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Is America First working in Asia? 

Just days before U.S. President Donald Trump arrives in the region for a five-nation, 12-day visit, China decided to play nice with South Korea. In doing so, Beijing reversed a prolonged state-sponsored boycott of all things South Korean. If China's move is sincere it would be a major advance for U.S. interests, bolstering an ally on the front lines of one of the world’s most dangerous hot spots. But China appeared to receive virtually nothing in return, and that raises questions about timing and China’s ultimate intentions.

The 15-month Sino-Korean dispute began last July with the introduction onto South Korean soil of a U.S.-built anti-missile system, the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system, known as THAAD. After years of diplomatic back-and forth in the shadow of a nuclear-armed North Korea, the South Korean and U.S. governments agreed to deploy a THAAD battery outside the small city of Seongju, 130 miles South of Seoul.

Due to the powerful detection and tracking capabilities of THAAD’s radar, China vehemently opposed the basing of the system on the peninsula. China went so far as to have its ambassador to South Korea, Qiu Guohong, publicly warn in February 2016 that the warm bilateral relationship “could be destroyed in an instant” if the THAAD system were deployed.

Immediately after THAAD’s deployment, China implemented a series of unofficial unilateral sanctions targeting South Korean-based companies operating in China; it encouraged a boycott of South Korean products; prevented South Korean entertainers from entering China; and strictly limited Chinese tourism to South Korea. As South Korea’s largest international trading partner, China was able to inflict an estimated $8 billion loss onto the South Korean economy.  

At the end of October, China abruptly shifted course. In a joint statement, South Korean and Chinese officials called for a normalization of relations, including an end to the Chinese boycott. Publicly, this was done in return for three South Korean assurances: First, there would be no additional deployments of THAAD batteries. Second, South Korea pledged not join a broader, U.S.-led, integrated regional missile defense system. Finally, South Korea will not enter into a trilateral military alliance with the United States and Japan. But South Korea had not seemed inclined to do any of these things, even without the Chinese concession.

With South Korea ceding little, and China sporting a reputation for playing the long game, the question remains why China would accept such an agreement. Two reasons suggest themselves, one innocuous and one troubling.

The less disturbing explanation would be that China simply reversed a failed policy. If China intended to undermine the U.S.-Korean alliance, its method was ham-fisted. The conclusion of the recent Communist Party of China congress may have offered an opportune moment to change course. At the time when THAAD was deployed in South Korea, the public favorability of China there was approaching that of the United States, long the most favored nation among South Koreans. But by March 2017 -- 7 months into the boycott -- China’s favorability had sunk to below that of the reviled Japanese. 

Still, such a quick admission of defeat would mark a dramatic shift in tendency for a China that has traditionally been glacier-like in its response to international public pressure. It would be particularly odd at a time when the U.S.-Korean alliance seemed weakened by U.S. attacks on the bilateral trade deal between the countries.

The more troubling explanation would be that there is more to the story. In this version, U.S. questioning of the alliance, coupled with Chinese boldness at the conclusion of the Party congress, led to a new Sino-Korean détente, the full scope of which we have not yet seen. While a conciliatory move toward South Korea would be an odd way to signal this, there are questions about whether China is moving beyond its traditional “lay low” strategy.

The delicate balance of power in Asia should be a top concern of President Trump’s as he embarks on his prolonged visit to the region. The outcome has enormous strategic importance to the United States and to the entire Asia-Pacific.