Now that U.S. President Barack Obama has accepted Chinese President Hu Jintao’s offer to visit China later this year, there is a huge opportunity for the two countries—both top emitters of greenhouse gases—to collaborate on reducing energy consumption. While China has so far rejected any quantified carbon emission reduction caps, there is perhaps another more pragmatic and cost-saving dialogue that could be opened: building green and retrofitting wasteful construction. After all, buildings contribute about a third of the world’s carbon emissions. Pushing builders to be more energy efficient can make a serious impact on global warming. This is cheap, low-hanging fruit that the U.S. and China would be foolish not to pick.
Yet a joint effort between the U.S. and China is only half the solution. It is equally important to standardize urban planning policies and win public support for green construction within individual countries. In the Chinese one-party state, this reality may be slower to come by than in the U.S., as Beijing must find ways to address rising energy shortages and environmental concerns without hindering rapid economic development or upsetting political stability—a stability that is very much intertwined with the health of the economy. Energy price distortions, a lack of national building energy standards, pressure for fast building turnover, relatively lower expertise and fewer experienced engineers in China as compared to developed countries—these are a few of the dilemmas the nation must overcome before it can successfully mount a green buildings revolution and be considered a true global leader on issues of energy and climate.
In China, green architecture seems to be an imminent reality. The central government, anxious about the worsening energy shortages, sees energy efficient buildings as a cost effective way to ease energy consumption while elevating China’s role as a clean energy leader. Last year, the nation spent 45% of its total energy expenditure on constructing and maintaining buildings alone. The state-run People’s Daily noted that if China were to retrofit all of its existing buildings, it would save 150 million tons of standard coal annually or the equivalent of four Three Gorges Dam projects. President Hu is also very much aware of the enormous market potential for green buildings. A recent report from the World Green Building Council and McGraw-Hill Construction predicts that Asia will play host to the fastest growing green buildings industry in the coming years, with energy service companies (ESCOS) making up to 73% of the market by 2013.
By issuing an ambitious five-year plan (2006-2010) mandating up to 65% energy savings from buildings in large cities like Beijing and Shanghai, the central government is hoping that development of a new green buildings sector will contribute to 40% of the total energy-saving targets for the period. Banners with slogans like “Build a more conservation-minded society” are displayed prominently in urban centers while construction of more than a few eco-cities reflects how important energy issues figure on the government agenda. Other highly politicized projects of course include the infamous 160-acre Beijing Olympic Village, which uses cutting edge solar photovoltaic power among other technologies for efficient lighting, heating and cooling. These internationally gold-certified LEED (Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design) structures, coupled with government mandates and eco-town plans, seem to show that China is taking more progressive-minded steps than the U.S. to address energy use.
Yet a closer look reveals that these projects, though remarkably environmentally conscious, hardly reflect the state of the green buildings industry in China. Despite the environmentally mindful rhetoric the government disseminates, the Chinese green buildings movement is still largely composed of privately funded independent projects and pilot projects made possible by contributions from international financial institutions like the World Bank, Asia Development Bank, and policy think tanks like the Natural Resources Defense Council. Without these NGOs, many of the most media-prominent public buildings, such as those in the Olympic Village, would not exist. Unfortunately, these demonstration projects have failed to spur the buildings market to adopt similar efficiency standards largely because there is a lack of incentives to do so.
The profitability of greening buildings on a mass scale is a tough sell. Because the Chinese central government subsidizes forms of energy like electricity and gas, retrofitting and building green is not perceived as dramatically cost-saving. Rapid development schedules also mean less patience for careful green design and less time to wait for the building to recoup first costs, despite studies which show the overall life-cycle costs from sustainable structures are far less than their conventional counterparts. As such, retrofits are generally restricted to an individual building-by-building basis under developers with enough capital or enough media publicity to attract funding for projects. In one case, almost every bank refused to lend capital to Sohota Electric, an energy savings company in Zhuhai, Guangdong, to complete retrofitting work, even when its client was the official state television station, CCTV.
Furthermore, building design and construction often occur independently and simultaneously, leaving little room for meaningful green design analysis to take place. But even with an integrated approach, the process is complicated by the relative scarcity of certified energy efficiency experts, consultants and managers in China as compared to other developed countries. This lack of expertise also translates into slightly higher startup costs and longer construction timelines.
To overcome these barriers, the Chinese government must be willing to back comprehensive changes to current market, bureaucratic and construction practices to encourage sustainable building. But to do so without upsetting economic stability or jeopardizing the ruling government’s power will require time—time that is quickly running out. So far, the central government has done little to correct energy price distortions due mainly to the highly unpopular nature of eliminating subsidies. Despite the global financial crisis, President Hu announced that China will, for the fifth year in a row, target an 8% growth rate. This attitude of privileging aggressive economic growth may very well favor fast construction over careful sustainable design. The country’s aggressive moves to purchase oil fields in parts of Africa and most recently in Kazakhstan do not seem to be signs of a leadership completely confident in the forthcoming efficacy of their clean energy campaigns.
In short, there is a lack of true comprehensive national energy performance standards, not to mention a dearth of monitoring mechanisms to verify and enforce these standards for green building design. Construction of eco-cities like Dongtan Eco-city on Chongming Island have stagnated due to poor planning that did not take into consideration the needs of local residents, while miscommunication among foreign investors and firms that had little understanding of Chinese building procedures and politics resulted in shoddy project oversight. Moreover, lack of standardized green building codes makes it impossible for developers to invest in truly sustainable buildings and not just falsely advertised “green” structures, many of which fail international eco-benchmarks.
Beijing’s lofty environmental goals and national eco-campaigns are good in the sense that they promote public consciousness of the energy crisis and the need for sustainable solutions. But China must begin to enact hard policies, for example, standardizing the various green building codes in existence and giving special regional attention to others if they want real energy savings and not just a tangle of uncoordinated efforts that result in unfinished projects. Once basic enforceable and standards are achieved, the momentum of transforming the buildings landscape will snowball exponentially, allowing architects, developers, construction companies, building residents and energy management personnel to communicate and collaborate on maximum energy savings practices. The government can subsidize trainings for green energy expertise, which will lower start-up building costs, and find ways to work with business leaders to develop more financial incentives to build green.
If China is truly committed to becoming a leader on energy security and climate change, we will soon see sweeping policy decisions that fix the structural problems currently preventing the green building industry from flourishing. If Beijing is truly committed, we will see willingness from the leadership to swap short term economic growth in return for the long term economic growth that can be achieved from investing in energy savings. Such monetary profit will be fungible, translating into higher national security, healthy trade relations and improved social stability. Cultivating strong bilateral ties on any issue with any country begins with a robust set of national policies at home. A partnership with the U.S. that aims to build eco-friendly structures on a grand scale will mean nothing if China cannot deliver on the domestic front. In a sense, this low hanging fruit of opportunity is a barometer for how the Chinese government can deliver on energy security promises if in a partnership with the U.S. To squander such a chance would be a shame.
Ariane Wu is the New Media Fellow at the Asia Society’s Center on U.S.-China Relations. For a related video, “Energy Retrofitting: The Story of Sohota,” go to http://www.asiasociety.org/chinagreen/energy-efficiency-sohota/
Comment:
Now that U.S. President Barack Obama has accepted Chinese President Hu Jintao’s offer to visit China later this year, there is a huge opportunity for the two countries—both top emitters of greenhouse gases—to collaborate on reducing energy consumption. While China has so far rejected any quantified carbon emission reduction caps, there is perhaps another more pragmatic and cost-saving dialogue that could be opened: building green and retrofitting wasteful construction. After all, buildings contribute about a third of the world’s carbon emissions. Pushing builders to be more energy efficient can make a serious impact on global warming. This is cheap, low-hanging fruit that the U.S. and China would be foolish not to pick.
Yet a joint effort between the U.S. and China is only half the solution. It is equally important to standardize urban planning policies and win public support for green construction within individual countries. In the Chinese one-party state, this reality may be slower to come by than in the U.S., as Beijing must find ways to address rising energy shortages and environmental concerns without hindering rapid economic development or upsetting political stability—a stability that is very much intertwined with the health of the economy. Energy price distortions, a lack of national building energy standards, pressure for fast building turnover, relatively lower expertise and fewer experienced engineers in China as compared to developed countries—these are a few of the dilemmas the nation must overcome before it can successfully mount a green buildings revolution and be considered a true global leader on issues of energy and climate.
In China, green architecture seems to be an imminent reality. The central government, anxious about the worsening energy shortages, sees energy efficient buildings as a cost effective way to ease energy consumption while elevating China’s role as a clean energy leader. Last year, the nation spent 45% of its total energy expenditure on constructing and maintaining buildings alone. The state-run People’s Daily noted that if China were to retrofit all of its existing buildings, it would save 150 million tons of standard coal annually or the equivalent of four Three Gorges Dam projects. President Hu is also very much aware of the enormous market potential for green buildings. A recent report from the World Green Building Council and McGraw-Hill Construction predicts that Asia will play host to the fastest growing green buildings industry in the coming years, with energy service companies (ESCOS) making up to 73% of the market by 2013.
By issuing an ambitious five-year plan (2006-2010) mandating up to 65% energy savings from buildings in large cities like Beijing and Shanghai, the central government is hoping that development of a new green buildings sector will contribute to 40% of the total energy-saving targets for the period. Banners with slogans like “Build a more conservation-minded society” are displayed prominently in urban centers while construction of more than a few eco-cities reflects how important energy issues figure on the government agenda. Other highly politicized projects of course include the infamous 160-acre Beijing Olympic Village, which uses cutting edge solar photovoltaic power among other technologies for efficient lighting, heating and cooling. These internationally gold-certified LEED (Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design) structures, coupled with government mandates and eco-town plans, seem to show that China is taking more progressive-minded steps than the U.S. to address energy use.
Yet a closer look reveals that these projects, though remarkably environmentally conscious, hardly reflect the state of the green buildings industry in China. Despite the environmentally mindful rhetoric the government disseminates, the Chinese green buildings movement is still largely composed of privately funded independent projects and pilot projects made possible by contributions from international financial institutions like the World Bank, Asia Development Bank, and policy think tanks like the Natural Resources Defense Council. Without these NGOs, many of the most media-prominent public buildings, such as those in the Olympic Village, would not exist. Unfortunately, these demonstration projects have failed to spur the buildings market to adopt similar efficiency standards largely because there is a lack of incentives to do so.
The profitability of greening buildings on a mass scale is a tough sell. Because the Chinese central government subsidizes forms of energy like electricity and gas, retrofitting and building green is not perceived as dramatically cost-saving. Rapid development schedules also mean less patience for careful green design and less time to wait for the building to recoup first costs, despite studies which show the overall life-cycle costs from sustainable structures are far less than their conventional counterparts. As such, retrofits are generally restricted to an individual building-by-building basis under developers with enough capital or enough media publicity to attract funding for projects. In one case, almost every bank refused to lend capital to Sohota Electric, an energy savings company in Zhuhai, Guangdong, to complete retrofitting work, even when its client was the official state television station, CCTV.
Furthermore, building design and construction often occur independently and simultaneously, leaving little room for meaningful green design analysis to take place. But even with an integrated approach, the process is complicated by the relative scarcity of certified energy efficiency experts, consultants and managers in China as compared to other developed countries. This lack of expertise also translates into slightly higher startup costs and longer construction timelines.
To overcome these barriers, the Chinese government must be willing to back comprehensive changes to current market, bureaucratic and construction practices to encourage sustainable building. But to do so without upsetting economic stability or jeopardizing the ruling government’s power will require time—time that is quickly running out. So far, the central government has done little to correct energy price distortions due mainly to the highly unpopular nature of eliminating subsidies. Despite the global financial crisis, President Hu announced that China will, for the fifth year in a row, target an 8% growth rate. This attitude of privileging aggressive economic growth may very well favor fast construction over careful sustainable design. The country’s aggressive moves to purchase oil fields in parts of Africa and most recently in Kazakhstan do not seem to be signs of a leadership completely confident in the forthcoming efficacy of their clean energy campaigns.
In short, there is a lack of true comprehensive national energy performance standards, not to mention a dearth of monitoring mechanisms to verify and enforce these standards for green building design. Construction of eco-cities like Dongtan Eco-city on Chongming Island have stagnated due to poor planning that did not take into consideration the needs of local residents, while miscommunication among foreign investors and firms that had little understanding of Chinese building procedures and politics resulted in shoddy project oversight. Moreover, lack of standardized green building codes makes it impossible for developers to invest in truly sustainable buildings and not just falsely advertised “green” structures, many of which fail international eco-benchmarks.
Beijing’s lofty environmental goals and national eco-campaigns are good in the sense that they promote public consciousness of the energy crisis and the need for sustainable solutions. But China must begin to enact hard policies, for example, standardizing the various green building codes in existence and giving special regional attention to others if they want real energy savings and not just a tangle of uncoordinated efforts that result in unfinished projects. Once basic enforceable and standards are achieved, the momentum of transforming the buildings landscape will snowball exponentially, allowing architects, developers, construction companies, building residents and energy management personnel to communicate and collaborate on maximum energy savings practices. The government can subsidize trainings for green energy expertise, which will lower start-up building costs, and find ways to work with business leaders to develop more financial incentives to build green.
If China is truly committed to becoming a leader on energy security and climate change, we will soon see sweeping policy decisions that fix the structural problems currently preventing the green building industry from flourishing. If Beijing is truly committed, we will see willingness from the leadership to swap short term economic growth in return for the long term economic growth that can be achieved from investing in energy savings. Such monetary profit will be fungible, translating into higher national security, healthy trade relations and improved social stability. Cultivating strong bilateral ties on any issue with any country begins with a robust set of national policies at home. A partnership with the U.S. that aims to build eco-friendly structures on a grand scale will mean nothing if China cannot deliver on the domestic front. In a sense, this low hanging fruit of opportunity is a barometer for how the Chinese government can deliver on energy security promises if in a partnership with the U.S. To squander such a chance would be a shame.
Ariane Wu is the New Media Fellow at the Asia Society’s Center on U.S.-China Relations. For a related video, “Energy Retrofitting: The Story of Sohota,” go to http://www.asiasociety.org/chinagreen/energy-efficiency-sohota/
Comment:
Now that U.S. President Barack Obama has accepted Chinese President Hu Jintao’s offer to visit China later this year, there is a huge opportunity for the two countries—both top emitters of greenhouse gases—to collaborate on reducing energy consumption. While China has so far rejected any quantified carbon emission reduction caps, there is perhaps another more pragmatic and cost-saving dialogue that could be opened: building green and retrofitting wasteful construction. After all, buildings contribute about a third of the world’s carbon emissions. Pushing builders to be more energy efficient can make a serious impact on global warming. This is cheap, low-hanging fruit that the U.S. and China would be foolish not to pick.
Yet a joint effort between the U.S. and China is only half the solution. It is equally important to standardize urban planning policies and win public support for green construction within individual countries. In the Chinese one-party state, this reality may be slower to come by than in the U.S., as Beijing must find ways to address rising energy shortages and environmental concerns without hindering rapid economic development or upsetting political stability—a stability that is very much intertwined with the health of the economy. Energy price distortions, a lack of national building energy standards, pressure for fast building turnover, relatively lower expertise and fewer experienced engineers in China as compared to developed countries—these are a few of the dilemmas the nation must overcome before it can successfully mount a green buildings revolution and be considered a true global leader on issues of energy and climate.
In China, green architecture seems to be an imminent reality. The central government, anxious about the worsening energy shortages, sees energy efficient buildings as a cost effective way to ease energy consumption while elevating China’s role as a clean energy leader. Last year, the nation spent 45% of its total energy expenditure on constructing and maintaining buildings alone. The state-run People’s Daily noted that if China were to retrofit all of its existing buildings, it would save 150 million tons of standard coal annually or the equivalent of four Three Gorges Dam projects. President Hu is also very much aware of the enormous market potential for green buildings. A recent report from the World Green Building Council and McGraw-Hill Construction predicts that Asia will play host to the fastest growing green buildings industry in the coming years, with energy service companies (ESCOS) making up to 73% of the market by 2013.
By issuing an ambitious five-year plan (2006-2010) mandating up to 65% energy savings from buildings in large cities like Beijing and Shanghai, the central government is hoping that development of a new green buildings sector will contribute to 40% of the total energy-saving targets for the period. Banners with slogans like “Build a more conservation-minded society” are displayed prominently in urban centers while construction of more than a few eco-cities reflects how important energy issues figure on the government agenda. Other highly politicized projects of course include the infamous 160-acre Beijing Olympic Village, which uses cutting edge solar photovoltaic power among other technologies for efficient lighting, heating and cooling. These internationally gold-certified LEED (Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design) structures, coupled with government mandates and eco-town plans, seem to show that China is taking more progressive-minded steps than the U.S. to address energy use.
Yet a closer look reveals that these projects, though remarkably environmentally conscious, hardly reflect the state of the green buildings industry in China. Despite the environmentally mindful rhetoric the government disseminates, the Chinese green buildings movement is still largely composed of privately funded independent projects and pilot projects made possible by contributions from international financial institutions like the World Bank, Asia Development Bank, and policy think tanks like the Natural Resources Defense Council. Without these NGOs, many of the most media-prominent public buildings, such as those in the Olympic Village, would not exist. Unfortunately, these demonstration projects have failed to spur the buildings market to adopt similar efficiency standards largely because there is a lack of incentives to do so.
The profitability of greening buildings on a mass scale is a tough sell. Because the Chinese central government subsidizes forms of energy like electricity and gas, retrofitting and building green is not perceived as dramatically cost-saving. Rapid development schedules also mean less patience for careful green design and less time to wait for the building to recoup first costs, despite studies which show the overall life-cycle costs from sustainable structures are far less than their conventional counterparts. As such, retrofits are generally restricted to an individual building-by-building basis under developers with enough capital or enough media publicity to attract funding for projects. In one case, almost every bank refused to lend capital to Sohota Electric, an energy savings company in Zhuhai, Guangdong, to complete retrofitting work, even when its client was the official state television station, CCTV.
Furthermore, building design and construction often occur independently and simultaneously, leaving little room for meaningful green design analysis to take place. But even with an integrated approach, the process is complicated by the relative scarcity of certified energy efficiency experts, consultants and managers in China as compared to other developed countries. This lack of expertise also translates into slightly higher startup costs and longer construction timelines.
To overcome these barriers, the Chinese government must be willing to back comprehensive changes to current market, bureaucratic and construction practices to encourage sustainable building. But to do so without upsetting economic stability or jeopardizing the ruling government’s power will require time—time that is quickly running out. So far, the central government has done little to correct energy price distortions due mainly to the highly unpopular nature of eliminating subsidies. Despite the global financial crisis, President Hu announced that China will, for the fifth year in a row, target an 8% growth rate. This attitude of privileging aggressive economic growth may very well favor fast construction over careful sustainable design. The country’s aggressive moves to purchase oil fields in parts of Africa and most recently in Kazakhstan do not seem to be signs of a leadership completely confident in the forthcoming efficacy of their clean energy campaigns.
In short, there is a lack of true comprehensive national energy performance standards, not to mention a dearth of monitoring mechanisms to verify and enforce these standards for green building design. Construction of eco-cities like Dongtan Eco-city on Chongming Island have stagnated due to poor planning that did not take into consideration the needs of local residents, while miscommunication among foreign investors and firms that had little understanding of Chinese building procedures and politics resulted in shoddy project oversight. Moreover, lack of standardized green building codes makes it impossible for developers to invest in truly sustainable buildings and not just falsely advertised “green” structures, many of which fail international eco-benchmarks.
Beijing’s lofty environmental goals and national eco-campaigns are good in the sense that they promote public consciousness of the energy crisis and the need for sustainable solutions. But China must begin to enact hard policies, for example, standardizing the various green building codes in existence and giving special regional attention to others if they want real energy savings and not just a tangle of uncoordinated efforts that result in unfinished projects. Once basic enforceable and standards are achieved, the momentum of transforming the buildings landscape will snowball exponentially, allowing architects, developers, construction companies, building residents and energy management personnel to communicate and collaborate on maximum energy savings practices. The government can subsidize trainings for green energy expertise, which will lower start-up building costs, and find ways to work with business leaders to develop more financial incentives to build green.
If China is truly committed to becoming a leader on energy security and climate change, we will soon see sweeping policy decisions that fix the structural problems currently preventing the green building industry from flourishing. If Beijing is truly committed, we will see willingness from the leadership to swap short term economic growth in return for the long term economic growth that can be achieved from investing in energy savings. Such monetary profit will be fungible, translating into higher national security, healthy trade relations and improved social stability. Cultivating strong bilateral ties on any issue with any country begins with a robust set of national policies at home. A partnership with the U.S. that aims to build eco-friendly structures on a grand scale will mean nothing if China cannot deliver on the domestic front. In a sense, this low hanging fruit of opportunity is a barometer for how the Chinese government can deliver on energy security promises if in a partnership with the U.S. To squander such a chance would be a shame.
Ariane Wu is the New Media Fellow at the Asia Society’s Center on U.S.-China Relations. For a related video, “Energy Retrofitting: The Story of Sohota,” go to http://www.asiasociety.org/chinagreen/energy-efficiency-sohota/
Comment:
Now that U.S. President Barack Obama has accepted Chinese President Hu Jintao’s offer to visit China later this year, there is a huge opportunity for the two countries—both top emitters of greenhouse gases—to collaborate on reducing energy consumption. While China has so far rejected any quantified carbon emission reduction caps, there is perhaps another more pragmatic and cost-saving dialogue that could be opened: building green and retrofitting wasteful construction. After all, buildings contribute about a third of the world’s carbon emissions. Pushing builders to be more energy efficient can make a serious impact on global warming. This is cheap, low-hanging fruit that the U.S. and China would be foolish not to pick.
Yet a joint effort between the U.S. and China is only half the solution. It is equally important to standardize urban planning policies and win public support for green construction within individual countries. In the Chinese one-party state, this reality may be slower to come by than in the U.S., as Beijing must find ways to address rising energy shortages and environmental concerns without hindering rapid economic development or upsetting political stability—a stability that is very much intertwined with the health of the economy. Energy price distortions, a lack of national building energy standards, pressure for fast building turnover, relatively lower expertise and fewer experienced engineers in China as compared to developed countries—these are a few of the dilemmas the nation must overcome before it can successfully mount a green buildings revolution and be considered a true global leader on issues of energy and climate.
In China, green architecture seems to be an imminent reality. The central government, anxious about the worsening energy shortages, sees energy efficient buildings as a cost effective way to ease energy consumption while elevating China’s role as a clean energy leader. Last year, the nation spent 45% of its total energy expenditure on constructing and maintaining buildings alone. The state-run People’s Daily noted that if China were to retrofit all of its existing buildings, it would save 150 million tons of standard coal annually or the equivalent of four Three Gorges Dam projects. President Hu is also very much aware of the enormous market potential for green buildings. A recent report from the World Green Building Council and McGraw-Hill Construction predicts that Asia will play host to the fastest growing green buildings industry in the coming years, with energy service companies (ESCOS) making up to 73% of the market by 2013.
By issuing an ambitious five-year plan (2006-2010) mandating up to 65% energy savings from buildings in large cities like Beijing and Shanghai, the central government is hoping that development of a new green buildings sector will contribute to 40% of the total energy-saving targets for the period. Banners with slogans like “Build a more conservation-minded society” are displayed prominently in urban centers while construction of more than a few eco-cities reflects how important energy issues figure on the government agenda. Other highly politicized projects of course include the infamous 160-acre Beijing Olympic Village, which uses cutting edge solar photovoltaic power among other technologies for efficient lighting, heating and cooling. These internationally gold-certified LEED (Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design) structures, coupled with government mandates and eco-town plans, seem to show that China is taking more progressive-minded steps than the U.S. to address energy use.
Yet a closer look reveals that these projects, though remarkably environmentally conscious, hardly reflect the state of the green buildings industry in China. Despite the environmentally mindful rhetoric the government disseminates, the Chinese green buildings movement is still largely composed of privately funded independent projects and pilot projects made possible by contributions from international financial institutions like the World Bank, Asia Development Bank, and policy think tanks like the Natural Resources Defense Council. Without these NGOs, many of the most media-prominent public buildings, such as those in the Olympic Village, would not exist. Unfortunately, these demonstration projects have failed to spur the buildings market to adopt similar efficiency standards largely because there is a lack of incentives to do so.
The profitability of greening buildings on a mass scale is a tough sell. Because the Chinese central government subsidizes forms of energy like electricity and gas, retrofitting and building green is not perceived as dramatically cost-saving. Rapid development schedules also mean less patience for careful green design and less time to wait for the building to recoup first costs, despite studies which show the overall life-cycle costs from sustainable structures are far less than their conventional counterparts. As such, retrofits are generally restricted to an individual building-by-building basis under developers with enough capital or enough media publicity to attract funding for projects. In one case, almost every bank refused to lend capital to Sohota Electric, an energy savings company in Zhuhai, Guangdong, to complete retrofitting work, even when its client was the official state television station, CCTV.
Furthermore, building design and construction often occur independently and simultaneously, leaving little room for meaningful green design analysis to take place. But even with an integrated approach, the process is complicated by the relative scarcity of certified energy efficiency experts, consultants and managers in China as compared to other developed countries. This lack of expertise also translates into slightly higher startup costs and longer construction timelines.
To overcome these barriers, the Chinese government must be willing to back comprehensive changes to current market, bureaucratic and construction practices to encourage sustainable building. But to do so without upsetting economic stability or jeopardizing the ruling government’s power will require time—time that is quickly running out. So far, the central government has done little to correct energy price distortions due mainly to the highly unpopular nature of eliminating subsidies. Despite the global financial crisis, President Hu announced that China will, for the fifth year in a row, target an 8% growth rate. This attitude of privileging aggressive economic growth may very well favor fast construction over careful sustainable design. The country’s aggressive moves to purchase oil fields in parts of Africa and most recently in Kazakhstan do not seem to be signs of a leadership completely confident in the forthcoming efficacy of their clean energy campaigns.
In short, there is a lack of true comprehensive national energy performance standards, not to mention a dearth of monitoring mechanisms to verify and enforce these standards for green building design. Construction of eco-cities like Dongtan Eco-city on Chongming Island have stagnated due to poor planning that did not take into consideration the needs of local residents, while miscommunication among foreign investors and firms that had little understanding of Chinese building procedures and politics resulted in shoddy project oversight. Moreover, lack of standardized green building codes makes it impossible for developers to invest in truly sustainable buildings and not just falsely advertised “green” structures, many of which fail international eco-benchmarks.
Beijing’s lofty environmental goals and national eco-campaigns are good in the sense that they promote public consciousness of the energy crisis and the need for sustainable solutions. But China must begin to enact hard policies, for example, standardizing the various green building codes in existence and giving special regional attention to others if they want real energy savings and not just a tangle of uncoordinated efforts that result in unfinished projects. Once basic enforceable and standards are achieved, the momentum of transforming the buildings landscape will snowball exponentially, allowing architects, developers, construction companies, building residents and energy management personnel to communicate and collaborate on maximum energy savings practices. The government can subsidize trainings for green energy expertise, which will lower start-up building costs, and find ways to work with business leaders to develop more financial incentives to build green.
If China is truly committed to becoming a leader on energy security and climate change, we will soon see sweeping policy decisions that fix the structural problems currently preventing the green building industry from flourishing. If Beijing is truly committed, we will see willingness from the leadership to swap short term economic growth in return for the long term economic growth that can be achieved from investing in energy savings. Such monetary profit will be fungible, translating into higher national security, healthy trade relations and improved social stability. Cultivating strong bilateral ties on any issue with any country begins with a robust set of national policies at home. A partnership with the U.S. that aims to build eco-friendly structures on a grand scale will mean nothing if China cannot deliver on the domestic front. In a sense, this low hanging fruit of opportunity is a barometer for how the Chinese government can deliver on energy security promises if in a partnership with the U.S. To squander such a chance would be a shame.
Ariane Wu is the New Media Fellow at the Asia Society’s Center on U.S.-China Relations. For a related video, “Energy Retrofitting: The Story of Sohota,” go to http://www.asiasociety.org/chinagreen/energy-efficiency-sohota/
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