Both Matthew Yglesias and Ross Douthat raise an issue that's been under-discussed with respect to Afghanistan, and that's the issue of saving face. Yglesias writes that it was "churlish" of him to point out that the Iraq surge had failed based on the objectives laid out for it because it made Washington feel good about leaving the country. Similarly, Douthat claims that the objective of a counter-insurgency strategy in Afghanistan is to "make it easier for leading U.S. policymakers to embrace a real withdrawal" - irrespective of obtaining any strategic objectives in the country.
There have been countless incidents in war when military commanders and/or their civilian leaders have made decisions that they knew would cost lives but were nonetheless essential to victory. There are also countless incidents when rulers sent armies off on fatal missions simply to assuage their imperial or monarchical vanity.
The U.S. has to think long and hard about where the current Afghan counter-insurgency falls on this continuum. It's one thing to risk the lives of American and Western soldiers because there is absolutely no other choice to safeguard our security. It's quite another to do so to make Washington's political establishment feel good about itself.
(AP Photo)
