It's an honor to return to the National Defense University. Here, at Fort McNair, Americans have served in uniform since 1791- standing guard in the early days of the Republic, and contemplating the future of warfare here in the 21st century.

For over two centuries, the United States has been bound together by founding documents that defined who we are as Americans, and served as our compass through every type of change. Matters of war and peace are no different. Americans are deeply ambivalent about war, but having fought for our independence, we know that a price must be paid for freedom. From the Civil War, to our struggle against fascism, and through the long, twilight struggle of the Cold War, battlefields have changed, and technology has evolved. But our commitment to Constitutional principles has weathered every war, and every war has come to an end.

With the collapse of the Berlin Wall, a new dawn of democracy took hold abroad, and a decade of peace and prosperity arrived at home. For a moment, it seemed the 21st century would be a tranquil time. Then, on September 11th, 2001, we were shaken out of complacency. Thousands were taken from us, as clouds of fire, metal and ash descended upon a sun-filled morning. This was a different kind of war. No armies came to our shores, and our military was not the principal target. Instead, a group of terrorists came to kill as many civilians as they could.

And so our nation went to war. We have now been at war for well over a decade. I won't review the full history. What's clear is that we quickly drove al Qaeda out of Afghanistan, but then shifted our focus and began a new war in Iraq. This carried grave consequences for our fight against al Qaeda, our standing in the world, and - to this day - our interests in a vital region.

Meanwhile, we strengthened our defenses - hardening targets, tightening transportation security, and giving law enforcement new tools to prevent terror.Most of these changes were sound. Some caused inconvenience. But some, like expanded surveillance, raised difficult questions about the balance we strike between our interests in security and our values of privacy. And in some cases, I believe we compromised our basic values - by using torture to interrogate our enemies, and detaining individuals in a way that ran counter to the rule of law.

After I took office, we stepped up the war against al Qaeda, but also sought to change its course. We relentlessly targeted al Qaeda's leadership. We ended the war in Iraq, and brought nearly 150,000 troops home. We pursued a new strategy in Afghanistan, and increased our training of Afghan forces. We unequivocally banned torture, affirmed our commitment to civilian courts, worked to align our policies with the rule of law, and expanded our consultations with Congress.

Today, Osama bin Laden is dead, and so are most of his top lieutenants. There have been no large-scale attacks on the United States, and our homeland is more secure. Fewer of our troops are in harm's way, and over the next 19 months they will continue to come home. Our alliances are strong, and so is our standing in the world. In sum, we are safer because of our efforts.

Now make no mistake: our nation is still threatened by terrorists. From Benghazi to Boston, we have been tragically reminded of that truth. We must recognize, however, that the threat has shifted and evolved from the one that came to our shores on 9/11. With a decade of experience to draw from, now is the time to ask ourselves hard questions - about the nature of today's threats, and how we should confront them.

These questions matter to every American. For over the last decade, our nation has spent well over a trillion dollars on war, exploding our deficits and constraining our ability to nation build here at home. Our service-members and their families have sacrificed far more on our behalf. Nearly 7,000 Americans have made the ultimate sacrifice. Many more have left a part of themselves on the battlefield, or brought the shadows of battle back home. From our use of drones to the detention of terrorist suspects, the decisions we are making will define the type of nation - and world - that we leave to our children.

So America is at a crossroads. We must define the nature and scope of this struggle, or else it will define us, mindful of James Madison's warning that "No nation could preserve its freedom in the midst of continual warfare." Neither I, nor any President, can promise the total defeat of terror. We will never erase the evil that lies in the hearts of some human beings, nor stamp out every danger to our open society. What we can do - what we must do - is dismantle networks that pose a direct danger, and make it less likely for new groups to gain a foothold, all while maintaining the freedoms and ideals that we defend. To define that strategy, we must make decisions based not on fear, but hard-earned wisdom. And that begins with understanding the threat we face.

Today, the core of al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan is on a path to defeat. Their remaining operatives spend more time thinking about their own safety than plotting against us. They did not direct the attacks in Benghazi or Boston. They have not carried out a successful attack on our homeland since 9/11. Instead, what we've seen is the emergence of various al Qaeda affiliates. From Yemen to Iraq, from Somalia to North Africa, the threat today is more diffuse, with Al Qaeda's affiliate in the Arabian Peninsula - AQAP -the most active in plotting against our homeland. While none of AQAP's efforts approach the scale of 9/11 they have continued to plot acts of terror, like the attempt to blow up an airplane on Christmas Day in 2009.

Unrest in the Arab World has also allowed extremists to gain a foothold in countries like Libya and Syria. Here, too, there are differences from 9/11. In some cases, we confront state-sponsored networks like Hizbollah that engage in acts of terror to achieve political goals. Others are simply collections of local militias or extremists interested in seizing territory. While we are vigilant for signs that these groups may pose a transnational threat, most are focused on operating in the countries and regions where they are based. That means we will face more localized threats like those we saw in Benghazi, or at the BP oil facility in Algeria, in which local operatives - in loose affiliation with regional networks - launch periodic attacks against Western diplomats, companies, and other soft targets, or resort to kidnapping and other criminal enterprises to fund their operations.

Finally, we face a real threat from radicalized individuals here in the United States. Whether it's a shooter at a Sikh Temple in Wisconsin; a plane flying into a building in Texas; or the extremists who killed 168 people at the Federal Building in Oklahoma City - America has confronted many forms of violent extremism in our time. Deranged or alienated individuals - often U.S. citizens or legal residents - can do enormous damage, particularly when inspired by larger notions of violent jihad. That pull towards extremism appears to have led to the shooting at Fort Hood, and the bombing of the Boston Marathon.

Lethal yet less capable al Qaeda affiliates. Threats to diplomatic facilities and businesses abroad. Homegrown extremists. This is the future of terrorism. We must take these threats seriously, and do all that we can to confront them. But as we shape our response, we have to recognize that the scale of this threat closely resembles the types of attacks we faced before 9/11. In the 1980s, we lost Americans to terrorism at our Embassy in Beirut; at our Marine Barracks in Lebanon; on a cruise ship at sea; at a disco in Berlin; and on Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie. In the 1990s, we lost Americans to terrorism at the World Trade Center; at our military facilities in Saudi Arabia; and at our Embassy in Kenya. These attacks were all deadly, and we learned that left unchecked, these threats can grow. But if dealt with smartly and proportionally, these threats need not rise to the level that we saw on the eve of 9/11.

Moreover, we must recognize that these threats don't arise in a vacuum. Most, though not all, of the terrorism we face is fueled by a common ideology - a belief by some extremists that Islam is in conflict with the United States and the West, and that violence against Western targets, including civilians, is justified in pursuit of a larger cause. Of course, this ideology is based on a lie, for the United States is not at war with Islam; and this ideology is rejected by the vast majority of Muslims, who are the most frequent victims of terrorist acts.

Nevertheless, this ideology persists, and in an age in which ideas and images can travel the globe in an instant, our response to terrorism cannot depend on military or law enforcement alone. We need all elements of national power to win a battle of wills and ideas. So let me discuss the components of such a comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy.

First, we must finish the work of defeating al Qaeda and its associated forces.

In Afghanistan, we will complete our transition to Afghan responsibility for security. Our troops will come home. Our combat mission will come to an end. And we will work with the Afghan government to train security forces, and sustain a counter-terrorism force which ensures that al Qaeda can never again establish a safe-haven to launch attacks against us or our allies.

Beyond Afghanistan, we must define our effort not as a boundless 'global war on terror' - but rather as a series of persistent, targeted efforts to dismantle specific networks of violent extremists that threaten America. In many cases, this will involve partnerships with other countries. Thousands of Pakistani soldiers have lost their lives fighting extremists. In Yemen, we are supporting security forces that have reclaimed territory from AQAP. In Somalia, we helped a coalition of African nations push al Shabaab out of its strongholds. In Mali, we are providing military aid to a French-led intervention to push back al Qaeda in the Maghreb, and help the people of Mali reclaim their future.

Much of our best counter-terrorism cooperation results in the gathering and sharing of intelligence; the arrest and prosecution of terrorists. That's how a Somali terrorist apprehended off the coast of Yemen is now in prison in New York. That's how we worked with European allies to disrupt plots from Denmark to Germany to the United Kingdom. That's how intelligence collected with Saudi Arabia helped us stop a cargo plane from being blown up over the Atlantic.

But despite our strong preference for the detention and prosecution of terrorists, sometimes this approach is foreclosed. Al Qaeda and its affiliates try to gain a foothold in some of the most distant and unforgiving places on Earth. They take refuge in remote tribal regions. They hide in caves and walled compounds. They train in empty deserts and rugged mountains.

In some of these places - such as parts of Somalia and Yemen - the state has only the most tenuous reach into the territory. In other cases, the state lacks the capacity or will to take action. It is also not possible for America to simply deploy a team of Special Forces to capture every terrorist. And even when such an approach may be possible, there are places where it would pose profound risks to our troops and local civilians- where a terrorist compound cannot be breached without triggering a firefight with surrounding tribal communities that pose no threat to us, or when putting U.S. boots on the ground may trigger a major international crisis.

To put it another way, our operation in Pakistan against Osama bin Laden cannot be the norm. The risks in that case were immense; the likelihood of capture, although our preference, was remote given the certainty of resistance; the fact that we did not find ourselves confronted with civilian casualties, or embroiled in an extended firefight, was a testament to the meticulous planning and professionalism of our Special Forces - but also depended on some luck. And even then, the cost to our relationship with Pakistan - and the backlash among the Pakistani public over encroachment on their territory - was so severe that we are just now beginning to rebuild this important partnership.

It is in this context that the United States has taken lethal, targeted action against al Qaeda and its associated forces, including with remotely piloted aircraft commonly referred to as drones. As was true in previous armed conflicts, this new technology raises profound questions - about who is targeted, and why; about civilian casualties, and the risk of creating new enemies; about the legality of such strikes under U.S. and international law; about accountability and morality.

Let me address these questions. To begin with, our actions are effective. Don't take my word for it. In the intelligence gathered at bin Laden's compound, we found that he wrote, "we could lose the reserves to the enemy's air strikes. We cannot fight air strikes with explosives." Other communications from al Qaeda operatives confirm this as well. Dozens of highly skilled al Qaeda commanders, trainers, bomb makers, and operatives have been taken off the battlefield. Plots have been disrupted that would have targeted international aviation, U.S. transit systems, European cities and our troops in Afghanistan. Simply put, these strikes have saved lives.

Moreover, America's actions are legal. We were attacked on 9/11. Within a week, Congress overwhelmingly authorized the use of force. Under domestic law, and international law, the United States is at war with al Qaeda, the Taliban, and their associated forces. We are at war with an organization that right now would kill as many Americans as they could if we did not stop them first. So this is a just war - a war waged proportionally, in last resort, and in self-defense.

And yet as our fight enters a new phase, America's legitimate claim of self-defense cannot be the end of the discussion. To say a military tactic is legal, or even effective, is not to say it is wise or moral in every instance. For the same human progress that gives us the technology to strike half a world away also demands the discipline to constrain that power - or risk abusing it. That's why, over the last four years, my Administration has worked vigorously to establish a framework that governs our use of force against terrorists - insisting upon clear guidelines, oversight and accountability that is now codified in Presidential Policy Guidance that I signed yesterday.

In the Afghan war theater, we must support our troops until the transition is complete at the end of 2014. That means we will continue to take strikes against high value al Qaeda targets, but also against forces that are massing to support attacks on coalition forces. However, by the end of 2014, we will no longer have the same need for force protection, and the progress we have made against core al Qaeda will reduce the need for unmanned strikes.

Beyond the Afghan theater, we only target al Qaeda and its associated forces. Even then, the use of drones is heavily constrained. America does not take strikes when we have the ability to capture individual terrorists - our preference is always to detain, interrogate, and prosecute them. America cannot take strikes wherever we choose - our actions are bound by consultations with partners, and respect for state sovereignty. America does not take strikes to punish individuals - we act against terrorists who pose a continuing and imminent threat to the American people, and when there are no other governments capable of effectively addressing the threat. And before any strike is taken, there must be near-certainty that no civilians will be killed or injured - the highest standard we can set.

This last point is critical, because much of the criticism about drone strikes - at home and abroad - understandably centers on reports of civilian casualties. There is a wide gap between U.S. assessments of such casualties, and non-governmental reports. Nevertheless, it is a hard fact that U.S. strikes have resulted in civilian casualties, a risk that exists in all wars. For the families of those civilians, no words or legal construct can justify their loss. For me, and those in my chain of command, these deaths will haunt us as long as we live, just as we are haunted by the civilian casualties that have occurred through conventional fighting in Afghanistan and Iraq.

But as Commander-in-Chief, I must weigh these heartbreaking tragedies against the alternatives. To do nothing in the face of terrorist networks would invite far more civilian casualties - not just in our cities at home and facilities abroad, but also in the very places -like Sana'a and Kabul and Mogadishu - where terrorists seek a foothold. Let us remember that the terrorists we are after target civilians, and the death toll from their acts of terrorism against Muslims dwarfs any estimate of civilian casualties from drone strikes.

Where foreign governments cannot or will not effectively stop terrorism in their territory, the primary alternative to targeted, lethal action is the use of conventional military options. As I've said, even small Special Operations carry enormous risks. Conventional airpower or missiles are far less precise than drones, and likely to cause more civilian casualties and local outrage. And invasions of these territories lead us to be viewed as occupying armies; unleash a torrent of unintended consequences; are difficult to contain; and ultimately empower those who thrive on violent conflict. So it is false to assert that putting boots on the ground is less likely to result in civilian deaths, or to create enemies in the Muslim world. The result would be more U.S. deaths, more Blackhawks down, more confrontations with local populations, and an inevitable mission creep in support of such raids that could easily escalate into new wars.

So yes, the conflict with al Qaeda, like all armed conflict, invites tragedy. But by narrowly targeting our action against those who want to kill us, and not the people they hide among, we are choosing the course of action least likely to result in the loss of innocent life. Indeed, our efforts must also be measured against the history of putting American troops in distant lands among hostile populations. In Vietnam, hundreds of thousands of civilians died in a war where the boundaries of battle were blurred. In Iraq and Afghanistan, despite the courage and discipline of our troops, thousands of civilians have been killed. So neither conventional military action, nor waiting for attacks to occur, offers moral safe-harbor. Neither does a sole reliance on law enforcement in territories that have no functioning police or security services - and indeed, have no functioning law.

This is not to say that the risks are not real. Any U.S. military action in foreign lands risks creating more enemies, and impacts public opinion overseas. Our laws constrain the power of the President, even during wartime, and I have taken an oath to defend the Constitution of the United States. The very precision of drones strikes, and the necessary secrecy involved in such actions can end up shielding our government from the public scrutiny that a troop deployment invites. It can also lead a President and his team to view drone strikes as a cure-all for terrorism.

For this reason, I've insisted on strong oversight of all lethal action. After I took office, my Administration began briefing all strikes outside of Iraq and Afghanistan to the appropriate committees of Congress. Let me repeat that - not only did Congress authorize the use of force, it is briefed on every strike that America takes. That includes the one instance when we targeted an American citizen: Anwar Awlaki, the chief of external operations for AQAP.

This week, I authorized the declassification of this action, and the deaths of three other Americans in drone strikes, to facilitate transparency and debate on this issue, and to dismiss some of the more outlandish claims. For the record, I do not believe it would be constitutional for the government to target and kill any U.S. citizen - with a drone, or a shotgun - without due process. Nor should any President deploy armed drones over U.S. soil.

But when a U.S. citizen goes abroad to wage war against America - and is actively plotting to kill U.S. citizens; and when neither the United States, nor our partners are in a position to capture him before he carries out a plot - his citizenship should no more serve as a shield than a sniper shooting down on an innocent crowd should be protected from a swat team

That's who Anwar Awlaki was - he was continuously trying to kill people. He helped oversee the 2010 plot to detonate explosive devices on two U.S. bound cargo planes. He was involved in planning to blow up an airliner in 2009. When Farouk Abdulmutallab - the Christmas Day bomber - went to Yemen in 2009, Awlaki hosted him, approved his suicide operation, and helped him tape a martyrdom video to be shown after the attack. His last instructions were to blow up the airplane when it was over American soil.I would have detained and prosecuted Awlaki if we captured him before he carried out a plot. But we couldn't. And as President, I would have been derelict in my duty had I not authorized the strike that took out Awlaki.

Of course, the targeting of any Americans raises constitutional issues that are not present in other strikes - which is why my Administration submitted information about Awlaki to the Department of Justice months before Awlaki was killed, and briefed the Congress before this strike as well. But the high threshold that we have set for taking lethal action applies to all potential terrorist targets, regardless of whether or not they are American citizens. This threshold respects the inherent dignity of every human life. Alongside the decision to put our men and women in uniform in harm's way, the decision to use force against individuals or groups - even against a sworn enemy of the United States - is the hardest thing I do as President. But these decisions must be made, given my responsibility to protect the American people.

Going forward, I have asked my Administration to review proposals to extend oversight of lethal actions outside of warzones that go beyond our reporting to Congress. Each option has virtues in theory, but poses difficulties in practice. For example, the establishment of a special court to evaluate and authorize lethal action has the benefit of bringing a third branch of government into the process, but raises serious constitutional issues about presidential and judicial authority. Another idea that's been suggested - the establishment of an independent oversight board in the executive branch - avoids those problems, but may introduce a layer of bureaucracy into national-security decision-making, without inspiring additional public confidence in the process. Despite these challenges, I look forward to actively engaging Congress to explore these - and other - options for increased oversight.

I believe, however, that the use of force must be seen as part of a larger discussion about a comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy. Because for all the focus on the use of force, force alone cannot make us safe. We cannot use force everywhere that a radical ideology takes root; and in the absence of a strategy that reduces the well-spring of extremism, a perpetual war - through drones or Special Forces or troop deployments - will prove self-defeating, and alter our country in troubling ways.

So the next element of our strategy involves addressing the underlying grievances and conflicts that feed extremism, from North Africa to South Asia. As we've learned this past decade, this is a vast and complex undertaking. We must be humble in our expectation that we can quickly resolve deep rooted problems like poverty and sectarian hatred. Moreover, no two countries are alike, and some will undergo chaotic change before things get better. But our security and values demand that we make the effort.

This means patiently supporting transitions to democracy in places like Egypt, Tunisia and Libya - because the peaceful realization of individual aspirations will serve as a rebuke to violent extremists. We must strengthen the opposition in Syria, while isolating extremist elements - because the end of a tyrant must not give way to the tyranny of terrorism. We are working to promote peace between Israelis and Palestinians - because it is right, and because such a peace could help reshape attitudes in the region. And we must help countries modernize economies, upgrade education, and encourage entrepreneurship - because American leadership has always been elevated by our ability to connect with peoples' hopes, and not simply their fears.

Success on these fronts requires sustained engagement, but it will also require resources. I know that foreign aid is one of the least popular expenditures - even though it amounts to less than one percent of the federal budget. But foreign assistance cannot be viewed as charity. It is fundamental to our national security, and any sensible long-term strategy to battle extremism. Moreover, foreign assistance is a tiny fraction of what we spend fighting wars that our assistance might ultimately prevent. For what we spent in a month in Iraq at the height of the war, we could be training security forces in Libya, maintaining peace agreements between Israel and its neighbors, feeding the hungry in Yemen, building schools in Pakistan, and creating reservoirs of goodwill that marginalize extremists.

America cannot carry out this work if we do not have diplomats serving in dangerous places. Over the past decade, we have strengthened security at our Embassies, and I am implementing every recommendation of the Accountability Review Board which found unacceptable failures in Benghazi. I have called on Congress to fully fund these efforts to bolster security, harden facilities, improve intelligence, and facilitate a quicker response time from our military if a crisis emerges.

But even after we take these steps, some irreducible risks to our diplomats will remain. This is the price of being the world's most powerful nation, particularly as a wave of change washes over the Arab World. And in balancing the trade-offs between security and active diplomacy, I firmly believe that any retreat from challenging regions will only increase the dangers we face in the long run.

Targeted action against terrorists. Effective partnerships. Diplomatic engagement and assistance. Through such a comprehensive strategy we can significantly reduce the chances of large scale attacks on the homeland and mitigate threats to Americans overseas. As we guard against dangers from abroad, however, we cannot neglect the daunting challenge of terrorism from within our borders.

As I said earlier, this threat is not new. But technology and the Internet increase its frequency and lethality. Today, a person can consume hateful propaganda, commit themselves to a violent agenda, and learn how to kill without leaving their home. To address this threat, two years ago my Administration did a comprehensive review, and engaged with law enforcement. The best way to prevent violent extremism is to work with the Muslim American community - which has consistently rejected terrorism - to identify signs of radicalization, and partner with law enforcement when an individual is drifting towards violence. And these partnerships can only work when we recognize that Muslims are a fundamental part of the American family. Indeed, the success of American Muslims, and our determination to guard against any encroachments on their civil liberties, is the ultimate rebuke to those who say we are at war with Islam.

Indeed, thwarting homegrown plots presents particular challenges in part because of our proud commitment to civil liberties for all who call America home. That's why, in the years to come, we will have to keep working hard to strike the appropriate balance between our need for security and preserving those freedoms that make us who we are. That means reviewing the authorities of law enforcement, so we can intercept new types of communication, and build in privacy protections to prevent abuse. That means that - even after Boston - we do not deport someone or throw someone in prison in the absence of evidence. That means putting careful constraints on the tools the government uses to protect sensitive information, such as the State Secrets doctrine. And that means finally having a strong Privacy and Civil Liberties Board to review those issues where our counter-terrorism efforts and our values may come into tension.

The Justice Department's investigation of national security leaks offers a recent example of the challenges involved in striking the right balance between our security and our open society. As Commander-in Chief, I believe we must keep information secret that protects our operations and our people in the field. To do so, we must enforce consequences for those who break the law and breach their commitment to protect classified information. But a free press is also essential for our democracy. I am troubled by the possibility that leak investigations may chill the investigative journalism that holds government accountable.

Journalists should not be at legal risk for doing their jobs. Our focus must be on those who break the law. That is why I have called on Congress to pass a media shield law to guard against government over-reach. I have raised these issues with the Attorney General, who shares my concern. So he has agreed to review existing Department of Justice guidelines governing investigations that involve reporters, and will convene a group of media organizations to hear their concerns as part of that review. And I have directed the Attorney General to report back to me by July 12th.

All these issues remind us that the choices we make about war can impact - in sometimes unintended ways - the openness and freedom on which our way of life depends. And that is why I intend to engage Congress about the existing Authorization to Use Military Force, or AUMF, to determine how we can continue to fight terrorists without keeping America on a perpetual war-time footing.

The AUMF is now nearly twelve years old. The Afghan War is coming to an end. Core al Qaeda is a shell of its former self. Groups like AQAP must be dealt with, but in the years to come, not every collection of thugs that labels themselves al Qaeda will pose a credible threat to the United States. Unless we discipline our thinking and our actions, we may be drawn into more wars we don't need to fight, or continue to grant Presidents unbound powers more suited for traditional armed conflicts between nation states. So I look forward to engaging Congress and the American people in efforts to refine, and ultimately repeal, the AUMF's mandate. And I will not sign laws designed to expand this mandate further. Our systematic effort to dismantle terrorist organizations must continue. But this war, like all wars, must end. That's what history advises. That's what our democracy demands.

And that brings me to my final topic: the detention of terrorist suspects.

To repeat, as a matter of policy, the preference of the United States is to capture terrorist suspects. When we do detain a suspect, we interrogate them. And if the suspect can be prosecuted, we decide whether to try him in a civilian court or a Military Commission. During the past decade, the vast majority of those detained by our military were captured on the battlefield. In Iraq, we turned over thousands of prisoners as we ended the war. In Afghanistan, we have transitioned detention facilities to the Afghans, as part of the process of restoring Afghan sovereignty. So we bring law of war detention to an end, and we are committed to prosecuting terrorists whenever we can.

The glaring exception to this time-tested approach is the detention center at Guantanamo Bay. The original premise for opening GTMO - that detainees would not be able to challenge their detention - was found unconstitutional five years ago. In the meantime, GTMO has become a symbol around the world for an America that flouts the rule of law. Our allies won't cooperate with us if they think a terrorist will end up at GTMO. During a time of budget cuts, we spend $150 million each year to imprison 166 people -almost $1 million per prisoner. And the Department of Defense estimates that we must spend another $200 million to keep GTMO open at a time when we are cutting investments in education and research here at home.

As President, I have tried to close GTMO. I transferred 67 detainees to other countries before Congress imposed restrictions to effectively prevent us from either transferring detainees to other countries, or imprisoning them in the United States. These restrictions make no sense. After all, under President Bush, some 530 detainees were transferred from GTMO with Congress's support. When I ran for President the first time, John McCain supported closing GTMO. No person has ever escaped from one of our super-max or military prisons in the United States. Our courts have convicted hundreds of people for terrorism-related offenses, including some who are more dangerous than most GTMO detainees. Given my Administration's relentless pursuit of al Qaeda's leadership, there is no justification beyond politics for Congress to prevent us from closing a facility that should never have been opened.

Today, I once again call on Congress to lift the restrictions on detainee transfers from GTMO. I have asked the Department of Defense to designate a site in the United States where we can hold military commissions. I am appointing a new, senior envoy at the State Department and Defense Department whose sole responsibility will be to achieve the transfer of detainees to third countries. I am lifting the moratorium on detainee transfers to Yemen, so we can review them on a case by case basis. To the greatest extent possible, we will transfer detainees who have been cleared to go to other countries. Where appropriate, we will bring terrorists to justice in our courts and military justice system. And we will insist that judicial review be available for every detainee.

Even after we take these steps, one issue will remain: how to deal with those GTMO detainees who we know have participated in dangerous plots or attacks, but who cannot be prosecuted - for example because the evidence against them has been compromised or is inadmissible in a court of law. But once we commit to a process of closing GTMO, I am confident that this legacy problem can be resolved, consistent with our commitment to the rule of law.

I know the politics are hard. But history will cast a harsh judgment on this aspect of our fight against terrorism, and those of us who fail to end it. Imagine a future - ten years from now, or twenty years from now - when the United States of America is still holding people who have been charged with no crime on a piece of land that is not a part of our country. Look at the current situation, where we are force-feeding detainees who are holding a hunger strike. Is that who we are? Is that something that our Founders foresaw? Is that the America we want to leave to our children?

Our sense of justice is stronger than that. We have prosecuted scores of terrorists in our courts. That includes Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, who tried to blow up an airplane over Detroit; and Faisal Shahzad, who put a car bomb in Times Square. It is in a court of law that we will try Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, who is accused of bombing the Boston Marathon. Richard Reid, the shoe bomber, is as we speak serving a life sentence in a maximum security prison here, in the United States. In sentencing Reid, Judge William Young told him, "the way we treat you...is the measure of our own liberties." He went on to point to the American flag that flew in the courtroom - "That flag," he said, "will fly there long after this is all forgotten. That flag still stands for freedom."

America, we have faced down dangers far greater than al Qaeda. By staying true to the values of our founding, and by using our constitutional compass, we have overcome slavery and Civil War; fascism and communism. In just these last few years as President, I have watched the American people bounce back from painful recession, mass shootings, and natural disasters like the recent tornados that devastated Oklahoma. These events were heartbreaking; they shook our communities to the core. But because of the resilience of the American people, these events could not come close to breaking us.

I think of Lauren Manning, the 9/11 survivor who had severe burns over 80 percent of her body, who said, "That's my reality. I put a Band-Aid on it, literally, and I move on."

I think of the New Yorkers who filled Times Square the day after an attempted car bomb as if nothing had happened.

I think of the proud Pakistani parents who, after their daughter was invited to the White House, wrote to us, "we have raised an American Muslim daughter to dream big and never give up because it does pay off."

I think of the wounded warriors rebuilding their lives, and helping other vets to find jobs.

I think of the runner planning to do the 2014 Boston Marathon, who said, "Next year, you are going to have more people than ever. Determination is not something to be messed with."

That's who the American people are. Determined, and not to be messed with.

Now, we need a strategy - and a politics -that reflects this resilient spirit. Our victory against terrorism won't be measured in a surrender ceremony on a battleship, or a statue being pulled to the ground. Victory will be measured in parents taking their kids to school; immigrants coming to our shores; fans taking in a ballgame; a veteran starting a business; a bustling city street. The quiet determination; that strength of character and bond of fellowship; that refutation of fear - that is both our sword and our shield. And long after the current messengers of hate have faded from the world's memory, alongside the brutal despots, deranged madmen, and ruthless demagogues who litter history - the flag of the United States will still wave from small-town cemeteries, to national monuments, to distant outposts abroad. And that flag will still stand for freedom.

Thank you. God Bless you. And may God bless the United States of America.

On May 9, a Philippine coast guard vessel sprayed with gunfire a Taiwanese fishing boat that was allegedly fishing illegally in the Philippines' "exclusive economic zone." In a case of what Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou called "cold blooded murder," Filipino forces fatally shot a 65-year-old fisherman in the back.

The fallout between the two countries has been considerable. Philippine President Benigno Aquino III rejected the murder allegation but gave a "personal" apology for the incident which he called "unintentional." Taiwan rejected the apology and accused the Philippines of a "lack of sincerity and credibility" in cooperating with its investigation. In the meantime, Taiwan sent navy ships to the area to protect its fishermen.

The official U.S. response has been minimal at best, with a State Department spokesman declaring the United States is "hopeful [the Philippines] will move forward" to investigate while the American ambassador to the Philippines said "we know these things will be resolved through negotiations....We're glad that they're going to work these things out as democracies do."

The real question is whether the U.S. can afford the luxury of effectively distancing itself from either this conflict between two U.S. allies or the even more contentious dispute between China and Japan over the uninhabitable Senkaku/Diaoyu islands near Taiwan.

What if the dead fisherman was a PRC national killed "accidentally" and "unintentionally" by Japanese naval forces? Or what if PRC maritime patrol boats in the East China Sea had shot dead a member of the Japanese coast guard? Even worse, what if a deadly clash occurred between the F-15 fighters Japan sometimes scrambles near the islands and a Chinese maritime aircraft patrolling the area it regards as Chinese territory?

In the case of the East China Sea, the U.S. has become hostage to the hardline policy of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who has used the island conflict to pander to nationalist feelings and bolster his domestic political standing.

In the event of a confrontation with Chinese patrol boats or aircraft, Abe has made it clear Japan will respond aggressively, shooting first and asking questions later, to defend Japan's territorial claims. That would draw in U.S. military forces to support Japan, based on the Obama administration's current interpretation of American obligations under the US-Japan defense treaty -- even though the U.S. does not recognize either Japanese or Chinese sovereignty over the islands.

Given the massive suffering that right-wing governments inflicted on the Japanese people (let alone other countries) during World War II, it is truly tragic the leadership of Japan is now risking military conflict over small islands that have no strategic value. It is even more absurd that the United States could be boxed into defending Tokyo's claims to islands it acquired by conquest in the 1895 Sino-Japanese war.

An analogous situation occurred in 2004 when Taiwan took actions that could have triggered war with China and precipitated a larger confrontation involving the United States because of US treaty obligations. Fortunately, President George W. Bush warned Taiwan to curb its aggressive behavior and avoided a conflict.

Of course, other American allies besides Japan and the Philippines have exploited the island disputes in Asia to bolster their nationalist credentials with domestic political constituencies. Among the most flagrant examples is the provocative visit of former South Korean President Lee Myung-bak in August of last year to the island of Dokdo/Takeshima, which is claimed by both South Korea and Japan. Lee's visit scuttled the prospect of improved military cooperation with Japan, which could have strengthened both countries' national security.

There are no lack of proposals from policy experts, in the United States and Asia, on how to mitigate, defuse and ultimately resolve the island conflicts in the South China and East China Seas. Brookings expert Richard Bush has written insightfully on ways to prevent the "tragic" scenarios he believes could come to pass between Japan and China in their island dispute. Nautilus senior associate Mark Valencia has laid out detailed prescriptions for a Code of Conduct to reduce the chances of conflict in the South China Sea.

In my recent book, The China Fallacy, I called for the U.S. to negotiate a pull-back of all Chinese forces now engaged in patrolling Japanese territory from a defined security zone surrounding Japan. I also proposed that all countries involved in the island disputes submit their claims for adjudication to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. Ironically, only the Philippines has followed the latter approach, thus far.

The sad truth is that expert proposals won't amount to a hill of beans if the country that now dominates the Asia Pacific -- the United States -- effectively chooses to look the other way when the threat of serious armed conflict over small islands arises. Expressing "hope" and giving "encouragement" for Asian countries to peacefully resolve these difficult disputes by themselves is not worthy of a country that has the diplomatic, political and military clout to push for and achieve conflict resolution. Needless to say, a largely hands-off attitude also does little to bolster the standing of the United States in the region.

Donald Gross is the author of The China Fallacy and a senior associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies' Pacific Forum. Follow him on Twitter @Donald_Gross. This article was originally published on The Huffington Post and has been republished with the author's permission.

(AP Photo)

The fact is that hard power is supremely necessary in today's world, for reasons having nothing to do with humanitarian intervention. Indeed, the Harvard professor and former government official, Joseph S. Nye, Jr., who, in 2004, actually coined the term "soft power" in an eponymous book, has always been subtle enough in his own thinking to realize how relevant hard power remains.

As I write, the two areas of the world that are most important in terms of America's long-term economic and political interests -- Asia and Europe -- are undergoing power shifts. The growth of Chinese air and naval power is beginning to rearrange the correlation of forces in Asia, while the weakening of the European Union in geopolitical terms -- because of its ongoing fiscal crisis -- is providing an opportunity for a new Russian sphere of influence to emerge in Central and Eastern Europe. Of course, both challenges require robust diplomacy on America's part. But fundamentally what they really require is a steadfast commitment of American hard power. And the countries in these two most vital regions are not bashful about saying so.

Security officials in countries as diverse as Japan and Poland, Vietnam and Romania desperately hope that all this talk about American soft power overtaking American hard power is merely that -- talk. For it is American warships and ground forces deployments that matter most to these countries and their officials. Indeed, despite the disappointing conclusions to the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, rarely before has American hard power been so revered in places that actually matter.

Asia is the world's demographic and economic hub, as well as the region where the great sea lines of communication coalesce. And unless China undergoes a profound political and economic upheaval -- of a degree not yet on the horizon -- the Middle Kingdom will present the United States with its greatest 21st century competitor. In the face of China's military rise, Japan is shedding its quasi-pacifistic orientation and adopting a positive attitude toward military expansion. In a psychological sense, Japan no longer takes the American air and naval presence in Northeast Asia for granted. It actively courts American hard power in the face of a territorial dispute with China over islands in the East China Sea. Japan knows that, ultimately, it is only American hard power that can balance against China in the region. For South Korea, too, American hard power is critical. Though the South Korean military can ably defend itself against North Korea's, again, it is America's air and naval presence in the region that provides for a favorable balance of power that defends Seoul against Pyongyang and its ally in Beijing. As for Taiwan, its very existence as a state depends on the American military's Pacific presence.

Don't tell officials in the Philippines that American hard power is any less relevant than in previous decades. Like Japan, after years of taking the U.S. Navy and Air Force for granted, Manila is literally desperate for American military support and presence against China, with which it disputes potentially resource-rich islands and geographical features in the South China Sea. Like Japan and South Korea, the Philippines is a formal treaty ally of the United States: that is to say, these countries matter. As for Taiwan, it is arguably one of the finest examples of a functioning democracy in the world beyond the West, as well as geopolitically vital because of its position on the main sea lines of communication. Thus, Taiwan too, matters greatly.

Vietnam, for its part, has emerged as a critical de facto ally of the United States. It is the single most important Southeast Asian country preventing China's domination of the strategically crucial South China Sea. And what is Vietnam doing? It is refitting Cam Ranh Bay as a deep-water harbor, officially to attract navies from India, Russia and elsewhere; but especially to attract the U.S. Navy.

Malaysia plays down its close relationship with the United States, as part of a delicate diplomatic minuet to get along with both China and the Muslim world. Nevertheless, the number of visits of American warships to Malaysian ports has jumped from three annually in 2003 to well over 50. As for Singapore, one of its diplomats told me: "We see American hard power as benign. The U.S. Navy defends globalization by protecting the sea lanes, which we, more than any other people, benefit from. To us, there is nothing dark or conspiratorial about the United States and its vast security apparatus."

In 1998, the Singaporeans built Changi Naval Base solely to host American nuclear-powered aircraft carriers and submarines. In 2011, there were 150 American warship visits to Singapore. Then there are the four American littoral combat ships that, it was announced in 2011, would be stationed in Singapore.

At the other end of Eurasia, whatever their public comments, diplomats from countries in Central and Eastern Europe are worried about any American shift away from hard power. In the 1990s, the security situation looked benevolent to them. They were in the process of joining NATO and the European Union, even as Russia was weakened by chaos under Boris Yeltsin's undisciplined rule. Following centuries of interminable warfare, they were finally escaping history, in other words. Now NATO and the European Union -- so vigorous and formidable in the 1990s -- look fundamentally infirm. Meanwhile, Russia has been, for the moment, revitalized through a combination of natural gas revenues and Vladimir Putin's dynamic authoritarianism-lite. Russia once again beckons on the doorstep of Europe, and the Poles, Romanians and others are scared.

Forget NATO. With declining defense budgets of almost all European member states, NATO is to be taken less and less seriously. The Poles, Romanians and so on now require unilateral U.S. hard power. For years already, the Poles and Romanians have been participating in U.S. military missions in Afghanistan, Iraq and sub-Saharan Africa. They have been doing so much less because they actually believe in those missions, but in order to prove their mettle as reliable allies of the United States -- so that the United States military will be there for them in any future hour of need.

As for the Middle East, Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf countries all desperately require U.S. hard power: If not specifically for an attack on Iran's nuclear facilities, then certainly in order to promote a balance of power unfavorable to Iran's regional hegemony.

Soft power became a trendy concept in the immediate wake of America's military overextension in Iraq and Afghanistan. But soft power was properly meant as a critical accompaniment to hard power and as a shift in emphasis away from hard power, not as a replacement for it. Hard power is best employed not when America invades a country with its ground troops but when it daily projects military might over vast swaths of the earth, primarily with air and naval assets, in order to protect U.S. allies, world trade and a liberal maritime order. American hard power, thus, must never go out of fashion.

Robert D. Kaplan is Chief Geopolitical Analyst at Stratfor, a geopolitical analysis firm, and author of the bestselling book The Revenge of Geography. Reprinted with permission.

The facts that the China failed to sign the McCartney-Macdonald line proposed by the British in 1899 or even contest the proposed alignment amounts to accepting the alignment. By and large the Chinese have been claiming areas up to this line which also corresponds to the Line of Actual Control (LAC).

Even assuming that there are some disputes in the alignment of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) which came into being after the 1962 war, the 19 km thick border line is inexplicable and sounds mischievous. China and India have signed two critical agreements on "Maintaining of Peace and Tranquility along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas" in 1993 and "Confidence Building Measures in the Military Field along the Line of Actual Control in India-China Border Areas" in 1996. These would not have been possible if there were such major perceptional differences.

In this context, Pakistan's role in enticing China to extend its claim line South of Xinjiang cannot be ignored. It ceded a large chunk of real estate in the Shaksgam Valley, a part of J&K to China illegally. China on its part, has replicated the ‘Delhi illegal colony model' to regularize her claim by slowly encroaching into the entire area of its interest without firing a bullet and developing infrastructure right from Baltistan in Pakistan in the West to Aksai Chin in the East.

The encroachment in the Daulat Beg Oldie (DBO) sector was to test India's response. Having intruded 19 km inside Indian Territory, the Chinese questioned the validity of the LAC and went on to state, "The Chinese side has confined activities to within the Chinese border and never trespassed across the line". This is nothing but deliberate assertion of its right over Indian territory.

Coming at a politically sensitive moment, India desperately wanted to end the standoff, restore status quo and prevent any escalation. India's meekness - studied response for some - provides the Chinese the freedom to consolidate its position in the DBO area. The situation can be compared to the Chinese construction of the road connecting Tibet to Sinkiang across the Aksai Chin in early 1950s. India was ignorant about the development for several years. Having managed to construct the road, the Chinese claimed ownership of the area.

A pattern can be deciphered: Gradually trespass into an area of interest over a period of time and set a routine that evades notice and serious attention thus avoiding any significant protest or challenge. Down play protests or apprehensions if any. Exploit unchallenged border encroachments as an opportunity to consolidate position and stake a claim to the area at an appropriate moment through precipitous military coercion and intimidation. On close evaluation this pattern can be discerned in the construction of dams across Brahmaputra.

Territorial interest and positioning

Indications are that China and Pakistan have reached an agreement to lease the Gilgit-Baltistan area to China for 50 years. China, it appears has already positioned 7000 to 110005 PLA soldiers in the Baltistan area who are working to construct the railway line from Gwadar to Xinjiang which runs parallel to the Karakoram Highway. The highway it is believed is being frantically upgraded. Reports of construction of 22 tunnels along the route to establish a gas pipeline from Iran to China are abound. These tunnels can act as a storehouse for missiles. Information relating to construction of huge housing complex in the area and a cemetery at Danyor 10 km across Gilgit river has also surfaced indicating that the Chinese are planning to stay in the area permanently - a clear indication that de facto control of the area has surreptitiously been ceded to China by Pakistan.

With its physical presence in all the four cardinal directions and India being in the South, China's interest clearly is in closing the gaps in the areas bounded by Gilgit - Baltistan in the west, Xinjiang in the North, Aksai Chin in the East and India to its South. That will facilitate free movement within the area. Securing the Karakoram heights along with this action will thwart any threat from India. There lies the Chinese interest in the Saltoro ridge in Siachen.

What are the strategic interests of China in securing the areas under discussion?

Besides providing freedom of movement, logistics and security, the area also provides the much needed buffer between India and the Chinese mainland. The Karakoram Highway which passes through this area connects China and Pakistan. The highway that connects Pakistan to Tibet and Xinjiang is also significant in that it opens up the strategic possibility of an alternative shorter route for uninterrupted energy supplies from the Gulf through Gwadar Port avoiding Afghanistan and the Chinese Muslim majority Uyghur dominated Kashgar area. Importantly, it also guarantees access to Afghanistan and Central Asia where China has invested heavily in energy and copper. In nutshell, with Gwadar port under their control, this area has become the key to China's access to the Arabian sea through Karakoram Highway and their investment opportunities in Afghanistan.

The missing strategic culture

The Indian leadership has for long been lulled into complacency over deterrence capability of nuclear weapons. Nuclear deterrence was viewed as the sole savior of the country against external aggression. No one would ever dare a nuclear power was the perception. Two nuclear power nations getting engaged in a military conflict too was inconceivable. Resultantly conventional military capability was overlooked and currently a state of helplessness exists which has taken the country back to 1962. While China continuously upgraded its military and built military infrastructure in Tibet and elsewhere, India continued to put all its eggs in the nuclear deterrence basket.

Border management

The Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) under the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), a Central Armed Police Force (CAPF) mans the LAC. The ITBP does not come under the Indian Army or its operational control. When an incident of this nature occurs, whom does the ITBP report to? What is the Army supposed to do? Who will issue the orders, the MHA or the MOD? Who will coordinate the situation on the ground? Dual control of critical forces deployed right at the border is a great folly. The ambiguity and the consequences of such vague command and control set up are clearly visible. These are areas where turf wars are unacceptable.

Lack of road communication

The Sub Sector North (SSN) is connected to the rest of Ladakh by two axes. The one along Nubra valley to Daulat Beg Oldie (DBO) traverses through Saser La Pass at a height of approximately 5200 meters. It is a foot track and would require 3 to 4 days to cover. The second route runs along the Shyok River to Depsang Plains passing through Depsang La Pass at a height of about 5450 meters. It would take anything from 15 to 20 days to negotiate the distance.

Given the strategic criticality, very little has been done to improve the communication in these areas in the last 50 years. The very fact that soldiers were deployed at such locations without proper road communication amounts to abandoning them with scant regard for their safety and well-being. How are these troops expected to survive in the event of an enemy attack? How quickly will they be reinforced or withdrawn? Incidentally, these are not positions with any worthwhile tactical significance to fight a defensive battle from. Ladakh is too far and events in these areas do not directly affect the rest of the country or the vote bank. Loss of territory, deplorable infrastructure or the pitiable quality of life which the people of this area are forced to suffer are invisible to public eye and thus get ignored. The situation along the LAC in other sectors is equally bad.

Operational fitness of the Army

Two mountain divisions were raised for operations in the mountains. The government, however, decided that there was no need for a Corps HQ. The state of weapons and equipment in these two newly raised mountain divisions and their state of operational preparedness is not up to mark.

The terrain configuration in our northern borders adjoining China lacks the space for manoeuver and the lateral communication needed for diversion or redeployment of troops. Considering the fact that penetration by a determined enemy into any defensive position is a possibility, India needs to keep its options open to limit penetration at certain level and take the battle into vulnerable areas of the offender. This alone will provide deterrence and a bargaining advantage in the event of an intrusion.

A cursory assessment of troop requirement indicate a minimum of two divisions with a Corps HQ as contingency reaction force and an additional two divisions with a Corps HQ to handle the counter offensive if and when required. The formations could be switched to take each other's role if necessary. These formations need to be equipped appropriately and most urgently without any delay.

What were the terms of withdrawal?

The Government has not come out with the terms of the agreement which culminated in the Chinese agreeing to withdraw from the area of its occupation. Having said that the Chinese were 19 km inside India's territory it is not clear as to why India had to withdraw from its own territory. Media reports during the crisis indicate that Chinese had made similar probes in three other areas. Further reports point to India demolishing its bunkers in the Chumer area which would ipso facto incapacitate Indian troops patrolling areas up to our claim line. The country needs to know the terms of agreement and the truth. The Chinese message is clear - notwithstanding India's nuclear power capability, Beijing will take the offensive to secure its interests, as, when and where it chooses.

Did India succumb to Chinese pressure?

Even if a proper agreement had not been reached in the matter yet, knowing the Chinese, such withdrawals would not have been settled without an undertaking or at least an understanding to accept China's interests in the area. The question is, having invested huge capital in developing infrastructure in and around the area; the Chinese are unlikely to give it away - they are there to stay.

Turning a blind eye to the Chinese encroachment and activities in the area will allow the Chinese to develop infrastructure in this area and keep the option open to rekindle the issue again at a future date. The Chinese are likely to use their ground position as leverage and a bargaining chip.

What would constitute an equitable ceasefire agreement?

The agreement between India and China in this dispute needs very careful study. It is imperative that both sides have access to areas up to their respective claim lines. India cannot afford to give away areas, which are of strategic importance. India also cannot provide an avenue for future intrusion by China or Pakistan. India needs to retain its freedom for developing infrastructure in its chosen areas. If China could develop infrastructure in disputed territory, it is time India did so too.

Siachen - an inconvenience to the Chinese

The domination and the location of the Saltoro ridge is a threat to the security and Strategic interests of China in this area. Apparently, Pakistan's efforts to negotiate with India to vacate Siachen in the recent past and their effort to influence the track two dialogues in that direction were at the Chinese call. It may also be of interest to know that during the Siachen talks in India between India and Pakistan on 30 and 31 May 2011, the Pakistani delegation had demanded that the Chinese be invited for the talks as the Shaksgam area is with them. The Chinese interest in this area is clear.

Lessons: Diplomacy and Friendship

Diplomacy especially with China does not work without military power, economic robustness and a strong leadership. The effect of DBO like incidents and the lack of firm response will have very adverse effects on India's influence on its smaller neighbours.

Considering the Chinese military strength, economic prowess and the investments made by them towards the development of infrastructure in the disputed areas, it would not be very easy to recover territory illegally occupied by them. Soft options are therefore unlikely to work.

As a matter of rule, India has adopted a policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of sovereign countries. However, if the burden of a country's human rights violations falls at its own doorstep as had happened in 1971 in erstwhile Pakistan, India may have no option but to provide moral, material and financial support besides highlighting and promoting the cause of the affected in various international bodies and institutions.

India has sheltered over 120,000 Tibetan refugees. These refugees are in India because their political aspirations and demands have remained unanswered even after 60 years. It may be recalled that China invaded the de facto independent Tibet in 1950 resulting in the incorporation of Tibet as a part of Republic of China. Since then, human rights violations have been perpetrated against the Tibetans to suppress their claims for independence. The number of Tibetan Buddhist self-immolation cases in the recent past stands testimony to the fact. It is time China learns to respect the sensibilities of people.

The unrest in the Uyghur dominated Xinjiang Autonomous region and in the Gilgit-Baltistan areas too open up a number of options for India. Chinese calculations of economic prosperity through Gwadar Port in Baluchistan can be nullified by providing moral, material and financial support to Baluchistan independence movement.

China is India's second-largest trading partner and their combined trade was $50.9 billion in the April-December period, according to Indian government figures, India may have to provide incentives to countries like Japan, South Korea, Vietnam, Philippines, and other western countries to promote their trade interests in India while restricting entry of Chinese goods and services through various measures.

DBO like incidents will prompt the Indian people to demand that India align with countries which are subjected to similar provocation. India may also have to weigh its options of supporting the US and other countries to limit Chinese influence and hegemony in the region. The US Asia pivot too may need a relook.

While accusing the US of trying to forge anti-China alliances, China should take a close look at its own aggressive show of strength which are forcing countries to go in for countervailing alliances. If indeed such alliances are formed, China cannot blame anyone but itself.

Exchange of maps indicating the perception of LAC on both sides should be expedited. India needs to work out its strategy to force Chinese to accept an equitable and a reasonable solution to the border dispute at an early date, failing which India should not hesitate to work on hard options suggested.

White Paper on illegal occupation of Indian Territory

It is time the entire issue of illegal occupation of Indian territory by Pakistan and India is investigated by a Committee consisting of a panel of judges, military professionals and a White Paper prepared for placing the facts before the Parliament.

Border Management

Effective border management entails unified command with integrated surveillance, intelligence, and communication network. Rules of engagement should be spelt out while the border management agency needs to lay down its Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) for dealing with border violations and skirmishes.

Operational preparedness

There is an urgent need to go into the state of operational readiness of the Defence Services. The Government needs to spell out its National Security Strategy and the Defence Strategy to enable the services to lay down their respective strategies. The aspect of collusion between China and Pakistan and the assessment of force structure requirements to face up to such challenges will emerge out the exercise.

Restructuring MOD

Ministry of Defence (MOD) in consultation with the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) is meant to handle situations of the kind as witnessed in DBO recently. In contrast, based on some media reports, the China Study Group (CSG) consisting of the NSA, and bureaucrats from other ministries including heads of Central Security Agencies took control of the situation. 30-odd Chinese soldiers are too insignificant a number to derail the normal processes of Government functioning. The need for restructuring the Integrated Headquarters of the MOD with a professional bureaucracy consisting of experts from strategic, military and diplomatic community rather than the present generalist should be given traction.

Originally published by Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (www.idsa.in) here.

(AP Photo)

The issue was not pressed very hard by the previous Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) government until the last months of its administration, but it has been raised anew by the more conservative Abe government.

Japan has a cabinet-level ministry devoted entirely to the abduction issue. The current state minister, Keiji Furuya, recently said that Tokyo would not lift bilateral sanctions against North Korea or resume aid until the issue was resolved, even if the North should agree to abandon its nuclear weapons program.

Furuya was in the U.S. a few weeks ago trying to raise awareness of the matter among Americans through symposiums held in Washington and New York. He took with him several relatives of those kidnapped by the North to tell their personal stories.

It may be a good time to be raising the issue, Tokyo thinks, as public attention in the U.S. and elsewhere has been drawn to North Korea as a result of its earlier nuclear bomb test and extreme bellicose threats to launch missiles at everyone. Moreover, the North recently condemned an American citizen of Korean extraction to fifteen years in prison.

The issue involves the fate of more than a dozen Japanese who were snatched by North Korean agents and spirited away to the North, ostensibly to train more agents in Japanese language and manners for future espionage. Most of these disappearances took place in the late 1970s and early 1980s, but it wasn't until North Korean defectors began appearing in the late 1990s that Tokyo became aware of their true fate.

In 2002 former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi flew to Pyongyang for a summit meeting with Kim Jong-il. At that meeting Kim admitted that North Korea had kidnapped Japanese and apologized for it; Leader Kim said that 12 people were kidnapped. Of these, five were returned to Japan; the other eight died. Case closed.

Tokyo disputes this. It claims 17 people were kidnapped (including five that Pyongyang says never entered the country), 5 were returned and 12 remain unaccounted for. It is skeptical of Pyongyang's assertions that they died in mysterious "traffic accidents" or committed suicide.

The families of the abductees have become celebrities. The parents of Megumi Yokota, who was snatched in 1977 when she was only 13, appear on television, at press conferences and are interviewed for their opinions on politics, nuclear weapons and North Korea (the latter not complimentary). Many conservative politicians, including Abe himself, wear the little blue ribbon in their lapel to show solidarity, much as Americans used to wear bracelets with POW names.

It was Abe who created the cabinet post for the abduction issue during his first term as prime minister from 2006 to 2007. The post languished after him. His successor Yasuo Fukuda showed little interest in the matter, as did the first two DPJ premiers. During the DPJ government, seven individuals held the abductee portfolio or were given it as part of other duties.

The last DPJ premier showed more interest in the issue. Yoshihiko Noda met with the families and indicated a willingness to fly to Pyongyang if necessary to move things along. He also wore the little blue lapel ribbon. However, the momentum for the DPJ was lost in its big electoral debacle.

Minister Furuya is making preparations to meet with North Korean counterparts in Mongolia's capital, which is a neutral place as Mongolia is not a party to the six-party talks aimed at ending the impasse. Pyongyang is reluctant to reopen the issue as it assumed that the elder Kim's confession and apology more than a decade ago was sufficient.

In another recent development, it was reported that a senior adviser to the prime minister, Isao Ijima, had flown to Pyongyang on a still undisclosed mission. He was a top aide to Junichiro Koizumi when he made his famous 2002 visit to Pyongyang and summit meeting with the late Kim Jong-il.

It is no exaggeration to say that resolution of the kidnappings has become the most important foreign policy issue for Japan and the main obstacle to normalization of relations with North Korea. Over the years Tokyo has cut off all contacts and even minimal trade in such things as clams plus cracking down on remittances from Koreans living in Japan.

The abductions are a touchy matter for Washington, which would really like to see it disappear as it complicates the united front on what it considers the much larger question of disarming the North of its nuclear weapons armory. Former President George W. Bush found this out the hard way when he first met with Megumi's parents and then removed North Korea from the list of nations sponsoring terrorism, which many Japanese considered a betrayal.

It complicates negotiations over North Korea's nuclear program. In the past Tokyo has refused to pay its share of promised heavy oil shipments claiming that Pyongyang is dragging its feet on resolving the kidnappings. That in turn gave the North an excuse to claim that parties to the six-party talks were reneging on their commitments.

But for Japanese it is more than just an abstract geopolitical issue. It tugs at the heartstrings. Who cannot feel the indignity of 13-year-old schoolgirl kidnapped on a public street returning home from school badminton practice or the years in which her parents were totally ignorant of her true fate. "It was like she disappeared in a puff of smoke," her mother once said.

And there is a new urgency, as the abductees that are still living are obviously not getting any younger. The oldest, Yutaka Kume, taken in 1977 when he was 51, would now be approaching 90. The youngest, Megumi, would be 50 if she were still living (Pyongyang says she committed suicide when she was about 30). Time is running out.

Todd Crowell is the author of the forthcoming Dictionary of the Modern Asian Language.

(AP Photo)

It was not the paucity of cars that struck me; it was the almost complete absence of trucks. This was, after all, the road from the coast to the capital, not the only road but still a significant one. It was early afternoon on a weekday. The oddest moment came when we reached a tollbooth not too far from Madrid. There was only one booth open and when we pulled up there was no one in it and no coin or credit card slot. We waited, then we left. Perhaps the attendant was in the bathroom. Perhaps the revenue didn't justify paying a toll taker. Perhaps this was one of the austerity measures they had taken.

I will never know. What I do know is that the drive had a sort of post-apocalyptic feel, except that it was very clean. We marveled at it and then realized that there was nothing that ought to have surprised us about it. The unemployment rate in Spain is more than 27 percent. Gasoline costs 1.4 euros a liter (more than $6.50 a gallon). At that price, a drive is no longer a casual undertaking; it has to justify itself. As for trucks, when that many people are out of work -- and have been for many months -- the demand for goods declines to the point that trucks will be rare on the road.

Youth Unemployment and Desperation

I should have been prepared for this. We stayed in a very nice hotel in Granada. In the morning when we left the hotel, there was a beggar sitting on the sidewalk, his back to the wall, to our right. We paid little attention. Beggars are not uncommon in Europe or the United States. But there is an aesthetic to beggars. They look a certain way, owing to alcohol, madness or a very long time in trouble. When we returned in the late afternoon, he was still there. He was in his mid-to-late 20s, wearing glasses and reading a book. He was dressed in khakis and a decent shirt. He wasn't mad, he wasn't drunk and he wasn't like the hippies of my youth. He wasn't playing an instrument. He was sitting, absorbed in a book and begging. There were other beggars in Granada of the more conventional sort but also several more who looked like this one.

There is an argument that says Spanish unemployment is not as bad as it seems because a huge amount of it is youth unemployment. It is implied that youth unemployment has less social consequence. Certainly, it is more immediately destabilizing to have the head of a household with children out of work, but when -- as some say -- 57 percent of those under the age of 25 are unemployed, it also has consequences. Older people get bitter, despair and tend to be fatalistic with what life dealt them -- or at least a lot of them do.

A 22-year-old becomes desperate. When a young man is unemployed because he is a musician or an artist awaiting discovery or because he has lived carelessly, that's one thing. But this is different unemployment. It is a generation whose dreams are shattered. They may have hoped to be a businessman or a craftsman, but that's not going to happen now. Unemployment of this sort doesn't go away in a few months or years. This is the level of unemployment the United States experienced in the Great Depression, the kind of unemployment that scars an entire generation. World War II solved the unemployment problem in the United States, but there is no global war on the horizon for Spain. Imagine what would have happened in the United States if the war hadn't come and the Depression had lasted 20 years.

No one knows how long this will last but everyone suspects that it will be a long time, and I share that suspicion. How do you accept a situation that says you, at the age of 22, will live on the margins of society along with half of your friends? More important, how do you live with that fact if you worked hard preparing for a career?

Failures that are caused by living carelessly can be managed. The very carelessness of the life makes the consequence nearly morally required. Some people in every generation fail and fall to the bottom rungs of society because, well, bad things sometimes happen. Those people do not constitute a social force. But when nearly half a generation, most from middle-class families, finds itself at the bottom, there is no explanation to provide solace. In its place there is, quite reasonably, a sense of victimhood. Whatever explanation one gives for the Spanish crisis -- the stupidity of politicians, the laziness of the public, the greed of bankers or whatever else -- the generation that is bearing the burden is the only one that is not guilty -- at least not yet.

This -- being the victim in personal calamity shared by half a generation -- is the foundation not just of political instability but also for the politics of rage. The older middle-class citizens, with the lives they thought they had secured shattered, hurled into the ranks of the permanently impoverished, represent the vanguard, if you will. But those who will never live the lives they thought they would, they are the explosive mass.

European Denial

I think the reason things are so calm -- occasional riots hardly count -- is that no one really believes that they won't awake from the nightmare. There is a firm belief that this period will end. The denial of what has happened is not confined to Spain. In speaking to a German, he declared my view that the European system is broken as "scandalous." A moderate official in the European Union, he became choleric at my assertion that countries such as Spain are being plunged into the kind of hell that creates political monstrosities in Europe. For him, the critical thing was that the banks were no more stable than ever. He was simply dismissive of unemployment as the problem. Most people dismiss my views with aplomb, without breaking into a sweat. I have learned that on the rare instance when I cause apoplexy, it's because what I have said is not too far from the other person's fears.

Far more interesting than the German official was the Spanish official at the European Union. He was equally enraged when I argued that the social (it is not beyond either a financial or economic) crisis was not going to be solved in the current framework. In almost the same words -- and the exact spirit -- as the German, he insisted that the problem would not only be solved but that he was working on it day and night and was very close to a resolution. From this I conclude that it is perhaps not just the Germans but the entire EU apparatus that either really believes a solution is imminent or simply doesn't want to consider the consequences of failure.

Another Spaniard, this one not a government official, said he missed Francisco Franco, the fascist dictator who won the Spanish Civil War and governed for decades. I was surprised to say the least, since Spain under Franco was even poorer than it is today. He explained that he missed Franco because he knew how to tell the Germans to go to hell. When Hitler asked Franco to join him in World War II, Franco refused. The Spaniards' desire to tell the Germans to go to hell is too easy. Even if this was all Germany's fault, which it isn't, Spain's problem wouldn't be solved.

The German problem is the European problem and vice versa, and so it has been for a long time. Ever since 1871, when Germany was unified, Germany and Europe have been struggling with the question of how to live with each other. They thought they had found the answer in the European Union -- and maybe they will, but not yet. Europe does not know how to live with a Germany that uses the free trade zone to surge its exports while blaming Europe for being lazy and shiftless. Germany does not know how to live with a Europe that does not see that all of its problems are due to its lack of industriousness.

Of course, to our 22-year-old in Spain, the debate has become irrelevant. He is broke, scared and bored -- not something you want a mass of young men to be. That is the point at which history turns. Over time, they become men with nothing to lose; they become violent men, trying to reshape the order by any means necessary. Looking around the violent parts of the world, it is young men with nothing to lose and fantasies of glory, led by older men who understand them and their needs, who wage the civil wars that tear countries apart.

The same happened in Europe after World War I. Sometimes the disaffected youth turn to crime, sometimes they turn to political crime and sometimes they become a political party. In Europe, it was a generation that felt betrayed by World War I, then an older generation crushed by unemployment and inflation and finally a younger generation with nothing left to lose. Then came World War II and the stunned realization that there were indeed things left to lose.

Driving in Spain, things look quiet, neat and empty. But in that emptiness there is something ominous, perhaps not so much post-apocalyptic as pre-apocalyptic. Spain is still under control, and the European elite still believe an answer will be found. But I don't see the path that leads to the redemption of a generation's hopes. There is time, but in my mind there isn't enough. And given the attitude of the Eurocrats I have met, there is no sense among the elite that time is running out.

George Friedman is chairman of Stratfor. Reprinted with permission.

A major new survey of Indian public opinion, published this week, reveals that most Indians are worried about what China's rise means for them. Indeed, 83 per cent see China as a security threat to India.

This is despite the fact that China has become India's largest trading partner, and that the two governments are trying to improve diplomatic ties, Li Keqiang visiting India this week in his first trip abroad as Premier.

Indians' mixed feelings about China capture one of many policy dilemmas for New Delhi identified in the poll, one of the most comprehensive surveys into what Indians think about their nation's future.

The poll, a joint project by the Lowy Institute for International Policy and the Australia India Institute, also highlights the depth of Indian concern about Pakistan, as well as emerging threats like shortages of water, food and energy.

It is a representative survey of 1233 Indians from all segments of society. It was conducted in seven languages throughout most geographical regions of the world's largest democracy.

The results reveal a fascinating duality about how Indians see their future, a combination of hope and fear that could well find substance in next year's national elections.

On the one hand, 74 per cent of Indians are optimistic about prospects for their economy, despite its recent stumbles. But Indians are divided about whether the fruits of rapid growth are being justly distributed.

And most Indians see major problems looming. Shortages of energy, water and food, along with climate change, register as the most important challenges, with 80-85 per cent of Indians rating these issues as "big threats" to their country's security.

Asked about their attitudes to other countries, Indians say they like the US most and Pakistan least.

And Australia rates highly. Asked to rate their feelings towards 22 other countries on a scale of 0 to 100, Indians rank the US first, then Singapore, Japan and Australia, well ahead of countries in Europe or the so-called BRICS - including Brazil, Russia, China and South Africa - with which India is sometimes seen to have some economic or diplomatic affinities.

Despite the civilian-led nature of modern India, it turns out that Indians are exceptionally attached to their armed forces: 95 per cent see the possession of a strong military as very important for India to achieve its aims in the world.

And, despite traditions of strategic autonomy and non-alignment, 72 per cent of Indians attach great importance to India having strong countries as partners - perhaps reflecting a growing pragmatism about how India can thrive and survive.

On Pakistan, the news is not all bad. Although an overwhelming majority (94 per cent) of Indians see Pakistan as a threat, citing terrorism as a major reason, 89 per cent agree that ordinary people in both countries want peace. And a similarly large majority, 87 per cent, agree that a big improvement in India-Pakistan relations requires courageous leadership on both sides, 76 per cent agreeing that as the larger country India should take the initiative.

But with Li's visit the relationship of the moment is between India and China, the world's two most populous states, uneasy neighbours and nations upon whose strategic choices much of the future security and prosperity of humanity will rest.

And here the opinion poll confirms that wariness about China's rise is a view widely held among Indian citizens.

As recent reports of a new Chinese incursion on the disputed border remind us, India and China have a difficult history going back to a brief but bitter war in 1962.

The poll reveals multiple reasons for popular Indian misgivings about China, including China's possession of nuclear weapons, competition for resources in third countries, China's efforts to strengthen its relations with other countries in the Indian Ocean region, and the border dispute.

But in responding to China's rise most Indians want an each-way bet: 65 per cent agree India should join other countries to limit China's influence yet a similar number (64 per cent) agree that India should co-operate with China to play a leading role in the world.

For Australia, one thing is clear: Julia Gillard's vision of a peaceful and prosperous Asian Century will depend heavily on circumstances that Canberra can do little to control - whether India and China can move beyond mistrust.

Li clearly has some persuading to do.

Rory Medcalf is director of the international security program at the Lowy Institute and oversaw the 2013 India Poll. Amitabh Mattoo is director of the Australia India Institute.

Every few months, this city of 1.5 million people in southern Japan, not far from mainland China, gets a dose of lung clogging courtesy of its neighbor.

Coal factories in the cities of Tianjin and Beijing, combined with the growing numbers of automobiles, pump out toxins that drift westward across the East China Sea. They hit Japan and, to a lesser extent, South Korea.

The most recent air pollution crisis came in February, when a whitish gray blanket of smog fell over Fukuoka. The city government put out an advisory on its early warning system - the first in Japan, started that month - urging everybody, and especially infants and the elderly, to stay indoors and wear face masks outside.

"There is concern among citizens over the health effects," said Keiko Nabamuta, a city environment official. "Whenever this happens, we ask residents to stay indoors and avoid hanging their laundry outside," a measure to prevent unsafe particulates from gathering on clothing.

The air pollution problem has become so pervasive that it has joined the list of diplomatic issues on the table between three fractious nations: China, which produces much of it, and Japan and South Korea, on its receiving end.

On May 7, top environmental officials of the three countries met in Kitakyushu, a city near Fukuoka, and agreed to set up a panel that will occasionally gather to explore solutions.

"Air pollution and climate change are common issues in the region," Japan's Environment Minister Nobuteru Ishihara told his counterparts in remarks carried by public broadcaster NHK. "Apart from domestic countermeasures, it is indispensable for China, South Korea and other countries to cooperate in solving them."

The promises of cooperation came at an odd time. This year, relations between the three countries have fallen to a nadir over a line-up of territorial disputes.

The nations have drummed up a war of words over two chains of islets: the Liancourt Rocks torn between South Korea and Japan, and the Senkaku Islands disputed between China and Japan.

Adding to the bad blood, the countries are also debating the history of Japanese atrocities during World War II.

South Korea and China expressed displeasure when, on Tuesday, the mayor of Osaka said that sex slaves, commonly referred to as "comfort women," were a "necessary evil" to maintain discipline in the Japanese army during World War II.

China's environmental protection minister, Zhou Shengxian, cancelled his attendance on claims he was preoccupied with the damage of the April earthquake in Sichuan, in south-central China, which killed some 200 people. Yet Japanese media speculated that his absence was related to rising tensions over the Senkaku Islands.

Early warning

Over the past year, the governments of Japan and South Korea have been stepping up their early warning capabilities for cities at risk from air pollution.

In Fukuoka, the municipal government raises the alarm on the municipal website when the average number of particulates with a diameter smaller than 2.5 micro-millimeters, known shorthand as PM2.5, reaches 35 or more micrograms per cubic meter in a day. That's less than one-thirtieth the thickness of human hair.

It's a mouthful, but a significant number. The label PM2.5 typically includes contaminants from coal plants and factories, and can lead to respiratory infections and cancer.

The fumes already pose a serious public health crisis for China. In April, a study published in leading medical journal The Lancet linked air pollution to 1.2 million deaths in the country in 2010. The number comprises more than a third of the world's total air pollution-related deaths.

The conundrum is getting worse for China and its neighbors. In the first three months of this year, the levels of two airborne pollutants - nitrogen dioxide and particulates from the PM2.5 to the PM10 range - increased by almost one-third in Beijing over the same period last year.

South Korea, too, has set up an early warning system, although it's dealing with a slightly different problem from the Beijing-born gasses.

Every spring, clouds of "yellow dust" move southward from the Gobi Desert - the mass that straddles Mongolia and northern China - and sweep the Korean peninsula and other parts of the Pacific.

The storms have been recorded for thousands of years, and have not always been a malignant force. But times are changing. China is industrializing and experiencing desertification, the process by which land becomes denuded and arid; the resulting winds are carrying heavy metals such as mercury, arsenic, and cancer-causing toxins into Seoul.

"The Korean government built six air quality concentration measuring stations throughout the nation," said Kim Jong-choon, the director at the Korean Institute of Environmental Research, a government body, "and they analyze not only air pollutants but also harmful substances in them such as lead, cadmium, and arsenic."

So far, South Korea has had mixed luck tackling the problem with China. In 2007, for instance, South Korea sent thousands of trees to China, in hopes they would be planted in the desert to halt the spread of yellow dust.

Instead, the Chinese government placed them next to a highway.

But Japan and South Korea haven't experienced all gloom and doom dealing with their difficult neighbor. Korean and Chinese volunteers are helping plant some 4 million trees in China's Gobi Desert, and the government says it's making an effort to ensure trees are placed in the right zones.

REYHANLI - Nearly a week after the two car-bomb attacks rocked this sleepy town, the people of Reyhanli, in southern Turkey, are still burying their dead.

In this Hatay Province town, near the border with Syria, three more bodies have just been found under the rubble, bringing the death toll from the May 11 attack to 51. Little by little, grief and despondency are being replaced by anger.

This exclusively Sunni town is definitely no bastion of resistance to the Justice and Development Party (AKP), the ruling conservative Islamic party. But now, the people of Reyhanli are holding Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan accountable for their situation -- accusing him of dragging their country into civil war by being assertive towards Bashar El-Assad and allowing Syrian rebels to set up bases in Turkey.

The Turkish government's official version of events - which blames local pro-Assad Arab Alawite fundamentalists for the massacre - is hard to swallow. So are the repeated speeches by Erdogan exempting the Syrian refugees and rebels - who have settled in Reyhanli by the thousands - from any responsibility. The people of Reyhanli resent Erdogan for this stance.

"Why hasn't Erdogan come to see us?" asks Hussein angrily, behind the counter of his grocery store. His shop is located a few meters away from the town hall, where the first bomb exploded. "He opens the border to everyone and thinks we are going to stay safe? He lets in all these people wearing galabiyaIslamic robes and beards down to their feet - a reference to the jihadists fighting in Syria - and he thinks we are going to believe that Turkish people bombed us?"

The second bombing occurred next to the post office. Cahit Seyhan is up on a stepladder, fixing the false ceiling of his pharmacy. He also believes that the government tried to save face by blaming the bombings on supporters of the Syrian regime. "It could very well be Jabhat al-Nusra," he argues, accusing one of the most famous jihadist groups leading the fight against Assad.

These reactions are emblematic of how the local population is anxious and worried about being the object of a new intimidation campaign - whoever the attacker may be. Merjimek, an insurance broker, warns: "Erdogan must stop playing with fire. He must force both sides to negotiate and find a compromise. Otherwise, there will be other explosions."

The revolt against Erdogan's stance on Syria is also born out of social frustration. Reyhanli's lower classes do not always approve of these refugees, who are sometimes wealthy, who sometimes start businesses in the city, and whose mass influx has driven real-estate prices to an all-time high. "They are opening more shops than we are, can you imagine?" says Hussein the grocer.

"AKP, USA, killers!"

This despondency can also be felt in the provincial capital of Antakya, known as Antioch in ancient times. Since the bombing, a very heterogeneous crowd made of left-wing militants, social workers, artists and students, has been gathering everyday in front of the bazaar. They have different religious beliefs - Sunni, Alawite and Christian - reflecting the variety in the city's religious and ethnic mosaic. For Ghaleb Redwan, one of the demonstration's organizers, "Hatay - another Turkish name for Antakya - is a very tolerant city, where people do not care about their neighbor's religious belief, and we want to keep it that way. We do not mind welcoming Syrian refugees, as long as it does not threaten our own security."

On Tuesday, fierce slogans could be heard during the demonstration - "AKP, USA, killers!" - revealing the anti-imperialistic views of a great number participants. Some of them are - more or less admittedly -supporters of the Syrian regime, especially the Alawite Arabs, who belong to the same Shia community as the Assad clan.

Some of them are also nostalgic of a time when the Hatay Province was part of Syria - the territory was under French command after the fall of the Ottoman Empire and only became part of Turkey in 1939.

Sheikh Ali Yeral, an Alawite leader in Hatay Province, believes "The Erdogan government's stance on Syria is enslaved to American and Israeli interests in the region. Its goal is to carve up the Arab states into a multitude of small states, to weaken them in front of Israel."

This political uprising has not gone unnoticed by the Turkish opposition. Kemal Kilicdaroglu, leader of the social-democratic People's Republican Party - the AKP's main opponent - travelled to Reyhanli to present his condolences, and then went to Antakya, where he made a more political speech.

Before flying to Washington to meet President Obama, Erdogan declared: "We are the first victims of theSyrian crisis in the region. We cannot just stand by watching what's happening."

If Erdogan does not look inclined to change his policy on Syria, it is because he knows that Hatay Province - because of its unique history and location - is an isolated case. Even if there have been a few demonstrations here and there, the rest of the country has not reacted as fiercely.

Still, the government remains prudent. Authorities have banned TV channels from images of victims of the attack. This censorship does not come as a surprise. Local and presidential elections are scheduled for 2014, and Erdogan has a lot at stake.

Reprinted with permission from Worldcrunch.

There are, of course, some recent precedents for outside intervention in the affairs of nation states to bring about a change of regime or even to create a new national entity out of one region of the original country.

So in the 1990s NATO bombing forced Serbia to surrender its province of Kosovo which had an Albanian majority with a still significant Serbian minority population. Kosovo was then recognised as a new national entity by most of the international community. And it was a NATO-sponsored no-fly zone over Libya that largely resulted in the collapse of Muammar Gaddafi's rule and the takeover by a new government.

There was, however, no such outside support for Chechnya's efforts to separate from the Russian Federation in the 1990s or the struggle by the Tamils over many years (now seemingly ended) to split off from the rest of Sri Lanka.

Throughout history there has been a great deal of chance involved in whether rebel forces have received the outside support that many need to secede from the existing regime or to overthrow it altogether. If the Confederacy had been able to get significant international recognition in the early 1860s it might have been able to put more pressure on Abraham Lincoln's administration for a negotiated settlement. But its slave-based economy was not only the major factor in sparking the conflict. It was also a powerful disincentive for the nations of Europe, particularly England, to recognise its existence as a legal entity.

But back to Syria. There can hardly be any dispute the Assad regime is an extremely unattractive one and has engaged in brutal repression of a rebellion in some regions of the country. Is it, however, less attractive than the governments of, for example, Iran, Yemen or Saudi Arabia? To a large extent the conflict in Syria is a tribal one, between the ruling Alawites and the rebel Sunnis. The rebels obviously have access to weapons from outside the country and it can be assumed they are financed, at least in part, by their Sunni colleagues in Saudi Arabia.

But recall Afghanistan in the 80s. The US provided considerable support for the mujahedin who eventually toppled the government and forced the withdrawal of the Russian troops that had supported it. This led ultimately, however, to the rise of the Taliban and the use of Afghanistan as a training ground for terrorists. In a final irony the US was then compelled to intervene in a fashion reminiscent of the Russians in the 80s. There is no evidence the Syrian rebels have any interest in a more democratic and representative administration than that of Assad. Nor is there any evidence they would be more sympathetic to US interests in the Middle East, including the long-term goal of encouraging some kind of negotiated settlement between Israel and the Palestinians.

All of this does not make it any easier to watch the scenes of carnage that regularly emerge in reports from inside Syria.

But there are a number of regimes around the world that repress their own people in the most brutal fashion. How is it to be determined which of them will be left without physical interference (as opposed to diplomatic condemnation) and which will be the subject of military intervention? Many would say that the mass killings in Cambodia in the 70s and Rwanda in the 90s would justify intervention from outside. These are obviously extreme examples but they still raise the question of when the conduct of a sovereign state towards its own citizens justifies military action by an international organisation or by a neighbouring country.

In the days before television coverage of conflicts these questions were largely academic. But graphic images of the results of aerial bombardment and tank attacks has placed much greater pressure of international bodies and a great power like the US to intervene in the internal affairs of individual nations. The problem is that no one has so far successfully formulated a set of principles that would suggest when the line has been crossed that would authorise such intervention.

The cautious approach so far of Barack Obama in relation to the Syrian problem suggests that he at least is aware that this is a very difficult line to draw.

Michael Sexton SC is the author of several books on Australian politics and history.

I survived my first encounter with Jewish observance different from what I'd been brought up to believe was the one true form.

My home shul, the one where I was bar mitzva, Agudas Achim, in Columbus, Ohio, was what some today call "conservadox." Men sat on one side, women on the other, separate but equal, and in the middle, true integration.

But it was a long way from egalitarian. Years later, when I became a husband and then had a daughter, I wanted an egalitarian congregation and found one where the rabbi believed and taught that all Jews are created equal. Today egalitarianism is widely practiced throughout the United States, where nearly 90 percent of Jews are non-Orthodox.

Egalitarianism, however, is still a revolutionary concept in the only Jewish state and unless that changes it could drive a further wedge between Israel and American Jewry, which feels increasingly alienated by the excessive influence of the ultra-religious establishment over daily life.

The debate in Israel over keeping women in their place - at the back of the bus, off the stage, dressed properly, seen but not heard (especially if they sing) and, above all, obedient - is about much more than religious practices. It reaches into what kind of country Israel is and wants to be, and its relationship with or alienation from the rest of the Jewish world. Does it want to be a 21st-century democracy or a 17th-century theocracy? It is one thing for the ultra-religious to practice their belief system as they wish among themselves, and something wholly different when they try to impose it on the majority of the society, which is also expected to financially support them because so many do not have jobs or pay taxes.

A poll out this week shows 56% of Israelis support (34% oppose) a Supreme Court ruling that women have the right to pray at the Western Wall "as they see fit," even if some religious groups object.

Women of the Wall holds Rosh Hodesh service the first of every month at the Kotel. And how do the pious religious gentlemen who claim control of the Kotel respond? They spit at the women, throw rocks, curse them, toss chairs, yell and physically assault them. All in the name of God.

Last Friday they bused in hundreds of teenage girls to flood the women's section of the Kotel so the liberal women were forced far away on the plaza. But something had changed. Instead of arresting the women for such heinous crimes as wearing a tallit, the police protected them from assault by those pious, peace-loving holy men.

It's not just at the Wall. Little girls walking down the streets have been spit upon by haredi (ultra-Orthodox) men who disapproved of they way they were dressed; a woman soldier was harassed and called a "whore" when she refused to move to the back of the bus. Haredi soldiers walked out of a military ceremony because women soldiers were singing.

Two female researchers were not allowed on stage and forced to sit in the balcony at a Health Ministry ceremony where they were to receive awards for their work, because to do otherwise would offend some rabbis and the ultra-Orthodox deputy minister who was presiding.

Israel boasts to the world that it is the only democracy in its part of the world, that it has freedom of religion and all citizens are treated equally. But it doesn't practice what it preaches. Jews have more religious freedom in the United States and other western democracies than in Israel when it comes to conversion, marriage, worship, burial, divorce, immigration and deciding who is a Jew.

The ultra-Orthodox establishment's diktat goes beyond religion to encompass public transit, billboard advertising, daylight savings time, public ceremonies and even - or especially - the army. Few haredi men serve in the military and calls to draft them have been met with protests, threats and calls for violent resistance.

Some who do serve have been told by their rabbis to disobey the orders of their commanders that the rabbis object to, such as removal of illegal West Bank outposts.

A key to haredi power is their readiness barter their votes for government ministries in any coalition, Right or Left. They'll sell their votes on "minor" issues like defense and foreign policy in exchange for control of ministries important to their agenda, like immigration, housing, education and religious affairs. Not only do they get to dominate policy that affects their institutions, often riddled with corruption, but they also get access to the Treasury to pay for the things they want. Leaders of all major parties have gladly paid the price - in shekels and power - for haredi votes.

The current coalition is one of the few in recent years with no haredi parties; as a result, the attorney-general was recently able to order government ministries to end gender segregation in public transit, cemeteries, health clinics, radio airwaves and even public sidewalks. He also said he would ignore demands by the haredim to block a court ruling permitting women to pray freely and wear religious garb at the Kotel. It remains to be seen whether the Netanyahu government will back him up or try to avoid offending the religious extremists just in case they're needed some day to replace a secular coalition partner.

Who controls the Wall, or seating on buses, may seem unimportant to Jews thousands of miles away, but it is part of a larger picture of the tyranny of a minority and what that says to American Jews who believe in, want to identify with and work to build political support for Israel.

That alienation can do more damage to American backing for Israel than any Arab enemy can hope to achieve.

And that will be the day they begin asking, "Whose Israel is this?"

On May 2, around 400 people were slaughtered, and possibly as many as 800 disappeared, in the Syrian coastal hamlet of al-Bayda. Of those killed, 200 were buried in a mass grave in which only 150 bodies were identifiable, the rest having been mutilated beyond all recognition. According to The New York Times, which interviewed eyewitnesses and survivors of the massacre, pro-regime forces clad or semi-clad in military fatigues went house to house, separating men and boys above the age of 10 from women and younger children. Whole families were executed and images have since emerged showing children piled atop each other, some with half their faces blown off. Corpses later recovered in al-Bayda were said to include "the burned body of a baby just a few months old" and "a fetus ripped from a woman's belly." Two days later, on May 4, a similar massacre was repeated in Ras al-Nabeh, a district near the city of Baniyas.

In contrast to previous atrocities, the regime neither denied that these massacres had taken place nor tried to blame it on the opposition. Rather, it boasted of its success. State television claimed that the army had "crushed a number of terrorists," while pro-regime Facebook pages displayed those grisly photographs of butchered children, categorizing them as militants. Moreover, the National Defense Forces were evidently involved in the assault on al-Bayda and assumed the most barbaric role of beating, shooting, or stabbing families to death, then burning down their houses. This new-minted guerrilla army is actually a professionalized reinvention of the pro-regime Popular Committees, which were, prior to 2013, locally armed Alawite militias that coordinated closely with the Syrian security services, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and Hezbollah. Now the Committees are being trained up, along with Jaysh al-Sha'bi, the Syrian "Basiji," as the primary purveyors of state violence.

"The Syrian military doesn't know how to fight an urban insurgency," Elizabeth O'Bagy of the Institute for the Study of War told me. "The regime would have lost significant territory in Homs had it not been for Hezbollah moving in from Lebanon," a relocation that Hassan Nasrallah was reluctant to order. In a valuable briefing she published, O'Bagy observes that the regime's strategy isn't to carve out an Alawite rump state on the Mediterranean but to retain a necessary arms and personnel resupply line from Damascus to Latakia. That's because the regime's greatest security threat is not a Sunni-on-Alawite conflict, but rather an intra-Alawite one.

A recent example O'Bagy cites is the death of close relative of exiled Rifaat al-Assad, the brother of Hafez al-Assad best known for masterminding the 1982 Hama massacre and attempting a failed coup in the early 1980s. The relative has been dead for roughly two and a half weeks but lies unburied because Rifaat, who has postured as an "opposition" figure for years, has not gained permission from Damascus to return to Qardaha, the Assads' ancestral home, to attend her funeral. As a result, a lot of latent or dormant clan tensions have flared up again, tensions not made easier by the dwindling Alawite demography along the coast. Sunnis are now said to comprise 45 percent of the population of Tartous, half the population of Latakia, and 70 percent of the population of the Latakia outskirts, which only means that they have been tolerated by Alawites in these areas - a phenomenon that is retrograde to the divide-and-rule strategy that Assad has pursued from the start of the uprising. The wholesale slaughter of Sunni communities in Houla, Quebair, Tremseh, al-Bayda, and Banias is therefore meant to dial up inter-tribal hatred and precipitate Sunni reprisal attacks.

The messaging in this regard has been unmistakable. The savagery in Banias occurred almost simultaneously with the leaking of an undated YouTube video showing a Turkish Alawite commander from Hatay province called Mihrac Ural discussing the need to "cleanse and liberate" the Alawite strongholds of the Syrian coast. Presented next to Sheikh Mouaffac Ghazal, an Alawite cleric (a rare sight in pro-regime propaganda), Ural is in fact a secular communist, whose curriculum vitae is is reminiscent of an Anatolian Carlos the Jackal. He was imprisoned in Turkey briefly after his participation in the 1970s in the Marxist-Leninist People's Liberation Party/Front, as well as its splinter faction Acilciler (the "Hasty Ones"), which is widely believed to have been the creation of Syrian intelligence. Released in 1980, Ural relocated to Syria and gained citizenship there. He's rumored to have been the man who first introduced Abdullah Ocalan, the now-imprisoned head of the Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK), to Hafez al-Assad.

Former CIA officer and counter-terrorism expert Edward Mickolus believes that Ural married Rifaat al-Assad's secretary, which would have made him extremely close to the fiefdom in Damascus that was in charge of the Defense Companies, one of the most elite (and overwhelmingly Alawite) regime protection forces until the early 1980s. Ural now heads the Syrian Resistance, an Alawite super-militia, that is suspected as the main perpetrator behind the Ras al-Nabeh massacre.

Following the Al Bayda attack, Ural spoke a funeral for a local militiaman, vowing to wage war against Saudi Arabian-supported rebels, and pledging fealty to Assad. Ural has also been implicated as the mastermind behind the car bombings in Reyhanli last week, which killed 51 people and were clearly designed to exacerbate both Turkish-Syrian and Alawite-Sunni animosities in that restive city.

That a thirty-year Red conscript of the mukhabarat is resurfacing just as the regime relies more and more on Khomeinist proxies is hardly a coincidence. It should also give the United States pause in its already ridiculous pursuit of further diplomatic efforts with Damascus. It's not entirely clear that a regime per se still exists, much less controls the loyalist swaths of Syria any more. Agents more akin to the Sudanese janjaweed or Rwandan impuzamugambi now appear to be the ones in charge.

Michael Weiss is a columnist for NOW Lebanon and the editor-in-chief of The Interpreter, a Russian translation journal sponsored by the Institute of Modern Russia. Follow him on Twitter @michaeldweiss. Reprinted with permission.

That Abbas continues to meet with Israelis on a regular basis in Ramallah does not seem to bother Fatah.

Nor does Fatah seem to be bothered that Palestinian security officers work closely together with their Israeli counterparts in the West Bank. That is called "security coordination" between the Palestinians and Israel.

But when Palestinian youths are invited to meet with Israelis as part of an interfaith dialogue project, Fatah is quick to issue denunciations and threats.

When Palestinian and Israeli teenagers are invited to play football together as part of a project to promote peace and coexistence, Fatah is also quick to react.

But Fatah has no problem when Abbas or any top Palestinian official meets with Israelis.

Nor does Fatah have a problem with some of its senior representatives carrying Israeli-issued VIP cards that grant them various privileges that are denied to most Palestinians, such as permission to enter Israel and avoid waiting at Israel Defense Force checkpoints.

Palestinian youths from Hebron, though, who met with Israelis near Bethlehem to share their problems and insights have been forced to issue a statement distancing themselves from the meeting.

Following threats from Fatah, which condemned the event as a form of "normalization" with Israel, the Palestinian participants claimed that they had been "misled" regarding the true goals of the meeting.

This claim was clearly issued because of the "anti-normalization" campaign waged by Fatah over the past few years. This is a campaign that -- in the context of "peace" and "coexistence" projects that are often sponsored and funded by the European Union and the U.S. -- aims at banning meetings between Israeli and Palestinians.

The most recent victims of the anti-normalization drive are Palestinian boys and girls who committed the "crime" of playing in a football match against Israeli teenagers. When pictures of the match appeared in the media, Fatah rushed to issue threats against the Palestinian players and those behind the tournament.

Organizers of the "anti-normalization" campaign, most of whom belong to Abbas's Fatah faction, have been boasting that, in recent years, they have succeeded in thwarting dozens of planned meetings between Israelis and Palestinians.

But Fatah has not condemned its own leader, Abbas, for meeting with Yacimovich and other Israelis.

The real problem here is that Abbas himself has not come out against Fatah's campaign of intimidation and threats. By remaining silent, Abbas in fact appears to have endorsed the "anti-normalization" campaign -- at least so long as its does not affect him personally.

The Fatah activists who are threatening Palestinian teenagers and youths for talking to Israelis and playing football with them are the same people who claim, at least in public, that they support the peace process with Israel.

But how can there ever be a peace process when any Palestinian who meets with an Israeli is immediately denounced as a traitor? It is worth noting that most of these denunciations are coming from the "moderate" Fatah, and not from Hamas.

It now remains to be seen how Fatah will react if and when U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry persuades Abbas to return to the negotiating table with Israel. Will Fatah condemn Abbas for advocating "normalization with the Israeli enemy" when he sits at the negotiating table? Or will Fatah continue to go only after Palestinian boys and girls who just want to have fun and play football?

Khaled Abu Toameh is an Arab-Israeli journalist, lecturer and documentary filmmaker. This article is reprinted with permission from the Gatestone Institute.

First and most important, the overriding goal should be to end this Forever War, not engage in a perpetual "global war on terror," without geographic or temporal limits.

Second, this is not a conflict without end, and there is a strategy to end it, outlined below. In November, also at the Oxford Union, Jeh Johnson, then general counsel of the United States Department of Defense, argued that in the conflict against Al Qaeda and its affiliates:

"there will come a tipping point - ... at which so many of the leaders and operatives of al Qaeda and its affiliates have been killed or captured, and the group is no longer able to attempt or launch a strategic attack against the United States, such that al Qaeda as we know it, the organization that our Congress authorized the military to pursue in 2001, has been effectively destroyed. At that point, we must be able to say to ourselves that our efforts should no longer be considered an "armed conflict" against al Qaeda and its associated forces; rather, a counterterrorism effort against individuals who are the scattered remnants of al Qaeda, or are parts of groups unaffiliated with al Qaeda...."

The key question going forward will thus be whether the US treats new groups that rise up to commit acts of terror as "associated forces" of Al Qaeda with whom it's already at war. This seems unwise, as under both domestic and international law, the United States has ample legal authority to respond to new groups that would attack without declaring war forever against anyone hostile to the country. More fundamentally, the United States is at war with Al Qaeda, not with any idea or religion, or with mere propagandists, journalists or sad individuals, like the recent Boston bombers, who may become radicalized, inspired by Al Qaeda's ideology, but never joining Al Qaeda itself.

Third, in regard to this conflict, the Obama administration has differed from its predecessor in three key respects. First, it has acknowledged that the United States is strictly bound by domestic and international law. Under domestic law, the administration has acknowledged that its authority derives from Acts of Congress, not just the president's vague constitutional powers. Under international law, this administration has expressly recognized that US actions are constrained by the laws of war, and it has worked hard to translate the spirit of those laws and apply them.

The Geneva Conventions envisioned two types of conflict - international armed conflicts between nation-states and non-international armed conflicts between states and insurgent groups within a single country, for example, a government versus a rebel faction located within that country. But September 11 made clear that the term "non-international armed conflicts" can also include transnational battles, for example, between a nation-state like the United States and a transnational non-state armed group like Al Qaeda that attacks it. The US Supreme Court has instructed the US government to translate the existing laws of war to this different type of "non-international" armed conflict.

Second, in conducting this more limited conflict, the administration has shown an absolute commitment to humane treatment of Al Qaeda suspects. Third, the Obama administration has determined not to address Al Qaeda and the Taliban solely through the tools of war. Instead, this administration has stated a longer-term objective - a "smart power" approach - under which force is used for limited and defined purposes within a much broader nonviolent frame, with the over-arching aim being to use diplomacy, development, education and people-to-people outreach to challenge Al Qaeda's ideology and diminish its appeal. Applying this approach, the Obama administration has combined a law-of-war approach with law-enforcement methods to bring all available tools to bear against Al Qaeda. In a remote part of Afghanistan, a law-of-war approach might be appropriate, but in London or New York, a law enforcement approach is surely more fitting. In either case, the US response to a suspect turns not on whether we generically label a person an "enemy combatant," but on whether we assemble the facts to prove that a particular person's behavior reveals that he is part of Al Qaeda.

So how to end the Forever War? President Obama should now diligently pursue three previously announced aims of US policy: 1) disengage from Afghanistan, 2) close Guantanamo and 3) discipline drones.

Disengaging from Afghanistan is fully underway, but three challenges loom. First, in transferring control of detention facilities, the US must ensure that transfers comply with obligations under international law not to return detainees to persecution or torture, and that future detentions comply with fair process and treatment obligations. Second, the US must work closely with the Afghans to help secure what Secretary of State John Kerry has called a "credible, safe, secure, all-inclusive, ... transparent, and accountable presidential election" to succeed Hamid Karzai in 2014. Third, the Afghan government must tackle the controversial task of negotiating with the Taliban. In so doing, it's crucial to build upon the myriad advances that have expanded individual freedom within Afghan civil society over the last decade.

Closing Guantanamo permanently is long past overdue. The US military prison in Cuba has 166 detainees, 76 fewer than in 2009. More than 100 of the detainees are on hunger strike, with many being force-fed. President Obama has acknowledged, "Guantanamo is not necessary to keep America safe. It is expensive. It is inefficient. It hurts us in terms of our international standing."

Crucially, he does not need a new policy to close Guantanamo. He just needs to put the full weight of his office behind the sensible policy first announced in 2009: Resume transfer of those who are cleared for transfer, try the triable, grant periodic review of those in law of war detention, resist further congressional restrictions and appoint a high-level White House envoy to implement the foregoing.

The goal of decimating Al Qaeda's core leads to the final contentious issue, disciplining drones. Critics often ask, "How, as a human rights advocate, could you criticize torture, while as a government lawyer, you defended the legality of drones?" The answer is sad, but simple: Torture is always unlawful. But killing those with whom a country is at war may be lawful, so long as the laws of war are strictly followed. It is the duty of government lawyers to police the line between those violent acts that are lawful and unlawful, and distinguish between those uses of force that do and do not on balance promote the human rights of innocent civilians.

Drones are not per se unlawful. If accurately targeted, they could be far more discriminate and lawful than indiscriminate weapons. The main problem is not drones, but that the Bush administration grossly mismanaged its response to 9/11. Instead of acting surgically against Al Qaeda when it had the chance, the administration squandered global goodwill by invading Iraq, committing torture, opening Guantanamo, flouting domestic and international law, and undermining civilian courts.

Left to pick up the pieces, Obama got off to a promising start, but that effort has slowed. Since 2010, the Obama administration has not done enough to be transparent about legal standards and its decision-making process. Small wonder that the public has lost track of the real issue, which is not drone technology per se, but the need for transparent, agreed-upon domestic and international legal process and standards. The Obama administration should now make public and transparent its legal standards and institutional processes for targeting and drone strikes, give facts to show why past strikes were necessary, and consult with Congress and allies on principled standards going forward. Most important, he should oppose proposed legislation that would grant him unneeded new authority to strike new shadowy foes.

The real and pressing issue facing the United States is how to end the Forever War underway since 2001. If the Obama administration cannot persuade its citizens, Congress and its closest allies that its drone program is legal, necessary for that task and under control, it will be hard for President Obama to see that war to its much-needed conclusion or take the other steps needed to secure the peace.

Harold Hongju Koh is Sterling Professor of International Law and former dean (2004-09), Yale Law School; former legal adviser, US Department of State (2009-13); former assistant secretary of state for democracy, human rights and labor (1998-2001). This essay is a condensed and edited version of a speech to the Oxford Union on May 7, 2013, and reflects his personal views, not that of any institution of which he is or has been affiliated.

© 2013 Yale Center for the Study of Globalization

(AP Photo)

At the Sankt Oberholz café, Germany's future lies in the balance. Here, in Berlin's "trendy" Mitte district, an international crowd of entrepreneurial 20 and 30-somethings meet. They make up two camps.

On one side, you have those who prefer to speak English as they discuss their new projects and business plans. On the other side, you have the Italians - the Oberholz has become the meeting place for the Italian start-up scene in Berlin. The Italians have come to the German capital because there's more creative freedom here than in Italy, where bureaucracy hinders new ventures and the recession takes care of the rest.

An aging German society can use all this young, well-educated talent. That's why Germany's Minister for Labor and Social Affairs, Ursula von der Leyen, referred to a "stroke of fortune" when she recently presented the latest figures for migration to Germany.

More than a million people came to Germany last year. If you deduct the ones who left, that's an increase of 369,000. There hasn't been this many since 1995. However there's no comparison between the people who came back then and the ones arriving now. In 1995, Germany's economy was not in good shape; the country was still trying to digest the consequences of re-unification and unemployment was high - so immigrants were perceived more as a threat than anything else.

Eighteen years later, the economy is booming, unemployment compared to other European countries is remarkably low - and skilled talent on the workforce is dwindling. What's more, the penny has dropped that in the face of an aging population, Germany can only keep up being a generous welfare state if immigration compensates for the low birth-rate.

More importantly - the type of immigrant has changed. For a long time, Germany attracted immigrants with low-level qualifications - people who stood the most chance of losing their job at some point and having to be helped out by the state.

According to the most recent study by the Expert Council of German Foundations on Integration and Migration (SVR), that situation has now reversed itself and the new immigrants are on average better educated than the native German population. Culturally they are also closer to Germans than earlier immigrants: most of them come from other European countries. The first non-European country on the list - occupying eighth place - is Turkey.

"America in Europe"

Unsurprisingly, many of the immigrants come from the southern European crisis-hit countries: there was a 45% increase in people from Spain, followed by Greeks and Portuguese (43% increase) and finally there were 40% more Italians.

In absolute numbers, however, immigrants from eastern European countries top the list. Since the collapse of Communism, Germany has slowly regained the role it enjoyed before the Nazi era as a cultural and economic magnet for Eastern Europe - something that is only encouraged by the presence of so many German companies in the region.

Anybody in Eastern Europe who is aiming for a successful career in a multinational company thinks of Germany in the same way they might think of the UK or the United States. For many young, well-educated Eastern Europeans, Germany is a country of opportunity where hard work and good performance can take you straight up the career ladder. In that sense, Germany is the smaller, geographically closer "America in Europe."

And that fact is starting to hit home in southern European countries as well. However there is the language hurdle, and the fact that the education given at southern European universities and technical colleges often does not correspond to the needs of employers, contribute to the fact that - even in this mega-crisis - Europe so far does not really have a flexible job market.

Everybody wins when educated, but jobless, young people migrate to places where their skills are needed. The young people win because their horizons are broadened. Strong economies like Germany's come out ahead because they can not only cover their needs for a skilled workforce but draw innovative talent. And in the end, the southern countries will win too when some of those immigrants return once the crisis is over, bringing with them professional experience, new ideas, and valuable contacts.

Germany, however, should not make the mistake of thinking that all this means it has found a magic formula for dealing with its demographic issues. The international start-up community that gathers at Berlin's Sankt Oberholz café is made up of world citizens who can, just as quickly as they came to Germany, pull up stakes and move elsewhere if we make things difficult for them with bureaucratic hurdles, over-regulation, unfairly high taxation, or for that matter outbreaks of xenophobia.

The same goes for engineers and other well-qualified immigrants needed in the economic powerhouse that is southern Germany. It is only if we give them the feeling of being welcome, and needed, that we will succeed in drawing now, but also in the future, the inflow of smart talent essential for a healthy economy and prosperous future.

Reprinted with permission from Worldcrunch.

The two-year-old Syrian crisis has now come to a point where Iran is on the defensive, as its positions in Lebanon and Iraq come under threat. But Washington's talks with Moscow in an effort to reach a negotiated settlement on the Syria crisis may indicate that the United States is not interested in allowing the pendulum to swing in the other direction this time around.

Remember that the United States had a bad, decadeslong experience with Sunni domination of the Middle East. It was Sunni dominance, in which the Shias were not sufficiently feared, that helped lead to a phalanx of Arab dictators -- in Egypt, Saudi Arabia and elsewhere -- who had little incentive to quell anti-Americanism in their midst. Such Leaders as Hosni Mubarak in Egypt and King Fahd in Saudi Arabia fostered a rotten and calcified political climate that was relatively empty of reform, while quietly tolerant of extremism, which resulted in the leader of the 9/11 terrorist cell being Egyptian and 15 of his 18 cohorts being Saudis. But at least the likes of Fahd and Mubarak ran strong states that cooperated with Western intelligence agencies: Perhaps not so the Sunni Islamists who might yet gain even more influence and power in Egypt and Syria. The last thing the West should want is a situation in Syria in which radical Sunni Islamist forces are able to project power in the region, especially across the country's eastern border into Iraq.

Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's quasi-democratic regime may be short on stability and long on thuggery, and it may be unduly interfered with by the Iranians, but at least it forms the basis of a state that might over time evolve in a better direction -- and therefore influence Iranian Shi'ism for the better, with Karbala and Najaf affecting debates in Qom. Allowing Iraq to fall will not just create a wider geopolitical space for jihadists to operate, it will also be a total reversal to the American efforts to establish democracy in Iraq. Furthermore, from the American point of view, the Shia-dominated Iraqi regime serves as a major counterbalance to Salafists gaining ground in the Sunni Arab world.

The Salafist threat is even greater when considering that Saudi Arabia, a country led by aging, Brezhnevite rulers, with a diminishing underground water table, a demographic male youth bulge and 40 percent youth unemployment, is weakening. The Sudairi Seven -- the seven sons of Ibn Saud's favorite wife, Hassa bint Ahmad al-Sudairi -- who lent coherence to the Saudi power structure, have all but disappeared. Nineteen grandsons and 16 surviving sons of Abdulaziz now compete on the Allegiance Council. And outside the Council there are many more grandsons. This is too large a group not to engage in complex factionalism, which could weaken the regime that has thus far remained resilient and make it difficult to deal with pressing problems. No one should underestimate the inherent artificiality of the Saudi state, built around the parched and deeply conservative upland of Najd, which has always struggled to subdue the more cosmopolitan maritime peripheries like Hijaz. The last thing Washington should want is to build a new Middle East around Saudi Arabia, which itself has entered a period of great uncertainty and is resolved to weakening Iranian influence in the northern rim of the Middle East at all costs -- even if it means empowering jihadists.

By contrast, while the Iranian empire -- as well as this particular Iranian regime -- may be facing severe crises, the Iranian state is more coherent than that of Saudi Arabia. Whereas Saudi Arabia is not synonymous with the Arabian Peninsula, Iran is more-or-less synonymous with the Iranian plateau, which straddles the Middle East and Central Asia as well as the two energy-producing regions of the Persian Gulf and the Caspian Sea. Rather than an artificial contrivance of a single family, Shiite Iran -- with its relative geographic logic -- is heir to Iranian states going back to antiquity, when Persia was the world's first superpower. Iran encapsulates a rich and eclectic civilization. Even under the present regime, in Iran there is a semblance of a democratic foundation, while in Saudi Arabia there is an utter lack of any sense of democracy. Always remember that the clerical hold over the Islamic republic is not eternal, even as the West is culturally much closer to Iran than to Saudi Arabia. The West should therefore be prepared in coming years for regionwide upheavals in which its alliances are rearranged.

Iran, with its nearly 76 million people, is the second-most populous country in the Middle East after Egypt, while its level of education and bureaucratic institutionalization is higher. The U.S. estrangement from Iran has already lasted over a third of a century -- a decade longer than the U.S. estrangement from "Red" China. This cannot go on forever. Washington cannot allow Iran to undermine American regional interests. But the United States should, nevertheless, attempt to create conditions favorable for a robust American-Iranian dialogue that will balance its warm relations with Saudi Arabia. The clerical regime may fall or more likely transform itself over time as a consequence.

We realize how extremely difficult this will be: Marg bar Amrika ("Death to America") is the bumper sticker of the Iranian revolution. It will be the last thing the clerical regime gives up. But whereas artificial states like Iraq, Syria and Libya are perennially threatened with implosion and Saudi Arabia's future evolution is uncertain, Iran will hopefully go on under evolving and strong central leadership.

We say "hopefully" because the Western-imposed sanctions regime could threaten to leave power in Tehran in the hands of revolutionary forces better positioned to control patronage networks within a shrinking economy. And a decentralization of power -- just at the time Iran reaches the nuclear threshold -- is potentially a greater danger than a centrally controlled, nuclear Iran. That is generally the fear of Iran specialist Vali Nasr, author of The Shia Revival (2006) and The Dispensable Nation: American Foreign Policy in Retreat (2013).

Weakening central authority -- not the continuation of autocracy -- remains the greatest danger to the region. Keep in mind that stability in the Middle East has never been a matter of democracy. To date, Israel has only signed peace treaties with Arab autocrats, men who ran strong states and who could purge members of their own power structures who disagreed with them. It is not democracy that the United States should primarily want, but a regional balance of power that will reduce the risk of war.

Now that Iran is being weakened by the slow-motion collapse of Bashar al Assad's Alawite regime, a chaotic Syria will likely become -- even more so -- the fulcrum of a power struggle between Iran and the Sunni Arab world for years to come, preventing either side from being able to dominate the region.

Cold wars are tolerable precisely because they are cold. And a new cold war in the Middle East, assuming sectarian violence can be kept down at a reasonable level, will be something that policymakers in Washington may see as being in the American interest. A region balanced at least has the possibility to be a region at relative peace, with a Shiite bastion composed of Tehran and Baghdad facing off against a belt of Sunni revivalism stretching from Egypt to Anbar in western Iraq. It is for this reason that Barack Obama's administration should not be in favor of a zero-sum result in Syria.

Robert D. Kaplan is Chief Geopolitical Analyst at Stratfor, a geopolitical analysis firm, and author of the bestselling book The Revenge of Geography. Kamran Bokhari is VP of Middle Eastern & South Asian Affairs at Stratfor. Reprinted with permission. 

Amid many incidents of violence and bloodshed aimed at thwarting the parliamentary elections, Pakistanis have voted for a democratic transition from one civilian government to another -- the first since the creation of Pakistan in 1947.

But will it deliver a stable and effective government capable of curing Pakistan's deep economic, social and security problems and foreign policy dilemmas while reining in the military and the Inter-Services Intelligence?

The election results are not as decisive as analysts have indicated. The Muslim League of Nawaz Sharif has won the largest number of seats, and will have no difficulty securing a simple majority, with support from a number of independents and smaller parties in the National Assembly.
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But to lead a stable, effective government and adopt structural reforms, Sharif would need a very solid parliamentary majority. The best option would be to enlist support from Imran Khan's Tareek-i-Insaf (PTI) and President Asif Zardari's Pakistan People's Party as part of building a national consensus. Yet it is this consensus that has been lacking among Pakistan's political elite.

Sharif and Zardari have been bitter rivals during the life of the last PPP-led parliament. Khan represents the aspirations of the young generation of Pakistanis. This puts him at odds with Sharif, who in many ways is tied to the "old guard" Punjabi majority.

Whatever the outcome, Sharif is likely to lead a very uneasy government. He cannot expect to have the kind of parliamentary support that could enable him to address effectively Pakistan's economic and security ills, divisions and endemic corruption.

Ideologically, he stands a better chance of success than the secularist PPP-led government did in seeking a settlement with the Pakistani Taliban to rein in violence. But it is by no means assured.

To generate the stability and security that is a prerequisite for tackling all other problems, Sharif would need the support of Khan, whose party has emerged as the biggest electoral winner in Pakhtunkhwa province, where the Pakistan Taliban has its roots and the Afghan Taliban and their affiliates have safe havens.

Beyond this, he would require the solid backing and loyalty of the military and ISI. Many analysts believe these forces have been instrumental in keeping Pakistan's disparate national groups together, but at the cost of undermining the necessary conditions for shaping a democratic and prosperous country.

The military and ISI boast a pervasive share in the political, economic and cultural life of Pakistan and control its nuclear arsenals. They also have enormous influence in the conduct of Pakistan's foreign policy, especially in relation to India and Afghanistan.

As well as being confronted with a growing Taliban militancy of its own, Pakistan has played a critical part in supporting the Afghan Taliban insurgency, seriously undermining the efforts of the US and its allies to stabilise Afghanistan.

The Pakistani military and security apparatus have had a hand in both. They originally nurtured the two developments as foreign policy tools for wider regional ambitions against India. Although they have grown weary of the Pakistani Taliban, they still appear determined to leverage the political landscape in post-2014 Afghanistan, when most of the US and NATO troops have withdrawn from the country, according to Pakistan's geopolitical preferences.

How a Sharif-led government could tame the military and ISI to act within a democratic framework and wrest from them control of Pakistan's Afghanistan and India policies will be a major challenge. In Turkey, the ruling moderate Islamist Justice and Development Party has been largely successful in this respect.

However, it took more than a decade to reach this goal. Given Pakistan's myriad domestic problems and foreign policy complications, the task of limiting the political space for the military and ISI is not going to be easy at all.

Another critical issue is relations with the US, which have been strained over the latter's unpopular drone operations. Sharif has already called for better relations with India, Afghanistan and the US, but it is not something that could be accomplished easily, given the depth of issues involved in these relations.

Even so, Pakistanis deserve to be applauded for holding the parliamentary elections, as problematic as they may have been.

A Sharif-led government should be widely supported by the international community to bring order to Pakistan. Sharif has been prime minister twice before (1990-1993 and 1997-1999). The first time he was dismissed on corruption charges and the second time he was overthrown by General Pervez Musharraf and forced into exile.

He has the experience and potential the third time round to be more effective.

Amin Saikal is professor of political science and director of the Centre for Arab and Islamic Studies (the Middle East and Central Asia) at the Australian National University.

Enter Ayatollah Akbar Hashmei Rafsanjani, the outspoken former president thought to have fallen out of favor with the establishment despite an active public life. After the 1999 student protests, he led a Friday sermon at Tehran University praising the use of government force in quelling dissent. In 2005, he lost another bid for the presidency to Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. During the 2009 election crisis he initially ducked the hardest questions being asked by reformists, but would go on to say that Iranians should be treated appropriately and authorities should allow vibrant discussion. In 2011 Rafsanjani lost his post as chairman of the Assembly of Experts to a hardline ally of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, only to be reappointed to the Expediency Discernment Council by none other than the Khamenei. Suffice it to say, Rafsanjani has cultivated his reputation as the "wily cleric" of Iranian politics: a loyal survivor, faithful to the system of government that affords him influence for as long it secures his interests.

Rafsanjani's entry into the election posits two important questions that merit serious consideration. First, would Rafsanjani not have entered the election if he did not have the blessing of Khamenei? That is unlikely, as far too much of his wealth and power is tied into the system to upset the delicate balance of power between two of the most influential political families in Iran.

Secondly, is it possible Khamenei consented to such a scenario in the interest of maintaining the status quo? Many, would argue just the opposite -- that Rafsanjani and the reformists who will support him, including former President Mohammad Khatami, pose a threat to the system. Contrary to that notion, the fervent supporters of Ahmadinejad's ally Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei pose the gravest threat to a carefully orchestrated political order. Khamenei may tacitly support Rafsanjani not out of the hope that he will win, but that he will at least keep the secular nationalists at bay. Should he actually win, the interests of those whom first established the Islamic Republic would be well looked after, and especially the powerful clerical establishment who cemented their authority with the constitutional referendum of 1989.

Political intrigue and heated debate will bring domestic politics to the fore of discussion among Iranians in the coming month. The mainstream narrative suggests Rafsanjani has shaken up the political landscape and will represent a major challenge for hardliners loyal to Khamenei and the system. The question Iranians must ask themselves is: just how shaken up could it possibly be?

Michael Miner is a Teaching Fellow at Harvard University and a member of the International Society for Iranian Studies.

(AP Photo)

Last August, the president vowed "[t]here would be enormous consequences if we start seeing movements on the chemical weapons front or the use of chemical weapons." Doubtless this was meant to deter Assad from tapping his chemical weapon stockpiles. But Assad called Obama's bluff, embarrassing the U.S.

Iran is following the Syrian conflict closely, and for two hugely important reasons. One, Syria is one of Iran's strategic allies. If the Assad regime falls, Iran loses its direct line of support to Hezbollah in Lebanon. Two, the Iranian regime is watching the U.S. response to Assad's provocations to see just how much it can get away with. Tehran now knows Mr. Obama's red lines aren't to be taken seriously.

U.S. inaction also informs Mr. Assad that he has more breathing space; he can continue to wreak carnage against his own people without fear of American meddling. It also sends a broad message to the world: The U.S. is actually quite tolerant of chemical weapons use.

That epiphany may embolden American enemies; it should certainly worry our allies. It's bound to increase the risk that more nations will acquire -- and use -- mass casualty weapons.

Mr. Obama's reluctance to get involved in another Middle East conflict is understandable. But sometimes limited involvement up front is necessary to preclude prolonged military engagement later.

Collecting evidence about what's going on before acting is a no-brainer. But wherever there is conflict, it is impossible to get a complete and crystal-clear picture about what is where and who is doing what -- especially at the tactical level. What Clausewitz called the "fog of war" exists in every single military conflict and it's the reality in which every American president must make decisions and authorize operations.

Also understandable is the president's preference for securing the cooperation of allies in undertaking whatever intervention is deemed necessary. It's something that should be pursued. But our allies will be more likely to pitch in if the president has a plan. And as for the UN working alongside the U.S. ... that's a pipe dream. Russia holds a veto in the Security Council, and Moscow not only wants Assad to succeed, it wants America to fail.

So far, the president has failed to advance American interests in the Syrian conflict one inch. It isn't even clear what the president realistically wants to see happen in Syria.

The White House issued a nice press release in February 2012. It said, "We will help because we stand for principles that include universal rights for all people and just political and economic reform. The suffering citizens of Syria must know: we are with you, and the Assad regime must come to an end."

Doubtless, Syria's "suffering citizens" agree. After all, Assad has tragically killed roughly 70,000 of them. But the Obama administration has provided little help to bring the regime to an end.

At the start of the revolution, the U.S. should have begun cultivating relationships with the non-Islamist factions of the opposition and worked doggedly to consolidate their power. It didn't. Instead, it weighed its options for months on end. And, all the while, terrorist groups gained power within the opposition, making it increasingly harder for the U.S. to support them.

This has raised the stakes in Syria, while making intervention all the more challenging. Assad is now desperate enough to use chemical weapons on his people to maintain power. The risk of a humanitarian catastrophe is tremendous -- and so is the threat that Syria remains a terrorist state; a chemical WMD-using arm of Iran.

Like it or not, what happens in Syria does not stay in Syria. Rather, it directly affects American security.

"Boots on the ground" or "hollow threats" is a false choice. The Commander in Chief needs to explain to the American people why stability in Syria is necessary for their security. Then, he needs to do whatever he can to empower the non-Islamist factions within the opposition, including providing arms.

Yes, those weapons could end up being used against Americans. But right now that risk must be weighed against the down-stream risk of chemical weapons being used against Americans.

Will President Obama do everything in his power to help force an outcome in Syria that is more favorable to the United States? Unfortunately, that remains an open question.

Rebeccah Heinrichs is a Visiting Fellow at The Heritage Foundation.

(AP Photo)

Beijing hopes to maximize its influence in the Council, as that body takes on more importance in managing the vast Arctic-a region with enormous economic, environmental, and potentially even military significance. As Gustav Lind, Sweden's Arctic ambassador and the Council's outgoing chair, told the New York Times last year: "We've changed from a forum to a decision-making body."

At a May 15th meeting in Kiruna, Sweden, which Secretary of State John Kerry is scheduled to attend, the Arctic Council will consider China's application along with those of several other aspirants, including the European Union. Council decisions are made by consensus, and the Wall Street Journal reports that the Obama administration has not yet decided whether it will support or oppose Beijing's drive for observer status. The United States should reject China's application, based on both the Arctic Council's formal criteria and Beijing's disregard for the values the Arctic Council is intended to uphold.

Washington probably hoped to sidestep responsibility for dealing with China's application for observer status. It was widely expected that Norway would thwart Beijing's candidacy in light of the harsh retaliation Oslo received after the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize went to Liu Xiaobo. In 2009, China sentenced Liu to 11 years in jail for his writings about political liberties and his signing of Charter 08, a democracy and human rights manifesto initially signed by over 350 Chinese intellectuals and activists on the 60th anniversary of the United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Beijing's desire to participate in the Arctic Council gave Norway a valuable card to play on Liu's behalf. As Leiv Lunde of the Fridtjof Nansen Institute told The Guardian in March: "There are not many areas where Norway is important to China at all, but the Arctic is one of them." But Norway has apparently sold itself-and Liu Xiaobo-short by accepting Chinese promises to end its bullying in exchange for Oslo changing its position on the observer application. It would be irresponsible to reward Beijing's tactic of behaving aggressively to win concessions and then gain credit for ending its bad behavior. Other members of the Council should also use the leverage Beijing's application provides to press for Liu Xiaobo's release.

With Norway committed to supporting Beijing, the burden is now on the United States to stop Beijing's application. The clearest reason to block China's application to the Arctic Council is its disregard of its neighbors' claims to sovereignty in the South China Sea and East China Sea, where Beijing has engaged in dangerous provocations in recent months. In fact, China's official newspaper published an article last week claiming that China may own Okinawa, the home to some 1.3 million Japanese citizens. Clearly this behavior falls short of the respect for other states' sovereignty required of observers.

China's treatment of Tibet is another indicator why it does not belong on the Arctic Council. Over and above the violation of Tibet's sovereignty, Beijing's policies of repression, environmental degradation, and the influx of ethnic Han Chinese into Tibet make China an unsuitable participant in the Arctic Council, which requires observers to respect the Arctic's indigenous peoples. Although most Tibetans would not consider themselves indigenous to China, the Chinese Communist Party's condescension toward Tibetan civilization and the justification of its invasion as "liberation" is a relevant consideration for Arctic states.

Furthermore, Council proceedings are distinguished by the participation of non-governmental organizations on an equal footing. Civil society in China is tightly controlled and groups that attempt to mobilize public opinion find themselves harassed and often shut down. The Arctic Council members should not fool themselves once admitted as a permanent observer, Beijing's Communist leaders will change.

Beijing's application forces the Arctic Council's members to ask themselves what kind of organization they want. Although the Ottawa Declaration, the Arctic Council's founding document, makes no express reference to democracy and the rule of law as criteria for membership or observer status, all of the Council's founding member countries were democracies at the time. Russia, an original member of the Arctic Council, has seen political regression under Vladimir Putin, and is designated "not free" by Freedom House. That is no reason to compromise standards to approve China's observer status. Indeed, all of the other current observer states-namely, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, and the United Kingdom-are democracies. This standard will become more important as the Council's responsibilities and influence expand.

At a recent academic conference, experts predicted that although Beijing's application will succeed, Canada will likely block the European Union's application for observer status because of a feud over the EU's on ban seal products. If China's application succeeds and the EU's application fails, that outcome would reflect badly on the Arctic Council and every one of its members.

Ellen Bork is Director of Democracy and Human Rights at the Foreign Policy Initiative.

(AP Photo)

These are familiar cliches of the romantic French capital, except that along the Rue des Archives, the couples in question are likely to be same-sex.

This is the Marais neighborhood, a favorite hangout of gay Parisians and a scene of celebration on April 23 when lawmakers in the Assemblee nationale, just down the Seine river, voted 331 to 225 to write same-sex marriage into law.

That celebration, however, was tinged with concern.

The Socialist government's bill to make France the world's 14th country to legalize gay marriage has unleashed a wave of opposition that has mobilized mass demonstrations and revealed a current of homophobia running deep and wide through French society.

"France has generally evolved positively in its attitudes to homosexuality, to the point that many people thought homophobia no longer exists. Well, now we know that it's still there," said Elisabeth Ronzier, head of the campaign group SOS Homophobie.

Her organization, which campaigns against violence and discrimination, has seen calls to its helpline increase three-fold this year, Ronzier told GlobalPost.

While gay couples are lining up to marry, opponents have launched a legal challenge at the Constitutional Court to block the legislation. A "national demonstration day" in favor of the "rights of children to have a mother and a father" has been called for May 26.

Leading organizers deny charges of homophobia and have sought to distance themselves from more hardline anti-gay protesters. They disowned the designers of a poster for the May 26 event which portrayed Justice Minister Christiane Taubira, who is black, as an enraged gorilla.

Nevertheless, grass-roots supporters of the movement frequently use homophobic language and gay-rights groups report a rise in violent attacks since the protests against same-sex marriage began.

"Homophobia is growing in France," said Adrian Lambert, a barman at Cox, a renowned gay bar on Rue des Archives.

"Society is more closed than other countries," he said, while pouring beers. "If you look at Spain or the Netherlands, France is more backward. Plus, there is this extremist tendency we always have to watch out for."

Two of Cox's regular customers were attacked and badly beaten last month after spending an evening in the neighborhood, Lambert says.

Opinion surveys have consistently shown a majority supporting the same-sex marriage bill. A poll published May 2 showed 53 percent backing the "marriage for all" law, which grants marriage and adoption rights to same-sex couples. Sixty-seven percent want an end to the demonstrations against the law.

Voters in Paris elected a gay man, Bertrand Delanoe, as their mayor in 2001 and sent him back to city hall in 2008.

Although derided by some as a "gay ghetto," the historic streets and alleys of the Marais appear to be a model of openness.

The district was previously better-known as a Jewish neighborhood - and its gay bars co-exist alongside falafel joints and delis selling knish and poppyseed strudel. Recently, it's taken off as a trendy shopping area, its stores and cafes becoming a popular tourist draw.

Despite such apparent tolerance, the gay marriage bill has attracted opposition on a scale and intensity unseen in France's European neighbors.

The Netherlands became the first European country to legalize gay-marriage in 2001, followed by Belgium two years later. In Spain, although there was opposition supported by the Catholic Church, same-sex marriage was legalized in 2005, with polls showing support from 62 percent of the population. Portugal followed suit in 2010.

Britain is currently introducing similar legislation. Bishops have written to newspapers to complain, but the country has seen no dissent approaching the French scale.

Opposition in France has united conservative, Catholic and far-right groups together with representatives of the country's Islamic community. The movement's unlikely figurehead is a comedien called Frigide Barjot, and who once entertained at a gay club called the Banana Cafe and recorded songs such as "Fais-moi l'amour avec two doigts" ("Make love to me with two fingers").

Barjot claimed to have brought a million to the streets for a demonstration in Paris back in January and is hoping for similar numbers this month. More legal challenges are planned even after the bill is signed into law.

Banners warning of the risks to French children posed by gay marriage and adoption rights have been strung along French highways, pamphlets carrying a similar message abound. Scuffles broke out among lawmakers during the parliamentary debate.

Barjot has denounced the more radical elements in the movement. Ultra-conservative groups have been blamed for death threats against politicians supporting the bill, vandalism of Socialist party offices and attacks on gays.

The fervor of opposition movement has been put down to the deep cleavages between left and right in France. Also stoking the fire are divisions between religious and secular traditions that date back to the Revolution of 1789, and that periodically flare up over issues ranging from schools' curricula to abortion.

Gay rights campaigner Ronzier points out that France has a history of street protests influencing politics, and that encourages demonstrators to believe they can change parliamentary opinion.

Others suggest the strength of the movement represents an attempt by French conservatives to find a rallying point following their defeat by President Francois Hollande and his Socialist Party in elections last year.

"The French people have an identity crisis," said Kevin, who works weekends selling gimp suits and whips at a store called Leather and Rubber, around the corner from the Rue des Archives.

"Some people aren't sure about their identity any more. Eith the Hollande government, the economic crisis - their lives don't have fixed anchor and that makes them resistant to change," he added.

Despite the current furor, French gays are confident the country will eventually be reconciled to marriage for all once the law is adopted.

"It will calm down, things will get back to normal and people will move on," Ronzier said.

In preparation, Paris hosted its first gay marriage salon on April 29, where would-be newly-weds could browse big day essentials offered by stylists, cake makers and florists.

The southern city of Montpellier, voted France's most gay-friendly city by the magazine Tetu, is hoping to hold France's first same-sex marriage in June. Paris is expected to follow soon after.

"I can't wait to marry all men and women of Paris who love each other," tweeted Anne Hidalgo, the Socialist favorite to win next year's mayoral election.

Just 3 miles west of Cabo de Sao Vicente at the base of the Ponta de Sagres lies Sagres, a pleasant little town of small villas and apartments. For the most part, these are summer homes, many owned by Germans and British, judging from the flags flying. It was here in 1410 that Prince Henry the Navigator founded a school for navigators. If Cabo de Sao Vicente is where the Earth ended for the Europeans, Ponta de Sagres became the place where the world began.

The Making of the Modern World

Prince Henry was the second son of Portuguese King John I. As a member of the royal class, he had the means to finance his ambitions. Those who attended his school included Vasco da Gama, who made the first voyage from Europe to India, and Magellan, whose expedition first circumnavigated the globe. Columbus was once shipwrecked and rescued off the coast, subsequently learning many of his later nautical skills in Portugal. This school gave rise to the most extraordinary alumni association imaginable.

How prosaic business opportunities generate the most risky and grandiose undertakings has come to interest me. This school arose with the specific goal of training sailors to go farther and farther south along the African coast in search of a sea route to India. The Portuguese sought this route to cut out the middleman in the spice trade. Spices were wealth in Europe; they preserved and seasoned food, and were considered medicinal and even aphrodisiacs. But they were fiendishly expensive, since they came to Europe via the Silk Road through Muslim-controlled territory, with each merchant along the way increasing their price.

Henry didn't just train seamen, he also financed explorations. During the 15th century, year after year, ships went out. Many, even most, never returned, but all of them pushed just a bit further south. Each voyage produced logs that Henry collected, collated, studied and relied on when planning future expeditions.

The more I learn more about Henry, the more his program reminds me of NASA and of Tom Wolfe's classic, The Right Stuff, about America's space program. Like NASA, each mission built on the last, trying out new methods in an incremental fashion. Henry didn't try to shoot to the moon, as they say. He was no Columbus, risking everything for glory, but rather a methodical engineer, pushing the limits a little at a time and collecting data.

His school has long since disappeared along with his palace. Only a single round marker on the ground remains, perhaps 30 feet wide, segmented in equidistant lines emanating outward to a circle. There is speculation that this is a sundial or a wind gauge of some sort. It could also be nothing; scholars never find an object that isn't filled with meaning, oftentimes religious. Of course, the physical remains of his school don't mean much. History was made here.

It was the place where Europe discovered the world, not only in the physical sense, but also in the direct encounters over time with the myriad cultures that made up the world. Europe wasn't kind to the world it discovered. But over time it did force each culture to become aware of all the others; after centuries, a Mongol student might learn about the Aztecs. Instead of a number of isolated worlds, each believing itself to be the center of the Earth, each new discovery fed the concept of a single world.

The Buccaneering Spirit

On this cape, early in the 15th century, well before Columbus sailed, Henry planned Europe's assault on the world. In the process, he laid the foundation of the modern world and modern Europe. Standing on the cliffs overlooking the Atlantic, even on this cheerful day, it is possible to imagine the courage it took to sail into probable death. I can't help but think of the voyages of astronauts and cosmonauts, one part dispassionate engineering and science, one part pure hubris.

The Americans and Russians, not the Europeans, undertook space programs. Europe got in late and never launched a manned flight. There are those who say that we can explore space with unmanned rockets. That may be true, but we cannot own space, we cannot claim it that way. If Henry created his school solely for knowledge, then perhaps sending messages in a bottle and waiting for a reply would have done that. But Henry, the prince who became a monk, also acted for wealth, God's glory and to claim his place in history.

Today, we have entered a phase of history where the buccaneering spirit has left us. The desire for knowledge has separated itself from the hunger we have for wealth and glory. Glory is not big today, cool is. Cool does not challenge the gates of heaven, it accepts what is and conforms to it. This is a passing phase, however. Humans will return to space to own it, discover unknown wealth and bring glory.

The Wright brothers made bicycles, in those days not cool and certainly not glorious. Their heirs "touched the face of God," as John Gillespie Magee put it in his poem High Flight. Like Kipling, scholars do not regard Magee as a serious poet. Perhaps they are right, but he still captured something lesser poets of the inner neuroses failed to capture: a way to speak of glory.

Out in West Texas and other desolate places, private companies -- privateers -- are reinventing the space program. They are searching for what Henry sought -- namely, wealth and glory. Like the pioneers of flight or Columbus, they might be a little mad, much too hungry and filled with hubris. But like Henry's explorers, they will take a government program and transform the world while making themselves and their country rich.

These are extreme thoughts, but Sagres makes you wild if you let it. What was done here staggers the imagination and causes me to hunger for more. Certainly, European imperialism brought misery to the world. But the world was making itself miserable before, and has since: One group of people has always been stealing land from other groups in a constant flow of history. What culture did not live on land stolen from another culture, either annihilated or absorbed? Ours has always been a brutal world. And the Europe Henry founded did not merely oppress and exploit, although it surely did those things. It also left as its legacy something extraordinary: a world that knew itself and all of its parts.

The European Legacy

It is odd to be thinking of Europe's legacy while sitting here in Portugal. Only the dead leave legacies, and Europe is not dead. Yet something in it has died. The swagger and confidence of a great civilization is simply not there, at least not on the European peninsula. Instead, there is caution and fear. You get the sense in Europe -- and here I think of conversations I had on previous trips in the last year or so -- of a fear that any decisive action will tear the place apart. Eastern Europeans are wondering what happened to the European Union and NATO, their twin guarantees of never having to worry about anything again. Western Europeans are worrying about how to return to the smug satisfaction of a prosperity that has disappeared.

There is a great deal of discussion about Europe's economic crisis and finding a way to return to the lost promise of the European Union. But what was that promise? It was a promise of comfort and security and what they called "soft power," which is power without taking risks or making anyone dislike you. The European search for comfort and safety is not trivial, not after the horrors of the 20th century. The British and French have given up empires, Russia has given up communism, Germany and Italy have given up fascism and racism. The world is better off without these things. But what follows, what is left?

I am not talking here of the economic crisis that is gripping Europe, leaving Portugal with 17 percent unemployment and Spain with 26 percent. These are agonizing realities for those living through them. But Europeans have lived through more and worse. Instead, I am speaking of a crisis in the European soul, the death of hubris and of risk-taking. Yes, these resulted in the Europeans trying to convert the world to Christianity and commerce, in Russia trying to create a new man and in Germany becoming willing to annihilate what it thought of as inferior men. The Europeans are content to put all that behind them. Their great search for the holy grail is now reduced to finding a way to resume the comforts of the unexceptional. There is something to be said for the unexceptional life. But it cannot be all there is.

Looking out a window at the cape on which Henry's school was built, it is difficult to connect today's Europe with his. His was poorer, more diseased, more unjust than this one. Life was harder and bleaker than we can imagine. As someone closer to the harder and bleaker side of Europe than to its glories, I can understand not wanting Europe to go there again. But there is no one without guilt, especially those who carefully catalogue the guilt of others. It is also impossible to imagine a truly human life without the hunger hidden inside the princely monk Henry.

We humans are caught between the hunger for glory and the price you pay and the crimes you commit in pursuing it. To me, the tension between the hunger for ordinary comforts and the need for transcendence seems to lie at the heart of the human condition. Europe has chosen comfort, and now has lost it. It sought transcendence and tore itself apart. The latter might have been Henry's legacy, but ah, to have gone to his school with da Gama and Magellan.

George Friedman is chairman of Stratfor. Reprinted with permission.

That's a frequent dialogue among witty Spaniards. I imagine that women could respond the same way. We husbands fare badly when compared with Brad Pitt, much better if contrasted with Eduardo Gómez, the super-ugly doorman's father in the comedy series Nobody Can Live Here on Spanish TV.

The same happens with countries and regions. To understand where we stand, we have to know where the others are and at what pace we move.

All this becomes relevant apropos the recent report on the most successful countries in Latin America. According to the news, the three wealthiest economies in Latin America are Chile, Panama (which has been growing at the rate of 8 percent for almost a decade) and Uruguay.

Argentina is relegated to fourth place, a fact perhaps explained by its lack of transparency. The government of Cristina Kirchner adulterates the rate of inflation to conceal the results of its poor performance. It cheats.

Despite its limitations, the clue to instantly understand the level of prosperity remains the per-capita GNP. It's the result of the sum of all the goods and services produced by a nation, divided by its population. For that figure to mean anything, it needs to be adjusted to what can be acquired with it. That's called Purchasing Power Parity, or PPP. What's the use of earning $20 per hour when a bottle of water costs $50?

Roughly speaking, the planet has 7 billion inhabitants and produces about $83 trillion per year ($83 million millions). That, in round figures, is $12,000 per capita. In some very prosperous societies, like the United States, the amount rises to $50,000, while in very poor societies, like Haiti, it barely reaches $1,700.

Let's stick to the world average, however: $12,000.

Several Latin American entities produce more than that, in fact: Chile, Panama, Uruguay, Argentina, Mexico, Venezuela and Costa Rica. Brazil is right on the money: $12,000.

But most produce less than the world average: Peru ($10,800), Colombia ($10,700), Cuba ($10,200), Dominican Republic ($9,600), Ecuador ($8,800), El Salvador ($7,700), Paraguay ($6,100), Guatemala ($5,200), Bolivia ($5,000), Honduras ($4,600) and Nicaragua ($3,300).

From that data, we can extract some conclusions:

The swift growth of Chile and Panama, two of the region's most open economies, indicates that theirs is the shortest route to the First World. It is likely that in 2020, if they stay on course, those two nations will have a level of prosperity equal to the average for the European Union, which today stands at $34,500.

At the other end of our reasoning, the countries that practice the so-called 21st-Century Socialism (Cuba, Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia and Nicaragua) are all below the world average, with the exception of Venezuela, which continues on its relative decline. That should tell them that they're traveling in the wrong direction.

Venezuela, which at one time was at the head of Latin America, today ranks sixth in per-capita income, with only $13,200, despite the river of petrodollars flowing through it. It must be Latin America's worst-managed country.

Brazil continues to be the country with a bright future that never arrives. The volume of its economy is big because it is a nation of 200 million people, but its real performance leaves much to be desired. In the past, Brazil was known as "Belindia," a nation where a developed segment lived as in Belgium, but where most people lived as in India. That cruel metaphor still applies.

To sum up: How's Latin America? It depends. In my opinion, its performance is mediocre. It could be a lot better.

Originally published in the Miami Herald. Republished with author permission.

(AP Photo)

This could be Tehran, or what's left of it, just after an Israeli nuclear strike.

Iranian cities -- owing to geography, climate, building construction, and population densities -- are particularly vulnerable to nuclear attack, according to a new study, "Nuclear War Between Israel and Iran: Lethality Beyond the Pale," published in the journal Conflict & Health by researchers from the University of Georgia and Harvard University. It is the first publicly released scientific assessment of what a nuclear attack in the Middle East might actually mean for people in the region.

Its scenarios are staggering. An Israeli attack on the Iranian capital of Tehran using five 500-kiloton weapons would, the study estimates, kill seven million people -- 86% of the population -- and leave close to 800,000 wounded. A strike with five 250-kiloton weapons would kill an estimated 5.6 million and injure 1.6 million, according to predictions made using an advanced software package designed to calculate mass casualties from a nuclear detonation.

Estimates of the civilian toll in other Iranian cities are even more horrendous. A nuclear assault on the city of Arak, the site of a heavy water plant central to Iran's nuclear program, would potentially kill 93% of its 424,000 residents. Three 100-kiloton nuclear weapons hitting the Persian Gulf port of Bandar Abbas would slaughter an estimated 94% of its 468,000 citizens, leaving just 1% of the population uninjured. A multi-weapon strike on Kermanshah, a Kurdish city with a population of 752,000, would result in an almost unfathomable 99.9% casualty rate.

Cham Dallas, the director of the Institute for Health Management and Mass Destruction Defense at the University of Georgia and lead author of the study, says that the projections are the most catastrophic he's seen in more than 30 years analyzing weapons of mass destruction and their potential effects. "The fatality rates are the highest of any nuke simulation I've ever done," he told me by phone from the nuclear disaster zone in Fukushima, Japan, where he was doing research. "It's the perfect storm for high fatality rates."

Israel has never confirmed or denied possessing nuclear weapons, but is widely known to have up to several hundred nuclear warheads in its arsenal. Iran has no nuclear weapons and its leaders claim that its nuclear program is for peaceful civilian purposes only. Published reports suggest that American intelligence agencies and Israel's intelligence service are in agreement: Iran suspended its nuclear weapons development program in 2003.

Dallas and his colleagues nonetheless ran simulations for potential Iranian nuclear strikes on the Israeli cities of Beer Sheva, Haifa, and Tel Aviv using much smaller 15-kiloton weapons, similar in strength to those dropped by the United States on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945. Their analyses suggest that, in Beer Shiva, half of the population of 209,000 would be killed and one-sixth injured. Haifa would see similar casualty ratios, including 40,000 trauma victims. A strike on Tel Aviv with two 15-kiloton weapons would potentially slaughter 17% of the population -- nearly 230,000 people. Close to 150,000 residents would likely be injured.

These forecasts, like those for Iranian cities, are difficult even for experts to assess. "Obviously, accurate predictions of casualty and fatality estimates are next to impossible to obtain," says Dr. Glen Reeves, a longtime consultant on the medical effects of radiation for the Defense Department's Defense Threat Reduction Agency, who was not involved in the research. "I think their estimates are probably high but not impossibly so."

According to Paul Carroll of the Ploughshares Fund, a San Francisco-based foundation that advocates for nuclear disarmament, "the results would be catastrophic" if major Iranian cities were attacked with modern nuclear weapons. "I don't see 75% [fatality rates as] being out of the question," says Carroll, after factoring in the longer-term effects of radiation sickness, burns, and a devastated medical infrastructure.

According to Dallas and his colleagues, the marked disparity between estimated fatalities in Israel and Iran can be explained by a number of factors. As a start, Israel is presumed to have extremely powerful nuclear weapons and sophisticated delivery capabilities including long-range Jericho missiles, land-based cruise missiles, submarine-launched missiles, and advanced aircraft with precision targeting technology.

The nature of Iranian cities also makes them exceptionally vulnerable to nuclear attack, according to the Conflict & Health study. Tehran, for instance, is home to 50% of Iran's industry, 30% of its public sector workers, and 50 colleges and universities. As a result, 12 million people live in or near the capital, most of them clustered in its core. Like most Iranian cities, Tehran has little urban sprawl, meaning residents tend to live and work in areas that would be subject to maximum devastation and would suffer high percentages of fatalities due to trauma as well as thermal burns caused by the flash of heat from an explosion.

Iran's topography, specifically mountains around cities, would obstruct the dissipation of the blast and heat from a nuclear explosion, intensifying the effects. Climatic conditions, especially high concentrations of airborne dust, would likely exacerbate thermal and radiation casualties as well as wound infections.

Nuclear Horror: Then and Now

The first nuclear attack on a civilian population center, the U.S. strike on Hiroshima, left that city "uniformly and extensively devastated," according to a study carried out in the wake of the attacks by the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey. "Practically the entire densely or moderately built-up portion of the city was leveled by blast and swept by fire... The surprise, the collapse of many buildings, and the conflagration contributed to an unprecedented casualty rate." At the time, local health authorities reported that 60% of immediate deaths were due to flash or flame burns and medical investigators estimated that 15%-20% of the deaths were caused by radiation.

Witnesses "stated that people who were in the open directly under the explosion of the bomb were so severely burned that the skin was charred dark brown or black and that they died within a few minutes or hours," according to the 1946 report. "Among the survivors, the burned areas of the skin showed evidence of burns almost immediately after the explosion. At first there was marked redness, and other evidence of thermal burns appeared within the next few minutes or hours."

Many victims kept their arms outstretched because it was too painful to allow them to hang at their sides and rub against their bodies. One survivor recalled seeing victims "with both arms so severely burned that all the skin was hanging from their arms down to their nails, and others having faces swollen like bread, losing their eyesight. It was like ghosts walking in procession... Some jumped into a river because of their serious burns. The river was filled with the wounded and blood."

The number of fatalities at Hiroshima has been estimated at 140,000. A nuclear attack on Nagasaki three days later is thought to have killed 70,000. Today, according to Dallas, 15-kiloton nuclear weapons of the type used on Japan are referred to by experts as "firecracker nukes" due to their relative weakness.

In addition to killing more than 5.5 million people, a strike on Tehran involving five 250-kiloton weapons -- each of them 16 times more powerful than the bomb dropped on Hiroshima -- would result in an estimated 803,000 third-degree burn victims, with close to 300,000 others suffering second degree burns, and 750,000 to 880,000 people severely exposed to radiation. "Those people with thermal burns over most of their bodies we can't help," says Dallas. "Most of these people are not going to survive... there is no saving them. They'll be in intense agony." As you move out further from the site of the blast, he says, "it actually gets worse. As the damage decreases, the pain increases, because you're not numb."

In a best case scenario, there would be 1,000 critically injured victims for every surviving doctor but "it will probably be worse," according to Dallas. Whatever remains of Tehran's healthcare system will be inundated with an estimated 1.5 million trauma sufferers. In a feat of understatement, the researchers report that survivors "presenting with combined injuries including either thermal burns or radiation poisoning are unlikely to have favorable outcomes."

Iranian government officials did not respond to a request for information about how Tehran would cope in the event of a nuclear attack. When asked if the U.S. military could provide humanitarian aid to Iran after such a strike, a spokesman for Central Command, whose area of responsibility includes the Middle East, was circumspect. "U.S. Central Command plans for a wide range of contingencies to be prepared to provide options to the Secretary of Defense and the President," he told this reporter. But Frederick Burkle, a senior fellow at the Harvard Humanitarian Initiative and Harvard University's School of Public Health, as well as a coauthor of the just-published article, is emphatic that the U.S. military could not cope with the scale of the problem. "I must also say that no country or international body is prepared to offer the assistance that would be needed," he told me.

Dallas and his team spent five years working on their study. Their predictions were generated using a declassified version of a software package developed for the Defense Department's Defense Threat Reduction Agency, as well as other complementary software applications. According to Glen Reeves, the software used fails to account for many of the vagaries and irregularities of an urban environment. These, he says, would mitigate some of the harmful effects. Examples would be buildings or cars providing protection from flash burns. He notes, however, that built-up areas can also exacerbate the number of deaths and injuries. Blast effects far weaker than what would be necessary to injure the lungs can, for instance, topple a house. "Your office building can collapse... before your eardrums pop!" notes Reeves.

The new study provides the only available scientific predictions to date about what a nuclear attack in the Middle East might actually mean. Dallas, who was previously the director of the Center for Mass Destruction Defense at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, is quick to point out that the study received no U.S. government funding or oversight. "No one wanted this research to happen," he adds.

Rattling Sabers and Nuclear Denial

Frederick Burkle points out that, today, discussions about nuclear weapons in the Middle East almost exclusively center on whether or not Iran will produce an atomic bomb instead of "focusing on ensuring that there are options for them to embrace an alternate sense of security." He warns that the repercussions may be grave. "The longer this goes on the more we empower that singular thinking both within Iran and Israel."

Even if Iran were someday to build several small nuclear weapons, their utility would be limited. After all, analysts note that Israel would be capable of launching a post-attack response which would simply devastate Iran. Right now, Israel is the only nuclear-armed state in the Middle East. Yet a preemptive Israeli nuclear strike against Iran also seems an unlikely prospect to most experts.

"Currently, there is little chance of a true nuclear war between the two nations," according to Paul Carroll of the Ploughshares Fund. Israel, he points out, would be unlikely to use nuclear weapons unless its very survival were at stake. "However, Israel's rhetoric about red lines and the threat of a nuclear Iran are something we need to worry about," he told me recently by email. "A military strike to defeat Iran's nuclear capacity would A) not work B) ensure that Iran WOULD then pursue a bomb (something they have not clearly decided to do yet) and C) risk a regional war."

Cham Dallas sees the threat in even starker terms. "The Iranians and the Israelis are both committed to conflict," he told me. He isn't alone in voicing concern. "What will we do if Israel threatens Tehran with nuclear obliteration?... A nuclear battle in the Middle East, one-sided or not, would be the most destabilizing military event since Pearl Harbor," wrote Pulitzer Prize-winning national security reporter Tim Weiner in a recent op-ed for Bloomberg News. "Our military commanders know a thousand ways in which a war could start between Israel and Iran... No one has ever fought a nuclear war, however. No one knows how to end one."

The Middle East is hardly the only site of potential nuclear catastrophe. Today, according to the Ploughshares Fund, there are an estimated 17,300 nuclear weapons in the world. Russia reportedly has the most with 8,500; North Korea, the fewest with less than 10. Donald Cook, the administrator for defense programs at the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration, recently confirmed that the United States possesses around 4,700 nuclear warheads. Other nuclear powers include rivals India and Pakistan, which stood on the brink of nuclear war in 2002. (Just this year, Indian government officials warned residents of Kashmir, the divided territory claimed by both nations, to prepare for a possible nuclear war.) Recently, India and nuclear-armed neighbor China, which went to war with each other in the 1960s, again found themselves on the verge of a crisis due to a border dispute in a remote area of the Himalayas.

In a world awash in nuclear weapons, saber-rattling, brinkmanship, erratic behavior, miscalculations, technological errors, or errors in judgment could lead to a nuclear detonation and suffering on an almost unimaginable scale, perhaps nowhere more so than in Iran. "Not only would the immediate impacts be devastating, but the lingering effects and our ability to deal with them would be far more difficult than a 9/11 or earthquake/tsunami event," notes Paul Carroll. Radiation could turn areas of a country into no-go zones; healthcare infrastructure would be crippled or totally destroyed; and depending on climatic conditions and the prevailing winds, whole regions might have their agriculture poisoned. "One large bomb could do this, let alone a handful, say, in a South Asian conflict," he told me.

"I do believe that the longer we have these weapons and the more there are, the greater the chances that we will experience either an intentional attack (state-based or terrorist) or an accident," Carroll wrote in his email. "In many ways, we've been lucky since 1945. There have been some very close calls. But our luck won't hold forever."

Cham Dallas says there is an urgent need to grapple with the prospect of nuclear attacks, not later, but now. "There are going to be other big public health issues in the twenty-first century, but in the first third, this is it. It's a freight train coming down the tracks," he told me. "People don't want to face this. They're in denial."

Nick Turse is the managing editor of TomDispatch.com and a fellow at the Nation Institute. An award-winning journalist, his work has appeared in the Los Angeles Times, the Nation, and regularly at TomDispatch. He is the author most recently of the New York Times bestseller Kill Anything that Moves: The Real American War in Vietnam (The American Empire Project, Metropolitan Books).

Originally published on TomDispatch. Republished with permission.

Sharif won the greatest number of seats but fell short of a majority in the National Assembly in a truly historic election for Pakistan's 65 year history as an independent state.

These were the first elections since independence in 1947 in which a civilian government completed its full five year term and transferred power to another civilian government through a relatively - considering Pakistan's difficult political environment - free and fair electoral process.

This was also the first election to be held under a totally independent judiciary and a caretaker government whose ministers had been agreed to by all major parties, and the first time that an independent electoral commissioner had been agreed to by all major political players.

This was also the first time that a politician had been elected for the third time as prime minister. Nawaz Sharif was prime minister between 1990 and 1993, but was removed on corruption charges; and again between 1996 and 1999 before being toppled by the then-Army Chief of Staff, General Pervez Musharraf.

The elections were marred with violence, particularly in the lead up to polling day. Well over 100 people were killed and scores injured by the Pakistani Taliban, the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), whose members believe that elections are un-Islamic and that Sharia should be law of the land.

Surprisingly, and against everyone's expectations, only one bomb went off on election day, killing 11 people.

However, the worry in the aftermath of these elections is the approach that Nawaz Sharif intends to take towards the TTP.

Sharif made it abundantly clear in the lead up to the election that he intends to negotiate with the TTP and will not demand any pre-conditions to talks. His political rival Imran Khan, the cricketer-turned-politician, believes in the same approach, so he can expect his support on that front. This will be important because Imran Khan's party, Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), will probably hold the balance of power in the national parliament.

Importantly, PTI won the largest number of seats in the provincial assembly of Khyber Pakhtunkwa, the province bordering Afghanistan. Imran Khan's position on the TTP issue will be critical therefore given that these Taliban terrorists are principally based in the northwest of the country.

Sharif has also indicated that fighting the TTP is not the way to resolve Pakistan's terrorism. Accordingly, his intention is to eventually withdraw the bulk of the 150,000 troops now stationed in the tribal areas along the Afghan border.

However, it is unlikely that the Pakistani army, which has suffered over 4,000 fatalities in its war against the TTP (more than all the losses of the coalition forces in Afghanistan), would be so keen to pull out of the tribal areas.

The army would also be suspicious of cutting deals with the TTP without first demanding that they lay down their arms. Every deal that the government of Pakistan has agreed to with the TTP in the past has eventually been broken by the militants and has required the army to take costly remedial military action.

However, it would not only be the army which would question cutting a deal with the TTP. The United States would also be worried with such an approach, especially if it led to the Pakistani army vacating the tribal areas. The departure of the Pakistani army would create a power vacuum which the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani Network fighters could easily exploit to launch attacks against coalition forces, including Australian troops, in Afghanistan.

Washington would certainly not be pleased with such a development, especially if it has negative repercussions on the stalled peace and reconciliation process in Afghanistan.

Another issue which will without any doubt lead to friction with the Americans is Sharif's approach to the CIA-operated un-manned drones. He firmly believes that these drone strikes - while quite effective in killing Al Qaeda and Taliban fighters - are a direct infringement on Pakistan's sovereignty and must stop immediately.

Although drone strikes have indeed been effective in killing many terrorists, most Pakistanis - including army figures - would agree that these need to stop. However, it is unlikely that the American will oblige too readily on that front.

But Pakistan has an important trump card up its sleeve. It knows that in the lead up to the American exit from Afghanistan in December 2014, the United States will need to ship out some 100,000 containers worth of hardware, and the easiest and cheapest way of doing so is by road through Pakistan. Needless to say, the Americans would not want to see those convoys stopped again, as they were for seven months in 2012. As such, the drone issue will require very delicate negotiation.

Given Nawaz Sharif has won the largest number of seats without a majority, he will have to show flexibity on a number of fronts, particularly with regard to negotiating with the TTP. This is an issue which is highly sensitive in Pakistan and, as he would know only too well, in Pakistani politics it is critical to have the army on your side.

Claude Rakisits is Associate Professor in Strategic Studies at Deakin University. This article originally appeared on The Conversation.

(AP Photo)

For decades in the Middle East the most reliable political tool often seemed to be the Israel card; condemning Israel, blaming it for the Arab world's problems, and claiming that those who were insufficiently militant on the issue were traitors.

But the Israel card doesn't work anymore, at least not in the way it used to. True, the rise of revolutionary Islamism has focused more hatred against Israel. Yet at the same time - and this analogy is imperfect - it is less of a single-issue movement. As revolutionary Islamists seek to destroy their rivals (nationalist, moderates and each other) and fundamentally transform their own societies, they are kept pretty busy.

Jibril Rajoub, a senior Fatah official and supposed moderate, may insist that Israel is the main enemy of the Arabs and Muslims, but the Arabs and Muslims aren't paying much attention. The Palestinian Authority, which his group runs - and which rules only on the West Bank - has no Middle Eastern patron at all.

The Sunni-Shia conflict is deepening, with clashes already taking place in Bahrain, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and above all Syria. Indeed, the Syrian civil war is a full-scale contest between the two blocs. Even Muslim Brotherhood think tanks have said that the Shia, and especially Iran, are a more dangerous threat than is Israel.

The chance that these two blocs would cooperate against Israel is close to zero. It was different a few years ago. Before the "Arab Spring," Iran seemed set to become the region's Muslim superpower. If Tehran obtained nuclear weapons (sometimes referred to as the "Islamic bomb") it was expected to wield growing influence throughout the Arab world.

Today, however, that situation has reversed itself. Sunni Arabs, whether they are Islamists or anti-Islamists, openly hate and fear Iran. A nuclear weapon in Tehran's hands would not increase its strategic or political influence. Iran faces a Sunni wall against its ambitions and it is almost without Arab allies.

As for Hezbollah, Iran's sole reliable ally, it is not able to attack Israel from southern Lebanon. Thousands of its soldiers are tied up in Syria to keep an arms supply route open, help the Bashar Assad regime win, and protect Shia villagers. It also faces growing opposition from Sunni Muslims, financed by the Saudis and stirred up by hatred over Hezbollah's actions in Syria, within Lebanon itself. Plus the fact that the Lebanese don't want to be victimized by Hezbollah going to war with Israel given the damage suffered in the late round in 2006.

This is not, of course, due only to the Sunni-Shia issue. There has also been a sharp revival of Arab identity against the Turks and Persians. The region's history of such ethnic clashes has been revived. If the Syrian civil war ends in a rebel victory, the winners will soon turn against their Turkish patrons. Indeed, while the trade between the two countries is still growing, the Syria issue has driven a deep rift between Turkey and Iran, who are supporting opposite sides.

Even Muslim Brotherhood Egypt and Muslim Brotherhood Hamas, which rules the Gaza Strip, have fallen out, albeit perhaps temporarily. The Egyptian government is unhappy that Hamas has not cracked down enough on the Salafists in Gaza and the Sinai who want to attack it.

In addition, Egypt - busy with internal transformation, domestic conflicts and economic problems - wants Hamas to keep things quiet on its border with Egypt.

Israeli officials describe current security cooperation with the Egyptian government, or at least the intelligence services and military, as being quite good. Disputes between Muslim Brotherhood groups and even more radical Salafists are creating problems in Egypt and Syria.

Another factor is the economic catastrophe that is striking, or is about to strike, much of the Arab world. The incompetence and bad policies of the Islamists are making a mess. In Iran, of course, this is heightened by international sanctions.

The obsessively anti-Israel strategy of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has become unpopular as being unnecessarily provocative.

The fact is that Syria is wrecked for many years to come; Iraq is not in good shape due to internal battles; and Egypt is on the verge of disaster. Obviously, to attempt to stir up hatred against Israel as being responsible for these problems in order to mobilize popular support is tempting.

But what can be done about it? Israeli flags can be burned in Cairo; tourism there may become impossible; and the embassy could be closed. Yet will Egypt court war, with a reluctant military, the need for international financial aid, and the possibility that the US could cut off the arms supply? Unlike the Arab nationalists, who could depend on the USSR, the Sunni Islamists have no big-money patron, at least outside Qatar.

Finally, something has been learned by the Arab masses and leaders over the past half-century. The old cries that Israel could easily be destroyed by cooperation and determination don't seem quite as persuasive in the face of many Arab military defeats. There's a lot more caution. Among the elites there's even the idea that Israel can be an asset in their struggle against Iran.

I don't want to overstate the case. Moves toward peace - with Islamists in power or looking over the regime's shoulders and eager to inveigh against treasonous moderation - are unlikely. Vicious propaganda will continue unabated. Terrorism will be launched at every opportunity.

Ironically, this change coincides with a frenzied effort to reduce support for Israel in the West, including in Jewish communities through boycotts, sanctions, divestment, and massive misinformation. One wonders at times whether this campaign is a substitute for relative disinterest in doing much in the Middle East itself. Perhaps this is taken as justifying inaction or perhaps it is seen as still another attempt to find a victorious strategy when so many others have failed.

Perhaps someday, if and when revolutionary Islamists have consolidated power in several countries, the situation will change again. But until then, yelling "Israel" at a crowded rally - at least in the Middle East - will not prove a panacea for the political problems of Arab governments and politicians.

The author is the director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center (www.gloria-center.org). His forthcoming book, Nazis, Islamists, and the Making of the Modern Middle East, will be published by Yale University Press.

With urgency in his voice, he refers to children being murdered and women being raped at the hands of the enemy.

"We really need you here. This is your opportunity for paradise."

"Paradise" via the distinct possibility of death on a Syrian battlefield, he means.

The man is calling for recruits to join the Al Nusra Front, an Al Qaeda affiliate that makes up part of Syria's fragmented armed opposition fighting the government forces of President Bashar al-Assad.

As unappealing as that "opportunity" may sound to the average European, the message has resonated with hundreds of youths here who have disappeared from their schools and homes and turned up in Syria.

Most are lifelong Muslims, while others are recent converts, a shocking number of them just teenagers, reportedly as young as 15.

Teenage Western recruits in Syria's uprising throw yet another complex layer on the country's 2-year-old civil war, which has killed more than 70,000 and displaced millions more. As it is, Western powers are grappling with how best to aid rebel groups that are fighting alongside extremists to replace Assad's regime.

It's also stirred communities here in Europe where authorities are on alert for any signs that residents are drawn to violent extremism.

The International Center for the Study of Radicalization, a London think tank, estimates as many as 600 Europeans have made this journey for jihad, with one of the largest contingents coming from Belgium. Belgian authorities estimate the number to be possibly as high as 80 individuals.

Among them is Jejoen Bontinck, an 18-year-old from Antwerp. His story has been grabbing headlines in recent weeks because his father, Dimitri Bontinck, is now in Aleppo in a desperate search for him, posting dramatic updates on Facebook.

The father has said his son was "brainwashed" by members of the outlawed Islamist organization Sharia4Belgium who befriended him in a city park.

Brian de Mulder, a 19-year-old also from Antwerp, is known to be there too, also drawn in by the shadowy group.

When family learned he was in Syria earlier this year, they held a joint press conference with the openly anti-Muslim Belgian nationalist party, Vlaams Belang, calling on the government to do more against Sharia4Belgium and its ilk.

After Belgian authorities raided four dozen houses and arrested six on suspicion of supporting terrorism last month, De Mulder, now known as Abu Qasem Brazili, sent the family a message saying he never wanted to see them again.

They weren't the only ones.

Two 16-year-olds from the Brussels suburb of Schaerbeek went missing for a few hours during their school's Easter break. They then called their parents from Turkey to say they were headed into the Syrian war zone.

The mother of one of the teens flew to Turkey immediately, coming back to Belgium days later heartbroken, with no information about her son.

With little or no contact with their kids, families are left scouring Al Nusra public relations videos, looking for confirmation their children are still alive.

Such YouTube videos were one of the first signs of proof the Europeans were there fighting with the Islamists, says Hicham El-Mzairh, an Antwerp city councilor with Muslim roots who knows several of the young men who've gone.

El-Mzairh points to a video, posted by a group he says is an offshoot of Al Nusra, of a firefight in which two of the young gunmen speak to each other in Dutch with what El-Mzairh describes as an unmistakable Antwerp accent.

Also unmistakable is the fact the two Flemish youth are rather new to this lifestyle, scrambling awkwardly up sand banks with their weapons.

"Abu what's-his-name," one says, in Dutch, addressing the other, before remembering his colleague's new name. "Abu Basir," he goes on, "only shoot when you see them."

While this exchange in Dutch has earned a few chuckles - and even its own Facebook page - the larger picture is dead serious. These young men are now instructed in techniques to kill, instilled with a hatred of the West, their home countries. Their families want them home; the rest of society isn't so sure.

Threat of their radicalized return

Europol, the European police network, has just released its annual threat assessment, showing officials are taking stock of this problem.

The police force has noted "increasing numbers of radicalized [European Union] citizens traveling to regions of conflict to engage in terrorist activities," Europol Director Rob Wainright wrote in the report.

"There is growing awareness of the threat posed by these people, should they return to the European Union intent on committing acts of terrorism," he added.

Next door, the Netherlands has already ticked its national security level up a notch specifically because it learned so many Dutch residents had gone to the Syrian battlefields.

El-Mzairh, long active in Antwerp's large Muslim community, says the alarm is justified. Long before the exodus to Syria raised new concerns, he'd been warning city leaders that Islamic radicals were making use of schools and parks to recruit young Belgians by exploiting a weak sense of community and inadequate guidance from old-fashioned imams in practicing tolerant Islam integrated with European norms.

"If we don't give them answers, they go to the internet," he says, where they "become hypnotized" by the likes of Al Nusra. "The biggest recruiter is the internet, it's YouTube."

And now, El-Mzairh says, the stringent Islam they've embraced to "fill the emptiness," as he describes it, is "also asking them to kill people that try to stop them. So they've got a holy book in one hand and a weapon in the other."

The Belgian government is at a loss over how they can be stopped. Border controls should be strengthened, most people agree. Another suggestion is to take away identity cards from those deemed vulnerable to extremist influences, so they can't leave the country.

Schaerbeek Mayor Bernard Clerfayt scoffs at that idea, even after the two teenagers who were schoolmates of his own children ran away to Syria. His town is half Muslim, half Catholic or other religions, and he says there's no way he's going to punish the entire Muslim youth population for the acts of relatively few.

"It's impossible," Clerfayt says, "to know which kids want to go to Syria. The two who did leave recently showed no signs they would do it."

What Clerfayt has done, controversially, is to shut down some of the free food distribution services at the local train station. Clerfayt says he learned there was radical Islamist propaganda being handed out with the meals and believes this connection may have been the link between the young teens and Syria.

While he's received some criticism for the move, Clerfayt says the vast majority of his municipality's Muslim population is grateful.

"They say, ‘That's not the way we live our religion here,'" he said. "They are happy if I protect their kids from that form of radicalism."

Clerfayt says tips about extremists hanging around the mosques came from the members themselves. This kind of localized warning system is what is being attempted on an EU-wide scale with the Radicalization Awareness Network, or RAN.

The program is spending nearly $10.5 million per year to link up community members from schools, religious institutions, health care and other sectors throughout the 27 member states, encouraging dialogue and exchange of best practices as well as training them how to identify signs of radicalism before an individual becomes dangerous.

European Commission spokesman Michele Cercone is realistic about the program's chances for success. "It's not that we'll have concrete results in the short term nor that we'll probably convince those that are already radicalized or who have extremist views to change their mind," Cercone said. "But we certainly can plant the seed of doubt."

Hicham El-Mzairh agrees that grassroots prevention is the only hope to identify those who may turn on their own families and communities. But he says this is going to be harder than the conventional "war on terror" the public is familiar with, because you can't see it coming.

"They are our kids," he said. "They don't have beards; they have gel in their hair. They are talking about Beyonce one day but the next day jihad in Syria."

In the hours between Thursday and Friday last week, the Israeli Air Force (IAF) struck a convoy of Iranian-made Fateh-110 missiles destined for Hezbollah that being warehoused near Damascus International Airport, as well as Russian-made Yakhont shore-to-sea cruise missiles. Then, between Saturday and Sunday, the IAF waged nine more air strikes on the Syrian capital, including on the Jamraya chemical research facility in north Damascus (a target it already struck in a similar raid last January), the Fourth Armored Division Headquarters in Mezzeh, southwest Damascus, and the Republican Guard's 104th Brigade in the Qasioun mountain region, which was engulfed in flames. Syria claims that more than 100 of its soldiers were killed by these attacks, and many more injured. (The Fourth Armored Division and Republican Guard are Assad's praetorian divisions, without which his conventional military would virtually cease to exist.)

According to press accounts, both Israeli sorties, as well the earlier one waged in January, occurred without the IAF ever penetrating Syrian airspace; it used stand-off missile systems from the skies above Lebanon. And Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was so unbothered by the threat of retaliation from powdering some of Bashar al-Assad's impregnable fortresses that he didn't even cancel a scheduled trip to China. Israelis then indicated that this isn't the last time they intend to pay call on Damascus. Assad, meanwhile, retaliated against the Zionist aggressor by bombing more of his own people.

Michael Ross, an ex-Mossad officer, told me that the key to Israel's in-and-out operations is its advanced electronic warfare system, which was constructed by Unit 8200 ("Israel's NSA") and is an advanced form of the "Suter" network that blinded Syrian radars during the IAF's 2007 attack on Syria's nuclear facility at al-Kibar. "The software identifies emitters and entry into enemy communications networks," Ross said. "Then it shuts down some or all enemy emitters or injects misleading information or even malware. To control the skies, you must first control the electromagnetic spectrum. This is now IAF doctrine." Ross also said that the Fateh-110 missiles had been delivered by Iran no more than a week before they were destroyed, which indicates that either the Islamic Republic is remarkably lax with its shipping manifests or that Israeli assets come and go in Syria like I do my own living room.

The last few days have seen a grit-teeth conversation among Syrian dissidents about what to make of Israel objectively aiding their cause. They needn't disturb their consciences overmuch because the IAF looks right past them and doesn't even see Syria as an independent country anymore, only an emerging Iranian suzerainty in the Levant. Dr. Shimon Shapira, a retired brigadier general of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), has written a paper unambiguously titled "Iran's Plans to Take Over Syria," which emphasizes comments made by Mehdi Taaib, the head of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei's think tank, that Syria is "35th district of Iran," tantamount to Khuzestan, the Arab-populated district of Iran. The architect of this grand strategy is Major General Qasem Suleimani, the commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corp-Quds Force, who, in an ambitious operation named for himself, has begun the training and financing of 150,000-strong sectarian militia in Syria known as Jaysh al Sha'bi, drawn from fighters from Iran, Lebanese Hezbollah, Iraq, and even the Gulf states. This Basiji-style irregular army, as well as older Syrian formations such as the minorities-staffed Popular Committees and the shabiha (both of which also receive the mullahs' largesse), stand to inherit the responsibilities of the Syrian Army, and further Iranian interest, in the event of regime collapse.

Lest anyone think that these claims amount to Israel overstating its own security threat, the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) has put out a new study about the Persian bulwark keeping Assad alive which legitimates and expands on Shapira's analysis. ISW also suggests that a major imperative for grounding Syrian aircraft or destroying the Air Force's infrastructure is to halt to the uninterrupted supply-line of personnel and materiel from Tehran.

The report neatly lays out the history of proven Iranian involvement in Syria such as the assassination of IRGC-QF Brigadier General Hassan Shateri in the Damascus countryside in February 2013, and the prisoner swap deal brokered between the regime and the Free Syrian Army in January, which saw the release of high-ranking officials of the IRGC-Ground Forces including the current and former commanders of IRGC Shohada unit; the commander of 14th Imam Sadegh Brigade (Bushehr province); and members of the 33rd al-Mahdi Brigade (Fars province). All of these units have extensive experience in counterinsurgency tactics, as they deal with provinces of Iran used to tribal and ethnic unrest. As the ISW authors observe: "The forward deployment of high-ranking current commanders of IRGC Ground Forces units is unusual, as IRGC-QF is Iran's traditional foreign military arm while IRGC-GF is responsible for internal security and conventional operations inside of Iran."

Moreover, the presence in Syria of agents from Iran's Law Enforcement Forces, a sub unit of the Iranian Interior Ministry answerable to the Supreme National Security Council (and thus Khamenei himself), suggests that Tehran views Syria much the same way that Moscow views Georgia: as a domestic rather than foreign concern.

How are Iranian agents and weapons arriving in Syria? Through Iranian commercial and sometimes even Air Force planes, which ISW considers the "most critical component of Iranian material support to Syria." In June 2011, the U.S. Treasury Department sanctioned Iran Air for sending military hardware including "missile or rocket components" to Syria, which the IRGC of course dressed this up as medical equipment or innocuous spare parts. Another Iranian airline, Yas Air, was also sanctioned in March 2012 for moving IRGC-GF agents and weapons. In total, the Treasury Department has identified 117 cargo and passenger planes associated with Yas Air, Iran Air, Mahan Air facilitating the regime's war machine. To quote from the ISW report:

"One Syrian Air Ilyushin-76... has been identified as having travelled between airfields around Moscow, Tehran, and Damascus in 2012. Unauthenticated flight manifest records indicate that this Syrian plane has used Iraqi, Iranian, and Azeri airspace to deliver equipment from Russia. The aircraft reportedly transported over 200 tons of Syrian banknotes printed in Russia over multiple trips in 2012. The aircraft also attempted to transport refurbished Mi-25 Russian attack helicopters in this manner, although Iraqi authorities denied the over-flight request."

When the U.S. controlled Iraqi's air space, Iran had to travel via Turkey's to deliver materiel to Syria. Yet Turkey started interdicting and inspecting Iranian aircraft in March 2011, forcing Iran to revert to Iraqi skyways. Nuri al-Maliki's assurances to the State Department that he would inspect all flights coming from Iran and headed to Syria would be worthless even if they weren't mendacious because the Iraqi Air Force in its current state can hardly patrol its own airspace. (Don't worry, though: the Transport Minster Hadi al-Amiri is a member of the Tehran-supported Badr Organization and widely seen as an accomplice of the IRGC.)

Still another problem is Iran's enabling of Iraqi Shiite militias in Syria such as Kata'ib Hezbollah (KH), Asai'b Ahl al-Haq (AAH) and the newly formed Abu al-Fadl al-Abbas Brigade (AFAB), which is diverse outfit of Syrian, Iraqi, and Lebanese Hezbollah fighters. Some of these militants are first flown to Tehran for training before being flown back to Damascus, chiefly to guard the Seyyada Zeinab district of the capital, where the daughter of Imam Ali is entombed.

Moving Iranian personnel and hardware within Syria is also best done through air transport. Yet the regime relies almost exclusively on the IL-76 transport plane, of which it currently has only five left in its inventory. Of its main strafing aircraft, the L-39 trainer jet, the Syrian Air Force is down to between 40 and 70. All other fixed-wing aircraft in its order of battle, particularly the MiG and SU attack jets, are Soviet-era, require heavy maintenance and even heavier training to make them mission capable. An intervention that confined itself to Syria's air traffic would therefore severely hinder Iran's ability to prop up Assad or further Suleimani's "takeover" project.

Perhaps seeking to drive this point home, ISW released a helpful slideshow yesterday examining the three ways that such an intervention can be accomplished. The first is to wage limited air strikes on Syrian infrastructure (runways, fuel depots, command, and control centers) without really going after the planes themselves. This would degrade the regime's ability to receive Iranian air cargo (or IRGC facilitators or repatriating militiamen) as well as then redistribute them around Syria. It would further reduce the regime's capability to launch air attacks against the opposition, thus improving, albeit not guaranteeing, conditions for a safe zone in the north. The second option is go after some Syrian aircraft and degrading the regime's ability to transport anyone or anything incoming from Iran around the country (though this option wouldn't necessarily stop personnel or materiel from entering Syria). The third option is a no-fly zone, which would eliminate the regime's ability to conduct bombing runs or receive aerial resupply from Iran. It would protect any safe zone established along the Syrian-Turkish border from aerial attack, though not from any ground incursions (here is where trained and well-equipped rebels would be necessary stand-in forces for foreign boots on the ground).

In a follow-up interview with Foreign Policy, ISW analyst Christopher Harmer explained: "Establishing a classic no-fly zone is time consuming and costly; grounding the Syrian Air Force is as simple as sending a few cruisers and destroyers from Norfolk over to the Eastern Med and dropping 250 (Tomahawk) TLAM into Syria. That ends the Syrian Air Force in less than an hour."

The good news is that this wouldn't cost nearly as much as the executive branch has let on. The bad news is that so long as President Obama gives his consent to further IAF sorties, I don't see the United States looking to compete with a regional ally for control of Syria's skies. The likelier outcome is that Israel will continue with pinprick operations to disrupt the Iranian-Syrian-Hezbollah missile nexus, while Suleimani's sectarian insurgency plans will continue unabated.

Michael Weiss is a columnist for NOW Lebanon and the editor-in-chief of The Interpreter, a Russian translation journal sponsored by the Institute of Modern Russia. Follow him on Twitter @michaeldweiss. Reprinted with permission.

In late April, when Asians pay respects to the dead, four members of the cabinet, led by Deputy Prime Minister Taro Aso and more than 150 members of parliament, made a pilgrimage to the Yasukuni Shrine in downtown Tokyo. It honors the spirits of the Japanese war dead, but also includes those of 14 Class-A war criminals condemned and executed for plotting to invade neighboring countries during World War II.

Abe was not among the visitors, but his statements in defense of their visit were perhaps more bellicose than they had to be. “My ministers will not yield to any kind of intimidation," he told parliament defiantly. It is natural, he said, to express respect to those who have died for their county. He donated a tree as a personal offering.

The visits were condemned not just by South Korea and China, as one might expect, but also from opinion leaders in the United State and abroad. Both the Washington Post and New York Times denounced the visits, especially as they came at a sensitive time when relations with between Japan and its neighbors are strained and North Korea is making threats.

Washington made no official protest itself, but can hardly be pleased with this sudden shift toward Japanese nationalism. Its desire to bring Seoul and Tokyo closer together to form a united front against North Korean provocations is constantly undercut by these unnecessary and controversial pilgrimages to the shrine.

The last time the Yasukuni roiled relations with neighbors was during the long (by Japanese standards) administration of Junichiro Koizumi, who made annual visits to the shrine in his official capacity. Ironically it was his successor, Abe, who restored relations and goodwill with China by declining to visit the shrine, something he now says he deeply regrets.

The Yasukuni Shrine has long been connected with state Shinto and an ultranationalist and inflammatory interpretation of Japan’s actions in World War II as being a wholly selfless effort to liberate Asia of European colonialism. Needless to say, other countries occupied by Japan don’t see things that way.

During the first months of his administration, Abe successfully suppressed what the Financial Times called in an editorial his hidden “inner nationalism.” His plan was to concentrate laser-like on economic revival building up popularity, well aware that his unpopular focus on history and the constitution had undercut his government and led to his resignation after only one year in office in 2007.

It may be that his government’s continuing popularity as expressed in public opinion polls that show that more than 70 percent of Japanese approve of his initial moves to revive the economy, called “Abenomics,” may be going to his head and that he, to again quote the Financial Times, “let the mask slip.”

The general election for half of the House of Councillors, the upper house of Japan’s bicameral parliament scheduled for July, was also said to exert some restraint, as Abe is very keen on winning. But the government seems to believe more and more that the election is in the bag. The recent landslide election of the LDP candidate in an upper house by-election on April 28 seems to support that notion.

On that same day, the government held what was billed as the first “National Sovereignty Day.” The date was said to commemorate the 61st anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of San Francisco in 1952, which restored Japan sovereignty and ended the American Occupation (save for Okinawa, which was returned only in 1972.)

Speaking in the presence of the Emperor and Empress, Abe said, “the next task for us is to revise the Constitution.” That goal called attention to another conservative obsession, revising the constitution that was written by Americans during the Occupation. It seemed to have lot to do with the elevation of the date, April 28, which previously had no special meaning to most Japanese.

Amending or abolishing the current constitution in favor of a new one has been a hobby horse of Japanese conservatives, including Abe, for years. They say that it is humiliating to be governed under a document written mainly by foreign occupiers. The extreme nationalist Shintaro Ishihara says he would have ditched the whole thing as soon as Japan was free to do so.

Ishihara is not a fringe figure. He is the co-leader of the Japan Restoration Party, which with 51 seats is the third largest bloc in the lower house of parliament. The other co-leader, Osaka Mayor Toru Hashimoto, shares his feelings about changing the charter.

Abe has already had meeting with leaders of this party and the two could easily put together the two-thirds majority needed to change the document (whether the two-thirds could be mustered in the upper house even after an electoral victory is debatable.) Their first move will be to change the rule to allow a simple majority enough to approve amendments subject to a national plebiscite.

Although most attention is focused on repealing or altering the famous “no war” Article 9, the LDP’s proposed alternative charter, made public a year ago even before the general election, goes much further in replacing what it terms foreign universal values with more traditional Japanese values, as they view them.

Many will be watching what the new government does in August, the traditional time linked to Japan’s surrender on Aug. 15, when Japanese leaders make official visits to the Yasukuni shrine if in fact they are going to make them. Whether they make the visits may depend on how the Japanese public reacts to this recent testing of the political waters.

At the moment there are no current public opinion polls to test the public reaction (though much commentary on Sunday talks shows was negative). One thing is fairly certain: The Abe administration will be more strongly influenced by local opinion than that of its neighbors. 

Todd Crowell is the author of the forthcoming Dictionary of the Modern Asian Language.

(AP Photo)

After five long years of battle in court, Adidas has finally settled with Adivon, a Chinese sportswear company. The latter is to transfer its Chinese trademarks and the triangular logo to the German multinational and will not be allowed to use them again, in any store.

Meanwhile, another unfinished lawsuit has aroused even more attention. This one is between QiaoDan and Jordan (Nike). The pronunciation of the two names in Chinese is the same. The Chinese sporting goods manufacturer, established in 1998, is still uncompromising in denying it has infringed the trademark of Air Jordan. They argue that their soundalike Chinese name does not constitute the object of a legal right to a name since it's only a common translated surname.

As one Chinese commentator put it, QiaoDan's justification is like ''speaking blindly with eyes wide open," both a lack of respect for the facts and an insult to consumers' intelligence.

This is the essence of China's copycat culture. The Chinese word for this is shanzhai, meaning a mountain stockade of bandits.

Perhaps due to the fact that mainstream culture is somehow less appealing and convincing, the shanzhai culture has a huge market in China. Many aim to seek legitimacy under the banner of shanzhai. It can be said that from the cultural level to the commercial level, both the context and power of the word are both undergoing subtle changes.

What has to be clarified is that the concept of shanzhai has both a cultural and commercial meaning, which are not necessarily the same. In cultural terms, it is meant as an ironic confrontation with the dominant culture by those outside the mainstream. Commercially speaking, shanzhai refers simply to pirating the product designs of famous brands, copying them at very low cost, and taking advantage of others to win -- just like Adivon or QiaoDan.

However, to a large extent, the natures of these two copycat behaviors have been confused. As the divide between the rich and the poor creates tension and class stratification, imitation becomes the main way for people to vent their emotions and to express their views. In a certain way, the existence of the copycat provides lubrication and a buffer zone for the society.

Meanwhile, many Chinese companies find business opportunities in this. They find that via brand imitation they can at very low cost circumvent the ethical and legal risks in taking the labor of others.

A lot of these pirate brands do not face criticisms, condemnation or sanction. They disregard others' intellectual property rights. They actually gain widespread sympathy in China. Some Chinese companies even take the opportunity to label themselves as a "national brand" and become a "hero" for taking on foreign commercial forces.

It is questionable whether or not these imitation Chinese brands that beat the drum of serving the people actually serve the interests of our nation and our people. Much too often many of the so-called Chinese national brands are just besmirching the entire nation's reputation for their own benefit.

When a disgraceful lawsuit is finally settled, some copycat brands become the legal winners. Nevertheless, in essence, they are running up an overdraft on the credit of the entire nation around the world. Every Chinese person is paying for this overdraft.

We have all along been claiming we need to improve China's soft power and make China an esteemed country so that it has access to a better business environment internationally. When are we ever going to get the respect we long for if our firms are destroying our credibility?

Quite a number of Chinese sympathizers of the imitators have suggested that copycatting is a good business model. It nurtures innovation and vitality. However, if we look around we know none of the Chinese copycat enterprises ever make it onto any global list of business success stories.

Take the mobile phone as an example. China has provided most of the world's brand-imitating mobile phones, yet it contributes next to nothing to this industry's innovation. China has yet to give birth to a brand in this field that is capable of threatening Samsung or Apple's position. Though we can't attribute all of Chinese firms' lack of creativity just to the copycat culture, it is undoubtedly part of the problem.

When imitation or piracy becomes rife, the bad money drives out the good money. It's a behavior which is tolerated,or even encouraged. Nothing less than the sustainable and healthy development of China is at stake.

Reprinted with permission from Worldcrunch.

In Syria, sectarianism is a byproduct of four decades of Alawite minority rule; in Iraq, power has become increasingly concentrated in the hands of the Shia majority or a segment thereof through the manipulation of electoral outcomes, thus fueling Sunni discontent based on an acute feeling of political discrimination. Secondly, while the Syrian crisis is homegrown and the result of indigenous authoritarian rule by family and sect, the Iraqi counterpart is a product of foreign invasion that led not only to regime change and almost a decade of foreign occupation, but also to near-total state failure. This last outcome led to the abdication by the state of providing security to its citizens, thus forcing individuals and families to take refuge in sectarian solidarities as a survival strategy.

Matters were made worse by the US occupation, with authorities playing favorites by privileging the Shia on the mistaken notion that Sunnis largely supported Saddam Hussein and therefore must not be allowed access to the levers of power. This strategy turned into self-fulfilling prophecy, leading to a Sunni insurgency and establishment of Al Qaeda in Iraq during the early years of the occupation, thus further embittering Sunni-Shia relations in the country. Sectarian divisions in Iraq would have been far less salient than they are today had the transition from Saddam's regime to a successor government, popularly elected, proceeded without foreign intercession. Given this background, when the state began to reappear on the scene during the past few years it could not fully shed its sectarian hue, thus laying the basis for the current crisis in Iraq.

Matters have been made worse in and for Iraq by the fact that, like Syria, Iraq has become a major theater of a proxy war between Iran and Saudi Arabia, with Turkey pushed by force of circumstances into adopting an anti-Iranian role, probably against the better judgment of its political leadership. Since both Saudi Arabia and Turkey are US allies, it's clear that there's a proxy war within a proxy war in Iraq that pits Iran against the United States, which considers Tehran its principal antagonist in the energy-rich and strategically important Middle East.

The Iranian objective in Iraq is clear - to prevent reemergence of the sort of military threat that Iraq under Saddam Hussein posed to Iran, a threat dramatically demonstrated by the Iraqi invasion of Iran in 1980 that led to an eight-year bloody conflict and left a million people dead.

The sectarian Shia card that Iran plays in Iraq to prevent the recurrence of this threat is but an instrument to achieve this objective. Tehran's primary goal is not to establish a Shia crescent in the Arab world for this would run counter to its broader objective of winning friends and influencing people in the predominantly Sunni Middle East, an essential condition for it to be recognized as a major power in the region.

The aspiration to be recognized as a major regional power in the Middle East brings Iran into conflict with Saudi Arabia which has similar aspirations based on its enormous oil wealth and custodianship of Islam's holiest sites. Additionally, Saudi Arabia has been in competition with Iran for preeminence in the Persian Gulf from before the Islamic Revolution in Iran. This struggle for preeminence intensified with the ideological challenge that the 1979 Iranian Revolution posed to the House of Saud, which bases legitimacy of its hereditary monarchy on an interpretation of Islam that enjoins political docility on its population.

This runs directly counter to the Iranian interpretation of Islam that views religious ideology as a vehicle for popular political mobilization.

The combination of these two factors led to the Saudi bankrolling, with assistance of allied Gulf monarchies, of the war that Saddam's Iraq imposed upon Iran during the 1980s. It also drives the Saudi regime's current animus against Iran. This hostility was epitomized in the famous statement by the Saudi King Abdullah, reported in an April 2008 US embassy secret cable, urging the United States to "cut off the head of the snake," clear reference to attacking Iran both to terminate Iran's nuclear program and roll back Tehran's influence in Iraq.

In this context Riyadh and its Sunni monarchical allies, including the Gulf sheikhdoms and Jordan, have repeatedly expressed their fear of a Shia Crescent comprised of Iran, Iraq, Assad's Syria and a Hezbollah-dominated Lebanon taking hold in the Middle East that would dictate the politics of the region. Iraq is crucial to the Saudis in this regard as a link between the Arab littoral of the Persian Gulf, which Riyadh considers to be its backyard, and the Fertile Crescent, the traditional heartland of the Arab world and birthplace of Arab nationalism.

No wonder then that Iraq, like Syria, has become a major theater in which the Saudi-Iranian rivalry is played out with Tehran supporting the Maliki government and Riyadh staunchly opposing it.

According to a leaked US State Department cable, Saudi King Abdullah told President Barack Obama's top counterterrorism adviser in March 2009, "I don't trust this man [Maliki]...He is an Iranian agent." In another leaked cable dated September 24, 2009, Christopher Hill, then American ambassador to Iraq, described the Saudi-Iranian rivalry being played out in Iraq as "The Great Game, in Mesopotamia."

Consequently, Saudi Arabia and Qatar - the latter coincidentally the sponsor of the TV network expelled from Iraq - have been funneling money and, given Iraq's porous borders, possibly weapons to the Iraqi opposition, a segment of which has been creating havoc by almost daily killings of Shiites in Iraq by suicide and car bombings in Baghdad and other parts of the country.

Matters have recently been made worse by the Maliki government's over-reaction to opposition demonstrations that have left dozens dead. Iraq seems to be moving toward the precipice of civil war in the footsteps of its Syrian neighbor where Iran and Saudi Arabia once again face off, the former in the role of the principal supporter of the Assad regime and the latter as a major supplier of funds and weaponry to the predominantly Sunni opposition.

Just as one cannot explain the Syrian imbroglio without reference to the involvement of external powers, one cannot explain the Iraqi descent into civil conflict without reference to the machinations of external powers, Saudi Arabia and Iran in particular.

A similar scenario seems to be emerging in Afghanistan as well with neighbors Pakistan and Iran supporting different ethnic groups and political formations engaged in an often violent struggle for power. The departure of NATO forces from Afghanistan at the end of 2014 is likely both to intensify the civil war and make it easier to decipher such intervention by regional actors. Domestic cleavages and regional rivalries often meld seamlessly in the highly volatile greater Middle East.

Mohammed Ayoob is University Distinguished Professor of International Relations, Michigan State University, and adjunct scholar with the Institute for Social Policy and Understanding. © 2013 Yale Center for the Study of Globalization

Indeed, Obama has onerous calculations: If I intervene, which group do I arm? Am I assured the weapons won't fall into the wrong hands? Am I assured the group or groups I choose to help really are acceptable to the West, and even if they are, will they matter in Damascus in the long run? And, by the way, what if toppling Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad through the establishment of a no-fly zone leads to even more chaos, and therefore results in an even worse human rights situation? Do I really want to own that mess? And even were I to come out of it successfully, do I want to devote my entire second term to Syria? Because that's what getting more deeply involved militarily there might entail.

In the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s, intervention did not provoke other powers in the region such as Russia, because Russia in the first decade after the Cold War was a weak and chaotic state unable to project its usual historical influence in the Balkans. But intervention in Syria could get the United States into a proxy war with a strengthened Russia and with Iran.

In a media-driven world, holding power is truly thankless. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel will have his term in office defined by three things: a withdrawal from Afghanistan, a serious reduction in the defense budget and responses to any overseas emergencies that crop up. There is no good way to accomplish the first two, and the third usually presents the same sort of awful choices the administration now faces in Syria. Secretary of State John Kerry energetically engages in negotiations with Iran and Afghanistan, and with Israel and the Palestinian territories, not because he necessarily wants to, but because he must. Anything less would indicate an abdication of America's responsibility as a great power. And yet the chances of good outcomes in all of those cases are slim.

The overarching theme here is that the media assumes American policymakers have significant control over events overseas, whereas in truth they often have very little. The complex, messy realities of ground-level war and politics in Syria, Iran and Afghanistan - short of aerial and naval bombardments or tens of thousands of boots on the ground - are probably not going to be pivotally shaped by American officials.

During the Cold War, when chaos was relatively limited and much of the globe was divided up into two ideological camps, it was at least possible to formulate creative diplomatic strategies through the mechanical manipulation of this or that country or group of countries against others. But in a world of weak and fragmented democracies, considerable anarchy and anemic alliance systems, it is much harder to manipulate reality. There is no night watchman. No one is in control, even as the media is more relentless than ever. (Indeed, could one imagine in today's media climate a Henry Kissinger or a James Baker constructively and sternly pressuring Israel as they once did?)

A relentless media means policies have little time to mature before they are declared failures. It means there is less secrecy because of so many leaks. And because so much is leaked, government officials themselves have less incentive to be candid, even in private meetings, on account of the assumption that no transcript stays secret forever, whatever the security classification given it. So the quality of discussion inside government deteriorates, even as the public policy climate outside also worsens. In sum, the semi-anarchic, post-Cold War world narrows the space for foreign policy success at the same time that the quality of foreign policy itself wanes.

Adding to the dilemma are the really hard problems - the ones that even the most creative diplomacy cannot solve. Every president of either party going back decades has failed on the issue of North Korea. Meanwhile, each administration gets blamed anew for the failure.

In such a climate, former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton ranks as the model diplomat. She often practiced activity for activity's sake, circling the globe nonstop before adoring cameramen while having no real diplomatic accomplishment to her credit, despite a refreshing tendency to speak boldly on occasion. The media approved of her because she was, well, a celebrity. She did promote one useful idea, though: the "pivot" away from the Middle East and toward the Asia-Pacific region. For that and maybe for that alone will she be remembered. The pivot was less a brilliant idea than a natural, organic evolution of policy intent, given the winding down of two Middle Eastern wars and the rising strategic and economic importance of the Pacific. But as noncontroversial as it should have been, the pivot was attacked in the media as being both too weak-kneed (How come we don't have more warships dedicated to Asia?) and too belligerent (against China).

So what is an American leader to do in such circumstances? How can one be a statesman in the face of reduced American influence in a semi-anarchic world and in the face of an increasingly demanding media?

The answer may be exactly what Obama is doing now in Syria: modestly assisting some of the rebel groups, but essentially avoiding the level of involvement that would make him henceforth responsible for events on the ground. In other words, let Iran get sucked deeper and deeper into the Syrian maelstrom, not the United States. The maintenance cost for Iran in a crumbling Syria will grow, even as Iran enjoys less influence there than it did during the era of a strong al Assad regime. At the same time, intensify the economic and diplomatic aid to Jordan, which, with its relatively small population and small economy, may well be possible to save. Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Libya, Yemen and so forth are all destined to be weak, quasi-chaotic states that the United States cannot put to rights without the kind of gargantuan effort that would undermine its interests elsewhere in the world and at home.

It may be -- barring some military attack on the United States or on a treaty ally that plainly justifies a commensurate military response -- that successful administrations will go unloved during their tenures, even while they are granted grudging respect in the years and decades that follow. This has often been the case in American history. But owing to the nature of the media and the nature of the world overseas, it might become increasingly the norm. Remember that President George W. Bush enjoyed high public approval ratings from the very beginning of his presidency, through 9/11 and the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. But it was the very military actions that he took, popular in the media at the time, that led in his second term to becoming a tragically failed president.

The lesson is this: When it comes to foreign affairs, there is usually no way to get good reviews. But once an American leader internalizes this, he might then begin to craft a strategy that is honorable and will ultimately secure his reputation.

Robert D. Kaplan is Chief Geopolitical Analyst at Stratfor, a geopolitical analysis firm, and author of the bestselling book The Revenge of Geography. Reprinted with permission.

I am in China, in the midst of a trip around the country. If you haven't been for a few years, the change is always breathtaking. The economies of scale offer China opportunities, many of which it takes full advantage of.

As the military boffins put it, size has a quality all of its own. However, there are some cases where even the enormous size of China does not guarantee the success of a particular enterprise.

This week I took one of China's very fast trains from Shanghai to Suzhou and back. The stations at both ends were clean, well organised and efficient. The trains left on time and arrived on time. They sped along at a more than respectable 275km/h. Local business figures in Shanghai say they find the very fast train to Beijing particularly useful. There is none of the hassle of an airport. The journey involves five hours of completely comfortable work time. And they arrive in the centre of Beijing.

But here is an astonishing fact. Shanghai is a city of 23 million people. Beijing is not much smaller. They are two of the fastest growing city economies in the world, both achieving double digit growth while China's overall economic growth slips to something between 7 and 8 per cent.

However, even with these enormous economies of scale, the train does not break even financially. This does not make me condemn it as a white elephant. Rather it is part of China's determined and admirable nation building. But only a nation with a very large surplus can afford luxuries like this.

It does also lead me to one other sober conclusion. If very fast rail does not pay for itself between Shanghai and Beijing, the idea that it could ever do so between Melbourne, Canberra, Sydney and Brisbane is ludicrous.

During the days I've spent in China, on the other hand, all the policy debate has been intensely real. China is an intensely real sort of place. Its astounding economic success story looks set to continue for at least another five years. But economic growth is starting to slow. Throughout the country there is increasingly wide discussion about how China should organise its future.

The winds of change seem to be blowing, but their direction is unclear. The new president, Xi Jinping, seems an altogether more emphatic and powerful personality than his predecessor, Hu Jintao, and he is changing to some extent the nature of political leadership in China. There's no doubt that China faces huge challenges ahead, just like every other country in the world.

The question is whether the China model has run its course, whether there needs to be some new model for development, and how China might adapt to this.

One straw in the wind was visible this week. The press reported that China had reached that point at which urban businesses have to raise wages faster than the inflation rate to attract workers from the countryside. The plentiful, at one point seemingly inexhaustible, supply of cheap labour has been at the heart of much of China's growth. But wages are now rising considerably. There are several different economies. Much of China is now a middle-income economy. Some of China is a fully developed economy. Some of it is still very poor.

In third, fourth and fifth-tier cities the process of urbanisation is still moving apace. This provides its own dynamic for growth.

But the so called middle-income trap is starting to affect much of China in a specific way. As one wag puts it, China is losing jobs at the bottom more quickly than it can add jobs at the top.

At the bottom, a lot of manufacturing jobs are moving to cheaper locations such as Cambodia and Vietnam. The cost of both land and labour are much cheaper than China in those places. Chinese policy makers reply that their workers, their society, has a higher skill level and is thus more productive. But that's exactly the argument European and American policy makers deployed when China started to attract huge amounts of investment into manufacturing and thus draw those jobs away from Europe and the US.

Then there is the demographic challenge. China's work force will peak this decade. It may very well grow old before it grows rich. Given China's past fertility policies, the demographic cliff will be particularly severe for China.

There are problems in the financial sector. People talk of a shadow banking system, a network of informal loan making that has produced many asset bubbles. There is, so some economists say, a staggering burden of local government debt. Much of this debt has been used to finance infrastructure. But it's not clear that this infrastructure will always provide an economic return.

These are problems and questions, rather than indicators of future Chinese failure. Every society faces serious challenges.

One of the great things going for China is its leaders generally avoid hugely irrational decisions.

And then if you want to be optimistic the success stories are everywhere. Suzhou is a case in point. Twenty-five years ago it was a small, pleasant city. Today it is half as big again as Sydney and offers the full-scale bourgeois life style to its citizens. And it is a result of conscious policy. It was set up as an industrial zone. It certainly had its problems but it has paid off handsomely. The housing is of a good quality, the universities are superb, all manner of hi-tech companies are to be found in research collaboration with local academies. The international flavour is strong.

In other words, those who say China will continue to address its most vexing problems and continue to succeed as well as anywhere, which means continue to grow in prosperity and power, have plenty to point to which bolsters their argument.

But equally those who believe the problems are so widespread, so systemic, that China faces a major course correction, economically and probably politically, and that this will have unpredictable consequences, can also make a respectable argument.

It was wisely said that the further away from China you are, the more confident you will be in your judgment about it. Being here convinces me that no one at all knows the future of China. But we do know this. It's going to matter to us a great deal.

The good news is that some of the most catastrophic scenarios outlined before the publication of the document have been avoided. These included some 50,000 job cuts in the army and the same number in the national defense industry, as well as the sale of aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle. Instead, the Ministry of Defense will have to reduce its armed forces by 24,000, on top of an already-planned layoff of 10,000 civilians. Of particular concern, French deployable forces will go down in strength from 30,000 to 15,000.

Despite these cuts, France will remain in the top tier of European military powers. But the cuts come just when more will be expected from France and its European partners amid U.S. strategic retrenchment, particularly in the Middle East and Africa. Given France's role in the intervention in Mali and in the fragile Central African Republic, it is no surprise that the Middle East and Africa are given special treatment in the White Book. But questions remain as to whether France's diminished capabilities will allow such wide-scale out-of-area operations in the future without the assistance of its European partners.

A partial answer can be found in the strong European dimension of the White Book. British and German officials were officially part of the committee tasked with the document's drafting, and Poland's government was also consulted. Paris is clearly intent on pursuing a pragmatic European approach to defense, one that involves not only London (the leading partner in the Libyan and Malian operations and a long-standing ally), but also Warsaw and hopefully Berlin playing stronger roles in the context of a multilateral "alliance of the able." This approach, encompassed in the Weimar Plus framework (France, Germany, Poland, Italy, and Spain), is designed to bring a maximum number of partners, and therefore capabilities, to the table, in order to kick-start discussions about the new dynamics of defense cooperation. This vision, which Paris hopes will be shared throughout Europe, also includes calls for a common European strategic vision and threat assessment, in the form of a revision to the 2003 European White Book on Security.

Paris is also adamant about pushing Europe's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) to the top of the agenda through decisions made by the European Council, while strengthening the more successful examples of European defense integration, such as the European Air Transport Command. Europeanization, ideally, would allow France and the continent's other militaries to assume some security responsibilities from the United States, but at a lower cost. The best example of this would be France making an effort to fill capability gaps that the United States filled in Mali and Libya - including air-to-air refueling, electronic surveillance and warfare, unmanned aerial vehicles, and airlifting - and pooling them with its European partners. France's initiative could fundamentally change the prospects of European security cooperation in the months leading up to December's European Council meeting, where these issues will be discussed. However, the White Book also predicts this will be a slow and challenging process, as the EU still does not see itself as a regional - let alone global - security actor.

Despite the pervasive theme of Europeanization in the White Book, the document does not endorse a geographic division of labor between Europe and the United States as the latter pivots to Asia. To the contrary, the White Book also underscores the need for France and its European partners to be engaged in Asia, which will be at the center of many future security challenges. The diversity and fluidity of security threats - from failed states, to cyber security, to the strategic implications of emerging powers - mean that France will have to act as a strategic actor beyond its periphery. But the harsh reality is that that challenge that will need to be met with significantly fewer capabilities and resources.

Martin Michelot is a research and program coordinator in the Paris office of the German Marshall Fund of the United States. Alexandra de Hoop Scheffer is the director of the Paris office. Reprinted with permission.

(AP Photo)

Israel's success does indicate that the purely military risks in enforcing some form of no fly or no move zone are now more limited that when the fighting in Syria began. At the same time, this does not mean that Syria could not put up a defense or that the US could simply rely on a few strikes or threats to either destroy Syria's air defense or intimidate it into complying with US demands.

The practical problem is that we do not know how many stand-off weapons were used, how far the Israeli Air Force (IAF) aircraft had to penetrate, or the real-world readiness of Syrian air defenses.

We do not know if Syria has seriously tried to halt IAF attacks. Syria has not been able to use these systems effectively against Israel since the early 1980s. Syria may be willing to wait out limited IAF strikes rather than reveal the electronic order of battle and send signals that would help Israel develop improved methods of suppression during a limited attack.

We know most of the Syrian longer-range surface-based air defenses are still largely active and provide overlapping coverage of much of the country. But they also have aging surface-to-air missiles (SAM) that have been only partially upgraded and are vulnerable to jamming and other electronic countermeasures, as well as antiradiation missiles.

There are no reliable estimates of what is left or active. Before the civil war intensified, the IISS and Jane's estimated that they included 25 AD brigades with some150 SAM batteries. These include a mix of aging low altitude defense systems, largely developed in the 1970s or earlier, using S-125 Pechora (SA-3 Goa), 2K12 mobile, short-range Kub (SA-6 Gainful), obsolete medium to high altitude defenses with S-75 Divna (SA-2 Guideline), and 2 AD regiments with 2 battalions each, which each had 2 batteries with S-200 Angara (SA-5 Gammon).

We also know that Syria has sought far more modern Russian systems like the S-300 and S-400 for more than two decades and every attempt has failed-largely because of Syrian financing problems and Russian sensitivity to Israeli views. It is also clear that Syria has had to relocate substantial parts of these forces to avoid rebel forces taking them. Syria had also over-concentrated them around its cities and near Israel before the civil war, leaving vulnerable "corridors" in the north and the west, while IAF aircraft could also fire from Lebanese air space.

Syria has more modern short ranges and manportable surface-based air defenses. The IISS-Jane's estimates indicate they include the following mobile systems: 14 9K33 Osa (SA-8 Gecko), 20 9K31 Strela-1 (SA-9 Gaskin), 20 9K37 Buk (SA-11 Gadfly), 30 9K35 Strela-10 (SA-13 Gopher), 96K6 Pantsir-S1 (SA-22 Greyhound), and the 9K317 Buk-M2 (SA-17 Grizzly). The manportable systems include 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail), 9K38 Igla (SA- 18 Grouse), 9K36 Strela-3 (SA-14 Gremlin), and the 9 K 338 Igla-SS (SA-24 Grinch).

The newest of these systems could be effective if their location was unknown but IAF aircraft had standoff weapons that allow them to strike outside the range of such systems and advanced countermeasures that will seriously degrade most of these systems. The Assad regime may also be scared of distributing them because of the risk that they would fall into rebel hands.

The Syrian air force had some 365-385 combat aircraft when the fighting started. It is not clear how many are now active but a rough estimate is probably about 50 percent with very low sustainability against an active air attack, limited pilot training, and low daily sorties generation rates. It had no modern air defense fighters and operational readiness standards have almost certainly degraded. Syrian holdings of air defense fighters included 85 aircraft with aging avionics and which are very vulnerable to both IAF and U.S. fighters, air-to-air missiles, and air combat systems like the AWACs. These include: 50 obsolescent MiG-23MF/ML/UM Flogger, 35 export versions of the MiG-29A/U Fulcrum with limited computer and radar capabilities for look-shoot down and long range BVR combat. According to the IISS, a large number of these systems were not operational before the civil war: 30 MiG-25 Foxbats and 2 MiG-25U Foxbats.

The rest of the Syrian air force was attack-oriented in spite of the fact that it had little chance of surviving Israel's air defenses. Again, the IISS and Jane's estimate it included some 105 obsolete MiG-21MF/bis Fishbed, 15 obsolete MiG-21U MongolA, 50 obsolescent MiG-23BN/UB Floggers, 50 limited-capability Su-22 Fitter D, and 20export versions of the Su-24 Fencer with limited computer and avionics capabilities. It is possible that the Syrian air force has rules of engagement that preclude the use of fighter aircraft for anything other than all-out war given the massive losses they suffered fighting the IAF in 1982.

This makes the Syrian forces vulnerable to U.S. military action to enforce some form of no fly/no move zone, but Syria still has a much larger and more capable mix of forces than Libya possessed. It would take a massive U.S. air and cruise missile attack to suppress it quickly and would be difficult for even two carrier groups to carry out and sustain. As a result, the United States would certainly desire land-bases from allies like Jordan and Turkey and the use of Qatari and/or Saudi bases.

Syria could also choose to ride out a U.S. threat and then constantly push the U.S. by appearing to prepare its forces, locking on radars, etc. These are tactics that would stress any U.S. forces enforcing a zone. Syria also knows all about them from U.S. operations in Iraq and the former Yugoslavia. In short, Syria does not have strong air defenses by U.S. standards but it is still very large. It would take a major U.S. air effort to accomplish quickly and the United States might well take some losses if Syria fought back and would have to have a sustained presence if Syria chose not to fight.

There is also the question of how broad a U.S. no-fly zone would really be. If the United States included civilian protection areas, it would have to be prepared to use airpower to stop pro-Assad ground forces as well.

If it was a true "no fly" zone, it would have to deal with Syrian helicopters as well, and they have been key threats. (IISS pre-civil war estimates were 33 Mi-25 Hind D attack helicopters, Mi-17 Hip H and 30 SA342L Gazelle multi-role armed helicopters, and 40 Mi-8 Hip transport helicopters, and some 60 percent are probably still operational).

Moreover, "no fly" would presumably mean no Syrian missiles and rockets and Syria still has a significant inventory of such systems. In short, even though the events of the past weekend may suggest air power's efficacy in responding to the civil war, it will be no easy task to expand this into a wider campaign.

Anthony H. Cordesman holds the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.

(AP Photo)

BACKGROUND

To be considered for this year's election, all presidential aspirants must file by May 11. The Guardian Council -- a powerful body with twelve members, six of whom are directly appointed by the Supreme Leader -- then decides which candidates are permitted to run based on its subjective judgment of their qualifications. The results of that process will be announced on May 16. Those disqualified can ask the council to reconsider; any such appeals would be decided by May 23.

On June 14, elections will be held for president, municipal council seats, and two vacant seats in the Assembly of Experts, which selects a new Supreme Leader if Ali Khamenei dies. Holding major elections simultaneously helps the regime keep costs down while exploiting the people's interest in local politics to raise turnout for the presidential vote. Hundreds of thousands of candidates have already registered for the municipal elections; here too, the Guardian Council determines who is qualified to run. Simultaneous elections also decrease the chances of a boycott -- reformists and technocrats have applied to run at all levels, so they would have difficulty asking voters to stay home on election day if the Guardian Council disqualifies their presidential candidates but approves their local candidates.

Past presidential elections have frequently produced surprising results, and no one is sure how this one will turn out -- at least in terms of which conservative will prevail. If no candidate wins a majority on June 14, a runoff between the top two vote-getters will be held on June 21.

REFORMISTS SIDELINED BUT NOT ELIMINATED

Despite efforts to convince the Islamic Republic's two previous presidents -- seventy-nine-year-old Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and Muhammad Khatami -- to enter the race, neither has accepted thus far. In addressing his supporters recently, Khatami asked how one can run for president if he is not even allowed to travel abroad, implicitly referring to himself (he has been barred from leaving the country to participate in international conferences since 2009).

In addition, the regime has heightened its vitriolic rhetoric against both men. In an April 29 editorial by the leading Iranian daily Kayhan, publisher Hossein Shariatmadari, a close confidant of Khamenei, called Khatami a "traitor," "corrupt on earth," and "fifth column." Similarly, Intelligence Minister Haydar Moslehi recently declared, "We have information that the person who claims that he predicted the fitna was himself involved in creating it," referring to the mass opposition protests of 2009. This was interpreted as a clear warning that neither Rafsanjani nor Khatami should run for president.

Indeed, Ayatollah Khamenei seems bent on not only marginalizing reformists, but also sidelining figures from the first generation of the Islamic Republic. He is unlikely to let Rafsanjani or Khatami run, and all of the other reformist/technocrat candidates are minor figures who have little chance of prevailing in June (e.g., former nuclear negotiator Hassan Rouhani, who is unknown to the vast majority of Iranians despite his high profile abroad). In fact, the Guardian Council may approve such candidates precisely because they are unlikely to garner many votes.

END OF THE ROAD FOR AHMADINEJAD?

In an April 10 editorial in Kayhan, Shariatmadari attacked Ahmadinejad for backing the controversial Esfandiar Rahim Mashai as his favorite candidate (Ahmadinejad himself cannot run because of Iran's two-term limit). The article pointed out Khamenei's July 2009 letter to Ahmadinejad criticizing Mashai as an inappropriate choice for vice president, making it difficult to imagine why he would now be considered a viable presidential candidate. Although one Guardian Council member responded to the editorial by stating that no decisions had been made on anyone yet, Mashai has little chance of being approved.

Some Iranian analysts believe that Ahmadinejad is well aware of Mashai's poor prospects and is pursuing a more subtle agenda -- namely, portraying himself as a victim of Khamenei and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. If that tactic succeeds in boosting his faction's popularity, he would then either introduce another candidate after Mashai's disqualification or use the momentum to further his own postelection plans. Yet Mashai is probably the only figure in Ahmadinejad's camp capable of attracting voters, since most Iranians blame the president and his team for years of economic mismanagement, corruption, and international isolation. Accordingly, Khamenei and the Guardian Council's strategy toward Ahmadinejad's faction may be the same as their approach to the technocrats and reformists -- disqualify or intimidate the main figures while approving the candidacy of minor figures who are unlikely to receive many votes.

NO CONSERVATIVE CONSENSUS

Iran's hardliners have put forward a great many candidates for the presidential race; in an April 27 speech, Khamenei expressed concern about the number of people vying to run. None of these conservative candidates has emerged as a clear frontrunner, and it is difficult to find any substantial ideological or policy differences between them. Their main strategy centers on blaming Ahmadinejad for Iran's economic problems, which is a convenient way to minimize the role of international sanctions.

Conservative candidates have also been eager to highlight the president's penchant for challenging the Supreme Leader's authority, running a rhetorical race to prove their own loyalty and subservience to Khamenei. Accordingly, the Guardian Council will have difficulty narrowing the field -- most of the conservative applicants have served in government, criticized the reformists and technocrats consistently, and advocated the radical version of velayat-e faqih (the doctrine granting the Supreme Leader his authority), so the council has no real justification to disqualify them.

CONCLUSION

Washington should not ignore Iran's presidential election, particularly given the regime's repeated claim that U.S. sanctions aim to hurt the people rather than curb the nuclear program. To rebut such rhetoric, Washington should show its concern for the people's democratic demands.

The U.S. government will have two clear opportunities to react to the election. First, once the final list of approved presidential candidates is announced, Washington should criticize Khamenei for letting the Guardian Council disqualify certain figures and intimidate others into staying out of the race. Second, in the likely event that opposition members inside or outside the country accuse the regime of manipulating the voting process, Washington should express concern about the election's legitimacy.

Sharp U.S. criticism of the electoral process would pose little risk of hurting the nuclear negotiations, and restraint has proven ineffective in the past -- Washington's relatively muted reaction to the 2009 postelection turmoil failed to improve the regime's negotiating posture then, so there is little sense in remaining quiet now. In contrast, taking a strong stance against electoral manipulation would show the Iranian people that the target of U.S. pressure is the regime, not them. Supporting their calls for democracy and civil rights is the most effective way to neutralize the government's anti-American propaganda. Once the election's trajectory becomes clearer, Washington can turn to the task of assessing how the outcome will affect the nuclear impasse and other crucial issues.

Mehdi Khalaji is a senior fellow at The Washington Institute.

A few shady characters nearby are eavesdropping, he says. This neighborhood is the territory of one particularly violent faction of "yakuza," the powerful criminal underworld of Japan.

Every month, bargaining with the mid-level mobsters and shakedowns have become draining tasks.

"The yakuza have a hand in all sorts of industries, and working with them is just a part of doing business in this city," admits the executive, who himself was a mafia-connected negotiator for a construction company for almost 40 years.

But times are changing.

"We used to have a sort of harmony with these bosses," he laments. "They were enforcers, protectors who asked for our money to smooth out permits and deals, but who kept the battles to themselves. Now they're out of control."

Facing a shrinking pot of spoils, five mafia syndicates are waging an unusually vicious gang war in the coastal prefecture of Fukuoka. It's a rustbelt region on the southernmost island of Japan proper - known as Kyushu - which has the largest number of organized crime groups in the country, according to the government.

The fighting is sucking in police and, at times, innocents. Thugs have occasionally tossed hand grenades - known in yakuza parlance as "pineapples" - into their archenemies' headquarters, and into the homes of corporate executives who have declined extortionist requests from organized crime.

Last year, the Fukuoka Prefecture Police even became the first in Japan to offer bounties of $1,200 to citizens who reported suspects in possession of the explosives.

The yakuza, who number about 5,000 in the prefecture, have also shown they're willing to go after the officials who no longer tolerate their presence. The mayor of Kitakyushu and his family have received death threats, a motorbike gunman shot and wounded a retired detective, and gangsters gunned down the head of a construction company in front of his wife.

The attacks became more intense three years ago, when the local government declared war on the yakuza and passed a number of restrictions on them. The moves came alongside a growing body of national laws.

In late 2011, Japan passed the first laws completely outlawing payments to the yakuza. In Fukuoka, police have taken special measures to prevent members of certain gangs from gathering in groups of five or more in public; starting in June, they'll be banned from entering some business districts.

In December, public safety commissions in Kyushu took the additional step of identifying the Kudo-kai as the only syndicate among five that is "particularly dangerous," drawing on evidence that it is behind many of the grenade incidents. Two other organizations, the Dojin-kai and Kyushu-Seido-kai, were given a less restrictive ranking as "combative" that will be lifted in June.

It is a legal marker that gives law enforcement wider search and seizure powers. "This organized crime group, the Kudo-kai, is especially bad," explains Tetsuya Nishida, a police commander in the organized crime division. "They don't mind hurting civilians, and they go into construction companies and restaurants to get what they want."

The Kudo-kai did not respond to a request for an interview sent by snail mail to their headquarters.

The Fukuoka gang war has erupted at a time when, in other areas of Japan, yakuza belligerence has subsided. For several years, the country's three largest underworld organizations - including the massive Yamaguchi-gumi consisting of 55,000 members - have consolidated power and haven't engaged in much open fighting, said Jake Adelstein, the author of "Tokyo Vice: An American Reporter on the Police Beat in Japan."

In Kyushu, on the other hand, no single victor has emerged among the fractious foes. "Fierce competition makes for fierce fighting," Adelstein said, drawing a comparison with the capital. "Tokyo gangsters don't lob hand grenades at each other."

Yet the mob maintains a potent and quiet reach in the Japanese business world, and experts are in disagreement over whether lawmakers will ever stamp out the yakuza completely. One in five companies admits to paying them off, reveals a November study by the National Police Agency, the organization that sets law enforcement policy.

Mob bosses also carry the backing of a titanic fan base. For years the yakuza were, and continue to be, revered by some as benevolent scofflaws who enforced a code of honor. They were seen as keeping the battles to themselves and avoiding civilians.

In the same way American pop culture finds romance in the stories of cowboys and pirates, the yakuza are glorified in fan magazines, comic books, and action films all over Japan.

But unlike the American underworld, the yakuza at times operate in the open without much thought to the eyes of police. The address of the Kudo-kai headquarters, a walled compound in Kitakyushu, is widely available on the internet, and the group sometimes offers interviews to journalists.

The National Police Agency acknowledges that it'll have a hard time thanks to an amendment in the Japanese constitution that guarantees freedom of assembly. The restraint has become apparent in Fukuoka, where the Kudo-kai sued the prefectural police in January over the "dangerous" label. The group's lawyer claims it infringes on their constitutional right to free expression.

Legal issues like these make Fukuoka residents doubt the effectiveness of striking the yakuza too hard.

"The police simply aren't powerful enough," says the construction executive. He thinks the mob presence will never go away, even if it is seeing a nationwide decline.

And then there was one. There had never been such a moment: a single nation astride the globe without a competitor in sight. There wasn't even a name for such a state (or state of mind). "Superpower" had already been used when there were two of them. "Hyperpower" was tried briefly but didn't stick. "Sole superpower" stood in for a while but didn't satisfy. "Great Power," once the zenith of appellations, was by then a lesser phrase, left over from the centuries when various European nations and Japan were expanding their empires. Some started speaking about a "unipolar" world in which all roads led... well, to Washington.

To this day, we've never quite taken in that moment when Soviet imperial rot unexpectedly-above all, to Washington-became imperial crash-and-burn. Left standing, the Cold War's victor seemed, then, like an empire of everything under the sun. It was as if humanity had always been traveling toward this spot. It seemed like the end of the line.

The Last Empire?

After the rise and fall of the Assyrians and the Romans, the Persians, the Chinese, the Mongols, the Spanish, the Portuguese, the Dutch, the French, the English, the Germans, and the Japanese, some process seemed over. The United States was dominant in a previously unimaginable way-except in Hollywood films where villains cackled about their evil plans to dominate the world.

As a start, the US was an empire of global capital. With the fall of Soviet-style communism (and the transformation of a communist regime in China into a crew of authoritarian "capitalist roaders"), there was no other model for how to do anything, economically speaking. There was Washington's way-and that of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank (both controlled by Washington)-or there was the highway, and the Soviet Union had already made it all too clear where that led: to obsolescence and ruin.

In addition, the US had unprecedented military power. By the time the Soviet Union began to totter, America's leaders had for nearly a decade been consciously using "the arms race" to spend its opponent into an early grave. And here was the curious thing after centuries of arms races: when there was no one left to race, the US continued an arms race of one.

In the years that followed, it would outpace all other countries or combinations of countries in military spending by staggering amounts. It housed the world's most powerful weapons makers, was technologically light years ahead of any other state, and was continuing to develop future weaponry for 2020, 2040, 2060, even as it established a near monopoly on the global arms trade (and so, control over who would be well-armed and who wouldn't).

It had an empire of bases abroad, more than 1,000 of them spanning the globe, also an unprecedented phenomenon. And it was culturally dominant, again in a way that made comparisons with other moments ludicrous. Like American weapons makers producing things that went boom in the night for an international audience, Hollywood's action and fantasy films took the world by storm. From those movies to the golden arches, the swoosh, and the personal computer, there was no other culture that could come close to claiming such a global cachet.

The key non-US economic powerhouses of the moment-Europe and Japan-maintained militaries dependent on Washington, had US bases littering their territories, and continued to nestle under Washington's "nuclear umbrella." No wonder that, in the US, the post-Soviet moment was soon proclaimed "the end of history," and the victory of "liberal democracy" or "freedom" was celebrated as if there really were no tomorrow, except more of what today had to offer.

No wonder that, in the new century, neocons and supporting pundits would begin to claim that the British and Roman empires had been second-raters by comparison. No wonder that key figures in and around the George W. Bush administration dreamed of establishing a Pax Americana in the Greater Middle East and possibly over the globe itself (as well as a Pax Republicana at home). They imagined that they might actually prevent another competitor or bloc of competitors from arising to challenge American power. Ever.

No wonder they had remarkably few hesitations about launching their incomparably powerful military on wars of choice in the Greater Middle East. What could possibly go wrong? What could stand in the way of the greatest power history had ever seen?

Assessing the Imperial Moment, Twenty-First-Century-Style

Almost a quarter of a century after the Soviet Union disappeared, what's remarkable is how much-and how little-has changed.

On the how-much front: Washington's dreams of military glory ran aground with remarkable speed in Afghanistan and Iraq. Then, in 2007, the transcendent empire of capital came close to imploding as well, as a unipolar financial disaster spread across the planet. It led people to begin to wonder whether the globe's greatest power might not, in fact, be too big to fail, and we were suddenly-so everyone said-plunged into a "multipolar world."

Meanwhile, the Greater Middle East descended into protest, rebellion, civil war, and chaos without a Pax Americana in sight, as a Washington-controlled Cold War system in the region shuddered without (yet) collapsing. The ability of Washington to impose its will on the planet looked ever more like the wildest of fantasies, while every sign, including the hemorrhaging of national treasure into losing trillion-dollar wars, reflected not ascendancy but possible decline.

And yet, in the how-little category: the Europeans and Japanese remained nestled under that American "umbrella," their territories still filled with US bases. In the Euro Zone, governments continued to cut back on their investments in both NATO and their own militaries. Russia remained a country with a sizeable nuclear arsenal and a reduced but still large military. Yet it showed no signs of "superpower" pretensions. Other regional powers challenged unipolarity economically-Turkey and Brazil, to name two-but not militarily, and none showed an urge either singly or in blocs to compete in an imperial sense with the US

Washington's enemies in the world remained remarkably modest-sized (though blown to enormous proportions in the American media echo-chamber). They included a couple of rickety regional powers (Iran and North Korea), a minority insurgency or two, and relatively small groups of Islamist "terrorists." Otherwise, as one gauge of power on the planet, no more than a handful of other countries had even a handful of military bases outside their territory.

Under the circumstances, nothing could have been stranger than this: in its moment of total ascendancy, the Earth's sole superpower with a military of staggering destructive potential and technological sophistication couldn't win a war against minimally armed guerillas. Even more strikingly, despite having no serious opponents anywhere, it seemed not on the rise but on the decline, its infrastructure rotting out, its populace economically depressed, its wealth ever more unequally divided, its Congress seemingly beyond repair, while the great sucking sound that could be heard was money and power heading toward the national security state. Sooner or later, all empires fall, but this moment was proving curious indeed.

And then, of course, there was China. On the planet that humanity has inhabited these last several thousand years, can there be any question that China would have been the obvious pick to challenge, sooner or later, the dominion of the reigning great power of the moment? Estimates are that it will surpass the US as the globe's number one economy by perhaps 2030.

Right now, the Obama administration seems to be working on just that assumption. With its well-publicized "pivot" (or "rebalancing") to Asia, it has been moving to "contain" what it fears might be the next great power. However, while the Chinese are indeed expanding their military and challenging their neighbors in the waters of the Pacific, there is no sign that the country's leadership is ready to embark on anything like a global challenge to the US, nor that it could do so in any conceivable future. Its domestic problems, from pollution to unrest, remain staggering enough that it's hard to imagine a China not absorbed with domestic issues through 2030 and beyond.

And Then There Was One (Planet)

Militarily, culturally, and even to some extent economically, the US remains surprisingly alone on planet Earth in imperial terms, even if little has worked out as planned in Washington. The story of the years since the Soviet Union fell may prove to be a tale of how American domination and decline went hand-in-hand, with the decline part of the equation being strikingly self-generated.

And yet here's a genuine, even confounding, possibility: that moment of "unipolarity" in the 1990s may really have been the end point of history as human beings had known it for millennia-the history, that is, of the rise and fall of empires. Could the United States actually be the last empire? Is it possible that there will be no successor because something has profoundly changed in the realm of empire building? One thing is increasingly clear: whatever the state of imperial America, something significantly more crucial to the fate of humanity (and of empires) is in decline. I'm talking, of course, about the planet itself.

The present capitalist model (the only one available) for a rising power, whether China, India, or Brazil, is also a model for planetary decline, possibly of a precipitous nature. The very definition of success-more middle-class consumers, more car owners, more shoppers, which means more energy used, more fossil fuels burned, more greenhouse gases entering the atmosphere-is also, as it never would have been before, the definition of failure. The greater the "success," the more intense the droughts, the stronger the storms, the more extreme the weather, the higher the rise in sea levels, the hotter the temperatures, the greater the chaos in low-lying or tropical lands, the more profound the failure. The question is: Will this put an end to the previous patterns of history, including the until-now-predictable rise of the next great power, the next empire? On a devolving planet, is it even possible to imagine the next stage in imperial gigantism?

Every factor that would normally lead toward "greatness" now also leads toward global decline. This process-which couldn't be more unfair to countries having their industrial and consumer revolutions late-gives a new meaning to the phrase "disaster capitalism."

Take the Chinese, whose leaders, on leaving the Maoist model behind, did the most natural thing in the world at the time: they patterned their future economy on the United States-on, that is, success as it was then defined. Despite both traditional and revolutionary communal traditions, for instance, they decided that to be a power in the world, you needed to make the car (which meant the individual driver) a pillar of any future state-capitalist China. If it worked for the US, it would work for them, and in the short run, it worked like a dream, a capitalist miracle-and China rose.

It was, however, also a formula for massive pollution, environmental degradation, and the pouring of ever more fossil fuels into the atmosphere in record amounts. And it's not just China. It doesn't matter whether you're talking about that country's ravenous energy use, including its possible future "carbon bombs," or the potential for American decline to be halted by new extreme methods of producing energy (fracking, tar-sands extraction, deep-water drilling). Such methods, however much they hurt local environments, might indeed turn the US into a "new Saudi Arabia." Yet that, in turn, would only contribute further to the degradation of the planet, to decline on an ever-larger scale.

What if, in the twenty-first century, going up means declining? What if the unipolar moment turns out to be a planetary moment in which previously distinct imperial events-the rise and fall of empires-fuse into a single disastrous system?

What if the story of our times is this: And then there was one planet, and it was going down.

Tom Engelhardt, co-founder of the American Empire Project and author of The United States of Fear as well as a history of the Cold War, The End of Victory Culture, runs the Nation Institute's TomDispatch.com. His latest book, co-authored with Nick Turse, is Terminator Planet: The First History of Drone Warfare, 2001-2050.

Originally published on TomDispatch. Republished with permission.

(AP Photo)

There is a curious parallel between the presidency of Barack Obama and that of his predecessor George W. Bush -- and it is not an altogether happy one. Bush's 'transformational' vision pushed the U.S. into Iraq, squandering the global outpouring of goodwill toward the United States post 9/11.

In stark contrast, Obama's realist approach to foreign affairs has made him weary of committing the U.S. to any foreign adventures. He came late and reluctantly to declare that Hosni Mubarak's time as Egypt's president was over, and was equally reluctant to declare military action during the Libyan revolution. Yet those two actions bought him more goodwill in the Arab world than his set-piece speech at the University of Cairo -- it is precisely that goodwill that is now in danger of being squandered in Syria.

Under Obama's presidency, the U.S. has consistently tried to keep at arm's length from the region. Yet foreign affairs -- the Middle East especially -- have a way of defying political platitudes. For Obama, his dithering over what to do in Syria has led to what is now a broader war. Indeed, by doing nothing for so long, Obama has created the conditions for a regional conflict as surely as Bush's inept invasion of Iraq did. If he does not make the right choices now, Syria will be Barack Obama's Iraq.

For long stretches of the last two years, events in Syria seemed to be at a stalemate. (In reality, they were not, but the daily grind of war, of small territorial losses and gains struggled to make the news agenda. The massacres that dotted the landscape of conflict occasionally registered, but the daily grind of war that claimed tens of thousands of Syrians was largely invisible.) Events are now escalating with alarming speed.

Within the past few days, the Syrian conflict has moved in new and disturbing directions. The regime of Bashar al-Assad has quietly introduced its chemical weapons arsenal into the conflict, and both Hezbollah and Israel have openly entered the war.

The Syrian conflict has now drawn in almost all the region's most powerful countries: Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Iran and Israel are now deeply involved, in one way or another, on one side or another. (The exception, so far, is Egypt, the Middle East's largest country.) If Obama feared getting involved in Syria would spark a regional conflagration, he was only half right. The regional war is already underway.

Much like Bush's legacy is intimately wed to Iraq, what Obama does now could forever define his presidency. Yet by procrastinating for so long, the president's options for action have shrunk.

A year ago, imposing a no-fly zone could have been done with wide support from Arab states and Turkey. Today, imposing a no-fly zone is both harder militarily with the entry of Hezbollah, and harder politically with the entrenchment of Russia and the meddling of Iran. Funneling arms to the rebels seemed like the safer option -- except the US declined to allow sufficiently lethal weaponry to reach the rebels, allowing a space for better-armed and more radical groups to gain support.

Obama's credibility -- and that of the United States -- is draining away as well. Assad has been subtle about testing America's "red lines," gradually escalating his use of missiles and airstrikes against civilians, and now slowly introducing chemical weapons. It was always incongruous of Obama to specify the use of chemical weapons as a "red line," as if the deliberate slaughter of innocents on such a scale could be allowed a pass. But, once such weapons were used, Obama compounded the error by inserting not one but two qualifiers into his denunciation of the regime: It was the "systematic" use of chemical weapons against "civilian" populations that would not be tolerated, he declared. What message would Assad and his generals have heard in the presidential palace in Damascus? That the occasional use of chemical weapons, or even the systematic use of such weapons against the rag-tag Free Syrian Army, would be fine. Obama's red lines, as Sen. John McCain said over the weekend, appear to be written "in disappearing ink." Tehran, Moscow and Beijing will have heard that message clearly.

Syria may not have been high on Obama's agenda for his second term, but how he reacts to this new escalation will have repercussions for U.S. policy far beyond the Levant. Not intervening in Syria as civilians die of chemical attack could be as bad for America under Obama as intervening spuriously in Iraq was for George W. Bush.

Faisal Al Yafai is an award-winning journalist and essayist. Follow him on Twitter @FaisalAlYafai.

As I prepare for my journey, I am drawn to a central question regarding the U.S.-European relationship, or what remains of it. Having been in Europe at a time when that relationship meant everything to both sides, and to the world, this trip forces me to think about NATO. I have been asked to make several speeches about U.S.-European relations during my upcoming trip. It is hard to know where to start. The past was built around NATO, so thinking about NATO's past might help me put things in perspective.

On a personal level, my relationship with Europe always passes through the prism of NATO. Born in Hungary, I recall my parents sitting in the kitchen in 1956, when the Soviets came in to crush the revolution. On the same night as my sister's wedding in New York, we listened on the radio to a report on Soviet tanks attacking a street just a block from where we lived in Budapest. I was 7 at the time. The talk turned to the Americans and NATO and what they would do. NATO was the redeemer who disappoints not because he cannot act but because he will not. My family's underlying faith in the power of American alliances was forged in World War II and couldn't be shaken. NATO was the sword of Gideon, albeit lacking in focus and clarity at times.

I had a more personal relationship with NATO. In the 1970s, I played an embarrassingly unimportant role in developing early computerized war games. The games were meant to evaluate strategies on NATO's central front: Germany. At that time, the line dividing Germany was the fault line of the planet. If the world were to end in a nuclear holocaust, it would end there. The place that people thought it would all start was called the Fulda Gap, a not-too-hilly area in the south, where a rapid attack could take Frankfurt and also strike at the heart of U.S. forces. The Germans speak of a watch on the Rhine. For my generation, or at least those millions who served in the armies of NATO, it was Fulda.

In the course of designing war games, I spent some time at SHAPE Technical Center in The Hague. SHAPE stands for Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe. The name itself is a reminder of the origins of NATO, deep in World War II and the alliance that defeated the Germans. It was commanded by SACEUR -- Supreme Allied Commander Europe -- who was always an American. Over time, the name became increasingly anachronistic, as SACEUR stopped resembling U.S. Gen. Dwight Eisenhower and started resembling the chair of a fractious church board, where people showed up for the snacks more than to make decisions.

To me, in the 1970s, SHAPE and SACEUR were acronyms that recalled D-Day and were built around the word "supreme." I was young and in awe, with a sense of history and pride in participating in it. Why I should be proud to participate in what might lead to total catastrophe for humanity seems odd in retrospect, but there is little in any of our lives that does not seem odd in retrospect. However, I was proud that I got to go into a building designated as SHAPE's technical center. I felt at the center of history. History, of course, is deceptive.

Games and Reality

It was never clear to me what those above us (whom we called "EBR," echelons beyond reality) did with the games that were built and played, or with the results, but I believe I learned a great deal about the war that was going to be fought. What cut short my career as a war gamer was my growing realization of the triviality of what we were doing and that the intelligence that we were building the games from was inherently deficient. Moreover, the commanders weren't all that interested in what we were doing. And there was the fact that I was genuinely enjoying and actually looking forward to a war that would test our theories. When the pieces on a map represent human beings and their loss means nothing to you, it is time to leave.

The war gaming was not the problem; properly done, as I hope it is by now, it can aid in victory and save lives. But then, knowing the men (women came later) who would stand and fight at Fulda if the time came, I felt I had been given a frivolous job. There was one thing I got from that job, however: I came into contact with troops from all the armies that might be called to fight. I had a profound sense that they were not just my colleagues but also my comrades. Some didn't like Americans, and others didn't like me, but this is no different than any organization. We were peering into the future, with our fates bound together.

The U.S. and Soviet Views of NATO

The United States believed that the Soviet conquest of Western Europe would integrate Soviet resources and European technology. This same fear led the Americans and Europeans to fight Germany in two wars from two very different perspectives. For my European colleagues, it meant the devastation of their countries, even if NATO won the war. The Dutch, for example, had lived under occupation and even preferred devastation over capitulation. For me, it was an abstract exercise, both in the strange mathematics of the war games and in the more distant consequences of defeat for my country. At the same time, there was a shared sense of urgency that formed the foundation of our relationship: War might come at any moment, and we must consider every possible move by the Soviets, and we must propose solutions.

The Americans were always haunted by Pearl Harbor. This is why 9/11 was such a blow. The historical recollection of the attack out of nowhere was always close. Doctrine said that we would have 30 days' warning of a Soviet attack. I had no idea where this doctrine came from, and I suspected that it came from the fact that we needed 30 days' warning to get ready. The Europeans did not fear the unexpected attack; rather, they dreaded the expected attack for which preparations had not been made. World War II haunted them differently. They were riveted on the fact that they knew what was coming and failed to prepare. The Americans and Europeans were united by paranoia, but their paranoia differed. For the Americans, staying out of alliances and not acting soon enough was what caused the war. The United States was committed to never repeating that mistake. NATO was one of many alliances. The Americans love alliances.

It is interesting to recognize now what the Soviets were afraid of. When World War II came to them, they had no allies. Their one ally, Germany, was the one that betrayed them. The Soviets were both taken by surprise and fought alone until the Americans and British chose to help them. The Soviets had played complex diplomacy with traditional alliances, and when it failed the Soviet Union committed itself to never again depending on others. It had the Warsaw Pact because the West had NATO, but it did not depend on its allies. The Americans threw themselves into alliances as if an alliance solved all problems. The Soviets, however, acted as if allies were the most dangerous things of all.

In the end, when we look back on it, war was much less likely than we felt. The West was not going to invade the East. On the defensive, the Soviets would have annihilated our much smaller force. And, truth be told, no one had the slightest interest in conquering Eastern Europe or the Soviet Union.

As for the Soviets, on paper they were an overwhelming force, but paper is a bad place to think about war. The Soviets did not want a nuclear exchange, and in their view the United States was itching to have one. They knew if they moved westward there would be an exchange. Plus, it turned out, the Soviets would have a great deal of trouble keeping their tanks fueled as they moved to the west. They had a plan for laying plastic pipes from their fuel depots and rolling them out as the tanks advanced. The problem was that the pipes never worked very well, and their fuel depots were slated for annihilation by airstrikes, possibly the day before the war began officially.

All of this is past and I recollect it with a combination of pride -- not for what I did, which was little, but for simply being there -- and chagrin about how little we understood the enemy. Both sides were ready for war. Both sides were expecting actions that the other side had no intentions of undertaking. But all of the plans that we created were, in the end, irrelevant. The only way to win the game -- as the movie War Games said -- was not to play it. Not surprisingly, the leaders -- Eisenhower and Khrushchev, Nixon and Brezhnev, Reagan and Gorbachev -- knew it better than the experts. It has always struck me as the world's great fortune that the two great superpowers were the United States and the Soviet Union, who managed the Cold War with meticulous care in retrospect. Imagine the European diplomats of 1914 or 1938 armed with nuclear weapons. It is easy to believe they would not have been as cautious.

NATO's Legacy and Disarray

What NATO provided that was priceless, and the unexpected byproduct of all of this, was a comradeship and unity of purpose on both sides of the North Atlantic. Even the French, who withdrew from NATO's military command under Charles de Gaulle, remained unofficially part of it. There was little question but that if "the balloon went up" -- the enemy took action -- the French would be there, arguing over who would command whom but fighting as hard as the Underground did before D-Day. But through NATO, I got to know Germans at a time when knowing Germans was not easy for me because of what my family went through during the war. I was forced to distinguish Germany from Franz who could play the ukulele.

I had a son in 1976. When I went to Europe, I met an Italian and we became friends. We would talk about what we would tell our families to do if the balloon went up. The conversation -- strange and perhaps pathological as it was -- bound us together. It was not war, it was not peace, but it was a place in the mind where the preparation for war and the anxiety that it generated created strange forms, such as plans for the movement of children in order to avoid a nuclear holocaust.

NATO, far more than a model United Nations or a Fulbright, allowed ordinary Americans and Europeans to know each other and understand that with linked fates, they were comrades in arms. After World War II, that was a profound lesson. Millions of draftees experienced that and took the lesson home.

The end of the Cold War is no great loss, although my youth went with it. Losing the unity of purpose that the Cold War gave Western Europe and the United States is of enormous consequence. For a while, after 1991, the two sides went on as if the alliance could exist even without an enemy. However, NATO started to fragment when it lost its enemy. The passion for a mission gave NATO meaning, and the passion was drained. The alliance continued to fragment when the United States decided to invade Iraq for the second time. The vast majority of countries in NATO supported the invasion -- a forgotten fact -- but France and Germany did not. This damaged the United States' relations with Europe, particularly with the French, who have a way of getting under the skins of Americans while appearing oblivious to it. But the greater damage was within Europe -- the division between those who wanted to maintain close relations with the United States, even if they thought the Iraq War was a bad idea, and those who wanted Europe to have its own voice, distinct from the Americans'.

The 2008 global financial contagion did not divide the Americans and Europeans nearly as much as it divided Europe. The relationship between European countries -- less among leaders than among publics -- has become poisonous. Something terrible has happened to Europe, and each country is holding someone else responsible. As many countries are blaming Germany as Germany is blaming for the crisis.

There can be no trans-Atlantic alliance when one side is in profound disagreement with itself over many things and the other side has no desire to be drawn into the dispute. Nor can there be a military alliance where there is no understanding of the mission, the enemy or obligations. NATO was successful during the Cold War because the enemy was clear, there was consensus over what to do in each particular circumstance and participation was a given. An alliance that does not know its mission, has no meaningful plans for what problems it faces and stages come-as-you-are parties in Libya or Mali, where invitations are sent out and no one RSVPs, cannot be considered an alliance. The committees meet and staffs of defense ministers prepare for conferences -- all of the niceties of an alliance remain. SACEUR is still an American, the Science and Technology Committee produces papers, but in the end, the commonality of purpose is gone.

My European colleagues and I were young, serious and dedicated. These are all dangerous things because we lacked historical perspective (but then, so did many of our elders). What we had together, however, was invaluable: a moment in history, possibly the last, when the West stood shoulder to shoulder in defense of liberal democracy and against tyranny. Still, I look back on the Soviets and then look at al Qaeda and I miss the Soviets. I understood them in a way I can never understand al Qaeda.

So I will be asked to speak about U.S-European relations. I will have to tell the Europeans two things. The first is that there is no American relationship with Europe because Europe is no longer an idea but a continent made up of states with diverse interests. There are U.S.-French relations and U.S.-Russian relations and so on. The second thing I will tell them is that there can be no confederation without a common foreign and defense policy. You can have different tax rates, but if when one goes to war they don't all go to war, they are just nations cooperating as they see fit.

I remember the camaraderie of young enlisted Americans and Europeans, and the solidarity of planning teams. This was the glue that held Europe together. It was not just the commanders and politicians, but the men who would have to cover each other's movement that created the foundations of NATO's solidarity. My recollections are undoubtedly colored with sentimentality, but I do not think I've done the idea an injustice. NATO bound Europe together because it made the nations into comrades. They were able to face Armageddon together. Europe without NATO's solidarity has difficulty figuring out a tax policy. In the end, Europe lost more when NATO fell into disuse than it imagined.

I don't know that NATO can exist without a Cold War. Probably not. What is gone is gone. But I know my nostalgia for Europe is not just for my youth; it is for a time when Western civilization was united. I doubt we will see that again.

"Geopolitical Journey: Nostalgia for NATO is republished with permission of Stratfor."

On April 27, Icelandic voters brought back to power the center-right conservatives they had ousted after the financial crisis of 2008 in favor of a pro-European socialist-green coalition. Beyond the political result, the elections exacerbated some of the pressing economic and strategic challenges that lie ahead for Iceland. Between accession to the European Union, the potential for a renewed relationship with the United States, and a strengthened partnership with China, Iceland faces numerous choices concerning its role in the transatlantic relationship.

Five years after a financial crisis made Iceland the center of international attention, a disconnect between the country's economic and social recovery is palpable. Emergency measures taken in the wake of the crisis with the blessing of the International Monetary Fund may have protected domestic depositors and assets, but they have led to higher taxes, currency devaluation, repossessions, and lower paying jobs. Despite steady 2.5 percent growth, unemployment projected to be below 5 percent by the end of the year, a positive current account balance, and government debt now below 100 percent of GDP, much of the population is still struggling. Growth may have returned sooner than expected, but it has been weaker. More pressing, household debts are still crippling; in 2012, 10 percent of homes were still in default with mortgages or rent.

Iceland's economy relies heavily - perhaps too heavily - on its geography and geology, which have enabled the development of successful fishing, geothermal energy, aluminum production, and tourism industries. With diversification now needed, Iceland must create the necessary conditions to attract foreign direct investment. This would require foreign creditors to suffer losses in an orderly way and the lifting of capital controls in a manner that avoids the further depreciation of the króna. The new Icelandic government will need to convince its people that it is capable of helping those still most affected by the crisis.

But beyond economic recovery, it is Iceland's role in global affairs that may be at a critical juncture. Despite continuing skepticism over the country's accession to the European Union and the euro, reinforced by the overwhelming victory of the center-right parties opposed to EU membership, talks might still go ahead under the new coalition government. Many Icelanders have voiced their interest in seeing what a finalized accession package would look like, with particular attention focused on the thorny issue of fisheries.

Iceland is also proving a strategic gateway of another kind. In early April, it became the first European country to sign a free trade agreement with China. The large size of the Chinese embassy in Reykjavik is a fair representation of the ambitions that Beijing may have in the region, and why it has been seeking for support to become a permanent observer of the Arctic Council. By 2020, approximately 15 percent of Chinese trade may be transiting through the Northern Sea Route.

Iceland's proximity to the Northwest Passage and to the resources of the Arctic confer it a key position in the region, and the island could become a hub for maritime transport or an advanced base for rescue missions in the north. Iceland has already signaled its willingness to play a central role in the region by forming the Arctic Circle, a non-profit, non-partisan platform designed "to facilitate dialogue and build relationships to confront the Arctic's greatest challenges." One of these challenges might yet be for Iceland to find signs of renewed interest in Washington following the closing of the Keflavik air and naval base in 2006.

Reykjavik must convince Americans and Europeans of its strategic relevance, whether or not it opts to become a member of the European Union. While Iceland still remains under the military protection of the United States, history also helps to remember that it is in Reykjavik's Höfði that Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev met in 1986 to discuss arms control and nuclear disarmament. And in 1991, it was Iceland that was the first country to recognize the independence of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania from the USSR - all three of which are now part of the EU.

Beyond asking to participate in discussions over a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, Reykjavik should continue to position itself as a natural strategic hub in the northern Atlantic. At the same time, both Washington and Brussels should more actively reach out and engage with Iceland, in order to avoid seeing the island drift too far away.

Guillaume Xavier-Bender is a program officer for economics in the Brussels office of the German Marshall Fund of the United States. Reprinted with permission.

Ruling coalitions led by the United Malays National Organisation have been in government since the formation of modern-day Malaysia in 1963. There were some hopes that breaking the dominance of UMNO would finally signal that Malaysia is able to start afresh and make the changes needed to fulfil its goal of being one of the few prosperous and harmonious multi-ethnic countries in Asia.

Change always brings promise. But Malaysia's problems are not necessarily due to its choice of leader, or even the party in power. Both Prime Minister Najib Razak and Anwar recognise that the country needs to reform its comprehensive suite of affirmative action policies favouring indigenous Malays in order to achieve further prosperity and social harmony. Najib tried and largely failed to do so in his first term when he assumed power in 2010.

In the lead-up to this election, Anwar frequently spoke about the need to redistribute national wealth based on need rather than race. Affirmative action policies are normally designed to protect minorities. The problem is that winding back decades-old policies that discriminate in favour of the majority are far more difficult to shift.

As any Malaysian (as I once was) will tell you, the 1969 race riots between indigenous Bumiputra Malays, who currently constitute almost 70 per cent of the population, and Chinese-Malaysians remains the defining event in the country's history.

The acceleration of economic, cultural, educational and political affirmative action policies from 1971 onwards was an understandable response to the national trauma of the violence during which 196 people died.

Even so, the race riots were largely caused by social-economic racial divisions within the country. Malaysian leaders then could have responded by attempting to move the country away from ideologies and policies that emphasised and entrenched racial differences. Instead, they did the opposite.

The move to improve the lives of indigenous Malays rather than all Malaysians has come at a heavy price. From 1971 to the present day, successive five-year plans drew up pro-Malay affirmative action policies, each going further than the last. Schemes were implemented to reduce Bumiputra (rather than overall) poverty and initiatives were adopted to speed up the redistribution of the country's corporate assets from Chinese and Indian-Malaysians for the benefit of Bumiputras.

Indeed, it is estimated that almost two thirds of Bumiputras who found employment from 1971 to 2000 were in jobs created through affirmative action policies. One legacy became the rise of a Malaysian civil service, which as a proportion of the population is the largest and best paid in Asia. Bumiputras make up more than 95 per cent of the service.

This is important because these are the same officials responsible for conceiving and implementing any government reform proposals.

Another consequence is distortions in the investment climate. For example, firms in key sectors are obliged to reserve at least 30 per cent of their equity for Bumiputras, and many require a Bumiputra business partner for registration. Special categories of bank loans are created exclusively for Malay-owned businesses and all banks are required to earmark at least 20 per cent of all money lent to Bumiputras.

Generous government assistance is provided to Malay businesspeople, including preferential access to contracts, licences, franchises, technical assistance, management training and reduced rent assistance. Businesses with at least one quarter of Malay executives are entitled to a 10 per cent corporate tax deduction.

Preference is given to Malay firms in the lucrative government procurement sectors: a real prize given the size of the government corporate sector as well as the fact that public investment exceeds private investment. Of all government contracts, 95 per cent go to Bumiputras.

Rather than creating a critical mass of dynamic Bumiputra entrepreneurs, Malaysia is plagued by the rise of rent-seeking Bumiputra elites dependent on state largesse and demanding the continuation of affirmative action policies on both sides of politics.

Many of those who should be best placed to drive the country's plan to escape the middle-income trap in which Malaysia finds itself already have voted with their feet. According to the World Bank, more than one million Malaysian citizens (out of a population of about 29 million) live abroad, with 90 per cent ethnic Chinese and much of the remainder ethnic Indians, both traditionally dominating the entrepreneurial and professional classes in the country.

Back to the election, it seems the majority of non-Bumiputra Malaysians who voted put their hopes in the opposition, figuring that any change could hardly be worse. We will now never know.

But an Anwar-led government would have encountered the same entrenched obstacles as Prime Minister Najib will continue to suffer.

Influential Bumiputra groups on both sides of politics - decisive in a country in which they represent the majority ethnicity - mostly wanted a greater share of state largesse for their stakeholders, not the winding back of affirmative action policies.

Unfortunately, even a genuinely free and fair election will not easily solve Malaysia's problems.

John Lee is the Michael Hintze fellow and adjunct associate professor at the Centre for International Security Studies, University of Sydney. He is also a non-resident senior scholar at the Hudson Institute in Washington, DC, and a director of the Kokoda Foundation in Canberra. Reprinted with permission.

Though many of the region's leaders seem to have either ignored or forgotten it, the second fight in Syria is taking place among opponents of the Syrian government.

As the opposition continues to pick off regime soldiers and the government embarks on yet another counteroffensive around Damascus and Homs, the rebels themselves are starting to duke it out over the natural resources in Syria's eastern plains, where the bulk of its crude oil is located.

As much as Syria's military opposition likes to portray itself as a disciplined military organization with a sense of unity against the "criminal" Assad regime to its foreign donors, the scuffle over oil in the small Deir ez-Zor village of al-Musareb - between seemingly rival rebel brigades- is the most public illustration to date that Assad's opponents are divided over some very large questions. How should Syria be governed after Bashar's fall? Which ideology (Salafi, moderate Islam, or secular) will reign supreme in a post-Assad Syria? And how strong will democracy be in a nation that has been traumatized by two years of civil war?

The picture painted by al-Musareb, courtesy of the excellent reporting of the Syria Comment blog of Joshua Landis, a Syria scholar at Oklahoma University, is one that is distressing for anyone who wants Bashar al-Assad's clique gone from power. But it's also a picture that was all but inevitable, given the fractious nature of the armed opposition since the uprising's early days in the summer of 2011, and the increasing power and leverage that jihadist groups have had within its ranks as the war has gotten bloodier.

While the exact chain of events is not clear, the scuffle in al-Musareb allegedly started over a dispute about an oil tanker truck. The area's major tribe, the al-Saf, was accused by Jabhat al-Nusra, the jihadist organization linked to Al'Qaeda in Iraq and designated as a terrorist organization by the United States last year, of buying an oil tanker that was stolen from its original owner. When members of Jabhat and the al-Saf met to mediate the dispute, violence quickly erupted between the two, resulting in the death of Jabhat's leader in the region.

Why the tribe shot and killed the Jabhat leader is still a matter of dispute. Tribal members complained that Jabhat al-Nusra was trying to intimidate them with weapons; Jabhat claims that the tribe deceived them and killed their man as a preemptive measure.

What is certain, however, is that Jabhat al-Nusra felt it necessary to retaliate with a vengeance. A full-scale assault against the tribe was launched, and the invasion had the devastating effect of demolishing dozens of homes, capturing of locals in the village, and displacing a significant amount of people. Fifty people were reportedly killed in the fighting, which culminated in a retaliatory strike by the tribe against Nusra's central headquarters in the region.

Depending on whom you ask, you get a different answer about which side started the violence. Yet the question is hardly relevant to the big picture: Jabhat al-Nusra, much like their jihadist cousins in Iraq, are clearly interfering with the daily lives of indigenous Syrians and overstaying their welcome.

This, perhaps, would not be a big deal if Syria had an effective and legitimate central government to mediate the dispute. But of course, government control in Deir ez-Zor is increasingly scarce, leaving various rebel groups and tribes to administer the affairs of a highly damaged society.

While it would be premature to say that the tribes of eastern Syria are preparing to mobilize and kick extremists such as Jabhat al-Nusra out of their towns and villages, the violence that erupted in al-Musareb is very similar to what happened in Iraq five years earlier, when the tribes of Anbar banded together to limit Al'Qaeda's influence in that part of the country.

As US, European, and Arab leaders continue to meet on Syria, they all would be wise to take a deeper look into what is happening within the anti-Assad opposition. It has been difficult thus far to get Bashar al-Assad to waver, but it will be even more difficult if groups within the Syrian resistance fight among one another.

And when Bashar al-Assad leaves, Syrians may have to weather more violence for a while longer-this time, between militias with different agendas on how Syria should be resurrected.

Daniel R. DePetris is a researcher at Wikistrat, Inc.,a geostrategic analysis firm, and an independent analyst. He has written about Syria for CNN.com, the Small Wars Journal, and The National Interest.

In two of the three global conflicts of the 20th Century, the United States took sides; in the third, it WAS a side. In World War I, we were less against Germany than with our long-time cultural and political allies, Britain and France. The cordial reception given to Americans in Germany between the wars, and the American affinity for parts of German society made some Americans reluctant to criticize the rise of Hitler. (See Hitlerland, by Andrew Nagorski.) In the Cold War, the United States faced off against Russia. The Cuban Missile Crisis was not about Cuba; the Central American wars of the 1980s were not about Central America. It was a war to the death between communism and democracy.

The end of the Cold War had two generally overlooked consequences. First, non-communist Russia retained its historic imperial nature, characterized by deep concern for and violent repression of threats to its "near abroad." Second, countries and groups in the Middle East were no longer bound to choose between Soviets and Americans as patrons. This was particularly important because neither democracy nor communism is compatible with Islamist thinking. (Obligatory disclaimer: This in no way implies that Muslim people cannot live in democracies or be democrats; or live in communist countries or be communists, for that matter.)

The fourth Great War is less "Islam against the West" (although that surely is there) than it is Sunni expansionists vs. Shiite expansionists. Neither is an appealing partner for the United States in the region, and neither has a natural claim on our politics or our interests. For reasons having to do with Iran itself, the U.S. will not choose to support Iranian-backed Shiites. However, Sunni expansionists are simply no better; Saudi and Qatari-supported Islamists run from the unacceptable Muslim Brotherhood to the even more unacceptable Wahabis, al Qaeda or Jabhat al Nusra - it is like a choice between cancer and a heart attack. (Second obligatory disclaimer: That is NOT to say the U.S. has no interests in the Middle East/North Africa/Southwest Asia, or that there is no humanitarian impulse due. It is to say both Sunni and Shiite expansionists have views and values inimical to Western liberal democracies, and neither is better than secular despots.)

In broad terms, the current fighting in the region is Sunni-Shiite: Iraq, Lebanon, Bahrain, Yemen, Pakistan, and rumblings in Kuwait all have a Sunni-Shiite component. Turkey thinks of the Ottoman Empire, particularly after the freeing of the "Stans" from Russian control. Iran revisits the Persian Empire. The Muslim Brotherhood, al Qaeda, Hezbollah, Hamas, Jabhat al Nusra, and others all find patrons in the region rather than in the U.S. or Russia. Oil money, particularly Saudi, Iranian and Qatari, greases various paths.

As both Sunnis and Shiites try to expand both deeper into their own societies and move farther afield, they run headlong into other regional, tribal, ethnic, religious, and familial interests. Christians, particularly in Iraq, Egypt, and Nigeria, have been hard hit as intolerance increases; it is estimated that half of Iraq's Christians have left the country. As a corollary, the minority communities of Syria backed the secular Assad regime for fear of an Islamist takeover. The U.S. has been attacked and vilified, and Europe is being subverted through "no go" zones for police, the installation of elements of Sharia law, and rising Muslim anti-Semitism. Venezuela and Argentina are Iran's hoped-for proxies, and Hezbollah operates freely in several South American countries.

Long involved in the repression of Sunni Caucasian nationalists, although the Chechen war only took on religious overtones in its second incarnation (2002-2007), Russia has chosen the Shiite side of the larger war. Even the idea of a nuclear Iran does not disturb Russia as much as the idea of shoulder-fired anti-aircraft weapons in the hands of Sunni terrorists. Russia preferred secular despots in the Middle East as well -- Saddam, Assad father and son, Nasser -- who would repress the Muslim Brotherhood and other internationalist Sunnis. The despots obliged. Nasser outlawed the Brotherhood, Assad killed tens of thousands in Hama, and Saddam ran a savagely secular state to ensure that his minority Sunnis could remain in power. Russia's commitment to Bashar Assad should not be underestimated.

And with shades of the Cold War, as Russia supports the Syrian regime, the U.S. has moved closer and closer to military involvement. Our first choice was to outsource the funding, arms and training of rebels to Turkey, Qatar and Saudi Arabia who chose, naturally enough, expansionist Sunni groups hoping to push Iranian-supported Shiites out of power. American arms are intended to end up with the Free Syrian Army, but according to David Ignatius "Islamist fighters...have formed the backbone of the Free Syrian Army for nearly two years. The Syrian opposition is almost entirely Sunni Muslim, and the Islamists (especially al-Nusra's recruits) have been among the best fighters."

The clear implication is that regardless of what they say to the U.S. to win our support, their long-term aims may be incompatible with ours. The possibility remains for direct U.S. military involvement, although hard on the heels of Hagel's statement about arming rebels, U.S. Special Operations Commander Admiral William McRaven strongly warned against considering the use of U.S. troops.

If American policy in Syria seems feckless, it is because it is feckless.

The President initially tried to "win" Assad to the West by sending envoys and lifting parts of the embargo. But Assad was not "won," and when he turned his army on his people, the President, apparently trying to satisfy American sensibilities with rhetoric, demanded that he step down. But Assad did not step down and rebel bands struck back, which did not displease the President, who was perhaps hoping that the rebels could do what his words alone could not do -- get rid of Assad quickly and without American involvement. The discovery that some rebels have serious jihadist tendencies offended American sensibilities, so the U.S. declined to "arm the rebels." That refusal apparently satisfied American public opinion, which leans heavily against any involvement in Syria; but the grossness of the slaughter, particularly the use of chemicals, did offend American sensibilities. The President's sliding "red line" on the use of chemical weapons offended some parties and satisfied others. Claiming to find "moderate, secular rebels" will satisfy some, but the admitted interconnectedness of the rebels -- and the fact that the Islamists are far and away the best fighters -- will continue to worry others.

The administration's policy on Syria has been a series of visceral reactions to graphic events and horrific casualties, offset by a gigantic distaste for confrontation. Without a definition of America's strategic interests, such as a defeat for both Iran and the Sunni jihadists, the chance remains that America might be dragged into another front in the Fourth Great War. A war in which neither side is our friend.

Shoshana Bryen is Senior Director of The Jewish Policy Center.

Originally published by the Gatestone Institute. Republished with permission.

(AP Photo)

To some degree, the global trends reflect a rejection by some political leaders of the ideals that are critical to democracy: openness, transparency, the right to independent thought.

But they also point to the sophistication of modern authoritarianism. In country after country, the leadership has developed shrewd strategies to control the politically relevant information and, more to the point, the interpretation of that information. That the practitioners of 21st-century despotism have succeeded in monopolizing the commanding heights of the media in the internet age is especially worrisome.

Under Vladimir Putin, Russia has emerged as a laboratory for the development of methods to suppress media freedom in the post-totalitarian era. Outright censorship has been eliminated, and outlets are left relatively free to pursue commercial success with entertainment programming, sports coverage, and news content on non-sensitive subjects. While their reach is limited, a few niche publications with more critical material have been allowed to survive. But to ensure that his message on key political matters would crowd out all others, Putin, in the earliest days of his presidency, moved to eliminate the independence of the country's most influential source of news, the major television networks. The national stations were either placed directly under state control or in the hands of cronies. Within a few years, what had been a vibrant and critical, albeit flawed, television landscape had been tamed.

In fact, under Putin, the news operations of major television networks have been turned into aggressive Kremlin propaganda instruments. Not content with ignoring regime critics, Russian television stations carry out relentless campaigns to humiliate and marginalize leading opposition figures. Those like Aleksey Navalny, the blogger and activist now on trial on dubious corruption charges, are depicted in pseudo-documentaries as extremists, criminals, and traitors, paid by shadowy foreign interests to undermine Russia.

The Russian system of media control is typical of the approach taken by other authoritarian-minded leaders, such as the late Hugo Chávez, who dominated mass media with his daily presence and left opposition outlets to wither under regulatory and financial pressure. The Russian method has been particularly influential with the country's Eurasian neighbors. According to Freedom House, the post-Soviet sphere has the most dismal press freedom record of any global region, with three Eurasian countries-Belarus, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan-registering scores that are among the world's worst.

The state of global press freedom is not as uniformly bleak. Even in the Middle East, while Egypt suffered serious backsliding in 2012 and Gulf monarchies cracked down on dissent, Tunisia and Libya retained most of the gains they registered in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, and Algeria and Morocco experienced modest improvements.

In practically every region, however, press freedom has been under significant pressure over the past several years. This may seem counterintuitive given the parallel growth in internet access, but in most countries, traditional media, which increasingly means television, remain the dominant source of news. Moreover, in the wake of the Arab Spring, authoritarian leaders worldwide have intensified their efforts to limit the potential of new media as an instrument of political change. In Russia, for example, a new law adopted in 2012 strengthened the state's ability to shut down websites, supposedly to protect minors from harmful content. Putin's allies have called for even more restrictive measures, and there can be little doubt that the leadership will take whatever steps it deems necessary to eliminate threats to its power.

The techniques of media control that predominate today are in many ways more subtle and insidious than old-fashioned censorship and propaganda, but authoritarian leaders have also demonstrated their willingness to use blunt tools like incarceration and violence to silence their most persistent critics. It is increasingly clear that these rulers will not sit idly by and let the tides of the information age sweep them away. Indeed, the current trend of declining media freedom will continue until those who cherish the values of an open society step forward to defend their beleaguered allies around the world, and confront the efforts of their opponents with a vigor that is equal to the task.

Leon Willems is the Director of Free Press Unlimited. Arch Puddington is the Vice President for Research at Freedom House. This article was originally published on Freedom House.

(AP Photo)

Probably the most important change is popular opinion. In his first two terms, Putin was genuinely popular and therefore able to arbitrate between different political clans and marginalise challengers. By applying a mix of seemingly incompatible policies - for example, liberal economic reforms coupled with restoration of some Soviet symbols and discourses - he managed to associate with very different groups in society, all of whom saw him as someone who shared at least part of their agenda.

That is not the case any more. Putin remains the most popular politician in Russia, but his support ratings have come down and his magic is fading. He clearly has lost the support of urban intellectuals. Protest has now moved from streets into the souls, where it is ripening, mutating, and waiting for a time to manifest itself again, probably in new ways. The provincial majority -whom Putin is now trying to mobilise as his power base - is not happy either. They may not care about political freedoms as much as the "creative class," but they also suffer from the problems of the system: corruption, inaccessibility of basic services, inadequate healthcare and education systems, etc.

People have stopped associating Putin with hopes for the future; instead those who support him do so because they see no credible alternative. During the first decade of the century, Putin's popularity rested on the notion that he had brought Russia out from the chaos, poverty and the perceived humiliation of the 1990s. Contrast with the 1990s remains Putin's main claim to legitimacy, but for the population, reference point is shifting: future, rather than past is becoming relevant; and the future is clouded by uncertainty.

Generational change is also eroding people's ability to empathise with Putin's other reference point: the late Soviet era. Putin's rhetoric still bears many hallmarks of that era; his jokes and metaphors often are rooted in Soviet realities. But younger Russians who do not remember the Soviet Union, and often have a distorted view of its nature, may simply not get it; for others, who do, these references make Putin seem like a man of the past.

So far the political opposition has failed to capitalise on this loss of support for Putin. The protest movement emerged too late to organise itself as a political force in time for the presidential elections in March. Even since then, it has struggled to agree on a proper message and strategy. The current so-called non-systemic opposition is a diverse group that includes nationalists, socialists, liberals and opportunists. Some hope to change the system by evolution, for others, revolution remains the only good option. Some want to completely destroy the system, while others want to just replace Putin. Some want to boycott the Putinist system completely, others are trying to score small victories in local elections, with the hope that this will cumulate into something bigger. As a rule, radicals from different ideological camps seem to get better along with each other than with their more moderate ideological peers.

Moreover, much of the energy of the protest movement comes from provinces. The peak of the protest was actually not in the "winter of dissent" in 2011-2012, when thousands of people gathered on the streets and squares of Moscow, but in 2009, when there were uncoordinated but frequent actions in provinces, mostly with social and economic messages. The leaders of these protests rarely link up with, and in many cases despise, the political class in Moscow. The protest movement in Moscow, in turn, has not yet managed to find a way of communicating with the provinces. The two agendas - local and practical versus high political - remain separate; no leader has managed to merge the two into one by demonstrating the links between local ills and the federal system of government.

Nevertheless, despite the opposition's problems, Putin himself seems to take it seriously. "He truly got scared in late 2011," stated one former high official. "He is now taking revenge on everyone who made him scared: protesters, independent NGOs and elites of fragile loyalty." Close to 30 people are under investigation under the so-called Bolotnoye case - the criminal case against participants in the protests that took place on the eve of Putin's inauguration last spring; and more are being added by the day. Three NGOs have been labelled "foreign agents" under the laws adopted last summer. Alexei Navalny, probably the most prominent protest leader, is facing a court-case on politically motivated charges. Much-trumpeted, but selectively applied anti-corruption campaign is designed to keep in check the Kremlin-associated elites, many of whom had flirted - and a few even joined - the opposition.

In many ways, this is very much like what Putin did in the early 2000s when he had just come to power. Slowly, and using legal means, he took on the individuals and institutions that had dared to challenge him while showing the oligarchs that they could keep their property and freedom if they steered clear of politics. However, it is uncertain whether this old approach has the same chance to succeed. Unlike in the early 2000s, when the dissent really emanated from a limited number of prominent actors - mainly oligarchs and the media -, this time the protest mood is inside the society; the leaders only express it. Putting Alexei Navalny in prison will not make protests to go away, closing down NGOs will not change the fact that badly organised government is not able to provide the elementary services, thereby creating incentives for people to self-organise in order to have at least the basic things taken care of. Effectively, the way Putin addresses "the winter of dissent" amounts to shooting the messengers instead of dealing with the problem: corrupt and inefficient system of governing.

So far, the Putinist system has kept itself afloat thanks to permanent influx of oil- and gas-money. Now, however, the economy is showing signs of slowdown even before the decline in oil gas prices has properly kicked in. The pie is getting smaller; and there are painful dilemmas. There is urgent economic need to reform, but reforms would have some social cost, which - given the already unhappy population - is risky. To keep the social expenditure on its current level or increase it, one needs money, but money is hard to come buy if global oil and gas prices stay under the levels foreseen in the Russian budgets. To get the economy off its dependence on raw materials, Russia should modernise, but modernisation inevitably foresees some political reforms, as this presumes the cooperation from "creative classes," who are currently antagonised and contemplating emigration. Dealing with corruption truly, rather than selectively, would be a big step forward on the economic as well as domestic political front, but this would erode the very bases of the Putinist system: loyalty of the elites in exchange for the possibilities of self-enrichment. Putin is used to having it all: abundant economic as well as political resources have been at his disposal during his first two terms. Now, both of these resources are drying up, forcing him to choose between different constituencies, loyalties and priorities; even worldviews. Having it all is not possible any more; and the choices made at this junction will not only determine the lifespan of Putin's rule, but will also have meaningful implications for post-Putin Russia.

Originally published by the European Council on Foreign Relations.

Citizenship in this context means two things. First, it means sharing a common, civic identity: the "self" in self-government. Second, it means participating in the creation and receipt of public goods, the sharing of burdens and benefits: the "government" in self-government. A sense of diminished citizenship is now pervasive across the socio-economic spectrum in North America. What is new is that the opportunities and demands of citizenship no longer seem to resonate strongly either with economic elites or with growing numbers of the middle class.

For the poor and marginalized, growing economic inequality undermines the promise of citizenship. There is less upward mobility for low-income Americans today than there is for their counterparts in Canada or Western Europe. Significant inequality used to be justified in the United States by the idea that everyone had a fair shot at the American Dream. That is less and less true today. Meanwhile, the middle class is beleaguered. Since 2000, according to Pew Research, it has "shrunk in size, fallen backward in income and wealth, and shed some - but by no means all - of its characteristic faith in the future."

Many at the top of the economic heap seem inclined to hive themselves off from their fellow citizens - in gated communities, niche charter schools, and luxury boxes at sports events. Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney found it difficult to appeal to "the 47 percent" in part because he found it hard to respect them as co-equal citizens. After all, what united the 47 percent - including many African Americans, Hispanics, and young people - was that they were all seen by the wealthy as recipients of "gifts" from the government of the day, not as civic participants in a political and governmental process whose programs bring them burdens and benefits as it does for other members of the political community.

The retreat from citizenship is both the product of deficient democratic practices and an accelerant of democratic dysfunction. Erecting barriers to political participation erodes the public's will to engage. Making voter registration more difficult by requiring voter identification or imposing short registration deadlines, or systematic efforts to suppress voting, pre-empt participation. Sophisticated gerrymandering that protects incumbents or favors one party is another obstacle. Other countries have independent bodies responsible for redefining electoral boundaries after a census. In the United States, this function is performed at the state level; with rare exceptions like California, which recently created an independent redistricting commission, it is carried out by state politicians who have an interest in warping the federal redistricting process for partisan advantage. The results can be grotesque, and incomprehensible to citizens.

Although Canada's electoral machinery generally works well, the country is afflicted by a number of the forces affecting citizenship and democratic practice in the United States. While less of a problem than in the United States, income inequality, middle-class insecurity, and the lack of confidence in legislatures have all increased in recent years. Unlike its southern neighbor, Canada has experienced significant long-term decline in voter turnout. Until 1993, voter turnout in federal elections was consistently better than 70 percent, but by 2008, turnout fell to 58.8 percent, the lowest level ever.

But Canada has an additional challenge that matters for democracy. In a country where French speakers constitute 22 percent of the total population, mostly in Quebec, the federal Conservative Party managed to form a majority government with minimal representation from that province. This means that French-speaking Quebecois have little voice in the councils of the federal government, including on sensitive issues like relaxing gun control, strengthening the status of the monarchy, tightening up on criminal sentencing and rehabilitation, aggressive support for Israel, and the like.

It will be difficult for the Conservatives to rebuild a competitive political base in Quebec, and they have shown that they can construct a governing coalition without it. Should this situation continue, the Quebecois would be effectively excluded from the opportunity to shape federal policies reflective of their own interests and needs. A continuing democratic dysfunction of this sort, linked as it is to the question of national unity, has explosive potential. While the exclusion and marginalization of significant classes of citizens gravely undermines the health of any democracy, the exclusion and marginalization of one of the national communities in a bi-national state threatens not just the health of the democracy, but the viability of the polity itself.

David Cameron is a senior fellow at the Transatlantic Academy, an initiative of the German Marshall Fund of the United States in Washington, DC.

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In the tumult of crisis and escape du jour, trends defining not only the future of the eurozone, but economic globalization, may have been overlooked.

Analyses and comments seldom mention that the countries in South European used membership of the eurozone as a cover. They borrowed to boost artificially high living standards. Profiteering creditors, both inside and outside the Europe, supported the unsustainable economic models. Greece borrowed from all-too-willing German and French banks to spend beyond its means. Cyprus adopted an irresponsible banking system, accounting for more than one third of its gross domestic product, more or less similar to offshore financial centers in the Caribbean, without scrutinizing origins of deposits from dubious investors. The eurozone rescued Cyprus after investments in Greek bonds failed, but penalized the investors. The financial world cried foul play, predicting a run on banks in Italy, Spain, Portugal and beyond.

But those banks bear little resemblance to those in Cyprus, and crisis may have been spurred by a few to protect profits.

As calm eventually returns for Cyprus, and even sooner for Greece, citizens and investors alike will realize they are better off inside the eurozone than outside. Exiting the eurozone would have confined them to permanent low growth before, during and after the crisis.

Adjustment policies for the weakest member states are working. In 2007 Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece all ran substantial deficits on the balance of payments. Now they are all close to balancealbeit with Greece a bit behind - see graph. Wage and benefit costs have fallen dramatically since 2008 inter alia by 36 percent in Ireland, 22 percent in Spain and 17 percent in Greece. The trend throughout Europe is for shrinking budget deficits with the eurozone deficit cut from 6.2 percent in 2009 to 3.5 percent in 2012, with 2.3 percent forecast for 2013.

More fascinating, eurozone policies may be the most significant socioeconomic experiment since the introduction of the welfare state more than 60 years ago.

The welfare state brought to Europe a high degree of social and income equality. The Gini index measures the degree of inequality in the distribution of family income; higher numbers signify greater inequality: 0.307 for the EU, 0.34 for the UK, 0.45 for the US, according to the CIA World Factbook. Economists disagree on inequality's effect on economic growth - some argue it promotes growth, others insist it's a barrier, but most would like to live in a country with a high degree of income equality as one of the main indicators for a high score on the human development index.

The Europeans should have known, but instead suppressed what the global economic recession disclosed: Revenues can no longer finance the generous welfare benefits. Privileges have allowed too many people to work too little, earning too much. Demographics turned against the welfare model, with a higher share of the population aged 65 years or more and a shrinking share of people working and paying. Eventually, investors, taxpayers and other cash cows revolted. Political power began to reflect the limits of how much the productive part of society could and would pay.

The reaction was astounding, a loud chorus pronouncing the death of the welfare model. But the doomsayers have since been proven wrong as the Europeans have launched a social economic enterprise around three pillars:

Governments trimmed expenditure levels and maintained the core of the welfare-state model. Most European nations have raised pension ages, which at first glance may not seem much. But such steps are, not the end of the road, but rather the beginning of a process and new mindset. Pension ages will gradually be hiked to reflect the need to keep people in the workforce longer and escape the demographic trap of a shrinking labor force. The four Southern European countries are now in the same age bracket for retirement as Germany (62.5 to 65 years). France is still in a lower age bracket, calling for further effort.

Restructuring the economic model with more mobility, including easier procedures for corporations to trim the number of workers, has been introduced. Trade unions once resisted such reforms, as seen in France during the mid-1990s. With union powers curbed, workers can merely delay or weaken proposals. Unions have begun to recognize that the wind has shifted, and they acquiesce to cuts, using what little power is left to insert conditions. Protests on the streets resemble a safety valve rather than efforts to force government's hand.

Old-fashioned privileges guaranteeing jobs, employment and service-sector monopolies for a few have been discarded. This ride is not smooth. Those losing what they regard as well-earned privileges and rights are resisting. In some cases, they purchased licences in good faith, expecting to regain their investment by charging high prices. For example, Greek truck drivers paid for licenses that could gain worth if the industry is liberalized.

The reform process is incomplete, in some cases half-hearted, but continues because no one has offered an alternative way to pay for generous benefits with shrinking revenues.

The South European countries saw their wage and benefits rising fast within the eurozone relative to the countries in the north. The generous benefits were splendid for a while, less splendid when competitiveness started to bite. Now wages and benefits must be rolled back. The process is agonizing, but has ignited a turnaround in the balance of payments for those losing competitiveness during the years prior to the crisis.

These three pillars to restore economic stability are a bitter medicine, but most politicians and citizens see no other path - and do not want to pass monstrous debts onto future generations. Reforms for Europe may still go wrong, but so far they are working and with time, as economies recover, Europeans will see that their sacrifices were not in vain. Governments are shifting, but basic policies are not. It's more likely that the eurozone will gain rather than lose members.

If successful, this political experiment has helped the Europeans to weather the storm. A sound foundation has been laid for an economic recovery that may take the eurozone back to a trend growth of, say, 1.5 percent. This may not be fantastic, but allows a higher living standard for a large majority of the population, thus preserving the model's core: The Europeans recognize the value of income and social equality. This is what the fight is about.

Focus shifts now to momentum for ongoing policies to reform and restructure economies of Southern European and France, introducing a more flexible labor market, higher geographical mobility, more technology-driven industries, and an improved banking system - all at a European level. Judged by recent performance, chances are Europeans will pass the test.

Joergen Oerstroem Moeller is a visiting senior research fellow with the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, and adjunct professor with the Singapore Management University & Copenhagen Business School.

Rights: Copyright © 2013 Yale Center for the Study of Globalization. Yale Global

(AP Photo)

Presumably that same community is therefore aware of the consequences that derive from such evidence. It's not a secret that Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey, Kuwait, Jordan, Britain, France, and even Israel have already intervened in Syria in some form or another and have done so without the United States. This renders the word 'unilateral,' now being trotted out by the anti-intervention camp to silence any talk of a no-fly zone or direct military action, more applicable to the administration's current disposition than to the one its allies encourage it to adopt.

So where does Obama stand and where is he headed? The short answer is nowhere - at least for now. Fred Hof, who used to coordinate Syria policy for the Obama Administration, has suggested that the White House is not making itself a hostage to a "comprehensive" U.N. chemical weapons investigation which will never take place because the Assad regime won't allow it. Rather, if you read the administration's messaging carefully, Hof writes, it is indeed pursuing alternative means of fact-finding and authentication. Exhibit A is the White House's April 25 letter to John McCain and Carl Levin, which claimed that, even though the "chain of custody" of chemical weapons was as yet unknown, the government was highly skeptical that any party other than the regime deployed them in Syria. The letter went on to state that the White House was "also working" with allies, friends, and the Syrian opposition (i.e. going around the U.N.) to "establish the facts."

Yet this letter was then belied by Obama's own comments five days later in which he said that he still had no idea who used chemical weapons (so it might have been the rebels after all?) or how or when they were used. It hardly matters anymore that 'who,' 'how' and 'when' were never relevant to the president's August 2012 policy, which made utilization and mobilization of chemical weapons the triggers for changing his "calculus" or "equation" on Syria. Obama has just created the possibility that America's supposed investigative partner, the Syrian opposition, might in fact be the real perpetrator. This will not only further alienate the very people whom the president has designated the inheritors of a post-Assad state, it will give Iran, Hezbollah and Russia stronger strategic coherence in framing the conflict, and of course it will give Assad a license to dip further into his non-conventional arsenal. General Salim Idriss, the head of the Supreme Military Command of the Free Syrian Army, was forced to respond with a letter of his own to Obama in which he tutored the leader of the free world in the lessons of totalitarianism.

The administration's wavering over the WMD question has form. For well over a year, its favorite fall-back position whenever it finds itself in the soup on Syria is to profess to be 'working with' an opposition that it subtly reminds the world is not all that scrutable or trustworthy to begin with. You can't really blame Syrians for suspecting that Washington is secretly supporting Damascus (every rebel I talk to these days thinks so) and that the real American policy is to keep people it doesn't like busy killing each other indefinitely

Even the unsentimental realists now applauding Obama's "prudence" - while also telling him that the use of chemical weapons is of no consequence to U.S. interests - must think it a colossal waste of time and money to run humanitarian aid to revolutionaries it doesn't want to help who reside in parts of a country that are still susceptible to being bombarded by MiGs and Scuds, let alone nerve agents.

Among Obama supporters who can see the administration is in disarray, there is still a rush to apologize and defend. Much of the president's policy muddle, we're told, is the lingering trauma in foreign policy caused by his predecessor. Obama came to office promising to end wars in the Middle East. He also vowed to be the un-Bush. Both are admirable goals but not when taken to the point of absurdity or at the expense of an overcorrection that sees the follies of Iraq repeating themselves ad infinitum, regardless of wholly divergent circumstances. Remind me again when Iraqi rebels clashed with Saddam's Republican Guard in and around Baghdad in 2002, or blew up Tariq Aziz in his office in advance of "shock and awe."

The failure to adjust one's thinking in light of new historical developments is a sign of ideological sclerosis, not progress. Many in Washington are beginning to grasp this. One disgruntled official in the State Department has said that the administration has been "borderline isolationist" in its thinking on Syria. This is actually slightly fair to Obama given the starring role that he has granted, and continues to grant, Russia. The Washington Post's Karen DeYoung reported yesterday that the president may be considering the provision of "lethal weaponry" to Syrian rebels, although a "political solution" to a conflict that now includes weekly reports of chemical agents being deployed is still apparently his preferred resolution. The real purpose of this vaguely provocative, anonymously sourced, and no doubt leaked article is to pressure Vladimir Putin into abandoning his copper-bottomed support for Bashar al-Assad. Secretary of State John Kerry is due to arrive in Moscow in the coming days and Obama has a one-on-one meeting with Putin scheduled for June. In other words, this is to be the absolute last chance - and this time we really mean it - for the Russian strongmen to get on the right side of history, even as they engage in a campaign of repression against their own opposition and civil society, which Human Rights Watch has called "unprecedented" in the post-Soviet era. Surely an excellent time for compromise and accommodation.

DeYoung's colleague David Ignatius further elaborated on this new-old stratagem:

"Obama's desire for Russian cooperation is one reason he has been cautious in responding to allegations that Assad has used chemical weapons. Obama talked by phone to President Vladimir Putin Monday, and an official said 'we still do believe there's a constructive role for Russia to play.'"

One way to politicize intelligence is to purposefully slow the investigation of war crimes in order to wield soft power leverage with a diplomatic adversary. (What price asphyxiated Arabs against the priority of the 'reset'?) Such thinking also shows how tenaciously committed the administration is to misreading intransigent regimes that have tried in vain to make their positions clear to the West.

The Putinists believe that all of Syria's rebels are terrorists. Threatening to arm those rebels is thus not likely to change the Putinists' view of the matter. The Russian Foreign Ministry has in the past blamed atrocities carried out by Assadist proxies, such as the Houla massacre, on the opposition. Most recently, Russia has facilitated and seconded the regime's propaganda about the supposed origin of a chemical attack in Khan al-Assal, Aleppo, by objecting to the U.N.'s demand for a forensic investigation that encompasses all of the targeted sites including those in Homs and Damascus. This suggests that the Russians, too, want to convince the world that it wasn't the regime that used sarin gas but its enemies - an allegation that would backfire if Obama took his own red line more seriously.

I almost felt sorry for Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov who once again finds himself having to beg to be understood. In a recent interview with Foreign Policy, he expressed himself "gratified" to discover that it was the Americans and Europeans who were the ones quietly unspooling their old preconditions about not engaging in "dialogue" with Assad. Lavrov also reaffirmed Russia's right to deliver anti-aircraft weapons and other lethal hardware to Syria and described his imminent visitor Kerry as "pragmatic," which is the same word Assad used to complimentarily characterize the United States's approach to his country as a whole.

What must the poor Russians do to show that they intend to play a destructive role in America's Syria policy? And what must it take for President Obama to realize that he's got as much international support on resolving the Syria crisis as he is ever going to get?

***

Many people otherwise sympathetic to what's happening in this luckless country believe that it's simply too late to do anything substantive because the opposition has been too 'radicalized' to ever possibly accept U.S. assistance in good faith. Jabhat al-Nusra has pledged its allegiance to al-Qaeda and Ayman al-Zawahiri (then un-pledged it, but whatever), and they're not even the largest franchise among Salafist-jihadist groups. Even if Obama did decide to run guns to the rebels, wouldn't he be enabling the nasties who want to wage sectarian holy war and then turn their attention to America when they're done?

Unfortunately, because we waited so long, 'blowback' is a more likely unintended consequence than it was a year ago and it is simply not possible to ensure that all weapons imported into Syria will stay out of the hands of the jihadists. Many of the Croatian arms have already found their way to Jabhat al-Nusra. (A way around this, of course, is to deny the rebels the heavy-duty hardware - namely anti-aircraft munitions - and instead do the work of neutralizing the regime's air power for them through some combination of aircraft and stand-off mechanisms.)

All this to one side, the administration's other stated objective of trying to put some "more skin in the game" by arming rebels is not so quixotic. Without overstating the case, there are still moderates within the ranks of the opposition, even if some have technically joined up with extremist elements. In many instances, "Islamists" make themselves known only when they believe that paymasters in Doha or Riyadh might be watching.

On a recent trip to Antakya, I met one such fighter called Abu Bashir. He belongs to a brigade known as the Mujahedeen of Jisr al-Shoughour and he was in Turkey to have some shrapnel removed from his arm and leg. Here's his group's declaration video, in which someone other than Abu Bashir says:

"Bismillah. Those who believe fight in the way of God. And those who reject faith fight in the way of tyranny. So fight the friends of Satan, sons of our great country. Because of the crimes of the Assad regime and their desecration of holy sites we have created the Brigade of the Mujahideen of Jisr al Shughour led by the civil commander Bassam al-Masri. And on this occasion we promise God and our people that we will defend the country and promise Assad's fighters that we will fight them anywhere we see them. God have mercy on our martyrs."

This is fairly mild stuff in comparison to what other rebel formations are putting out these days, but it nonetheless led me to inquire as to the patron or sponsor of Abu Bashir's katiba. Without hesitating he told me that it was the Muslim Brotherhood. This is how the conversation went from there:

"So you're Ikhwan?"
"No."
"Then why have you joined them?"
"Because I need to pay my men and coordinate with other brigades in Idlib and they are the ones to do this."
"And if someone else came along and offered to pay your men and coordinate with other brigades, you would accept them?"
"Of course."

I've heard some variation of this line many times in the past several months, chiefly among those who are more frustrated with America than irreconcilably opposed to America. The talk with Abu Bashir then moved to how problematic Jabhat al-Nusra had become for the country (as well as the regime's prior underwriting of the very same al-Qaeda agents now waging war against the regime). Then, an hour or so later, I saw Abu Bashir smoke the biggest joint I've seen since my college days.

The point is not that they aren't hardcore ideologues fighting in Syria but that not everyone who professes himself to be one is necessarily that. Many so-called "Salafis," for instance, could not tell you the first thing about the Salafi doctrine - they just joined Suqoor al-Sham because they wanted comrades with the highest level of discipline and battlefield experience.

Obama has been good on telling Americans to be tolerant and not judge by appearances, a key aspect of his outreach to the Islamic world. He might want to apply that logic in Syria, and realize that the U.S. still has allies ready to end the long nightmare of the Assad regime - they just need to be recognized as such.

Michael Weiss is special project manager at the Institute of Modern Russia. Follow him on Twitter @michaeldweiss. Reprinted with permission.

CARACAS - In this exclusive interview with Le Monde, his first for any international media since his recent victory in the April 14 Venezuelan presidential election, former union leader Nicolas Maduro, 50 years old, does not waver.

The hand-picked heir of Hugo Chavez had served as the Comandante's Foreign Minister, and you can hear it in his speeches as he preaches radical "Chavism:" no mercy against the opposition's disputing his election, endless references to the Bolivarian revolution's legacy, hero-worshiping of leaders, and a strident anti-American stance that echos Gaddafi and Iran's dictatorial regime. Maduro apologies for none of it, and only seems open to foreign investors such as China, referring to the very Chinese "special economic areas" concept.

Nicolas Maduro - sporting a colorful tracksuit - received us in the hall of his modest presidential residence, located on a military base as the capital Caracas saw its streets filled with May 1st demonstrators, both opposition supporters as well as the "Chavists," deprived of their iconic leader who ran this oil state for 14 years.

LE MONDE: Brawls in the parliament, violent incidents in the streets resulting in seven dead: Venezuela is a very tense and polarized state. How do you intend to prevent such events from recurring?

NICOLAS MADURO: The country is not polarized, it's mobilized. It remains so thanks to our revolution against economic dependency, poverty, impoverishment, inequalities. It's a revolution against the same capitalism that devastated our homeland in the past. We have a democratic socialism. When groups of people decide to fight against us -- it happened 200 years ago during the struggle for independence, it's happening again, this time for our new independence -- it always creates tensions. We rely on our constitution and institutions to move forward, and we can trust them. I can guarantee you peace and democracy. Whatever threat is made against us, we shall overcome it. Europe needs to understand this for the Europeans still trust their stereotypes. People think Venezuela is a dictatorial regime.

Are you willing to open a dialogue with the opposition?

I have called for a sit-down with everyone, but the opposition's leadership is composed of very extreme right-wingers, they won't let the political parties have peaceful negotiations. This group wants to hijack the government. [...] I'm calling upon Europeans to open their eyes. Chile had Pinochet. When (Salvador) Allende was attacked, everyone was shocked by the violence. The same ideology is emerging here. If I make any comparison with Mussolini, Franco or Hitler, people say I'm exaggerating. But I'm sounding the alarm here in Latin America. All the ingredients for an extremist right-wing project are there. If those people happen to take over - it won't happen - they would destroy democracy in Venezuela and enforce a totalitarian regime.

The opposition convinced 49% of the Venezuelans. Do you believe all of its members are "fascists" as you call them?

Not all of them are but what we call social democracy or Christian democracy is on the verge of extinction in Venezuela because of these extremists on the right. We won 17 out of the 18 elections these last 14 years. We just faced the most difficult of them all for we had to run without Commandante Chavez, the soul of the Bolivarian revolution. I was a candidate who started with nothing and I won. Chavism was fluctuating between 50 and 60%, sometimes 63%. It's a very strong and solid historic movement. My message to France and Europe is that we will make sure Venezuela won't witness the rise of another Pinochet. And we will do it the democratic way.

You see yourself as Hugo Chavez's heir. His stance on the international stage was the one of a "resistance" against an alleged American imperialism and through alliances with repressive regimes - Gaddafi, Al-Assad, Lukashenko, Ahmadinejad. Are you willing to take a step back from all this?

You say "an alleged imperialism." Imperialism exists! The US has practiced worldwide imperialism. They had already invaded half of Mexico in the 19th century. During the 20th, they accomplished a total hegemony, an economic, military and political empire. The 21st century was the start of a new era. On one side, you have a unipolar imperial world and on the other, an emerging pluripolar, multicentric, and balanced world, which in fact follows the path of our libertador Simon Bolivar. We believe in a balanced world without empires. Venezuela has coped with a century of oil domination, American companies sowing misery, this is why we have an anti-imperialist program.

As of our friends... Gaddafi was friends with Sarkozy and Berlusconi. They attended banquets together. He was financing their campaigns. As a member of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, we have always been friends with Libya. President Chavez has always been a loyal friend of Gaddafi, assassinated in the crudest way possible. Europe should think about the bombings and the destruction of Libya that filled the country with terrorists. Who's truly ruling Libya's military and sending thousands of armed men to fight in Syria? It's Al Qaeda.

The Syrian president is bombing his own people with planes and tanks. Why aren't you condemning these actions if you're preaching democracy?

The foreign intervention in Syria has created a civil war. We have a good economic agreement with Bashar Al-Assad. We need to draw a line here anyway: Venezuela is a democratic country. And in Latin America in general, everyone's looking for its own economic model after the 1990s neo-liberal disaster. As a matter of fact, what's happening now in Europe echoes what occurred here during the 1990s: every social indicator was pointing downward, and it led to a political explosion and revolutions. This is the reason why Chavez, Kirchner, Correa and Lula came to power. Europe, be advised.

You speak of a multipolar world. Who should be Venezuela's ally in the 21st century? Europe or China and Russia?

A group has been formed: the BRICS. This is the global core which may bring balance through great changes. It comprises 3 billion people: China, our Brazilian brothers, India, South Africa...It brings great hope to the world, just like Europe once did. The problem is Europe let itself get dominated by the American policies. Europe needs to join the BRICS to form a great global alliance for a new kind of coexistence in order to end interventionism and war.

What would it take for Obama's United States and your country to normalize relations?

Respect. Respect for Latin America. They don't respect us. It's an old grudge. Two doctrines. The Monroe Doctrine used to mean "America for Americans," that is the United States of America. And then there was Simon Bolivar saying "the union of America, former Spanish colony." These are two different doctrines. One is imperialist and the other is preaching liberation. I know for a fact that there is a group of ultra-conservatives and terrorists within the US. Look up Roger Noriega, John Negroponte, Otto Reich...Each of these men are planning the violent destabilization of Venezuela. Sometimes, the US government tries to control them, sometimes it doesn't. The United States are ruled by a financial, media-centered, military-industrial apparatus. Behind Obama's grin, he orders bombings. He just displays a different image than Bush. That's how he expands US global domination.

We just appointed a new chargé d'affaires. We are willing to work on a more positive relation. We will see.

Oil has been Chavez's great tool of leverage in his regional policy, with the social programs. However, your country's production is stagnant. How are you going to open this sector for foreign investments? How are you planning to diversify an oil-dominated economy?

In Venezuela, the oil belt hosts 27 multinational companies from around the world, including French ones. We welcome everyone who hasn't invested in our country yet to do so. We are creating special economic areas to favor investments and technology. We have studied the Chinese experience of the municipality of Pudong in Shanghai. On the other hand, Venezuela has 33 million hectares of arable land available and only use 3 million.

We have all it takes to be a major power in agriculture.

You speak of liberty. When you go to Cuba to talk with Raul and Fidel Castro, which you recently did, do you tackle the subjects of political prisoners and detained journalists?

We are proud of Cuba and we will continue to show our support for this noble and united people. Fidel and Chavez had a special bond, like between father and son. Fidel Castro represents the dignity of the South American continent against empires. He's a living legend, an icon of independence and freedom across the continent.

Originally published in Worldcrunch. Republished with permission.