RealClearWorld - The Compass Blog

No Good Deed Goes Unpunished (Haiti Edition)

One would think that, whatever your views on various U.S. military interventions abroad, saving people from a major disaster would be fairly uncontroversial. You would be wrong:

It seems very clear that the US government is controlling Haiti to ensure that its own interests are paramount in the rebuilding process.

That's from Mike Gonzalez, writing in the Guardian. And what interests would those be? Apparently it's getting Haitians back to work:

The coup in Honduras, the recent agreement on extending military bases in Colombia and now Haiti recall Obama's concern, expressed during the election campaign, that "we are losing Latin America". It also interlocks very conveniently with US economic interests in the region and in Haiti in particular. Food and water may be scarce, but some of the factories in the so-called export processing zones, where Haitians labour in sweatshop conditions, have managed to get their machines working again. Yet there is still no electricity in the areas where people are surviving in makeshift camps or under plastic sheeting in the streets.

Much better for Haitians not to work, I suppose. Alex Massie finishes Gonzalez off.

(AP Photo)

DADT and the GWAT

Danny Kaplan, writing on Israeli policy in the pages of Foreign Policy, is puzzled by the American debate over gays in the military:

In Israel, military authorities have kept gay enlistment a minor concern by sticking to a minimal strategy: officially acknowledge the full participation of gays and at the same time ignore them as a group that may require special needs. Gay soldiers do not receive, and do not expect to receive, any special treatment in combat settings. It is simply a non-issue. If the U.S. government will adopt a similar course, it could enjoy not only a more liberal military, but also, perhaps, a more combat-effective one where the focus is on defeating the enemy rather than questioning fellow soldiers.
At a time when Americans are attempting to lead a campaign against terror and foreign dictatorships in the name of democracy, they should be more apprehensive of what is happening in their own military backyard.

I'd rather leave the domestic components of this debate to the Politics side of things, but I can't help but feel that DADT proponents are missing a great opportunity to accentuate the values Americans are fighting for in the so-called Global War Against Terrorism. If such a war does exist on a global scale, and it's indeed a societal conflict, what then does a stated policy of hiding gay servicemen and women say to our enemies about the sincerity of Western values? If radical Islamists advocate the torture of homosexuals in public squares, what then is the Western response?

Does Mating Competition Drive China's Savings Rate?

By Patrick Chovanec

Here’s a thought for Valentine’s Day:

Wei Shangjin, a professor at Columbia Business School, proposes an intriguing new theory in Forbes to account for why the Chinese save so much. Conventional explanations of China’s high savings rate focus on high out-of-pocket expenses for health care and education, the absence of a social safety net, and an undervalued currency that makes exports cheap and imports expensive. But in Wei’s view, it all boils down to sex — the gender ratio, that is, and the competition it causes in the marriage market.

In China today, he notes, there are 122 baby boys born for every 100 girls. Given China’s one-child policy, most Chinese parents, especially in low-income rural areas, have a strong preference for having a boy to carry on the family line (in my own observation, residents of high-income cities like Beijing, in contrast, seem to actually prefer girls). Even though it’s technically illegal under Chinese law to tell an expecting couple the sex of a fetus (for precisely this reason), many find out anyway and will abort a girl in order to try again for a boy. Others will flout the rules and keep having children until they get a boy, then stop. In either case, the result is a lopsided demographic with a lot more boys than girls.

China’s one-child policy was instituted in 1979, so that means there’s been plenty of time for those baby boys and girls to grow up and start looking for mates. And when they pair off, there aren’t enough girls to go around. According to the numbers, one out of every five young men will be unable to find a partner. Which means, if you don’t want to end up the lonely heart, you better have a plan to impress the ladies. For families with boys, Wei believes, that means saving up to buy housing and other accoutrements of wealth that will help attract a mate (in fact, in some parts of China, bachelors and their parents have resorted to forking over a cash “bride price” that can go as high as US$5,000, a payment that represents several years’ income for a farming family. The lucrative practice has given rise to organized scams involving “runaway brides” who take the money and disappear. For a rather eye-opening read on this topic, check out this recent Wall Street Journal article).

Wei’s theory, that mating competition drives high savings rates in China, is an interesting notion, one he tries to back up with hard data. He reports:

In our study we compared savings data across regions and in households with sons versus those with daughters. We found that not only did households with sons save more than households with daughters on average but also that households with sons tend to raise their savings rate if they happen to live in a region with a more skewed sex ratio.

Even those not competing in the marriage market must compete to buy housing and make other significant purchases, pushing up the savings rate for all households.

The effect is significant. The household savings rate in China rose from about 16% of disposable income in 1990 to over 30% today, which is much higher than most countries. (The comparable rate in the U.S. was about 3% before the crisis, and 6% in recent months.) About half of the increase in the savings rate of the last 25 years can be attributed to the rise in the sex ratio imbalance.

When I read Wei’s article, it immediately called to mind a joke one of my Chinese students told me. My wife and I had just had our first child — a boy — this past October, and he was quick to congratulate me on this, for most Chinese, highly enviable outcome. I remarked, though, that my wife’s parents would actually have preferred a girl. He said that this was a common attitude in Beijing, unlike the rest of the country. A boy, he said, is like China Construction Bank. You must save and save in order to afford and buy a house. A girl, on the other hand, is like CITIC (China’s first financial institution set up to raise foreign investment) because she will bring in money from outside. It’s a very Chinese analogy — I didn’t quite get it at first — but it captures an outlook that would seem to back up Wei’s theory.

Demographics certainly have a big impact on saving and spending patterns, but the usual focus is on age, not sex. I don’t know whether Wei’s theory is correct — I still think saving to pay for out-of-pocket health care is a key factor — but it certainly presents food for thought. If it is true, even in part, it suggests that the Chinese preference to save rather than spend may go far deeper, and prove far less tractable, than many economists believe.

(In any event, China has certainly come a long way from 1973, when Mao allegedly made Kissinger a bizarre offer to send 10 million “excess” Chinese women to the United States. Don’t take my word for it, check out the BBC and AFP).

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Patrick Chovanec is a professor at Tsinghua University's School of Economics and Management in Beijing, China. He blogs at http://chovanec.wordpress.com/

Video of the Day

It looks like Sherman was right:

It is apparent to me that Al Jazeera is attempting to paint the U.S. in a negative light with this video. While U.S. soldiers are in vehicles, who do you suppose delivered (and secured) those supplies? Nevertheless, this video highlights the Catch-22 that many Afghans feel they are in now.

For more videos on issues around the world, check out the Real Clear World Video page.

Iran's Iconoclast Obsession

A video snippet from last week's panel hearing before the House Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia offers us some interesting insights on what an internal compromise could look like in Iran:

The exchange between Rep. Fortenberry (R-NE) and the panel experts (which included, among others, WINEP Senior Fellow Mehdi Khalaji) is a valuable one, but we get to brass tacks around the 3:50 mark, when Fariborz Ghadar outlines what a power-sharing deal may entail. Those items, in short, are:

- A Reduction of the Supreme Leader's power.

- More opposition members in the Majlis.

- Ayatollah Rafsanjani assuming more power and serving a more "active" role as mediator.

While I do believe such a hypothetical compromise would require fewer ballot restrictions, I find the other two items rather unlikely. For one, Rafsanjani is already serving as a governmental mediator on the Expediency Council and the Assembly of Experts. Unless a compromise were to somehow grant more authority to those bodies, I simply don't see how he could be any more of a balancing figure in the already inefficient and dysfunctional Iranian government. Plus, Rafsanjani and Ahmadinejad, to my knowledge, despise each other. You can't really be a mediator if you can't stand to be in the same room as those you're attempting to temper.

Truth is, the Iranian government has been trying to figure out a way to streamline its decision making for years now. The solutions tend to be what we in the West call 'Big Government' ones; if one government institution isn't working, just create another one! The result is a layer cake of councils, committees, assemblies and so on which overlap and obstruct the other like the design of a plaid sweater. The system is a check upon a check upon a check, with everyone stalemating each other into irrelevance.

The other problem, perhaps needless to say, is Ahmadinejad himself. He is the crux of the Green Movement's ire; the tie that binds. Anything that might validate his authority and position will likely be deemed unacceptable by the opposition.

There is, however, a way to neuter the presidency, and that's by strengthening - and diversifying - the Majlis, or parliament. Khamenei could do this by weakening or calling for a national ballot initiative on the Guardian Council. Weaken or eliminate that body altogether, and the Majlis could become more diverse and serve as a true check against the president, the supreme leader and, perhaps, the IRGC. This would by default strengthen the position of speaker, making yet another perfunctory executive role for Rafsanjani or whomever unnecessary. Again, Iran's problem isn't a dearth of deliberation, but its gluttonous surplus of it.

It may better serve the Green Movement to distance itself from Mousavi et al. and become a faceless movement, but targeting various executives for national ills only further panders to the notion that everything will improve if only so-and-so were deposed, or if so-and-so had won the presidency. The country's history is a connect-the-dots of iconoclasts: Pahlavi, Mosaddegh, another Pahlavi, Khomeini, Khamenei, Ahmadinejad and so on. We are all guilty at times of viewing history (and progress, for that matter) through the lives and actions of the individual. Iran's time line is no different. But a focus on legislative reform could set Iran on a wiser path toward more thorough constitutional reform, and hopefully a freer and more democratic society.

(h/t K-Lo)

Ukraine Election, Reaction

If the results of Ukraine's election hold, it appears that Viktor Yanukovych will be the next President.

Here's a look at some international reaction:

Adrian Karatnycky:

Indeed, the signals emanating from Mr. Yanukovych's closest aides, as well as key leaders from the Our Ukraine coalition with whom I met last week in Kyiv, suggest the new president and the government he will try to bring into office will likely represent a broad-based mix of longtime Regions party officials, and competent financial and economic technocrats and market reformers—including some from the former Yushchenko team. For instance, there is a good chance that banker Serhiy Tyhypko, who finished a strong third in the presidential race, will be offered the prime minister's post rather than Mr. Yanukovych's longtime ally and campaign director, Mykola Azarov, who is also under serious consideration. The odds of a broad-based coalition are reinforced by the modesty of Mr. Yanukovych's victory, clear-cut though it was.

All this means that, should the political coalition under discussion take root, Ukraine will at last achieve an interval of political stability and economic policy consensus. Ironically, that means Mr. Yanukovych's presidency may move further toward fulfilling the promises of the Orange Revolution than the fractious rule of Yushchenko-Tymoshenko ever did.

The Economist:

Moscow is likely to celebrate a victory for Mr Yanukovitch as a belated vindication of Mr Putin’s backing five years ago and as a victory over the West. In fact, Mr Yanukovich is sympathetic to large industrial groups and will guard their business interests more zealously than Ms Tymoshenko may have done. The relationship with the Kremlin will improve, but none of Ukraine’s mainstream politicians or tycoons sees any future in a political or economic union with Russia.
In any event, this election was not about geopolitics but about Ukraine’s own governance and economy. The choice of Mr Yanukovich as president would be neither a disaster nor a breakthrough for Ukraine’s oligarchic political system. He would inherit a country with weak institutions, a struggling economy and a disillusioned population. He may not be able to deal with those. But at this stage it is less important than having a clear winner.

Colin Graham:

A particularly tiresome event has occurred again and again ever since the Berlin wall came down. Leaders feted by the west as representing a radical fresh outlook for their post-communist, eastern European countries have generally turned out to be little different to their predecessors. In 2004, it was often conveniently forgotten that Yushchenko had at one stage been an integral part of the political establishment he was then seemingly trying to oust. The departing president at the time was the much-denounced Leonid Kuchma who had appointed Yushchenko as his prime minister five years before the "orange revolution".

Andrew Wilson:

By the end of the day, almost all the votes should be in. Turnout didn't quite reach over 70% - it is estimated at 69.1%, which was only 2.4% up on round one, and therefore another disappointment for Tymoshenko.
This means that the temptation to contest the outcome is still there, but depends on finding convincing evidence of significant fraud. The vote ‘against all' is confirmed at 4.4% and invalid or spoiled ballots at 1.2%. The abstainers did more than apparently defeat Tymoshenko; if Yanukovych wins it will be with less than 50% of the vote - which will be a less than ringing endorsement of his new presidency.

Benjamin Bidder:

Once again, it looks as though Ukraine is headed for political stalemate. For years, the country has been divided between those, like Tymoshenko, who would maneuver the country toward the European Union and NATO, and those like Yanukovych who prefer a more cautious approach to the West. Sunday's election did little to resolve the tension -- and a court case could inject even more bitterness into the rivalry.

(AP Photo)

Iran Demonstrates the Limits of Smart Power

Shortly after Secretary Clinton appeared on CNN hailing the virtues of smart power, Iran announced it was going to enrich more Uranium. Said Clinton:

But the fact is, because we engaged, the rest of the world has really begun to see Iran the way we see it. When we started last year talking about the threats that Iran’s nuclear program posed, Russia and other countries said, well, we don’t see it that way. But through very slow and steady diplomacy, plus the fact that we had a two-track process – yes, we reached out on engagement to Iran, but we always had the second track, which is that we would have to try to get the world community to take stronger measures if they didn’t respond on the engagement front.

The basic trouble for the Obama administration with respect to Iran and engagement is that the time tables aren't synced. If engagement is expected to change Iranian behavior, it must do so over the long term. Depending on which estimate you believe, Iran may achieve its nuclear goals in the short-to-medium term.

If we assume that Iran is essentially hell bent on some nuclear weapons capability (a functional weapon or the ability to quickly assemble one) than engagement is probably not going to stop them. Sanctions may not either, because again, Iran may be close enough to its nuclear goals that it can outlast the pinch of sanctions (but Iran may also be much further away than we assume). Nor is it at all clear, despite what Secretary Clinton asserted, that the U.S. has convinced other countries to view Iran the way do. China has just openly rebuffed (again) American calls for sanctions and it remains to be seen whether Russia will ultimately opt for them (especially since China gives them cover).

But the real trouble for the Obama administration is that it has set its goal as an Iran without nuclear weapons. Affirming this goal is obviously essential for diplomacy or sanctions to have any chance of working, but you can see how it boxes the administration into a corner. If their preferred tactics fail, they will either be left with a humiliating climb-down as Iran crosses the nuclear threshold, or be forced to take military action, with all of its attendant consequences.

(AP Photo)

What Matters with China?

The subject of U.S.-China ties is hot now and no wonder, with so many divisive issues on the agenda. The question is, which issues should matter to the U.S. and which ones should we let slide? Max Boot offers his cheat-sheet:

That doesn’t mean we should engage in needless and self-destructive confrontations with China over global warming and currency, but that also doesn’t mean we should mindlessly kowtow to China’s every whim. As I argued in this Weekly Standard article in 2005, we should pursue a balanced approach to China, tough on security and human-rights issues but accommodating on trade and currency policy.

The interesting thing to note about Boot's preferences is that his points of emphasis (human rights and security) are the matters that don't actually impact American lives, while the things he wants to let slide (especially currency) are Chinese policies that do have a good deal of impact on the lives of Americans. China's human rights record is an internal matter, whereas her currency valuation is an international matter of fairly large significance for the U.S. economy. Why, I wonder, does one trump the other?

(AP Photo)

Can America Learn from the Byzantine Empire?

James Rubin, a former Assistant Secretary of State in the Bush administration, writes in the New Republic:

Ironically, the net effect of the Bush years may have not only been structural economic damage caused by an unexpected explosion of trillions of dollars of debt due to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and attendant military spending, but also the damage done to perceptions of American military superiority caused by the difficulties in achieving victory in Iraq, not to mention the very real strains on the military services. In short, American dominance is a lot harder to envisage after the Bush administration than it was before President Bush took office—a time when France’s foreign minister was describing the United States as the world’s “hyperpower.”

While I would quibble with the notion that our ballooning debt was "unexpected" (what else do you expect when you cut taxes, expand entitlements and wage war in two countries?) I think Rubin's point is spot-on. In their zeal to use and demonstrate American power, the Bush administration ultimately wound up exposing its limits and doing serious, objective damage to American power. By every measure - economic, military, geopolitical - America was a weaker country in January 2009 than it was in January 2000.

And this is what is ultimately distracting about the debate over "American decline." Those who seem to take the most umbrage at the concept are the ones who would likely champion the very policies that would continue to accelerate America's decline. And while there are no doubt critics who relish the thought of American decline, or who advocate simply accepting its inevitability, others are using the loss of American power as a sign that a course-correction is needed to put the U.S. on a more sustainable path to retaining great power status.

And here's where the U.S. might learn from the Byzantine Empire. Strategist Edward Luttwak, who wrote the Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire, argues that their template for preserving great power has a lot to recommend it. He expands on the concept at length here:

One striking point that Luttwak makes (at around the 44:30 minute mark) was that the rulers of the Byzantine Empire took the view that they were preserving the strength of their system for centuries against all rivals. They avoided burning themselves out fighting war after war to destroy enemies and instead sought to use containment and deft diplomacy to manage their many enemies. And they succeeded, in Luttwak's view, in creating the longest running empire in the history of the world.

Obviously, we live in a different world, but the basic guiding principles that Luttwak elucidates in a short piece in Foreign Policy, still strike me as reasonable.

Georgia Hires Gephardt

Republic of Georgia continues to spend big money on lobbying for its interests in the United States. The Hill reported that the small Caucasus country has signed former House Democratic Leader Richard Gephardt (D-Mo.) to lobby for her in Washington. Gephardt Group Government Affairs signed a one-year contract worth more than $430,000 to represent Georgia. Gephardt, the former Democratic leader in the House of Representatives, heads the group. The firm will “provide lobbying and government relations services to Georgia,” according to the contract filed with the Justice Department.

According to The Hill, "Gephardt’s ties to Democrats and the Obama administration could be helpful to the Georgian government, which wants U.S. support for its effort to join NATO and U.S. support against Russia. The two countries fought a short war in 2008." Georgia is also hedging its bets with both political parties, and in November 2009, the country’s national security council signed Orion Strategies to a three-month, $10,000 contract. Orion is run by Randy Scheunemann, a foreign policy adviser to Sen. John McCain’s (R-Ariz.) presidential campaign.

The question remains on the effectiveness of such lobbying by Georgia. American interests in the former Soviet Union walk the fine line between cordial and friendly relations with Russia and support for small, vulnerable states like Georgia - especially if they present geopolitical advantages in the form of pipeline routes or proximity to areas of intense interest to Washington (Middle East, Iran, Iraq, etc.).

For Georgia, which offers small-scale assistance to the U.S. efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, membership in NATO is a major policy goal as a way to break free of Russian influence. For its part, Russia considers such NATO expansion as a threat to the state and voices strong opposition to the expansion of the Western alliance that will include countries in Moscow's "traditional sphere of influence." Gephardt's group is not the first firm retained by Georgia since the 2008 war with Moscow - and it probably won't be the last if not enough progress is made on the NATO issue, for example.

Ultimately, such lobbying efforts boil down to a zero-sum game against Russia's interests - and while the United States has been able to maintain its influence in the Caucasus, it has also tried hard to keep its relationship with Moscow on the level. So the question is - which lobbying firm will get Georgia's contract next year? The field is wide open at this point.

Russia to NATO: We Want to Tango, Not Lambada

Russian political establishment continues to criticize NATO's current stance and views NATO's possible eastward movement with concern. NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen believes that the new Military Doctrine of Russia, in which the expansion of NATO to the East is cited as a threat, does not reflect the reality, and "is a contradiction to our attempts at improving our relations."

However, Nikolai Patrushev, Secretary of Russian Security Council, responded that while Russia was not going to attack anyone, it wasn't going to fully renounce nuclear weapons either. For his part, Dmitry Rogozin, Russian Permanent Representative to NATO said: "NATO says that in a true partnership, it takes two to tango. And here it turns out that while we offer to dance tango, we are offered to dance lambada."

Earlier this Saturday, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, speaking at the Munich security conference, presented his country's concept of the Treaty on European Security. At that time, Lavrov stressed that Russia still considers as unacceptable the expansion of NATO to the east.

Moscow does not understand "how the NATO base, located in the newly adopted countries - members of the alliance, could strengthen Russia's security. "How, for example, NATO forces in the Black Sea will enhance our security?" questioned Lavrov.

Secretary Patrushev, in commenting on the new doctrine on Saturday, stated that the military concepts laid out by the Russian government allow his country to defend itself by all available means - including nuclear weapons, which are a means to deter potential adversaries. "We do not intend to attack anyone! But if Russia's existence as a state is questioned under threat of an attack, then, of course, we have no choice. We will conduct a peaceful policy, but at the same time, we will defend our national interests and will defend ourselves by any means at our disposal."

Patrushev also hinted that Russia will not wait until a strike is launched against her. "In view of the weapons that are now available to some countries, we will not be able to respond with a retaliatory strike. So, naturally, we will work hard to get information about any plans against Russia, and, naturally, we will work to ensure that no strike is carried out against my country."

Nuclear Weapons = Not Safe

Think U.S. nuclear weapons are secure? Think again:

[Hat tip: Kelsey Hartigan]

Palin on Iran

Governor Palin certainly isn't the first to suggest a strike on Iran, so that's not really news. But there's a puzzling flippancy in the governor's foreign policy rhetoric that I think deserves some more nuanced attention.

I think - and hope - the governor will expand upon her foreign policy vision in the coming weeks and months, especially if she's truly considering a presidential bid in 2012.

(h/t Think Progress)

Russia's Fifth-Generation Fighter Jet Finally Takes Off

On Jan. 29, Russia officially tested its fifth-generation fighter plane - T-50 PAK FA. The video of the flight shows that the aircraft bears a strong resemblance to the American F-22 stealth aircraft. Russian official sources stated that it would take additional 4 to 5 years to finally test the plane before it would be in service by the country's air force.

Alexander Golts of Russia's "Yezhedenvniy Zhurnal" offers a stinging critique of what appears to be Moscow's slow path towards high-tech air force parity with the United States.

Meanwhile, Russia does not seem to have any luck trying to get its domestically-produced UAV's off the ground - its new plane, dubbed "Aist" - Flying Crane - could not take off properly during its flight test and crashed. "Aist" was supposed to be the base model for the creation of "Julia-E" UAV that would have provided data and information to the "Iskander" missile complex. At this point, any further development of the military "Julia" UAV is postponed indefinitely.

The article nostalgically points out that "30 years ago, USSR was an undisputed global UAV leader, having produced almost 1,000 Tu-143 "Reis" UAVs between 1972 and 1989."

Russia Cites NATO as Its Biggest Threat

On Feb. 5, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev made public his country's new military doctrine, where NATO is listed as the chief adversary. The doctrine cites growing proximity of NATO military infrastructure to Russia's borders as a threat to the country.

Some of the threats cited in the doctrine include basing of international military contingents on the territory of certain countries, as well as the basing of the ballistic missile defenses, which Russia sees as undermining its nuclear parity with the West. Other threats listed in the doctrine include attempts at a coup d'etat, violation of the country's territorial integrity and threats posed by the information warfare. The new doctrine is envisioned through 2020.