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The results reflected Iraq's fragmented and shifting identity: Old faces like that of the returning independent Ayad Allawi were common, but new secularist parties gained ground, as did Sunni tribal leaders associated with the Awakening Movements. Despite losses by religious parties such as ISCI, (Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq) Shiite Islamists made up the majority of the elected seats in southern Iraq, and the incumbent Iraqi Islamic Party, a Sunni group, held on to a plurality in Diyala.
With this melting pot of victors there does not seem to be one common trend, except that Maliki topped them all.
Maliki and his newly named State of Law coalition bagged 38 percent of the vote in Baghdad and achieved pluralities all through the southern provinces of Iraq.
Once maligned for losing control of the country, Maliki has reinvented his image by cracking down, hard, on insurgents and militias, giving him the aura of a strongman capable of holding Iraq together.
Campaigning on public works and stability concerns, he changed the name of his party to the State of Law Coalition, incorporating tribal leaders and independents in the mix.
Iraqi's, apparently, have responded favorably to this nationalist, hardline attitude, which resonates with their frustration over sectarian violence and increasing fears of Iranian influence through Shiite Islamist parties.
But here's the rub: the State of Law Coalition is just a new name for al-Dawa, the oldest Shiite Islamist party in Iraq. Maliki's party seems to have won popularity by focusing on raising employment and establishing order, but al-Dawa still calls for some form of an Islamic state and seeks advice from Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. In spite of Iraqi voters' concerns of Persian influence, the prime minister paid a visit to Tehran following the January vote.
Moreover, Maliki did not win simply by playing nice. His status as an enforcer has been earned through an increasingly aggressive push against the militias in Iraq, most notably Moqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army.
Critics have pointed out that Sadr is also conveniently a major political opponent of Maliki, and that a weakened Mahdi Army plays into Maliki's personal agenda nicely. Shiite Islamists have used their militias as an extension of their political power both to establish control of unstable neighborhoods and to fend off competing parties.
While ISCI and the Sadrists have their own militias, until now al-Dawa has not. Iraq's army may become the permanent substitute for al-Dawa's lack of militia, as evidenced by Maliki's confrontation with Sadr in March 2008. When the Iraqi army butted heads with the Mahdi Army in Basra it was just as much a squabble between competing Shiite parties as a government move to establish order in the south of Iraq.
Additionally, Maliki has been centralizing power for himself. He has established two security forces, the Baghdad Brigade and the Counterterrorism Task Force, that report directly to the prime minister. In the face of a loud outcry by Kurdish, Sunni, and ISCI parliamentarians, he has also recruited tribal militias that are funded directly through his office.
These groups sound strangely similar to the type of extra-governmental militia's he has promised to destroy.
So who is Nouri Kamal al-Maliki?
By alienating ISCI (the flag bearer of federalism) with his insistence upon a strong central government, the prime minister is in need of new partners. He has now made overtures to Sadr, of all people. Incredibly, Sadr gave the go ahead for independent candidates he backed in the January elections to work with Maliki's State of Law Coalition.
Even though Maliki won by playing on homegrown Iraqi pride, it is easy to see him sliding into a more Islamist nationalist agenda, with the help of Sadr. In fact, the rise of Iraqi nationalism dressed in Shiite garb is a distinct possibility. Shiite Islamists do not claim to subvert Iraqi nationalism; they believe that being Shiite is an integral part to being an Iraqi. Maliki's government may seek to redefine Iraq's identity, mixing projects for new roads with plans for Shiite madrassas.
Conversely, as Maliki continues to amass power, the ideology of his allies, or his own party, may simply matter less and less. The prime minister has acquired the ability to appoint and dismiss Iraqi army officers, bypassing the chief of staff, which has effectively transformed the Iraqi army into yet another personal militia.
With two additional security forces as well as armed tribesman reporting directly to him, Maliki already has the necessary components to shift Iraq from multiparty rule to an oligarchy, using the same methods of state control and patronage politics that were hallmarks of the Baath party.
As Iraqis themselves struggle to reconcile dueling identities drawn from competing religious, tribal and political allegiances, how Maliki proceeds from here will be a crucial factor determining the identity of Iraq as a nation.
With Sistani, his al-Dawa supporters and Sadr in tow, he could morph Iraq into a country whose nationalist sentiment is defined by Shiism. Equally probable, he has the means to establish a powerful central state reminiscent of Iraq's former regimes and to quash political opposition, profiting from the seemingly endless goodwill emanating from the United States, whose idea of victory has devolved into avoiding a civil war.
However, it is Maliki who has restored a semblance of order to a country that is splitting apart at the seams, and his election campaign emphasized the infrastructure and social concerns that are acutely problematic in the country. In a reasonably free environment, Iraqis decided to take a chance on him for four more years. What he does with that trust will define the future of Iraq.
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Daniel Long Hoffman studies political science at Knox College, in Galesburg, IL, USA. He can be reached for questions or comments at dlhoffma@gmail.com var dc_AdLinkColor = 'blue' ; var dc_PublisherID = 81548 ; var dc_open_new_win = 'yes'; adsonar_placementId=1431408;adsonar_pid=1459767;adsonar_ps=-1;adsonar_zw=540;adsonar_zh=150;adsonar_jv='ads.adsonar.com'; To add a comment,Please log in:Read Full Article »
