realclearworld Newsletters: Mideast Memo
Earlier this week we addressed the pitfalls of caliphate nostalgia in the Middle East, and how that bygone institution has been misunderstood, and falsely acclaimed, in light of recent upheaval across much of the region.
Still, there is something alluring about a Middle East that is bound by more than lines on a map, in addition to a system that balances out all of the region's competing interests and ideologies -- call it the "Ottoman mosaic."
As the 5th anniversary of the Arab Spring uprisings rapidly approaches, Hy Matz of the Wilson Center explores this idea of greater interconnectivity in the region, and how the rapid spread of jihadist extremism across porous borders helps explain the Mideast's current mood:
"Through its actions in Iraq and Syria, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) has demonstrated that state borders cannot contain organizations, movements, and ideas that operate on a pan-regional arena. ISIL leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi's declaration of the return of the Caliphate, with himself as Caliph, for ‘all Muslims everywhere' highlights his regional orientation. Baghdadi's vision of one united Muslim World taps into an undercurrent of pan-regional communal affiliations and aspirations, the same undercurrent that, in a different fashion, fueled the rise of former Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser and the Pan-Arab Nationalist movement in the 1950s."
He goes on to cite a tangentially related phenomenon that is also binding the region together: the Syrian refugee crisis. Matz:
"By the end of 2014, MENA countries were hosting roughly 5.5 million refugees, nearly double the number they were hosting in 2010, according to UN figures. ... In these states, the refugee crisis has amplified sectarianism, imposed greater resource constraints, and generated new pressures on state governments, further illustrating the degree to which external problems can quickly become internal challenges for states across the MENA region."
The absence of state authority in countries like Iraq, Syria, and Yemen has led to a rapid spike in sectarian identity politics across the region, and competing powers such as Iran and Saudi Arabia have been more than happy to capitalize on this in their respective quests for influence.
The Ottoman system, in spite of all of its flaws, for centuries maintained a kind of equilibrium in the region that seems unthinkable today, and the post-World War I order -- often referred to as the "authoritarian bargain" by Mideast scholars -- barely lasted a century. Is it time, now, for a better system to replace it? If so, what might that system look like?
Al-Monitor columnist Madawi Al-Rasheed, a visiting professor at the London School of Economics, suggests that a web of civil society proponents -- human rights activists, democratic reformers -- could possibly bridge the gap between the old and new systems. "The solution does not lie in strengthening the old regimes or resuscitating them to suffocate the population even more, but in strengthening alternative forces that can act as a countercurrent to the existing terrorism menace," she writes.
The trouble with this approach is that the authoritarian governments in the Middle East fear these activists nearly as much as they do the militant jihadists of ISIS, and across the region prison cells are brimful of journalists, lawyers, and democrats whose only crime was the pursuit of a freer and more transparent society.
Many of those aforementioned authoritarian governments, moreover, serve as allies and strategic beachheads in the West's war against the Islamic State group, and are thus unlikely to see any serious opprobrium for their human rights records in the foreseeable future. For now, the authoritarian bargain muddles along.
Preserving the Ottoman Mosaic -- Project Syndicate
Sunni-Shiite Conflict Reflects Modern Power Struggle -- Wall St. Journal
Does the Mideast Need a Caliphate? -- RealClearWorld
Jordan's Jails Ground Zero in ISIS Fight -- BuzzFeed
Around the Region
Is ISIS stagnating? McClatchy's Mitchell Prothero investigates, following last month's deadly attacks in Paris:
"Aymenn al Tamimi, a jihadi expert for the Middle East Forum in Philadelphia, says an Islamic State document dated Oct. 2 that he has uncovered offered temporary amnesty to deserters from the group. That's a possible sign that the group's having trouble retaining troops amid flagging morale, he said, and may be one reason the group is expanding the battlefield to Europe at a time when it seems to have abandoned large-scale military operations in Iraq and Syria.
"‘On the home front, they're facing challenges in recruiting and mobilizing,' he said. ‘Impossible to fight on so many fronts at once.'"
Scholars Eli Berman and Jacob Shapiro argue that if history is any guide, ISIS's own efforts at state building may ultimately lead to its demise:
"Even absent attrition, ISIL would be doomed as a state. Modern history shows us that unpredictable autocratic regimes always suffer terrible economies and low growth. Every other state in the last century that has had extortionary governance (high and unpredictable tax rates administered by an autocratic leadership that redistributes to regime insiders) has seen its economy crumble over time.
"ISIL's governing institutions are terrible from the perspective of economic activity: they offer poor property rights, unpredictable taxation, no investment in human capital, no credit markets or affordable insurance. Unless ISIL's leaders have figured out a radical new way of managing production that no other country has devised, then their economy is going to produce little."
UAE readies for the long war. Yesterday we addressed the United Arab Emirates' increasingly assertive foreign policy. Now, as the war in Yemen continues to drag on, Emiratis both at home and on the front appear to be preparing for a lengthy conflict. Reuters' Sam Wilkin reports from Aden:
"In the absence of a quick military victory, the UAE has poured money into reconstruction and humanitarian aid in Aden, hoping to build a sustainable economy and set an example of good governance that will turn public opinion against the Houthis.
"A team from the UAE's Red Crescent Society said it had spent almost $100 million on power stations alone, and distributed food to 163,000 families.
[...]
"UAE troops flying home said they would be back in Yemen after a short break. With its air-conditioned tents and satellite television, the base in Aden has become a second home for many of them.
"On the UAE home front, cars carry stickers supporting the troops and cinemas show elegies to the fallen soldiers, proclaiming that ‘Your sacrifice protects the nation'. Newspapers are filled with dispatches from the front.
"On Monday, there were public commemorations for ‘Martyr's Day', a new public holiday introduced after 45 Emirati soldiers were killed in a single incident."
Who's buying ISIS's oil? Probably not the Turkish government, writes Chatham House's David Butter:
"There are many steps before oil produced under IS control reaches an end-user.
"It is highly likely that Turkish business people, customs officials and intelligence agents are among the people implicated, but the scale of the entire trade is tiny compared with Turkey's own energy economy (in which Russia plays a dominant role), and most of the participants are within Syria."
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