Over 100 million Indonesians went to the polls this month as the world's largest Muslim-majority nation held legislative elections on April 9. This is the third national election cycle since the democratization process began just a decade ago. It is also the first election in which voters cast ballots for individual legislators within a party slate, rather than merely voting for a political party itself. While this represents a major step toward making government directly accountable to voters, the process is also certain to produce a significant number of disgruntled candidates whose failure to attain a seat in the legislature may now be blamed on something other than internal party politics.
As it turns out, there is good reason for disappointment with the implementation of this year's election. The political parties managed themselves rather well throughout the campaign period; however the National Election Commission apparently made grave errors in setting up the polls. It has become apparent that a huge number of eligible names may have been left off voter rolls. Credible accusations of vote fraud also remain to be addressed. As a result, there is some question as to whether all of the country's leading political parties will sign off on vote tallies once the counting is concluded on May 9.
But before we rush to support some disenfranchised political set, it is important to understand the overall thrust of the election results. By all accounts, incumbent President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono will almost certainly emerge the victor. His Democrat Party is projected to have won a plurality in the legislative election with approximately 20% of the vote. This is nearly a three-fold increase above his party's fledgling performance in 2004. Moreover, polls gauging the popularity of candidates for the upcoming presidential election on July 8 identify Mr. Yudhoyono as the undisputed favorite ahead of all other challengers by at least 35 percentage points in an open race. Gauged against individual contenders in hypothetical two-candidate races, the president's popularity increases dramatically.
In the next position in the popularity polls is former President Megawati Sukarnoputri, who held the nation's highest office from July 2001 to October 2004. Her Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) is known for its defiant stand against the Soeharto government in 1996 as well as consistent leadership in nationalist politics. PDI-P is projected to tie for second place in the legislative election with Golkar. As the political apparatus that orchestrated elections during the era of authoritarian politics, Golkar's experience enabled it to win a plurality of the vote in 2004. Its aging leaders now appear rudderless however in spite of their partnership in Mr. Yudhoyono's current ruling coalition. Each of these second-string parties appears to have mustered only around 14% of the vote this year, representing a decline since 2004 of approximately four percentage points for Megawati's PDI-P and a dismal seven point loss for Golkar.
Islamic political parties also experienced devastating setbacks in this election. Overall, support for Islamic parties declined from some 31% of the vote in 2004 to perhaps 20% this year. Although the conservative Justice and Prosperity Party (PKS) managed to gain a percentage point or so with 8.5% of the votes projected, it fell far shy of its 20% target. Several smaller Islamic parties appear to have suffered complete collapse as their failure to secure at least 2.5% of the vote means they will not be awarded seats in the legislature and will not be eligible to contest the next national election in 2014. This appears to be the fate of the ultra-conservative Crescent Star Party (PBB), which has reportedly been knocking on the doors of secular party offices this week in an effort to once again reduce the minimum vote threshold needed for party survival.
Aside from President Yudhoyono's growing popularity and the declining fortunes of political Islam, this election tells us some profound things about Indonesian society. In particular, to sum up the current state of Indonesian politics in a word, it appears that Indonesians have grown increasingly pragmatic in their approach to politics.
The nation's first democratic election in 1955 resulted in the emergence of four relatively distinct political blocks with nationalists, Islamic modernists, Islamic traditionalists, and communists each earning between 16% and 22% of the vote. These groupings reflected the deep social and cultural divisions that animated politics for decades and led to the deadly polarization of the mid-1960s.
The present election reveals little trace of an ideologically divided nation. On the contrary, even experienced observers of Indonesian politics are hard pressed to describe just how Golkar, PDI-P and the Democrat Party differ beyond some minor economic policy positions and of course the character of the individuals involved. Each party is considered nationalist, committed to Indonesia's official ideology of Pancasila, more or less pro-business, and ostensibly anti-graft. Each also has some track record of accommodating powerful religious lobbies when party interests are at stake.
The fourth contender, the Islamic PKS, distinguishes itself as the party of dakwah (Islamic preaching). However, as public opinion polls have suggested public frustration with divisive religious politics, PKS has moderated its approach and has attempted to woo voters by presenting itself in increasingly nationalistic terms.
In broad brush strokes, what this election thus suggests about Indonesian society is that the emotional draw of ideology, religion, charismatic leadership, and social controversy has begun to decline as concerns about good governance, fiscal accountability, and government professionalism have risen. The problem that Indonesia faces no longer stems from its past social and cultural divisions. Rather, the danger at hand reflects the fragmentation of a political elite that has yet to understand the interests of voters while failing to grasp the nature of the new democratic playing field.
The fact is that it is hard to read this election as anything other than a significant vote of confidence in President Yudhoyono’s ability to govern—in spite of his party's current weakness in the legislature. Most of the major political players appear to have accepted this fact and are moving forward with the coalition-building process through which they will nominate candidates for the presidential election.
There will certainly be numerous disputes over legislative party seats in the coming months. Indeed, it has quickly become clear that the election of 2009 will be remembered as a serious test of Indonesia's young democracy. But there is already a legal precedent in place for handling election disputes in the courts.
Before any of Indonesia's major politicians decide to reject the election results outright and lead their supporters into the streets in protest, I suggest a whirlwind tour of the region. Indonesia's expanding sense of democracy stands in sharp contrast to several of its nearest Southeast Asian neighbors. Across the Straights in Malaysia, for example, a new prime minister has taken office amid a ban on opposition newspapers and accusations of extra-constitutional political manipulation in the northern state of Perak. In Thailand, a state of emergency continues in the capital as democratic institutions have been set aside in apparent favor of street demonstrations.
We've heard much about the world's largest Muslim-majority nation in recent years and how it has come to stand out as a model of democratic stability. We know that direct elections have been instituted at the provincial, district, and municipal levels across the country since 2005. But now with the nation facing a growing political crisis, let us hope Indonesia's current and former leaders can demonstrate to the world that all of this talk about "Indonesian exceptionalism" really has some depth.
Richard Kraince is Research Professor of Southeast Asian Humanities at the College of Mexico in Mexico City.
Comment:
Posted April 23, 2009
Over 100 million Indonesians went to the polls this month as the world's largest Muslim-majority nation held legislative elections on April 9. This is the third national election cycle since the democratization process began just a decade ago. It is also the first election in which voters cast ballots for individual legislators within a party slate, rather than merely voting for a political party itself. While this represents a major step toward making government directly accountable to voters, the process is also certain to produce a significant number of disgruntled candidates whose failure to attain a seat in the legislature may now be blamed on something other than internal party politics.
As it turns out, there is good reason for disappointment with the implementation of this year's election. The political parties managed themselves rather well throughout the campaign period; however the National Election Commission apparently made grave errors in setting up the polls. It has become apparent that a huge number of eligible names may have been left off voter rolls. Credible accusations of vote fraud also remain to be addressed. As a result, there is some question as to whether all of the country's leading political parties will sign off on vote tallies once the counting is concluded on May 9.
But before we rush to support some disenfranchised political set, it is important to understand the overall thrust of the election results. By all accounts, incumbent President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono will almost certainly emerge the victor. His Democrat Party is projected to have won a plurality in the legislative election with approximately 20% of the vote. This is nearly a three-fold increase above his party's fledgling performance in 2004. Moreover, polls gauging the popularity of candidates for the upcoming presidential election on July 8 identify Mr. Yudhoyono as the undisputed favorite ahead of all other challengers by at least 35 percentage points in an open race. Gauged against individual contenders in hypothetical two-candidate races, the president's popularity increases dramatically.
In the next position in the popularity polls is former President Megawati Sukarnoputri, who held the nation's highest office from July 2001 to October 2004. Her Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) is known for its defiant stand against the Soeharto government in 1996 as well as consistent leadership in nationalist politics. PDI-P is projected to tie for second place in the legislative election with Golkar. As the political apparatus that orchestrated elections during the era of authoritarian politics, Golkar's experience enabled it to win a plurality of the vote in 2004. Its aging leaders now appear rudderless however in spite of their partnership in Mr. Yudhoyono's current ruling coalition. Each of these second-string parties appears to have mustered only around 14% of the vote this year, representing a decline since 2004 of approximately four percentage points for Megawati's PDI-P and a dismal seven point loss for Golkar.
Islamic political parties also experienced devastating setbacks in this election. Overall, support for Islamic parties declined from some 31% of the vote in 2004 to perhaps 20% this year. Although the conservative Justice and Prosperity Party (PKS) managed to gain a percentage point or so with 8.5% of the votes projected, it fell far shy of its 20% target. Several smaller Islamic parties appear to have suffered complete collapse as their failure to secure at least 2.5% of the vote means they will not be awarded seats in the legislature and will not be eligible to contest the next national election in 2014. This appears to be the fate of the ultra-conservative Crescent Star Party (PBB), which has reportedly been knocking on the doors of secular party offices this week in an effort to once again reduce the minimum vote threshold needed for party survival.
Aside from President Yudhoyono's growing popularity and the declining fortunes of political Islam, this election tells us some profound things about Indonesian society. In particular, to sum up the current state of Indonesian politics in a word, it appears that Indonesians have grown increasingly pragmatic in their approach to politics.
The nation's first democratic election in 1955 resulted in the emergence of four relatively distinct political blocks with nationalists, Islamic modernists, Islamic traditionalists, and communists each earning between 16% and 22% of the vote. These groupings reflected the deep social and cultural divisions that animated politics for decades and led to the deadly polarization of the mid-1960s.
The present election reveals little trace of an ideologically divided nation. On the contrary, even experienced observers of Indonesian politics are hard pressed to describe just how Golkar, PDI-P and the Democrat Party differ beyond some minor economic policy positions and of course the character of the individuals involved. Each party is considered nationalist, committed to Indonesia's official ideology of Pancasila, more or less pro-business, and ostensibly anti-graft. Each also has some track record of accommodating powerful religious lobbies when party interests are at stake.
The fourth contender, the Islamic PKS, distinguishes itself as the party of dakwah (Islamic preaching). However, as public opinion polls have suggested public frustration with divisive religious politics, PKS has moderated its approach and has attempted to woo voters by presenting itself in increasingly nationalistic terms.
In broad brush strokes, what this election thus suggests about Indonesian society is that the emotional draw of ideology, religion, charismatic leadership, and social controversy has begun to decline as concerns about good governance, fiscal accountability, and government professionalism have risen. The problem that Indonesia faces no longer stems from its past social and cultural divisions. Rather, the danger at hand reflects the fragmentation of a political elite that has yet to understand the interests of voters while failing to grasp the nature of the new democratic playing field.
The fact is that it is hard to read this election as anything other than a significant vote of confidence in President Yudhoyono’s ability to govern—in spite of his party's current weakness in the legislature. Most of the major political players appear to have accepted this fact and are moving forward with the coalition-building process through which they will nominate candidates for the presidential election.
There will certainly be numerous disputes over legislative party seats in the coming months. Indeed, it has quickly become clear that the election of 2009 will be remembered as a serious test of Indonesia's young democracy. But there is already a legal precedent in place for handling election disputes in the courts.
Before any of Indonesia's major politicians decide to reject the election results outright and lead their supporters into the streets in protest, I suggest a whirlwind tour of the region. Indonesia's expanding sense of democracy stands in sharp contrast to several of its nearest Southeast Asian neighbors. Across the Straights in Malaysia, for example, a new prime minister has taken office amid a ban on opposition newspapers and accusations of extra-constitutional political manipulation in the northern state of Perak. In Thailand, a state of emergency continues in the capital as democratic institutions have been set aside in apparent favor of street demonstrations.
We've heard much about the world's largest Muslim-majority nation in recent years and how it has come to stand out as a model of democratic stability. We know that direct elections have been instituted at the provincial, district, and municipal levels across the country since 2005. But now with the nation facing a growing political crisis, let us hope Indonesia's current and former leaders can demonstrate to the world that all of this talk about "Indonesian exceptionalism" really has some depth.
Richard Kraince is Research Professor of Southeast Asian Humanities at the College of Mexico in Mexico City.
Comment:
Posted April 23, 2009
Over 100 million Indonesians went to the polls this month as the world's largest Muslim-majority nation held legislative elections on April 9. This is the third national election cycle since the democratization process began just a decade ago. It is also the first election in which voters cast ballots for individual legislators within a party slate, rather than merely voting for a political party itself. While this represents a major step toward making government directly accountable to voters, the process is also certain to produce a significant number of disgruntled candidates whose failure to attain a seat in the legislature may now be blamed on something other than internal party politics.
As it turns out, there is good reason for disappointment with the implementation of this year's election. The political parties managed themselves rather well throughout the campaign period; however the National Election Commission apparently made grave errors in setting up the polls. It has become apparent that a huge number of eligible names may have been left off voter rolls. Credible accusations of vote fraud also remain to be addressed. As a result, there is some question as to whether all of the country's leading political parties will sign off on vote tallies once the counting is concluded on May 9.
But before we rush to support some disenfranchised political set, it is important to understand the overall thrust of the election results. By all accounts, incumbent President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono will almost certainly emerge the victor. His Democrat Party is projected to have won a plurality in the legislative election with approximately 20% of the vote. This is nearly a three-fold increase above his party's fledgling performance in 2004. Moreover, polls gauging the popularity of candidates for the upcoming presidential election on July 8 identify Mr. Yudhoyono as the undisputed favorite ahead of all other challengers by at least 35 percentage points in an open race. Gauged against individual contenders in hypothetical two-candidate races, the president's popularity increases dramatically.
In the next position in the popularity polls is former President Megawati Sukarnoputri, who held the nation's highest office from July 2001 to October 2004. Her Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) is known for its defiant stand against the Soeharto government in 1996 as well as consistent leadership in nationalist politics. PDI-P is projected to tie for second place in the legislative election with Golkar. As the political apparatus that orchestrated elections during the era of authoritarian politics, Golkar's experience enabled it to win a plurality of the vote in 2004. Its aging leaders now appear rudderless however in spite of their partnership in Mr. Yudhoyono's current ruling coalition. Each of these second-string parties appears to have mustered only around 14% of the vote this year, representing a decline since 2004 of approximately four percentage points for Megawati's PDI-P and a dismal seven point loss for Golkar.
Islamic political parties also experienced devastating setbacks in this election. Overall, support for Islamic parties declined from some 31% of the vote in 2004 to perhaps 20% this year. Although the conservative Justice and Prosperity Party (PKS) managed to gain a percentage point or so with 8.5% of the votes projected, it fell far shy of its 20% target. Several smaller Islamic parties appear to have suffered complete collapse as their failure to secure at least 2.5% of the vote means they will not be awarded seats in the legislature and will not be eligible to contest the next national election in 2014. This appears to be the fate of the ultra-conservative Crescent Star Party (PBB), which has reportedly been knocking on the doors of secular party offices this week in an effort to once again reduce the minimum vote threshold needed for party survival.
Aside from President Yudhoyono's growing popularity and the declining fortunes of political Islam, this election tells us some profound things about Indonesian society. In particular, to sum up the current state of Indonesian politics in a word, it appears that Indonesians have grown increasingly pragmatic in their approach to politics.
The nation's first democratic election in 1955 resulted in the emergence of four relatively distinct political blocks with nationalists, Islamic modernists, Islamic traditionalists, and communists each earning between 16% and 22% of the vote. These groupings reflected the deep social and cultural divisions that animated politics for decades and led to the deadly polarization of the mid-1960s.
The present election reveals little trace of an ideologically divided nation. On the contrary, even experienced observers of Indonesian politics are hard pressed to describe just how Golkar, PDI-P and the Democrat Party differ beyond some minor economic policy positions and of course the character of the individuals involved. Each party is considered nationalist, committed to Indonesia's official ideology of Pancasila, more or less pro-business, and ostensibly anti-graft. Each also has some track record of accommodating powerful religious lobbies when party interests are at stake.
The fourth contender, the Islamic PKS, distinguishes itself as the party of dakwah (Islamic preaching). However, as public opinion polls have suggested public frustration with divisive religious politics, PKS has moderated its approach and has attempted to woo voters by presenting itself in increasingly nationalistic terms.
In broad brush strokes, what this election thus suggests about Indonesian society is that the emotional draw of ideology, religion, charismatic leadership, and social controversy has begun to decline as concerns about good governance, fiscal accountability, and government professionalism have risen. The problem that Indonesia faces no longer stems from its past social and cultural divisions. Rather, the danger at hand reflects the fragmentation of a political elite that has yet to understand the interests of voters while failing to grasp the nature of the new democratic playing field.
The fact is that it is hard to read this election as anything other than a significant vote of confidence in President Yudhoyono’s ability to govern—in spite of his party's current weakness in the legislature. Most of the major political players appear to have accepted this fact and are moving forward with the coalition-building process through which they will nominate candidates for the presidential election.
There will certainly be numerous disputes over legislative party seats in the coming months. Indeed, it has quickly become clear that the election of 2009 will be remembered as a serious test of Indonesia's young democracy. But there is already a legal precedent in place for handling election disputes in the courts.
Before any of Indonesia's major politicians decide to reject the election results outright and lead their supporters into the streets in protest, I suggest a whirlwind tour of the region. Indonesia's expanding sense of democracy stands in sharp contrast to several of its nearest Southeast Asian neighbors. Across the Straights in Malaysia, for example, a new prime minister has taken office amid a ban on opposition newspapers and accusations of extra-constitutional political manipulation in the northern state of Perak. In Thailand, a state of emergency continues in the capital as democratic institutions have been set aside in apparent favor of street demonstrations.
We've heard much about the world's largest Muslim-majority nation in recent years and how it has come to stand out as a model of democratic stability. We know that direct elections have been instituted at the provincial, district, and municipal levels across the country since 2005. But now with the nation facing a growing political crisis, let us hope Indonesia's current and former leaders can demonstrate to the world that all of this talk about "Indonesian exceptionalism" really has some depth.
Richard Kraince is Research Professor of Southeast Asian Humanities at the College of Mexico in Mexico City.
Comment:
Posted April 23, 2009
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