It has become commonplace to assume that the transition from US president George W. Bush to Barack Obama signals a move away from a unilateral, harsh, uncompromising and even militant approach toward Iran to a newfound willingness to embrace dialogue and engagement on the basis of an acceptance of the current regime.
Many seem to believe that the past failures to deal effectively with Iran's nuclear ambitions are due to the uncompromising approach of the Bush administration; they hold high hopes for the new US president who is finally willing to reasonably sort out the problem by sitting down to talk to Iranian leaders on equal standing and with respect. His extended hand to Iran's leaders can be expected to encourage Iran to unclench its fist.
But how accurate is this depiction of the past, and how realistic are the hopes that by expressing willingness to negotiate unconditionally, Obama will be in a better position to improve relations with Iran? Most importantly, will this defuse the crisis surrounding Iran's nuclear ambitions?
Looking back at the attempts to confront Iran's nuclear activities since 2002, the record of the Bush administration is somewhat different from what is commonly assumed. While the axis of evil statement of January 2002 is repeated over and over to prove Bush's harsh approach toward Iran, his State of the Union of the following year is rarely quoted. In this January 2003 speech Bush set out the logic of "different strategies for different threats" that charted a different course for Iran, one that involved working with other governments and the International Atomic Energy Agency - clearly setting Iran apart from Iraq. Bush subsequently supported the efforts of the EU-3 (Germany, France and Britain) to negotiate with Iran from 2003 to 2005; these efforts were discontinued only when the Europeans became convinced that Iran was not negotiating in good faith.
Moreover, even in light of that experience, in May 2006 secretary of state Condoleezza Rice announced that the US would be willing to join direct negotiations with Iran if it suspended uranium enrichment. This became the position of Europe as well, and was thereafter reflected in the UN Security Council resolutions from 2006 to 2008 which demanded that Iran cease uranium enrichment activities and imposed some (not very harsh) economic sanctions.
Finally, since March 2008 no further decisions or steps have been taken against Iran, and over the summer of 2008 the US (under Bush) clarified that the military option was no longer even on the table.
It has become commonplace to assume that the transition from US president George W. Bush to Barack Obama signals a move away from a unilateral, harsh, uncompromising and even militant approach toward Iran to a newfound willingness to embrace dialogue and engagement on the basis of an acceptance of the current regime.
Many seem to believe that the past failures to deal effectively with Iran's nuclear ambitions are due to the uncompromising approach of the Bush administration; they hold high hopes for the new US president who is finally willing to reasonably sort out the problem by sitting down to talk to Iranian leaders on equal standing and with respect. His extended hand to Iran's leaders can be expected to encourage Iran to unclench its fist.
But how accurate is this depiction of the past, and how realistic are the hopes that by expressing willingness to negotiate unconditionally, Obama will be in a better position to improve relations with Iran? Most importantly, will this defuse the crisis surrounding Iran's nuclear ambitions?
Looking back at the attempts to confront Iran's nuclear activities since 2002, the record of the Bush administration is somewhat different from what is commonly assumed. While the axis of evil statement of January 2002 is repeated over and over to prove Bush's harsh approach toward Iran, his State of the Union of the following year is rarely quoted. In this January 2003 speech Bush set out the logic of "different strategies for different threats" that charted a different course for Iran, one that involved working with other governments and the International Atomic Energy Agency - clearly setting Iran apart from Iraq. Bush subsequently supported the efforts of the EU-3 (Germany, France and Britain) to negotiate with Iran from 2003 to 2005; these efforts were discontinued only when the Europeans became convinced that Iran was not negotiating in good faith.
Moreover, even in light of that experience, in May 2006 secretary of state Condoleezza Rice announced that the US would be willing to join direct negotiations with Iran if it suspended uranium enrichment. This became the position of Europe as well, and was thereafter reflected in the UN Security Council resolutions from 2006 to 2008 which demanded that Iran cease uranium enrichment activities and imposed some (not very harsh) economic sanctions.
Finally, since March 2008 no further decisions or steps have been taken against Iran, and over the summer of 2008 the US (under Bush) clarified that the military option was no longer even on the table.
It has become commonplace to assume that the transition from US president George W. Bush to Barack Obama signals a move away from a unilateral, harsh, uncompromising and even militant approach toward Iran to a newfound willingness to embrace dialogue and engagement on the basis of an acceptance of the current regime.
Many seem to believe that the past failures to deal effectively with Iran's nuclear ambitions are due to the uncompromising approach of the Bush administration; they hold high hopes for the new US president who is finally willing to reasonably sort out the problem by sitting down to talk to Iranian leaders on equal standing and with respect. His extended hand to Iran's leaders can be expected to encourage Iran to unclench its fist.
But how accurate is this depiction of the past, and how realistic are the hopes that by expressing willingness to negotiate unconditionally, Obama will be in a better position to improve relations with Iran? Most importantly, will this defuse the crisis surrounding Iran's nuclear ambitions?
Looking back at the attempts to confront Iran's nuclear activities since 2002, the record of the Bush administration is somewhat different from what is commonly assumed. While the axis of evil statement of January 2002 is repeated over and over to prove Bush's harsh approach toward Iran, his State of the Union of the following year is rarely quoted. In this January 2003 speech Bush set out the logic of "different strategies for different threats" that charted a different course for Iran, one that involved working with other governments and the International Atomic Energy Agency - clearly setting Iran apart from Iraq. Bush subsequently supported the efforts of the EU-3 (Germany, France and Britain) to negotiate with Iran from 2003 to 2005; these efforts were discontinued only when the Europeans became convinced that Iran was not negotiating in good faith.
Moreover, even in light of that experience, in May 2006 secretary of state Condoleezza Rice announced that the US would be willing to join direct negotiations with Iran if it suspended uranium enrichment. This became the position of Europe as well, and was thereafter reflected in the UN Security Council resolutions from 2006 to 2008 which demanded that Iran cease uranium enrichment activities and imposed some (not very harsh) economic sanctions.
Finally, since March 2008 no further decisions or steps have been taken against Iran, and over the summer of 2008 the US (under Bush) clarified that the military option was no longer even on the table.
It has become commonplace to assume that the transition from US president George W. Bush to Barack Obama signals a move away from a unilateral, harsh, uncompromising and even militant approach toward Iran to a newfound willingness to embrace dialogue and engagement on the basis of an acceptance of the current regime.
Many seem to believe that the past failures to deal effectively with Iran's nuclear ambitions are due to the uncompromising approach of the Bush administration; they hold high hopes for the new US president who is finally willing to reasonably sort out the problem by sitting down to talk to Iranian leaders on equal standing and with respect. His extended hand to Iran's leaders can be expected to encourage Iran to unclench its fist.
But how accurate is this depiction of the past, and how realistic are the hopes that by expressing willingness to negotiate unconditionally, Obama will be in a better position to improve relations with Iran? Most importantly, will this defuse the crisis surrounding Iran's nuclear ambitions?
Looking back at the attempts to confront Iran's nuclear activities since 2002, the record of the Bush administration is somewhat different from what is commonly assumed. While the axis of evil statement of January 2002 is repeated over and over to prove Bush's harsh approach toward Iran, his State of the Union of the following year is rarely quoted. In this January 2003 speech Bush set out the logic of "different strategies for different threats" that charted a different course for Iran, one that involved working with other governments and the International Atomic Energy Agency - clearly setting Iran apart from Iraq. Bush subsequently supported the efforts of the EU-3 (Germany, France and Britain) to negotiate with Iran from 2003 to 2005; these efforts were discontinued only when the Europeans became convinced that Iran was not negotiating in good faith.
Moreover, even in light of that experience, in May 2006 secretary of state Condoleezza Rice announced that the US would be willing to join direct negotiations with Iran if it suspended uranium enrichment. This became the position of Europe as well, and was thereafter reflected in the UN Security Council resolutions from 2006 to 2008 which demanded that Iran cease uranium enrichment activities and imposed some (not very harsh) economic sanctions.
Finally, since March 2008 no further decisions or steps have been taken against Iran, and over the summer of 2008 the US (under Bush) clarified that the military option was no longer even on the table.
It has become commonplace to assume that the transition from US president George W. Bush to Barack Obama signals a move away from a unilateral, harsh, uncompromising and even militant approach toward Iran to a newfound willingness to embrace dialogue and engagement on the basis of an acceptance of the current regime.
Many seem to believe that the past failures to deal effectively with Iran's nuclear ambitions are due to the uncompromising approach of the Bush administration; they hold high hopes for the new US president who is finally willing to reasonably sort out the problem by sitting down to talk to Iranian leaders on equal standing and with respect. His extended hand to Iran's leaders can be expected to encourage Iran to unclench its fist.
But how accurate is this depiction of the past, and how realistic are the hopes that by expressing willingness to negotiate unconditionally, Obama will be in a better position to improve relations with Iran? Most importantly, will this defuse the crisis surrounding Iran's nuclear ambitions?
Looking back at the attempts to confront Iran's nuclear activities since 2002, the record of the Bush administration is somewhat different from what is commonly assumed. While the axis of evil statement of January 2002 is repeated over and over to prove Bush's harsh approach toward Iran, his State of the Union of the following year is rarely quoted. In this January 2003 speech Bush set out the logic of "different strategies for different threats" that charted a different course for Iran, one that involved working with other governments and the International Atomic Energy Agency - clearly setting Iran apart from Iraq. Bush subsequently supported the efforts of the EU-3 (Germany, France and Britain) to negotiate with Iran from 2003 to 2005; these efforts were discontinued only when the Europeans became convinced that Iran was not negotiating in good faith.
Moreover, even in light of that experience, in May 2006 secretary of state Condoleezza Rice announced that the US would be willing to join direct negotiations with Iran if it suspended uranium enrichment. This became the position of Europe as well, and was thereafter reflected in the UN Security Council resolutions from 2006 to 2008 which demanded that Iran cease uranium enrichment activities and imposed some (not very harsh) economic sanctions.
Finally, since March 2008 no further decisions or steps have been taken against Iran, and over the summer of 2008 the US (under Bush) clarified that the military option was no longer even on the table.
It has become commonplace to assume that the transition from US president George W. Bush to Barack Obama signals a move away from a unilateral, harsh, uncompromising and even militant approach toward Iran to a newfound willingness to embrace dialogue and engagement on the basis of an acceptance of the current regime.
Many seem to believe that the past failures to deal effectively with Iran's nuclear ambitions are due to the uncompromising approach of the Bush administration; they hold high hopes for the new US president who is finally willing to reasonably sort out the problem by sitting down to talk to Iranian leaders on equal standing and with respect. His extended hand to Iran's leaders can be expected to encourage Iran to unclench its fist.
But how accurate is this depiction of the past, and how realistic are the hopes that by expressing willingness to negotiate unconditionally, Obama will be in a better position to improve relations with Iran? Most importantly, will this defuse the crisis surrounding Iran's nuclear ambitions?
Looking back at the attempts to confront Iran's nuclear activities since 2002, the record of the Bush administration is somewhat different from what is commonly assumed. While the axis of evil statement of January 2002 is repeated over and over to prove Bush's harsh approach toward Iran, his State of the Union of the following year is rarely quoted. In this January 2003 speech Bush set out the logic of "different strategies for different threats" that charted a different course for Iran, one that involved working with other governments and the International Atomic Energy Agency - clearly setting Iran apart from Iraq. Bush subsequently supported the efforts of the EU-3 (Germany, France and Britain) to negotiate with Iran from 2003 to 2005; these efforts were discontinued only when the Europeans became convinced that Iran was not negotiating in good faith.
Moreover, even in light of that experience, in May 2006 secretary of state Condoleezza Rice announced that the US would be willing to join direct negotiations with Iran if it suspended uranium enrichment. This became the position of Europe as well, and was thereafter reflected in the UN Security Council resolutions from 2006 to 2008 which demanded that Iran cease uranium enrichment activities and imposed some (not very harsh) economic sanctions.
Finally, since March 2008 no further decisions or steps have been taken against Iran, and over the summer of 2008 the US (under Bush) clarified that the military option was no longer even on the table.
It has become commonplace to assume that the transition from US president George W. Bush to Barack Obama signals a move away from a unilateral, harsh, uncompromising and even militant approach toward Iran to a newfound willingness to embrace dialogue and engagement on the basis of an acceptance of the current regime.
Many seem to believe that the past failures to deal effectively with Iran's nuclear ambitions are due to the uncompromising approach of the Bush administration; they hold high hopes for the new US president who is finally willing to reasonably sort out the problem by sitting down to talk to Iranian leaders on equal standing and with respect. His extended hand to Iran's leaders can be expected to encourage Iran to unclench its fist.
But how accurate is this depiction of the past, and how realistic are the hopes that by expressing willingness to negotiate unconditionally, Obama will be in a better position to improve relations with Iran? Most importantly, will this defuse the crisis surrounding Iran's nuclear ambitions?
Looking back at the attempts to confront Iran's nuclear activities since 2002, the record of the Bush administration is somewhat different from what is commonly assumed. While the axis of evil statement of January 2002 is repeated over and over to prove Bush's harsh approach toward Iran, his State of the Union of the following year is rarely quoted. In this January 2003 speech Bush set out the logic of "different strategies for different threats" that charted a different course for Iran, one that involved working with other governments and the International Atomic Energy Agency - clearly setting Iran apart from Iraq. Bush subsequently supported the efforts of the EU-3 (Germany, France and Britain) to negotiate with Iran from 2003 to 2005; these efforts were discontinued only when the Europeans became convinced that Iran was not negotiating in good faith.
Moreover, even in light of that experience, in May 2006 secretary of state Condoleezza Rice announced that the US would be willing to join direct negotiations with Iran if it suspended uranium enrichment. This became the position of Europe as well, and was thereafter reflected in the UN Security Council resolutions from 2006 to 2008 which demanded that Iran cease uranium enrichment activities and imposed some (not very harsh) economic sanctions.
Finally, since March 2008 no further decisions or steps have been taken against Iran, and over the summer of 2008 the US (under Bush) clarified that the military option was no longer even on the table.
It has become commonplace to assume that the transition from US president George W. Bush to Barack Obama signals a move away from a unilateral, harsh, uncompromising and even militant approach toward Iran to a newfound willingness to embrace dialogue and engagement on the basis of an acceptance of the current regime.
Many seem to believe that the past failures to deal effectively with Iran's nuclear ambitions are due to the uncompromising approach of the Bush administration; they hold high hopes for the new US president who is finally willing to reasonably sort out the problem by sitting down to talk to Iranian leaders on equal standing and with respect. His extended hand to Iran's leaders can be expected to encourage Iran to unclench its fist.
But how accurate is this depiction of the past, and how realistic are the hopes that by expressing willingness to negotiate unconditionally, Obama will be in a better position to improve relations with Iran? Most importantly, will this defuse the crisis surrounding Iran's nuclear ambitions?
Looking back at the attempts to confront Iran's nuclear activities since 2002, the record of the Bush administration is somewhat different from what is commonly assumed. While the axis of evil statement of January 2002 is repeated over and over to prove Bush's harsh approach toward Iran, his State of the Union of the following year is rarely quoted. In this January 2003 speech Bush set out the logic of "different strategies for different threats" that charted a different course for Iran, one that involved working with other governments and the International Atomic Energy Agency - clearly setting Iran apart from Iraq. Bush subsequently supported the efforts of the EU-3 (Germany, France and Britain) to negotiate with Iran from 2003 to 2005; these efforts were discontinued only when the Europeans became convinced that Iran was not negotiating in good faith.
Moreover, even in light of that experience, in May 2006 secretary of state Condoleezza Rice announced that the US would be willing to join direct negotiations with Iran if it suspended uranium enrichment. This became the position of Europe as well, and was thereafter reflected in the UN Security Council resolutions from 2006 to 2008 which demanded that Iran cease uranium enrichment activities and imposed some (not very harsh) economic sanctions.
Finally, since March 2008 no further decisions or steps have been taken against Iran, and over the summer of 2008 the US (under Bush) clarified that the military option was no longer even on the table.
It has become commonplace to assume that the transition from US president George W. Bush to Barack Obama signals a move away from a unilateral, harsh, uncompromising and even militant approach toward Iran to a newfound willingness to embrace dialogue and engagement on the basis of an acceptance of the current regime.
Many seem to believe that the past failures to deal effectively with Iran's nuclear ambitions are due to the uncompromising approach of the Bush administration; they hold high hopes for the new US president who is finally willing to reasonably sort out the problem by sitting down to talk to Iranian leaders on equal standing and with respect. His extended hand to Iran's leaders can be expected to encourage Iran to unclench its fist.
But how accurate is this depiction of the past, and how realistic are the hopes that by expressing willingness to negotiate unconditionally, Obama will be in a better position to improve relations with Iran? Most importantly, will this defuse the crisis surrounding Iran's nuclear ambitions?
Looking back at the attempts to confront Iran's nuclear activities since 2002, the record of the Bush administration is somewhat different from what is commonly assumed. While the axis of evil statement of January 2002 is repeated over and over to prove Bush's harsh approach toward Iran, his State of the Union of the following year is rarely quoted. In this January 2003 speech Bush set out the logic of "different strategies for different threats" that charted a different course for Iran, one that involved working with other governments and the International Atomic Energy Agency - clearly setting Iran apart from Iraq. Bush subsequently supported the efforts of the EU-3 (Germany, France and Britain) to negotiate with Iran from 2003 to 2005; these efforts were discontinued only when the Europeans became convinced that Iran was not negotiating in good faith.
Moreover, even in light of that experience, in May 2006 secretary of state Condoleezza Rice announced that the US would be willing to join direct negotiations with Iran if it suspended uranium enrichment. This became the position of Europe as well, and was thereafter reflected in the UN Security Council resolutions from 2006 to 2008 which demanded that Iran cease uranium enrichment activities and imposed some (not very harsh) economic sanctions.
Finally, since March 2008 no further decisions or steps have been taken against Iran, and over the summer of 2008 the US (under Bush) clarified that the military option was no longer even on the table.
It has become commonplace to assume that the transition from US president George W. Bush to Barack Obama signals a move away from a unilateral, harsh, uncompromising and even militant approach toward Iran to a newfound willingness to embrace dialogue and engagement on the basis of an acceptance of the current regime.
Many seem to believe that the past failures to deal effectively with Iran's nuclear ambitions are due to the uncompromising approach of the Bush administration; they hold high hopes for the new US president who is finally willing to reasonably sort out the problem by sitting down to talk to Iranian leaders on equal standing and with respect. His extended hand to Iran's leaders can be expected to encourage Iran to unclench its fist.
But how accurate is this depiction of the past, and how realistic are the hopes that by expressing willingness to negotiate unconditionally, Obama will be in a better position to improve relations with Iran? Most importantly, will this defuse the crisis surrounding Iran's nuclear ambitions?
Looking back at the attempts to confront Iran's nuclear activities since 2002, the record of the Bush administration is somewhat different from what is commonly assumed. While the axis of evil statement of January 2002 is repeated over and over to prove Bush's harsh approach toward Iran, his State of the Union of the following year is rarely quoted. In this January 2003 speech Bush set out the logic of "different strategies for different threats" that charted a different course for Iran, one that involved working with other governments and the International Atomic Energy Agency - clearly setting Iran apart from Iraq. Bush subsequently supported the efforts of the EU-3 (Germany, France and Britain) to negotiate with Iran from 2003 to 2005; these efforts were discontinued only when the Europeans became convinced that Iran was not negotiating in good faith.
Moreover, even in light of that experience, in May 2006 secretary of state Condoleezza Rice announced that the US would be willing to join direct negotiations with Iran if it suspended uranium enrichment. This became the position of Europe as well, and was thereafter reflected in the UN Security Council resolutions from 2006 to 2008 which demanded that Iran cease uranium enrichment activities and imposed some (not very harsh) economic sanctions.
Finally, since March 2008 no further decisions or steps have been taken against Iran, and over the summer of 2008 the US (under Bush) clarified that the military option was no longer even on the table.
It has become commonplace to assume that the transition from US president George W. Bush to Barack Obama signals a move away from a unilateral, harsh, uncompromising and even militant approach toward Iran to a newfound willingness to embrace dialogue and engagement on the basis of an acceptance of the current regime.
Many seem to believe that the past failures to deal effectively with Iran's nuclear ambitions are due to the uncompromising approach of the Bush administration; they hold high hopes for the new US president who is finally willing to reasonably sort out the problem by sitting down to talk to Iranian leaders on equal standing and with respect. His extended hand to Iran's leaders can be expected to encourage Iran to unclench its fist.
But how accurate is this depiction of the past, and how realistic are the hopes that by expressing willingness to negotiate unconditionally, Obama will be in a better position to improve relations with Iran? Most importantly, will this defuse the crisis surrounding Iran's nuclear ambitions?
Looking back at the attempts to confront Iran's nuclear activities since 2002, the record of the Bush administration is somewhat different from what is commonly assumed. While the axis of evil statement of January 2002 is repeated over and over to prove Bush's harsh approach toward Iran, his State of the Union of the following year is rarely quoted. In this January 2003 speech Bush set out the logic of "different strategies for different threats" that charted a different course for Iran, one that involved working with other governments and the International Atomic Energy Agency - clearly setting Iran apart from Iraq. Bush subsequently supported the efforts of the EU-3 (Germany, France and Britain) to negotiate with Iran from 2003 to 2005; these efforts were discontinued only when the Europeans became convinced that Iran was not negotiating in good faith.
Moreover, even in light of that experience, in May 2006 secretary of state Condoleezza Rice announced that the US would be willing to join direct negotiations with Iran if it suspended uranium enrichment. This became the position of Europe as well, and was thereafter reflected in the UN Security Council resolutions from 2006 to 2008 which demanded that Iran cease uranium enrichment activities and imposed some (not very harsh) economic sanctions.
Finally, since March 2008 no further decisions or steps have been taken against Iran, and over the summer of 2008 the US (under Bush) clarified that the military option was no longer even on the table.
It has become commonplace to assume that the transition from US president George W. Bush to Barack Obama signals a move away from a unilateral, harsh, uncompromising and even militant approach toward Iran to a newfound willingness to embrace dialogue and engagement on the basis of an acceptance of the current regime.
Many seem to believe that the past failures to deal effectively with Iran's nuclear ambitions are due to the uncompromising approach of the Bush administration; they hold high hopes for the new US president who is finally willing to reasonably sort out the problem by sitting down to talk to Iranian leaders on equal standing and with respect. His extended hand to Iran's leaders can be expected to encourage Iran to unclench its fist.
But how accurate is this depiction of the past, and how realistic are the hopes that by expressing willingness to negotiate unconditionally, Obama will be in a better position to improve relations with Iran? Most importantly, will this defuse the crisis surrounding Iran's nuclear ambitions?
Looking back at the attempts to confront Iran's nuclear activities since 2002, the record of the Bush administration is somewhat different from what is commonly assumed. While the axis of evil statement of January 2002 is repeated over and over to prove Bush's harsh approach toward Iran, his State of the Union of the following year is rarely quoted. In this January 2003 speech Bush set out the logic of "different strategies for different threats" that charted a different course for Iran, one that involved working with other governments and the International Atomic Energy Agency - clearly setting Iran apart from Iraq. Bush subsequently supported the efforts of the EU-3 (Germany, France and Britain) to negotiate with Iran from 2003 to 2005; these efforts were discontinued only when the Europeans became convinced that Iran was not negotiating in good faith.
Moreover, even in light of that experience, in May 2006 secretary of state Condoleezza Rice announced that the US would be willing to join direct negotiations with Iran if it suspended uranium enrichment. This became the position of Europe as well, and was thereafter reflected in the UN Security Council resolutions from 2006 to 2008 which demanded that Iran cease uranium enrichment activities and imposed some (not very harsh) economic sanctions.
Finally, since March 2008 no further decisions or steps have been taken against Iran, and over the summer of 2008 the US (under Bush) clarified that the military option was no longer even on the table.
It has become commonplace to assume that the transition from US president George W. Bush to Barack Obama signals a move away from a unilateral, harsh, uncompromising and even militant approach toward Iran to a newfound willingness to embrace dialogue and engagement on the basis of an acceptance of the current regime.
Many seem to believe that the past failures to deal effectively with Iran's nuclear ambitions are due to the uncompromising approach of the Bush administration; they hold high hopes for the new US president who is finally willing to reasonably sort out the problem by sitting down to talk to Iranian leaders on equal standing and with respect. His extended hand to Iran's leaders can be expected to encourage Iran to unclench its fist.
But how accurate is this depiction of the past, and how realistic are the hopes that by expressing willingness to negotiate unconditionally, Obama will be in a better position to improve relations with Iran? Most importantly, will this defuse the crisis surrounding Iran's nuclear ambitions?
Looking back at the attempts to confront Iran's nuclear activities since 2002, the record of the Bush administration is somewhat different from what is commonly assumed. While the axis of evil statement of January 2002 is repeated over and over to prove Bush's harsh approach toward Iran, his State of the Union of the following year is rarely quoted. In this January 2003 speech Bush set out the logic of "different strategies for different threats" that charted a different course for Iran, one that involved working with other governments and the International Atomic Energy Agency - clearly setting Iran apart from Iraq. Bush subsequently supported the efforts of the EU-3 (Germany, France and Britain) to negotiate with Iran from 2003 to 2005; these efforts were discontinued only when the Europeans became convinced that Iran was not negotiating in good faith.
Moreover, even in light of that experience, in May 2006 secretary of state Condoleezza Rice announced that the US would be willing to join direct negotiations with Iran if it suspended uranium enrichment. This became the position of Europe as well, and was thereafter reflected in the UN Security Council resolutions from 2006 to 2008 which demanded that Iran cease uranium enrichment activities and imposed some (not very harsh) economic sanctions.
Finally, since March 2008 no further decisions or steps have been taken against Iran, and over the summer of 2008 the US (under Bush) clarified that the military option was no longer even on the table.
It has become commonplace to assume that the transition from US president George W. Bush to Barack Obama signals a move away from a unilateral, harsh, uncompromising and even militant approach toward Iran to a newfound willingness to embrace dialogue and engagement on the basis of an acceptance of the current regime.
Many seem to believe that the past failures to deal effectively with Iran's nuclear ambitions are due to the uncompromising approach of the Bush administration; they hold high hopes for the new US president who is finally willing to reasonably sort out the problem by sitting down to talk to Iranian leaders on equal standing and with respect. His extended hand to Iran's leaders can be expected to encourage Iran to unclench its fist.
But how accurate is this depiction of the past, and how realistic are the hopes that by expressing willingness to negotiate unconditionally, Obama will be in a better position to improve relations with Iran? Most importantly, will this defuse the crisis surrounding Iran's nuclear ambitions?
Looking back at the attempts to confront Iran's nuclear activities since 2002, the record of the Bush administration is somewhat different from what is commonly assumed. While the axis of evil statement of January 2002 is repeated over and over to prove Bush's harsh approach toward Iran, his State of the Union of the following year is rarely quoted. In this January 2003 speech Bush set out the logic of "different strategies for different threats" that charted a different course for Iran, one that involved working with other governments and the International Atomic Energy Agency - clearly setting Iran apart from Iraq. Bush subsequently supported the efforts of the EU-3 (Germany, France and Britain) to negotiate with Iran from 2003 to 2005; these efforts were discontinued only when the Europeans became convinced that Iran was not negotiating in good faith.
Moreover, even in light of that experience, in May 2006 secretary of state Condoleezza Rice announced that the US would be willing to join direct negotiations with Iran if it suspended uranium enrichment. This became the position of Europe as well, and was thereafter reflected in the UN Security Council resolutions from 2006 to 2008 which demanded that Iran cease uranium enrichment activities and imposed some (not very harsh) economic sanctions.
Finally, since March 2008 no further decisions or steps have been taken against Iran, and over the summer of 2008 the US (under Bush) clarified that the military option was no longer even on the table.
It has become commonplace to assume that the transition from US president George W. Bush to Barack Obama signals a move away from a unilateral, harsh, uncompromising and even militant approach toward Iran to a newfound willingness to embrace dialogue and engagement on the basis of an acceptance of the current regime.
Many seem to believe that the past failures to deal effectively with Iran's nuclear ambitions are due to the uncompromising approach of the Bush administration; they hold high hopes for the new US president who is finally willing to reasonably sort out the problem by sitting down to talk to Iranian leaders on equal standing and with respect. His extended hand to Iran's leaders can be expected to encourage Iran to unclench its fist.
But how accurate is this depiction of the past, and how realistic are the hopes that by expressing willingness to negotiate unconditionally, Obama will be in a better position to improve relations with Iran? Most importantly, will this defuse the crisis surrounding Iran's nuclear ambitions?
Looking back at the attempts to confront Iran's nuclear activities since 2002, the record of the Bush administration is somewhat different from what is commonly assumed. While the axis of evil statement of January 2002 is repeated over and over to prove Bush's harsh approach toward Iran, his State of the Union of the following year is rarely quoted. In this January 2003 speech Bush set out the logic of "different strategies for different threats" that charted a different course for Iran, one that involved working with other governments and the International Atomic Energy Agency - clearly setting Iran apart from Iraq. Bush subsequently supported the efforts of the EU-3 (Germany, France and Britain) to negotiate with Iran from 2003 to 2005; these efforts were discontinued only when the Europeans became convinced that Iran was not negotiating in good faith.
Moreover, even in light of that experience, in May 2006 secretary of state Condoleezza Rice announced that the US would be willing to join direct negotiations with Iran if it suspended uranium enrichment. This became the position of Europe as well, and was thereafter reflected in the UN Security Council resolutions from 2006 to 2008 which demanded that Iran cease uranium enrichment activities and imposed some (not very harsh) economic sanctions.
Finally, since March 2008 no further decisions or steps have been taken against Iran, and over the summer of 2008 the US (under Bush) clarified that the military option was no longer even on the table.
It has become commonplace to assume that the transition from US president George W. Bush to Barack Obama signals a move away from a unilateral, harsh, uncompromising and even militant approach toward Iran to a newfound willingness to embrace dialogue and engagement on the basis of an acceptance of the current regime.
Many seem to believe that the past failures to deal effectively with Iran's nuclear ambitions are due to the uncompromising approach of the Bush administration; they hold high hopes for the new US president who is finally willing to reasonably sort out the problem by sitting down to talk to Iranian leaders on equal standing and with respect. His extended hand to Iran's leaders can be expected to encourage Iran to unclench its fist.
But how accurate is this depiction of the past, and how realistic are the hopes that by expressing willingness to negotiate unconditionally, Obama will be in a better position to improve relations with Iran? Most importantly, will this defuse the crisis surrounding Iran's nuclear ambitions?
Looking back at the attempts to confront Iran's nuclear activities since 2002, the record of the Bush administration is somewhat different from what is commonly assumed. While the axis of evil statement of January 2002 is repeated over and over to prove Bush's harsh approach toward Iran, his State of the Union of the following year is rarely quoted. In this January 2003 speech Bush set out the logic of "different strategies for different threats" that charted a different course for Iran, one that involved working with other governments and the International Atomic Energy Agency - clearly setting Iran apart from Iraq. Bush subsequently supported the efforts of the EU-3 (Germany, France and Britain) to negotiate with Iran from 2003 to 2005; these efforts were discontinued only when the Europeans became convinced that Iran was not negotiating in good faith.
Moreover, even in light of that experience, in May 2006 secretary of state Condoleezza Rice announced that the US would be willing to join direct negotiations with Iran if it suspended uranium enrichment. This became the position of Europe as well, and was thereafter reflected in the UN Security Council resolutions from 2006 to 2008 which demanded that Iran cease uranium enrichment activities and imposed some (not very harsh) economic sanctions.
Finally, since March 2008 no further decisions or steps have been taken against Iran, and over the summer of 2008 the US (under Bush) clarified that the military option was no longer even on the table.
It has become commonplace to assume that the transition from US president George W. Bush to Barack Obama signals a move away from a unilateral, harsh, uncompromising and even militant approach toward Iran to a newfound willingness to embrace dialogue and engagement on the basis of an acceptance of the current regime.
Many seem to believe that the past failures to deal effectively with Iran's nuclear ambitions are due to the uncompromising approach of the Bush administration; they hold high hopes for the new US president who is finally willing to reasonably sort out the problem by sitting down to talk to Iranian leaders on equal standing and with respect. His extended hand to Iran's leaders can be expected to encourage Iran to unclench its fist.
But how accurate is this depiction of the past, and how realistic are the hopes that by expressing willingness to negotiate unconditionally, Obama will be in a better position to improve relations with Iran? Most importantly, will this defuse the crisis surrounding Iran's nuclear ambitions?
Looking back at the attempts to confront Iran's nuclear activities since 2002, the record of the Bush administration is somewhat different from what is commonly assumed. While the axis of evil statement of January 2002 is repeated over and over to prove Bush's harsh approach toward Iran, his State of the Union of the following year is rarely quoted. In this January 2003 speech Bush set out the logic of "different strategies for different threats" that charted a different course for Iran, one that involved working with other governments and the International Atomic Energy Agency - clearly setting Iran apart from Iraq. Bush subsequently supported the efforts of the EU-3 (Germany, France and Britain) to negotiate with Iran from 2003 to 2005; these efforts were discontinued only when the Europeans became convinced that Iran was not negotiating in good faith.
Moreover, even in light of that experience, in May 2006 secretary of state Condoleezza Rice announced that the US would be willing to join direct negotiations with Iran if it suspended uranium enrichment. This became the position of Europe as well, and was thereafter reflected in the UN Security Council resolutions from 2006 to 2008 which demanded that Iran cease uranium enrichment activities and imposed some (not very harsh) economic sanctions.
Finally, since March 2008 no further decisions or steps have been taken against Iran, and over the summer of 2008 the US (under Bush) clarified that the military option was no longer even on the table.
It has become commonplace to assume that the transition from US president George W. Bush to Barack Obama signals a move away from a unilateral, harsh, uncompromising and even militant approach toward Iran to a newfound willingness to embrace dialogue and engagement on the basis of an acceptance of the current regime.
Many seem to believe that the past failures to deal effectively with Iran's nuclear ambitions are due to the uncompromising approach of the Bush administration; they hold high hopes for the new US president who is finally willing to reasonably sort out the problem by sitting down to talk to Iranian leaders on equal standing and with respect. His extended hand to Iran's leaders can be expected to encourage Iran to unclench its fist.
But how accurate is this depiction of the past, and how realistic are the hopes that by expressing willingness to negotiate unconditionally, Obama will be in a better position to improve relations with Iran? Most importantly, will this defuse the crisis surrounding Iran's nuclear ambitions?
Looking back at the attempts to confront Iran's nuclear activities since 2002, the record of the Bush administration is somewhat different from what is commonly assumed. While the axis of evil statement of January 2002 is repeated over and over to prove Bush's harsh approach toward Iran, his State of the Union of the following year is rarely quoted. In this January 2003 speech Bush set out the logic of "different strategies for different threats" that charted a different course for Iran, one that involved working with other governments and the International Atomic Energy Agency - clearly setting Iran apart from Iraq. Bush subsequently supported the efforts of the EU-3 (Germany, France and Britain) to negotiate with Iran from 2003 to 2005; these efforts were discontinued only when the Europeans became convinced that Iran was not negotiating in good faith.
Moreover, even in light of that experience, in May 2006 secretary of state Condoleezza Rice announced that the US would be willing to join direct negotiations with Iran if it suspended uranium enrichment. This became the position of Europe as well, and was thereafter reflected in the UN Security Council resolutions from 2006 to 2008 which demanded that Iran cease uranium enrichment activities and imposed some (not very harsh) economic sanctions.
Finally, since March 2008 no further decisions or steps have been taken against Iran, and over the summer of 2008 the US (under Bush) clarified that the military option was no longer even on the table.
It has become commonplace to assume that the transition from US president George W. Bush to Barack Obama signals a move away from a unilateral, harsh, uncompromising and even militant approach toward Iran to a newfound willingness to embrace dialogue and engagement on the basis of an acceptance of the current regime.
Many seem to believe that the past failures to deal effectively with Iran's nuclear ambitions are due to the uncompromising approach of the Bush administration; they hold high hopes for the new US president who is finally willing to reasonably sort out the problem by sitting down to talk to Iranian leaders on equal standing and with respect. His extended hand to Iran's leaders can be expected to encourage Iran to unclench its fist.
But how accurate is this depiction of the past, and how realistic are the hopes that by expressing willingness to negotiate unconditionally, Obama will be in a better position to improve relations with Iran? Most importantly, will this defuse the crisis surrounding Iran's nuclear ambitions?
Looking back at the attempts to confront Iran's nuclear activities since 2002, the record of the Bush administration is somewhat different from what is commonly assumed. While the axis of evil statement of January 2002 is repeated over and over to prove Bush's harsh approach toward Iran, his State of the Union of the following year is rarely quoted. In this January 2003 speech Bush set out the logic of "different strategies for different threats" that charted a different course for Iran, one that involved working with other governments and the International Atomic Energy Agency - clearly setting Iran apart from Iraq. Bush subsequently supported the efforts of the EU-3 (Germany, France and Britain) to negotiate with Iran from 2003 to 2005; these efforts were discontinued only when the Europeans became convinced that Iran was not negotiating in good faith.
Moreover, even in light of that experience, in May 2006 secretary of state Condoleezza Rice announced that the US would be willing to join direct negotiations with Iran if it suspended uranium enrichment. This became the position of Europe as well, and was thereafter reflected in the UN Security Council resolutions from 2006 to 2008 which demanded that Iran cease uranium enrichment activities and imposed some (not very harsh) economic sanctions.
Finally, since March 2008 no further decisions or steps have been taken against Iran, and over the summer of 2008 the US (under Bush) clarified that the military option was no longer even on the table.
It has become commonplace to assume that the transition from US president George W. Bush to Barack Obama signals a move away from a unilateral, harsh, uncompromising and even militant approach toward Iran to a newfound willingness to embrace dialogue and engagement on the basis of an acceptance of the current regime.
Many seem to believe that the past failures to deal effectively with Iran's nuclear ambitions are due to the uncompromising approach of the Bush administration; they hold high hopes for the new US president who is finally willing to reasonably sort out the problem by sitting down to talk to Iranian leaders on equal standing and with respect. His extended hand to Iran's leaders can be expected to encourage Iran to unclench its fist.
But how accurate is this depiction of the past, and how realistic are the hopes that by expressing willingness to negotiate unconditionally, Obama will be in a better position to improve relations with Iran? Most importantly, will this defuse the crisis surrounding Iran's nuclear ambitions?
Looking back at the attempts to confront Iran's nuclear activities since 2002, the record of the Bush administration is somewhat different from what is commonly assumed. While the axis of evil statement of January 2002 is repeated over and over to prove Bush's harsh approach toward Iran, his State of the Union of the following year is rarely quoted. In this January 2003 speech Bush set out the logic of "different strategies for different threats" that charted a different course for Iran, one that involved working with other governments and the International Atomic Energy Agency - clearly setting Iran apart from Iraq. Bush subsequently supported the efforts of the EU-3 (Germany, France and Britain) to negotiate with Iran from 2003 to 2005; these efforts were discontinued only when the Europeans became convinced that Iran was not negotiating in good faith.
Moreover, even in light of that experience, in May 2006 secretary of state Condoleezza Rice announced that the US would be willing to join direct negotiations with Iran if it suspended uranium enrichment. This became the position of Europe as well, and was thereafter reflected in the UN Security Council resolutions from 2006 to 2008 which demanded that Iran cease uranium enrichment activities and imposed some (not very harsh) economic sanctions.
Finally, since March 2008 no further decisions or steps have been taken against Iran, and over the summer of 2008 the US (under Bush) clarified that the military option was no longer even on the table.
It has become commonplace to assume that the transition from US president George W. Bush to Barack Obama signals a move away from a unilateral, harsh, uncompromising and even militant approach toward Iran to a newfound willingness to embrace dialogue and engagement on the basis of an acceptance of the current regime.
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