The closer Iran gets to the bomb and the clearer it becomes that the international community is unable or unwilling to stop it, the more frequent the argument is made that Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons may prove uneventful. There is no evidence to suggest Iran will behave in any but a responsible manner and accede to the unwritten rules of strategic deterrence, it is said.
Parts of US-made B-61 nuclear bomb [illustrativepurpose only; no relation to story]. Photo: Courtesy
Iran's foreign policy has traditionally been marked by caution. Its apparent opting for a turnkey nuclear posture instead of rushing headlong to build a bomb in itself indicates as much. Despite the bloodcurdling declarations emanating these days from Teheran, the Iranians are keenly aware that by acquiring nuclear armaments they will automatically become the target of their enemies' nuclear weapons.
On the face of it these seems like valid points. But a closer examination of recent history suggests that when it comes to strategic deterrence, Iran's record is much murkier. First, Iran has continuously demonstrated that it was not deterred by various warnings and sanctions, and instead continued to pursue its nuclear weapons program.
Even the 2007 CIA National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) which claimed Iran suspended its nuclear program in 2003, because of "increasing international scrutiny and pressure," in effect qualified its judgment to only one aspect of the Iranian program: the construction of nuclear warheads. And, the NIE expressed only "moderate" confidence that the suspension has not been lifted already.
WHILE MUAMMAR GADDAFI of Libya was so unnerved by the US invasion of Iraq that he agreed to dismantle his country's entire weapons of mass destruction program, Iran continues to discount stern and increasingly overt warnings. As recently as 2007, in a display widely seen as sending a strong signal to Teheran, Israel launched an air strike that reportedly destroyed a Syrian nuclear reactor under construction. Yet Iran remained undeterred.
Similarly in 2006, during the Second Lebanon War, Teheran could not have known what would be Israel's response to Hizbullah firing thousands of rockets, many of which were produced and delivered by Iran, at its cities. For example, Israel could have chosen to launch a full-scale invasion of Lebanon to destroy Hizbullah's rocket arsenal or even opt to confront Iran itself in retaliation.
The closer Iran gets to the bomb and the clearer it becomes that the international community is unable or unwilling to stop it, the more frequent the argument is made that Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons may prove uneventful. There is no evidence to suggest Iran will behave in any but a responsible manner and accede to the unwritten rules of strategic deterrence, it is said.
Parts of US-made B-61 nuclear bomb [illustrativepurpose only; no relation to story]. Photo: Courtesy
Iran's foreign policy has traditionally been marked by caution. Its apparent opting for a turnkey nuclear posture instead of rushing headlong to build a bomb in itself indicates as much. Despite the bloodcurdling declarations emanating these days from Teheran, the Iranians are keenly aware that by acquiring nuclear armaments they will automatically become the target of their enemies' nuclear weapons.
On the face of it these seems like valid points. But a closer examination of recent history suggests that when it comes to strategic deterrence, Iran's record is much murkier. First, Iran has continuously demonstrated that it was not deterred by various warnings and sanctions, and instead continued to pursue its nuclear weapons program.
Even the 2007 CIA National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) which claimed Iran suspended its nuclear program in 2003, because of "increasing international scrutiny and pressure," in effect qualified its judgment to only one aspect of the Iranian program: the construction of nuclear warheads. And, the NIE expressed only "moderate" confidence that the suspension has not been lifted already.
WHILE MUAMMAR GADDAFI of Libya was so unnerved by the US invasion of Iraq that he agreed to dismantle his country's entire weapons of mass destruction program, Iran continues to discount stern and increasingly overt warnings. As recently as 2007, in a display widely seen as sending a strong signal to Teheran, Israel launched an air strike that reportedly destroyed a Syrian nuclear reactor under construction. Yet Iran remained undeterred.
Similarly in 2006, during the Second Lebanon War, Teheran could not have known what would be Israel's response to Hizbullah firing thousands of rockets, many of which were produced and delivered by Iran, at its cities. For example, Israel could have chosen to launch a full-scale invasion of Lebanon to destroy Hizbullah's rocket arsenal or even opt to confront Iran itself in retaliation.
The closer Iran gets to the bomb and the clearer it becomes that the international community is unable or unwilling to stop it, the more frequent the argument is made that Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons may prove uneventful. There is no evidence to suggest Iran will behave in any but a responsible manner and accede to the unwritten rules of strategic deterrence, it is said.
Parts of US-made B-61 nuclear bomb [illustrativepurpose only; no relation to story]. Photo: Courtesy
Iran's foreign policy has traditionally been marked by caution. Its apparent opting for a turnkey nuclear posture instead of rushing headlong to build a bomb in itself indicates as much. Despite the bloodcurdling declarations emanating these days from Teheran, the Iranians are keenly aware that by acquiring nuclear armaments they will automatically become the target of their enemies' nuclear weapons.
On the face of it these seems like valid points. But a closer examination of recent history suggests that when it comes to strategic deterrence, Iran's record is much murkier. First, Iran has continuously demonstrated that it was not deterred by various warnings and sanctions, and instead continued to pursue its nuclear weapons program.
Even the 2007 CIA National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) which claimed Iran suspended its nuclear program in 2003, because of "increasing international scrutiny and pressure," in effect qualified its judgment to only one aspect of the Iranian program: the construction of nuclear warheads. And, the NIE expressed only "moderate" confidence that the suspension has not been lifted already.
WHILE MUAMMAR GADDAFI of Libya was so unnerved by the US invasion of Iraq that he agreed to dismantle his country's entire weapons of mass destruction program, Iran continues to discount stern and increasingly overt warnings. As recently as 2007, in a display widely seen as sending a strong signal to Teheran, Israel launched an air strike that reportedly destroyed a Syrian nuclear reactor under construction. Yet Iran remained undeterred.
Similarly in 2006, during the Second Lebanon War, Teheran could not have known what would be Israel's response to Hizbullah firing thousands of rockets, many of which were produced and delivered by Iran, at its cities. For example, Israel could have chosen to launch a full-scale invasion of Lebanon to destroy Hizbullah's rocket arsenal or even opt to confront Iran itself in retaliation.
The closer Iran gets to the bomb and the clearer it becomes that the international community is unable or unwilling to stop it, the more frequent the argument is made that Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons may prove uneventful. There is no evidence to suggest Iran will behave in any but a responsible manner and accede to the unwritten rules of strategic deterrence, it is said.
Parts of US-made B-61 nuclear bomb [illustrativepurpose only; no relation to story]. Photo: Courtesy
Iran's foreign policy has traditionally been marked by caution. Its apparent opting for a turnkey nuclear posture instead of rushing headlong to build a bomb in itself indicates as much. Despite the bloodcurdling declarations emanating these days from Teheran, the Iranians are keenly aware that by acquiring nuclear armaments they will automatically become the target of their enemies' nuclear weapons.
On the face of it these seems like valid points. But a closer examination of recent history suggests that when it comes to strategic deterrence, Iran's record is much murkier. First, Iran has continuously demonstrated that it was not deterred by various warnings and sanctions, and instead continued to pursue its nuclear weapons program.
Even the 2007 CIA National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) which claimed Iran suspended its nuclear program in 2003, because of "increasing international scrutiny and pressure," in effect qualified its judgment to only one aspect of the Iranian program: the construction of nuclear warheads. And, the NIE expressed only "moderate" confidence that the suspension has not been lifted already.
WHILE MUAMMAR GADDAFI of Libya was so unnerved by the US invasion of Iraq that he agreed to dismantle his country's entire weapons of mass destruction program, Iran continues to discount stern and increasingly overt warnings. As recently as 2007, in a display widely seen as sending a strong signal to Teheran, Israel launched an air strike that reportedly destroyed a Syrian nuclear reactor under construction. Yet Iran remained undeterred.
Similarly in 2006, during the Second Lebanon War, Teheran could not have known what would be Israel's response to Hizbullah firing thousands of rockets, many of which were produced and delivered by Iran, at its cities. For example, Israel could have chosen to launch a full-scale invasion of Lebanon to destroy Hizbullah's rocket arsenal or even opt to confront Iran itself in retaliation.
The closer Iran gets to the bomb and the clearer it becomes that the international community is unable or unwilling to stop it, the more frequent the argument is made that Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons may prove uneventful. There is no evidence to suggest Iran will behave in any but a responsible manner and accede to the unwritten rules of strategic deterrence, it is said.
Parts of US-made B-61 nuclear bomb [illustrativepurpose only; no relation to story]. Photo: Courtesy
Iran's foreign policy has traditionally been marked by caution. Its apparent opting for a turnkey nuclear posture instead of rushing headlong to build a bomb in itself indicates as much. Despite the bloodcurdling declarations emanating these days from Teheran, the Iranians are keenly aware that by acquiring nuclear armaments they will automatically become the target of their enemies' nuclear weapons.
On the face of it these seems like valid points. But a closer examination of recent history suggests that when it comes to strategic deterrence, Iran's record is much murkier. First, Iran has continuously demonstrated that it was not deterred by various warnings and sanctions, and instead continued to pursue its nuclear weapons program.
Even the 2007 CIA National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) which claimed Iran suspended its nuclear program in 2003, because of "increasing international scrutiny and pressure," in effect qualified its judgment to only one aspect of the Iranian program: the construction of nuclear warheads. And, the NIE expressed only "moderate" confidence that the suspension has not been lifted already.
WHILE MUAMMAR GADDAFI of Libya was so unnerved by the US invasion of Iraq that he agreed to dismantle his country's entire weapons of mass destruction program, Iran continues to discount stern and increasingly overt warnings. As recently as 2007, in a display widely seen as sending a strong signal to Teheran, Israel launched an air strike that reportedly destroyed a Syrian nuclear reactor under construction. Yet Iran remained undeterred.
Similarly in 2006, during the Second Lebanon War, Teheran could not have known what would be Israel's response to Hizbullah firing thousands of rockets, many of which were produced and delivered by Iran, at its cities. For example, Israel could have chosen to launch a full-scale invasion of Lebanon to destroy Hizbullah's rocket arsenal or even opt to confront Iran itself in retaliation.
The closer Iran gets to the bomb and the clearer it becomes that the international community is unable or unwilling to stop it, the more frequent the argument is made that Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons may prove uneventful. There is no evidence to suggest Iran will behave in any but a responsible manner and accede to the unwritten rules of strategic deterrence, it is said.
Parts of US-made B-61 nuclear bomb [illustrativepurpose only; no relation to story]. Photo: Courtesy
Iran's foreign policy has traditionally been marked by caution. Its apparent opting for a turnkey nuclear posture instead of rushing headlong to build a bomb in itself indicates as much. Despite the bloodcurdling declarations emanating these days from Teheran, the Iranians are keenly aware that by acquiring nuclear armaments they will automatically become the target of their enemies' nuclear weapons.
On the face of it these seems like valid points. But a closer examination of recent history suggests that when it comes to strategic deterrence, Iran's record is much murkier. First, Iran has continuously demonstrated that it was not deterred by various warnings and sanctions, and instead continued to pursue its nuclear weapons program.
Even the 2007 CIA National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) which claimed Iran suspended its nuclear program in 2003, because of "increasing international scrutiny and pressure," in effect qualified its judgment to only one aspect of the Iranian program: the construction of nuclear warheads. And, the NIE expressed only "moderate" confidence that the suspension has not been lifted already.
WHILE MUAMMAR GADDAFI of Libya was so unnerved by the US invasion of Iraq that he agreed to dismantle his country's entire weapons of mass destruction program, Iran continues to discount stern and increasingly overt warnings. As recently as 2007, in a display widely seen as sending a strong signal to Teheran, Israel launched an air strike that reportedly destroyed a Syrian nuclear reactor under construction. Yet Iran remained undeterred.
Similarly in 2006, during the Second Lebanon War, Teheran could not have known what would be Israel's response to Hizbullah firing thousands of rockets, many of which were produced and delivered by Iran, at its cities. For example, Israel could have chosen to launch a full-scale invasion of Lebanon to destroy Hizbullah's rocket arsenal or even opt to confront Iran itself in retaliation.
The closer Iran gets to the bomb and the clearer it becomes that the international community is unable or unwilling to stop it, the more frequent the argument is made that Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons may prove uneventful. There is no evidence to suggest Iran will behave in any but a responsible manner and accede to the unwritten rules of strategic deterrence, it is said.
Parts of US-made B-61 nuclear bomb [illustrativepurpose only; no relation to story]. Photo: Courtesy
Iran's foreign policy has traditionally been marked by caution. Its apparent opting for a turnkey nuclear posture instead of rushing headlong to build a bomb in itself indicates as much. Despite the bloodcurdling declarations emanating these days from Teheran, the Iranians are keenly aware that by acquiring nuclear armaments they will automatically become the target of their enemies' nuclear weapons.
On the face of it these seems like valid points. But a closer examination of recent history suggests that when it comes to strategic deterrence, Iran's record is much murkier. First, Iran has continuously demonstrated that it was not deterred by various warnings and sanctions, and instead continued to pursue its nuclear weapons program.
Even the 2007 CIA National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) which claimed Iran suspended its nuclear program in 2003, because of "increasing international scrutiny and pressure," in effect qualified its judgment to only one aspect of the Iranian program: the construction of nuclear warheads. And, the NIE expressed only "moderate" confidence that the suspension has not been lifted already.
WHILE MUAMMAR GADDAFI of Libya was so unnerved by the US invasion of Iraq that he agreed to dismantle his country's entire weapons of mass destruction program, Iran continues to discount stern and increasingly overt warnings. As recently as 2007, in a display widely seen as sending a strong signal to Teheran, Israel launched an air strike that reportedly destroyed a Syrian nuclear reactor under construction. Yet Iran remained undeterred.
Similarly in 2006, during the Second Lebanon War, Teheran could not have known what would be Israel's response to Hizbullah firing thousands of rockets, many of which were produced and delivered by Iran, at its cities. For example, Israel could have chosen to launch a full-scale invasion of Lebanon to destroy Hizbullah's rocket arsenal or even opt to confront Iran itself in retaliation.
The closer Iran gets to the bomb and the clearer it becomes that the international community is unable or unwilling to stop it, the more frequent the argument is made that Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons may prove uneventful. There is no evidence to suggest Iran will behave in any but a responsible manner and accede to the unwritten rules of strategic deterrence, it is said.
Parts of US-made B-61 nuclear bomb [illustrativepurpose only; no relation to story]. Photo: Courtesy
Iran's foreign policy has traditionally been marked by caution. Its apparent opting for a turnkey nuclear posture instead of rushing headlong to build a bomb in itself indicates as much. Despite the bloodcurdling declarations emanating these days from Teheran, the Iranians are keenly aware that by acquiring nuclear armaments they will automatically become the target of their enemies' nuclear weapons.
On the face of it these seems like valid points. But a closer examination of recent history suggests that when it comes to strategic deterrence, Iran's record is much murkier. First, Iran has continuously demonstrated that it was not deterred by various warnings and sanctions, and instead continued to pursue its nuclear weapons program.
Even the 2007 CIA National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) which claimed Iran suspended its nuclear program in 2003, because of "increasing international scrutiny and pressure," in effect qualified its judgment to only one aspect of the Iranian program: the construction of nuclear warheads. And, the NIE expressed only "moderate" confidence that the suspension has not been lifted already.
WHILE MUAMMAR GADDAFI of Libya was so unnerved by the US invasion of Iraq that he agreed to dismantle his country's entire weapons of mass destruction program, Iran continues to discount stern and increasingly overt warnings. As recently as 2007, in a display widely seen as sending a strong signal to Teheran, Israel launched an air strike that reportedly destroyed a Syrian nuclear reactor under construction. Yet Iran remained undeterred.
Similarly in 2006, during the Second Lebanon War, Teheran could not have known what would be Israel's response to Hizbullah firing thousands of rockets, many of which were produced and delivered by Iran, at its cities. For example, Israel could have chosen to launch a full-scale invasion of Lebanon to destroy Hizbullah's rocket arsenal or even opt to confront Iran itself in retaliation.
The closer Iran gets to the bomb and the clearer it becomes that the international community is unable or unwilling to stop it, the more frequent the argument is made that Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons may prove uneventful. There is no evidence to suggest Iran will behave in any but a responsible manner and accede to the unwritten rules of strategic deterrence, it is said.
Parts of US-made B-61 nuclear bomb [illustrativepurpose only; no relation to story]. Photo: Courtesy
Iran's foreign policy has traditionally been marked by caution. Its apparent opting for a turnkey nuclear posture instead of rushing headlong to build a bomb in itself indicates as much. Despite the bloodcurdling declarations emanating these days from Teheran, the Iranians are keenly aware that by acquiring nuclear armaments they will automatically become the target of their enemies' nuclear weapons.
On the face of it these seems like valid points. But a closer examination of recent history suggests that when it comes to strategic deterrence, Iran's record is much murkier. First, Iran has continuously demonstrated that it was not deterred by various warnings and sanctions, and instead continued to pursue its nuclear weapons program.
Even the 2007 CIA National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) which claimed Iran suspended its nuclear program in 2003, because of "increasing international scrutiny and pressure," in effect qualified its judgment to only one aspect of the Iranian program: the construction of nuclear warheads. And, the NIE expressed only "moderate" confidence that the suspension has not been lifted already.
WHILE MUAMMAR GADDAFI of Libya was so unnerved by the US invasion of Iraq that he agreed to dismantle his country's entire weapons of mass destruction program, Iran continues to discount stern and increasingly overt warnings. As recently as 2007, in a display widely seen as sending a strong signal to Teheran, Israel launched an air strike that reportedly destroyed a Syrian nuclear reactor under construction. Yet Iran remained undeterred.
Similarly in 2006, during the Second Lebanon War, Teheran could not have known what would be Israel's response to Hizbullah firing thousands of rockets, many of which were produced and delivered by Iran, at its cities. For example, Israel could have chosen to launch a full-scale invasion of Lebanon to destroy Hizbullah's rocket arsenal or even opt to confront Iran itself in retaliation.
The closer Iran gets to the bomb and the clearer it becomes that the international community is unable or unwilling to stop it, the more frequent the argument is made that Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons may prove uneventful. There is no evidence to suggest Iran will behave in any but a responsible manner and accede to the unwritten rules of strategic deterrence, it is said.
Parts of US-made B-61 nuclear bomb [illustrativepurpose only; no relation to story]. Photo: Courtesy
Iran's foreign policy has traditionally been marked by caution. Its apparent opting for a turnkey nuclear posture instead of rushing headlong to build a bomb in itself indicates as much. Despite the bloodcurdling declarations emanating these days from Teheran, the Iranians are keenly aware that by acquiring nuclear armaments they will automatically become the target of their enemies' nuclear weapons.
On the face of it these seems like valid points. But a closer examination of recent history suggests that when it comes to strategic deterrence, Iran's record is much murkier. First, Iran has continuously demonstrated that it was not deterred by various warnings and sanctions, and instead continued to pursue its nuclear weapons program.
Even the 2007 CIA National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) which claimed Iran suspended its nuclear program in 2003, because of "increasing international scrutiny and pressure," in effect qualified its judgment to only one aspect of the Iranian program: the construction of nuclear warheads. And, the NIE expressed only "moderate" confidence that the suspension has not been lifted already.
WHILE MUAMMAR GADDAFI of Libya was so unnerved by the US invasion of Iraq that he agreed to dismantle his country's entire weapons of mass destruction program, Iran continues to discount stern and increasingly overt warnings. As recently as 2007, in a display widely seen as sending a strong signal to Teheran, Israel launched an air strike that reportedly destroyed a Syrian nuclear reactor under construction. Yet Iran remained undeterred.
Similarly in 2006, during the Second Lebanon War, Teheran could not have known what would be Israel's response to Hizbullah firing thousands of rockets, many of which were produced and delivered by Iran, at its cities. For example, Israel could have chosen to launch a full-scale invasion of Lebanon to destroy Hizbullah's rocket arsenal or even opt to confront Iran itself in retaliation.
The closer Iran gets to the bomb and the clearer it becomes that the international community is unable or unwilling to stop it, the more frequent the argument is made that Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons may prove uneventful. There is no evidence to suggest Iran will behave in any but a responsible manner and accede to the unwritten rules of strategic deterrence, it is said.
Parts of US-made B-61 nuclear bomb [illustrativepurpose only; no relation to story]. Photo: Courtesy
Iran's foreign policy has traditionally been marked by caution. Its apparent opting for a turnkey nuclear posture instead of rushing headlong to build a bomb in itself indicates as much. Despite the bloodcurdling declarations emanating these days from Teheran, the Iranians are keenly aware that by acquiring nuclear armaments they will automatically become the target of their enemies' nuclear weapons.
On the face of it these seems like valid points. But a closer examination of recent history suggests that when it comes to strategic deterrence, Iran's record is much murkier. First, Iran has continuously demonstrated that it was not deterred by various warnings and sanctions, and instead continued to pursue its nuclear weapons program.
Even the 2007 CIA National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) which claimed Iran suspended its nuclear program in 2003, because of "increasing international scrutiny and pressure," in effect qualified its judgment to only one aspect of the Iranian program: the construction of nuclear warheads. And, the NIE expressed only "moderate" confidence that the suspension has not been lifted already.
WHILE MUAMMAR GADDAFI of Libya was so unnerved by the US invasion of Iraq that he agreed to dismantle his country's entire weapons of mass destruction program, Iran continues to discount stern and increasingly overt warnings. As recently as 2007, in a display widely seen as sending a strong signal to Teheran, Israel launched an air strike that reportedly destroyed a Syrian nuclear reactor under construction. Yet Iran remained undeterred.
Similarly in 2006, during the Second Lebanon War, Teheran could not have known what would be Israel's response to Hizbullah firing thousands of rockets, many of which were produced and delivered by Iran, at its cities. For example, Israel could have chosen to launch a full-scale invasion of Lebanon to destroy Hizbullah's rocket arsenal or even opt to confront Iran itself in retaliation.
The closer Iran gets to the bomb and the clearer it becomes that the international community is unable or unwilling to stop it, the more frequent the argument is made that Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons may prove uneventful. There is no evidence to suggest Iran will behave in any but a responsible manner and accede to the unwritten rules of strategic deterrence, it is said.
Parts of US-made B-61 nuclear bomb [illustrativepurpose only; no relation to story]. Photo: Courtesy
Iran's foreign policy has traditionally been marked by caution. Its apparent opting for a turnkey nuclear posture instead of rushing headlong to build a bomb in itself indicates as much. Despite the bloodcurdling declarations emanating these days from Teheran, the Iranians are keenly aware that by acquiring nuclear armaments they will automatically become the target of their enemies' nuclear weapons.
On the face of it these seems like valid points. But a closer examination of recent history suggests that when it comes to strategic deterrence, Iran's record is much murkier. First, Iran has continuously demonstrated that it was not deterred by various warnings and sanctions, and instead continued to pursue its nuclear weapons program.
Even the 2007 CIA National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) which claimed Iran suspended its nuclear program in 2003, because of "increasing international scrutiny and pressure," in effect qualified its judgment to only one aspect of the Iranian program: the construction of nuclear warheads. And, the NIE expressed only "moderate" confidence that the suspension has not been lifted already.
WHILE MUAMMAR GADDAFI of Libya was so unnerved by the US invasion of Iraq that he agreed to dismantle his country's entire weapons of mass destruction program, Iran continues to discount stern and increasingly overt warnings. As recently as 2007, in a display widely seen as sending a strong signal to Teheran, Israel launched an air strike that reportedly destroyed a Syrian nuclear reactor under construction. Yet Iran remained undeterred.
Similarly in 2006, during the Second Lebanon War, Teheran could not have known what would be Israel's response to Hizbullah firing thousands of rockets, many of which were produced and delivered by Iran, at its cities. For example, Israel could have chosen to launch a full-scale invasion of Lebanon to destroy Hizbullah's rocket arsenal or even opt to confront Iran itself in retaliation.
The closer Iran gets to the bomb and the clearer it becomes that the international community is unable or unwilling to stop it, the more frequent the argument is made that Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons may prove uneventful. There is no evidence to suggest Iran will behave in any but a responsible manner and accede to the unwritten rules of strategic deterrence, it is said.
Parts of US-made B-61 nuclear bomb [illustrativepurpose only; no relation to story]. Photo: Courtesy
Iran's foreign policy has traditionally been marked by caution. Its apparent opting for a turnkey nuclear posture instead of rushing headlong to build a bomb in itself indicates as much. Despite the bloodcurdling declarations emanating these days from Teheran, the Iranians are keenly aware that by acquiring nuclear armaments they will automatically become the target of their enemies' nuclear weapons.
On the face of it these seems like valid points. But a closer examination of recent history suggests that when it comes to strategic deterrence, Iran's record is much murkier. First, Iran has continuously demonstrated that it was not deterred by various warnings and sanctions, and instead continued to pursue its nuclear weapons program.
Even the 2007 CIA National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) which claimed Iran suspended its nuclear program in 2003, because of "increasing international scrutiny and pressure," in effect qualified its judgment to only one aspect of the Iranian program: the construction of nuclear warheads. And, the NIE expressed only "moderate" confidence that the suspension has not been lifted already.
WHILE MUAMMAR GADDAFI of Libya was so unnerved by the US invasion of Iraq that he agreed to dismantle his country's entire weapons of mass destruction program, Iran continues to discount stern and increasingly overt warnings. As recently as 2007, in a display widely seen as sending a strong signal to Teheran, Israel launched an air strike that reportedly destroyed a Syrian nuclear reactor under construction. Yet Iran remained undeterred.
Similarly in 2006, during the Second Lebanon War, Teheran could not have known what would be Israel's response to Hizbullah firing thousands of rockets, many of which were produced and delivered by Iran, at its cities. For example, Israel could have chosen to launch a full-scale invasion of Lebanon to destroy Hizbullah's rocket arsenal or even opt to confront Iran itself in retaliation.
The closer Iran gets to the bomb and the clearer it becomes that the international community is unable or unwilling to stop it, the more frequent the argument is made that Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons may prove uneventful. There is no evidence to suggest Iran will behave in any but a responsible manner and accede to the unwritten rules of strategic deterrence, it is said.
Parts of US-made B-61 nuclear bomb [illustrativepurpose only; no relation to story]. Photo: Courtesy
Iran's foreign policy has traditionally been marked by caution. Its apparent opting for a turnkey nuclear posture instead of rushing headlong to build a bomb in itself indicates as much. Despite the bloodcurdling declarations emanating these days from Teheran, the Iranians are keenly aware that by acquiring nuclear armaments they will automatically become the target of their enemies' nuclear weapons.
On the face of it these seems like valid points. But a closer examination of recent history suggests that when it comes to strategic deterrence, Iran's record is much murkier. First, Iran has continuously demonstrated that it was not deterred by various warnings and sanctions, and instead continued to pursue its nuclear weapons program.
Even the 2007 CIA National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) which claimed Iran suspended its nuclear program in 2003, because of "increasing international scrutiny and pressure," in effect qualified its judgment to only one aspect of the Iranian program: the construction of nuclear warheads. And, the NIE expressed only "moderate" confidence that the suspension has not been lifted already.
WHILE MUAMMAR GADDAFI of Libya was so unnerved by the US invasion of Iraq that he agreed to dismantle his country's entire weapons of mass destruction program, Iran continues to discount stern and increasingly overt warnings. As recently as 2007, in a display widely seen as sending a strong signal to Teheran, Israel launched an air strike that reportedly destroyed a Syrian nuclear reactor under construction. Yet Iran remained undeterred.
Similarly in 2006, during the Second Lebanon War, Teheran could not have known what would be Israel's response to Hizbullah firing thousands of rockets, many of which were produced and delivered by Iran, at its cities. For example, Israel could have chosen to launch a full-scale invasion of Lebanon to destroy Hizbullah's rocket arsenal or even opt to confront Iran itself in retaliation.
The closer Iran gets to the bomb and the clearer it becomes that the international community is unable or unwilling to stop it, the more frequent the argument is made that Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons may prove uneventful. There is no evidence to suggest Iran will behave in any but a responsible manner and accede to the unwritten rules of strategic deterrence, it is said.
Parts of US-made B-61 nuclear bomb [illustrativepurpose only; no relation to story]. Photo: Courtesy
Iran's foreign policy has traditionally been marked by caution. Its apparent opting for a turnkey nuclear posture instead of rushing headlong to build a bomb in itself indicates as much. Despite the bloodcurdling declarations emanating these days from Teheran, the Iranians are keenly aware that by acquiring nuclear armaments they will automatically become the target of their enemies' nuclear weapons.
On the face of it these seems like valid points. But a closer examination of recent history suggests that when it comes to strategic deterrence, Iran's record is much murkier. First, Iran has continuously demonstrated that it was not deterred by various warnings and sanctions, and instead continued to pursue its nuclear weapons program.
Even the 2007 CIA National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) which claimed Iran suspended its nuclear program in 2003, because of "increasing international scrutiny and pressure," in effect qualified its judgment to only one aspect of the Iranian program: the construction of nuclear warheads. And, the NIE expressed only "moderate" confidence that the suspension has not been lifted already.
WHILE MUAMMAR GADDAFI of Libya was so unnerved by the US invasion of Iraq that he agreed to dismantle his country's entire weapons of mass destruction program, Iran continues to discount stern and increasingly overt warnings. As recently as 2007, in a display widely seen as sending a strong signal to Teheran, Israel launched an air strike that reportedly destroyed a Syrian nuclear reactor under construction. Yet Iran remained undeterred.
Similarly in 2006, during the Second Lebanon War, Teheran could not have known what would be Israel's response to Hizbullah firing thousands of rockets, many of which were produced and delivered by Iran, at its cities. For example, Israel could have chosen to launch a full-scale invasion of Lebanon to destroy Hizbullah's rocket arsenal or even opt to confront Iran itself in retaliation.
The closer Iran gets to the bomb and the clearer it becomes that the international community is unable or unwilling to stop it, the more frequent the argument is made that Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons may prove uneventful. There is no evidence to suggest Iran will behave in any but a responsible manner and accede to the unwritten rules of strategic deterrence, it is said.
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