An unusual visit to the State Department earlier this week: Libya's National Security Advisor, and son of the President, Mutassim Qadhafi met Secretary Clinton for talks last Tuesday (read here). The Secretary gave little hint of the issues on the agenda, but that didn't diminish from the overall message: that the U.S. is interested in renewing its relationship with Libya after a long period of cool relations.
The case of Libya is not unique. It joins a long list of countries—Cuba, Iran, Myanmar, Russia, Syria, and perhaps Sudan—with whom the U.S. is trying to renew relations. Perhaps the only state missing from the list is North Korea (no explanation needed).
The turn around is remarkable. Never in the history of U.S. foreign policy has a reverse like this taken place. Not in 1933 with the recognition of the Soviet government. Not in 1947 with the Truman Doctrine. Not in 1970 with Kissinger's opening to China. And not in 1990 with the collapsing Soviet Union. The scope of the changes engineered by the Obama administration appears to be broader and deeper than ever before. The question is: why? The reasons are hard to discern but there seem to be three foremost.
First, as President Obama famously proclaimed in his inauguration speech "we will extend a hand if you are will to unclench your fist." The idea being the U.S. will open relations if other states change their tone. Secretary Clinton made comments similar "...the clear lesson of the last twenty years is that we must both combat threats and seize the opportunities of our interdependence... we must build a world with more partners and less adversaries... The best way to advance America's interest... is to design and implement global solutions... This isn't a philosophical point. This is our reality... to lead in today's world [obliges] us to recognize the overwhelming fact of our interdependence."
The example of Cuba is probably the best. The U.S. has little to gain from opening relations with Cuba—the state is too small and insignificant to make impact on the U.S. national interest. A relic of the Cold War, and something that deserves to be reversed, the Cuba policy has proven to be more costly to implement than it is worth to follow through. Past Presidents have calculated that trading votes in Florida for better relations with Castro's of Cuba was not a worthwhile exchange. But despite the low return, Obama and Clinton have created an opening. No one can be sure where it will go, but the fact that they have reveals a peculiar kind of idealistic realism—the idea that engagement is a policy worth pursuing for its own sake.
Second, it could be the new diplomacy of Obama and Clinton is really a tactical undertaking. They cite the examples of Iran and Russia. The U.S. has strong differences with both. In the case of Iran, the U.S. has concerns with its nuclear development, support for Hezbollah and Hamas, threats toward Israel, to name a few. With Russia, the U.S. is upset by their positions on Kosovo and Georgia, bases in Central Asia, and lackluster support for the mission in Afghanistan. The U.S. has tried to work each—Iran and Russia—separately, but with little success. If the U.S. leverages only Iran, Russia acts as a counter. If the U.S. leverages only Russia, then Iran does the same.
Therefore, if diplomacy by pressing each separately does not work, that argues for a full court press. This is what the Obama administration has done to date. The explanation then has less to do with arching opinions about U.S. interdependence and more to do with the exigencies of the moment. It is purely tactical: if engagement does not succeed, they will abandon it.
Third, there is the alternative that neither of the aforementioned is really right. The true motives of the President and Secretary Clinton are not explained by a personal world view or tactical considerations, but rather an outright rejection of the Bush administration's approach. Anything that runs counter to their predecessors suffices for good policy. Both the President and the Secretary are quick to highlight how different their conduct has been from the Bush administration. By this line of reasoning, engagement with states around the world is just another example of a repudiation of the Bush Doctrine, much like the order to close Gitmo, or the decision to withdraw from Iraq.
Of course this explanation is not very persuasive. President Obama has changed some policies, but he has maintained many others. He has continued with the contact group, the P5+1, for negotiations with Iran—a group organized during the Bush administration. More notable, he has retained the Bush diplomat who has represented the U.S. at those negotiations. His policy in the Middle East, and on Hamas, so far have not varied from the Bush administration. Even despite two visits by his special envoy and a visit by Secretary Clinton. He has retained Secretary of Defense Robert Gates. And he is expanding the Bush policy in Afghanistan. So it would be an overstatement to say that Obama's polices have been truly driven by distinction from the Bush administration. Besides, as former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger explained, one cannot overturn all of U.S. foreign policy with each new administration.
What then for the future? The change in U.S. foreign policy is dramatic. But the magnitude of the difference does not guarantee it success. Obama and Clinton have proven themselves able at the creation of openings and conducting successful public diplomacy. But openings that end in disappointment, or that lead to nowhere, can be worse than no opening at all. So far their opening game has been good. It remains to be seen whether Obama and his foreign policy team play as strong a mid- and end-game as they do the beginning.
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