SEOUL — Once again, tension is rising across Asia over North Korea's missile program. Unlike its previous "surprise" launches, North Korea notified international agencies in advance that it will send a "satellite" into orbit some time between April 4 and 8. The question for the world is not whether Pyongyang will launch its missile, but what happens afterward.
The United States, Japan and South Korea have already condemned the launch as a "provocative act" and a violation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1718, adopted in October of 2006, five days after North Korea conducted a nuclear weapons test. Yesterday, Barack Obama called for a "stern, united" world response, and Japan vowed to press for an emergency session of the UN Security Council.
Instead of hot rhetoric, however, what is needed now is a cool-headed assessment of the military implications of the missile launch. If Japan, the U.S. and others try to intercept or counter the missile, military tension - even possible combat - is likely to ensue. How to prevent unnecessary military measures and countermeasures is the most immediate concern for the region's governments. Above all, the ongoing six-party talks (China, the U.S., Japan, Russia, South Korea and North Korea) that have sought to bring North Korea's nuclear program to an end must not become a casualty.
In dealing with North Korea, two fundamental issues must be addressed. First, although governments are justified in criticizing Pyongyang for its foolhardy, counterproductive and self-destructive behaviour over many years, including acts perpetrated against its own people, North Korea is not solely to blame for its missile tantrum.
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Indeed, the Bush administration's unilateral behaviour, including the dismantling of the 1994 Geneva Agreed Framework with North Korea, the hyping of an enriched uranium deal and the infamous "axis of evil" speech, has increased the paranoia of an already paranoid regime. So George Bush's foreign policy toward North Korea, especially during his first term, must take a fair share of responsibility for the current mess.
More fundamentally, no one should think that North Korea's totalitarian Communist system can be changed overnight. No one inside or outside can remove its anachronistic dynastic regime, and no outsider can hope to quickly modify the policy behaviour of its fossilized military, party and administrative bureaucrats. These are the cold realties of North Korea.
But cold realities do not necessarily have to turn into hot combat. Indeed, the idea of warfare on the Korean peninsula should be unthinkable, given the grotesque levels of deaths it would likely cause. Even to contemplate such a possibility is proof of diplomatic failure, not a triumph of leadership.
A leadership mismatch, moreover, has been a central obstacle in resolving the problem of North Korea's weapons of mass destruction and the ultimate question of achieving a unified Korea. Since the emergence of two separate regimes and systems on the Korean peninsula in 1948, South Korea and the U.S. have dealt with only two "supreme leaders," Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il. During the same period, there have been 10 South Korean presidents and 12 U.S. presidents.
For the past 10 years, three South Korean presidents and three U.S. presidents have been trying to deal with the same "perpetual" leader - Kim Jong-il. From Mr. Kim's perspective, encountering such leadership changes and subsequent policy clashes are both bewildering and difficult to assimilate. Just on the South Korean side, he has had to cope with Kim Dae-jung's "sunshine policy" of engagement, Roh Moo-hyun's "on again, off again" diplomacy, and Lee Myung-bak's current confrontational stand. From the U.S., he has confronted engagement on the part of Bill Clinton, unilateral confrontation from George W. Bush, and the nascent "principled engagement" of Barack Obama.
This form of leadership mismatch has also disturbed relations between Seoul and Washington. The discrepancy between the two-term, four-year U.S. presidency and the one-term, five-year South Korean presidency has sometimes been problematic, and the respective policies toward North Korea of U.S. and South Korean administrations have often collided.
When they do, both sides must spend an enormous amount of time and effort in reaching a consensus, leaving the isolated North breeding all sorts of conspiracy theories.
The Korean question is even more intractable and perplexing if the leadership changes of other regional parties such as China, Japan and Russia are factored into the political equation.
The long-term result of all this is oscillation between dialogue and deadlock - which has led to uncertain engagement or heated confrontation. To break this sterile cycle, what is needed is not more hot rhetoric about North Korea's missiles but a commitment to steady, patient diplomacy that transcends changes in the political cycle. There is no quick fix in disentangling the Korean knot. Only persistence and commitment will do.
Yang Sung-chul is chairman of the advisory committee of the Kim Dae-Jung Peace Foundation and a former South Korean ambassador to the United States.
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