as much as this offensive represents a symbolic effort to take back the Yazidi stronghold of Sinjar -- which has been under ISIS control for more than a year -- the real prize in this fight is in fact the highway that runs through the city. The Washington Post's Erin Cunningham has more:
"Highway 47 runs from the militant-ruled city of Mosul in Iraq to northeastern Syria, where the Islamic State has declared the capital of its self-proclaimed caliphate -- the city of Raqqa, about 300 miles away. The Sunni extremists use the road to transport fighters, weapons, cash and oil between their two largest cities. The U.S. military says the Islamic State sells the oil on the black market to fund operations."
We in the media often say that ISIS controls large "swaths" of territory in northern Iraq and Syria. However, the militant organization is in many ways a highway power, relying on long transnational routes to move fighters, weapons, and resources from one part of its self-styled caliphate to the other.
The United States and its local allies hope that by targeting these crucial arteries, they will be able to spread ISIS thin and cut it off from its two largest urban hubs, Raqqa and Mosul. Control of Highway 47, Cunningham adds, would also push Islamic State forces into the desert, forcing the jihadist group to rely on a network of circuitous passages that are more difficult to navigate and more susceptible to flooding, not to mention airstrikes. The highway holds symbolism as well:
"Highway 47 has linked Raqqa and Mosul militarily, commercially and politically for 18 months, since the Islamic State staged its lightning offensive across northern Iraq in June 2014, capturing Mosul in the blitz. And because the caliphate's land in this area is contiguous, it bolsters the legitimacy of the Islamic State in the eyes of its followers, analysts say."
Taking and keeping these routes are two different things, however. "The only way to cut off this area is to establish military outposts within line of sight of each other, covered by a generous allocation of airpower," the Washington Institute's Michael Knights told the New York Times.
Who Are the Yazidis? -- Washington Post
The Many Ways to Map the Islamic 'State' -- The Atlantic
Yazidi Infighting Stalls Battle Against ISIS -- Al-Monitor
Around the Region
But who will control Sinjar? As Kurdish forces make their way into the city center of Sinjar, reports of infighting and long-simmering disputes between the Yazidis and the peshmerga are increasingly emerging. The New York Times:
"Beyond the tactical division of the forces, there were political influences at work. After months of tension among rival Kurdish factions, which some analysts said played a part in delaying the start of the offensive, the main body of pesh merga forces out of Iraqi Kurdistan was taking the lead on Thursday. It included a unit of Yazidi fighters, as well as some volunteers, including some fighters from Syria.
"But fighters from the Syrian affiliate of the Kurdistan Workers' Party, or the PKK, listed as a terrorist group by the United States and some of its allies, were also fighting ISIS on a different stretch of road. Even though most of the Yazidi fighters were accompanying the government forces, they tend to favor the PKK over the Kurdish government, crediting the group for helping many escape ISIS last year as the jihadists swept over Mount Sinjar."
Mahmut Bozarslan provides further context:
"What was behind the PKK's deep interest in Sinjar? Yazidis, because of their Kurdish roots and religious beliefs, have been the most oppressed people of the region. They decided to get organized in the first years of the new century and were embraced by the PKK, which opened the way to PKK influence in the Sinjar area. But the PKK left, fearing the US attacks in the area. Meanwhile, many Yazidi youth had joined the PKK. The IS offensive against Sinjar provided the PKK with another opportunity to return.
[...]
"Recently, the KRG and the PKK tried again to find a solution but failed. According to reports, the PKK laid down two conditions to be met for it to leave the area: to take part in the operation to liberate Sinjar, and official recognition of the Shengal Resistance Units. Heval Agid, the PKK official in charge of Sinjar, said the PKK will fight any effort to remove it from the area. He added the PKK had officially declared that it would leave the town after it was liberated."
Genocide. Michael Isikoff of Yahoo! Politics explains how Thursday's decision by the United States Holocaust Museum to designate the Islamic State group's war on the Yazidis as genocide will have echoes throughout the halls of Congress:
"The move to invoke the powerfully evocative ‘genocide' label comes amid continuing internal discussions among senior officials at the White House, the State Department and other agencies about the legal implications of such a statement. A loosely worded 1948 treaty calls on signatory nations, including the United States, to take unspecified actions to "prevent and to punish" the "odious scourge" of genocide.
"But officials cautioned that there were still issues to iron out before committing the U.S. to a legal designation that some may argue requires an adjustment to U.S. military strategy. That strategy is currently designed, in President Obama's formulation, to ‘ultimately destroy' the Islamic State (also known as ISIS and ISIL) -- a goal that one administration supporter, Rep. Adam Schiff, the ranking Democrat on the House Intelligence Committee, acknowledged this week could take between 15 and 20 years absent intervention by ground troops from neighboring countries."
Oman looks east. And finally, Gulf analyst Giorgio Cafiero highlights the longstanding, and still developing, relationship between Beijing and Muscat:
"Ties between the two countries date back to pre-Islamic history. Oman sent trade missions to China as early as the fourth century. By the eighth century, the Omanis reportedly introduced eastern China to Islam, according to former US Ambassador to Oman Gary Grappo.
"In 1983, Oman became the first Arab country to export its oil to China. Beijing recognized the sultanate as a potentially important player in China's quest to secure Middle Eastern energy supplies. Over the years, China's consumption of Oman's oil has become crucial for both nations' economies. China is Oman's top export partner, last year accounting for 43% of the nation's exports (the United Arab Emirates and South Korea ranked second and third at 10% and 8%, respectively), and Oman is China's fourth-largest trading partner in the Middle East and North Africa region."
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