The U.S. foreign policy establishment disapproves of President Donald Trump’s cease-fire agreement for southwestern Syria. The complaints suggest a wish for deeper involvement in that war, but offer no strategy by which to achieve anything worthwhile for America.
Meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Hamburg, Trump agreed to foster a cease-fire in three Syrian provinces. The State Department explained: “The basis of the whole understanding is obviously that each side, each party to it uses its influence with those parties on the ground with which we have relationships. So we and Jordan, in particular, have good relationships with the Southern Front, with the principal armed factions in southwest Syria.” State said as well: “there’s an expectation the Russians will use their influence to ensure that [the Iranians] respect the ceasefire.”
Were this cease-fire to hold indefinitely and to spread, what had been Syria would be divided between the Syrian government - supported by Iran and Russia - and those factions of Sunni rebels supported by the United States, Egypt, and Jordan, plus the Kurds, along more or less the current areas they control. This could happen because the forces fighting there have reached a balance of exhaustion. It would require further moderation by their supporters in Turkey, Qatar, Sadi Arabia, and Iran, but mainly by Russia and America.
The U.S foreign policy establishment seems unable to look at war from the perspective of howAmerica’ s advantage may be secured.
The Wall Street Journal opined that “Putin is not America’s friend, ” and continued: “The Russians want to help their client Bashar Assad win back all of Syria while retaining their military bases.” Their agreement with America is “only because they think that can serve Assad’s purposes.” Thus did its editorial board illustrate its ignorance. Putin is in Syria to serve Russia’s interests, not Assad’s. Restoring all of Syria to Assad is impossible and has never been Russia’s objective. Obviously, the July 6 cease-fire and the spread thereof would seal Syria’s division. Nevertheless, the Journal faults Trump for not knowing “what it wants in Syria” and for wanting “a better relation with Russia.” It suggests a more “hardheaded” attitude, but not what should be America’s objective.
Nor did former U.N. ambassador John Bolton. Writing in The Guardian, he faulted the agreement because it “legitimises Russia’s participation in the Syrian struggle, thereby keeping Assad's dictatorship alive.” Even “discussions with Russia about a post-Assad Syria” he said, manifest the “delusion that Moscow shared our interest in removing Assad. Russia would acquiesce only if another Russian stooge were to fill his shoes.” This too processes reality through the U.S foreign policy establishment’s navel.
In the real world, legitimacy de facto is created by creating facts on the ground. Russia has done that. Nothing that anyone in America has suggested stands a chance of undoing it. When a post-Assad Syria comes into being, it will be because Russia agrees to it. With whom else might Americans discuss the future parts, borders, and rulers of what had been Syria?
Putin has well-nigh secured his objective of an air and naval pied a terre on the Mediterranean at Latakia and Tartus, surrounded by Alawites dependent on Moscow. He did it by organizing them, Shiite militias, and Iran to fight the Sunnis, which they wanted to do for their own reasons. Defeating and exhausting Sunni radicals in the Levant relieves their pressure on Russia’s Muslim population. In the process, Syria and Iraq have devolved into their ethnic/religious components. Putin will offer the Sunnis a future Sunni-stan’s borders and relationship with his Mediterranean enclave. The Saudis, the Egyptians, and the local Sunnis are not in a position to refuse. The Israelis have already made their deal with Russia. Were Iran to try scuttling, it would find itself in a strategic pincer.
What is America’s interest regarding those arrangements? How does anyone suggest securing that interest? Our main interest - that nothing must come out of that Sunni-stan that is injurious to us - may be achieved by a peace jointly enforced by the great powers. This is within our limited power to achieve. President Trump is pursuing that interest by taking part in defining the Levant’s future borders. This is a judicious use of America’s remaining power in the region.
Trump’s withdrawal of support for certain Syrian Sunni rebels is a step in the right direction. Now it is incumbent upon him to make sure that Russia reins in its own clients. Also within reach is curbing the destructive alliance between Qatar, with whose rulers our establishment has cozy relations, and Russia’s client Iran. Unfortunately, even as Saudis and Emiratis try to shut down that alliance, including its support for the Muslim Brotherhood as well as Qatar’s al Jazeera, our establishment is helping Qatar stay close to Iran. This is not what Trump says he wants, but this is what is happening.
By rejecting Trump’s initiative in favor of a “hardheaded” attitude, meaning louder talk coupled with indecisive warfare, our establishment proves its incompetence.
