Many of us who watched the Orange Revolution with admiration four years ago have become disappointed with its failure to usher in a period of democratic stability and sustained reform. Recent crises have strengthened this feeling.
Nonetheless, there have been some clear improvements. Media censorship has ended, elections are free and fair, civil society is flourishing and the economy is more open. These are considerable gains, especially when compared to developments in Russia. But that is a very low benchmark to set. The Orange Revolution promised something more substantive -- an economic and political transformation that would put Ukraine firmly on the path to membership of the European Union.
But this hasn't happened yet, and part of the responsibility for this lies with the EU itself. Europe's soft power proved remarkably effective in encouraging the transition from communism to democracy in Eastern Europe but only when the promise of full membership was the end goal. It was only the prospect of inclusion in the EU club that encouraged the emerging democracies to make the painful sacrifices required to get there. It also provided the financial support and political supervision needed to meet the immense legislative and administrative challenges involved. The problem with Ukraine is that it expected to achieve the same results without any support or a clear statement that membership is an achievable goal.
