Whither American interests in the Mideast after Egypt
John Quiggan hits on an important point:
More generally, the whole approach of US foreign policy towards the â??Middle Eastâ? rests on assumptions that will be hard to sustain when the existing dictatorships are gone. Most fundamentally, how can the idea that the US has â??strategic interestsâ? in the region be justified? In some sense, this idea rests on the assumption that the existing governments are less than legitimate, and can be dealt with in terms of traditional Great Power politics, with spheres of influence, secret deals and so on. Even weak democratic states display much more effective resistance to external interference in their domestic affairs than do typical autocratic regimes.
I think the U.S. can justify the fact that it has "interests" in the region without simultaneously justifying everything it does to defend those interests. It's the latter, not the former, that is being thrown into sharp relief with the protests across the region.
Consider that no matter who rules the various states of the Middle East, Americans will still drive cars (as will the Chinese and Europeans, etc.). American - and global - industry will still require oil to function. Also, crucially, Middle Eastern governments will still need to sell oil to earn income. There's a convergence of interests there that we should be able to leverage to everyone's mutual benefit no matter who's running the show in the Middle East.
