Think the Middle East is complicated? Need a scorecard to identify the players on the field? Confused about who's doing what to whom and why? Join the club.
But if you want a handy road map to help guide you through 2016, keep your eye focused on the following four realities. Pay attention to the day-to-day headlines, but don't lose sight of the trends. These four in particular will continue to define the landscape of this broken, angry, and dysfunctional region.
The Saudi-Iranian rivalry: No relationship between any two Middle East countries can purport to represent the region as whole. But the intensifying rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran may come close. Embodied in this competition are broader political, religious and sectarian tensions between Sunnis and Shia, and a struggle for regional influence and power between a rising Iran and a defensive and uncharacteristically risk-ready Saudi Arabia. These two also represent increasingly formalized alliances. Indeed, the struggle for Syria reflects a clash between a Sunni axis that includes Saudi Arabia; the United Arab Emirates; Kuwait and Egypt on some issues; and a variety of Sunnis militias. This grouping faces up against a Shiite bloc, led by Iran, including Hezbollah; what's left of the Assad regime; and pro-Iraq Shia militias.
Two important outside powers have aligned with each bloc - Turkey with its fellow Sunnis, and Russia with the Iran-led Shiite axis. This Saudi-Iranian cold war will likely remain a proxy struggle, but it could turn hot. Remember that regardless of its intensity at any given moment, this rivalry is not going away. Hardliners on both sides will continue to stir up trouble, and clashing regional interests will do the rest.
The meltdown of the Arab State: The Middle East isn't disintegrating, but the concept of the Arab state is under severe duress. Three kinds of situations present themselves: failed or failing states (Yemen, Libya, and Syria); dysfunctional polities that will continue to wrestle with huge, chronic political and economic challenges (Iraq, Egypt); and the functional states, largely in the Gulf, that have survived the Arab Spring intact. Most intriguing is the case of Saudi Arabia, where falling oil prices, rising deficits, cutbacks in social welfare benefits, and concern about internal opposition contrast with a preternatural stability and capacity to survive - and recently even to project power. Yet it is stunning to observe that the most functional and capable states in the region are the three non-Arab states: Turkey, Iran, and Israel. With all their problems, these states still manage to wield substantial economic and military power and influence. While Arab states such as Jordan, Tunisia, and Morocco continue to hold their own, the trend for the major states in the Arab world is likely to be continued dysfunction, lack of effective reform, and in some cases, near-fragmentation.
Transnational actors: The vacuum created by the absence of state authority has allowed a number of transnational actors to exert power. This isn't just a case of a sensational headline or two about the rise of the Islamic State. It's a regional phenomenon that is here to stay.
Just look around the region. In Lebanon, Hezbollah has emerged as the most important actor, using and defying state authority. Hamas has staked out a separate fiefdom in Gaza and challenges the Palestinian Authority and Israel. In Libya, ISIS has carved out its own territory, as have several al-Qaeda affiliates. In Yemen, the Houthis and al-Qaeda have made a mockery of state authority. And despite the success of the Iraqi military in Ramadi, the Kurds and pro-Iranian Shiite militias dominate in certain areas of the country. Indeed, empty spaces, bad or no governance, sectarian tensions between Sunnis and Shia, and just plain mistrust of centralized authority will ensure that local actors consolidate their control while transnational groups spread their influence.
The role of the United States: Even if we weren't in the eighth year of the Obama Administration, with the President running out of time and influence to address the challenges of the region, the situation for the United States in the Middle East would be pretty grim. There isn't a single problem -- from Iran's putative quest for a nuclear weapon, to stabilizing Syria or Iraq, to the unresolved Israeli-Palestinian problem, to defeating ISIS - that has an American or even a regional solution. There's no real leadership in the Middle East, nor does Washington have reliable partners. The recent Iranian-Saudi rivalry has left the United States somewhere in the middle - mistrusted and disliked from Tehran to Riyadh - without the clout to do much about the rising Sunni-Shiite sectarian and political struggle.
Ousting ISIS from Ramadi was indeed a milestone, but hardly a turning point in a near-futile effort to rebuild a unified Iraqi polity. Though weakened in Iraq and Syria, ISIS has jumped its borders, and the group now spreads its influence by inspiring rather than directing its jihadist terror. Important international players such as Russia and Turkey have overlapping goals with the United States in certain respects, but a fundamentally different agenda in others, such as their stance toward the Kurds or visions for a political transition in Syria. The Iranian nuclear deal is being implemented even while Tehran continues to play an unhelpful role in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen.
As we move into 2016, the Middle East is going to continue to be a broken, angry, and dysfunctional place. Indeed, the four trends discussed above all but guarantee it. There is scant room for dramatic improvement, and a great deal more space for further deterioration. As for the United States, amid all the region's uncertainties, one thing is clear. Whether it's an R or a D, a he or a she, in the White House in 2017, the next president will confront a Middle East filled with missions impossible, long shots, and lost causes. Count on it.
(AP photo)
