Just as he is being criticized by those to his right for his emphasis on engagement with Iran, President Obama came under attack from the left, in the op-ed pages of the May 23 New York Times, for just the opposite. Unlike critics from the right who largely concur with the president's stated objectives but disagree with his tactics, Flynt Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett argue for a full about-face on Iran policy. Obama's current policy, they assert, is doomed to fail unless he repudiates pressure and instead accommodates the Iranian regime and its nuclear aspirations, ostensibly in order to improve U.S.-Iran relations. The Leveretts both misread the Iranian regime and misapprehend U.S. interests; as a result, their proposed policy would neither lead to the rapprochement they seek nor prevent Tehran from acquiring nuclear weapons.
The premise of the authors' analysis is that the lack of progress toward a U.S.-Iran rapprochement is the result of U.S. belligerence, which they believe makes Tehran unreceptive to U.S. overtures. In so arguing, they suffer from solipsism; in an inversion of Newton's Third Law, for the authors, every Iranian action must be a reaction to something the United States has done. So Roxana Saberi's arrest is a "fundamentally defensive"-- action taken in response to U.S. policy, Supreme Leader Khamenei's speeches railing against the West are a reflection of "legitimate concern,"-- and so forth. This line of thinking neglects the possibility that the Iranian regime is acting according to its own calculation of its interests, foremost among which is regime survival. The Saberi arrest may have less to do with the United States than with the regime's longstanding repression of journalists, activists (such as advocates for women's and labor rights), minorities (such as the Bahai), and anyone else it deems a threat. Iran's two-decade pursuit of nuclear weapons may have objects other than the United States as well. Likewise, the authors fault Obama for failing to pursue a "grand bargain,"-- but few observers of Iran believe that the regime is interested in such an arrangement.
Furthermore, the authors' suggestion that forgoing pressure will yield progress toward U.S.-Iran reconciliation stands at odds with the historical evidence. While the Clinton administration's series of unilateral concessions to the Khatami government met with no response, Iran's suspension of both nuclear weapons efforts and uranium enrichment in 2003 is widely believed to have been a response to U.S. military action in Iraq. Similar arguments could be made for other policy shifts made by Tehran. The authors cite post-9/11 negotiations with Iran as evidence of the regime's interest in productive negotiations, but fail to note that these talks also took place in the shadow of U.S. military activity in states bordering Iran, or that Iran cooperated against its longstanding enemies -- the Taliban and Al-Qaeda -"“ while continuing unabated its pursuit of nuclear weapons and support for terrorism.
As for policy recommendations, the authors modestly suggest that the United States eschew cooperation with Israel, provide the Iranian regime a security guarantee, accept an "increasingly sophisticated"� Iranian nuclear program, and learn to accept Iranian support for Hamas and Hizballah. This amounts to achieving one's objectives by redefining defeat as success. It is worth examining each of these suggestions in turn (I leave it to Michael Mandelbaum to address the frequent but inappropriate use of the Nixon-to-China analogy invoked by the authors).
First, in dismissing the notion of a coalition between Israel and the Arab states to counter Iran, the authors fail to understand that this is not a policy prescription but a description of fact. Because they harbor mutual concerns over Iran's behavior, Israel and its neighbors have been pursuing complementary policies aimed at countering Tehran. Indeed, one could argue that this ad hoc coalition -"“ galvanized by Iran's own belligerence "“- extends well beyond the region. There would be many obstacles, as the authors assert, to transforming this state of affairs into an explicit, formal alliance, but fortunately there is also no practical need to do so.
Second, the notion that Iran would be placated by security guarantees is questionable. There is little to suggest that Iran is interested in such guarantees. They would more likely underscore the regime's vulnerability than its strength, given that stable governments rarely seek foreign assurances of their stability. The regime is also likely canny enough to understand that the only trustworthy guarantors of security "“- external and internal -- are alliances based on shared, enduring interests, or effective forceful deterrents. Absent a change in Iran's behavior, it is unlikely that any U.S. assurance would lead the regime to forgo its quest for the ultimate deterrent, given Iran's testy relations with its neighbors and others.
Finally, a sophisticated nuclear program that stops one turn of the screwdriver away from a nuclear weapon is strategically no different for U.S. interests than actual Iranian possession of an atomic bomb. To accept the former is to say that you accept the latter. Given the potential consequences of a nuclear Iran -"“ whether the emboldening of its militant proxies, the sparking of a regional nuclear arms race, or the realization of an existential threat to Israel "“- acquiescence should not be an option considered by the United States.
Ultimately the authors argue not for changing Iranian behavior, but rather for accepting it and adapting U.S. policies accordingly in hopes of better bilateral relations. They take as given that Iran shares our desire for reconciliation, but as I have argued previously on this blog, it is unlikely that the regime does so. Thus, in sacrificing strategic objectives for cordial relations, the United States would ultimately achieve neither "“- we would earn scorn, not respect, for abandoning our allies and abdicating our interests.
So true. Not to mention the unhappy fact that those cats appear to be more than fans of the Mullahs or Syria's Dr General President For Life.
The Leverettes seem more like enabling advocates at worst and a malign influence at best.
Given the potential consequences of a nuclear Iran -"“ whether the emboldening of its militant proxies, the sparking of a regional nuclear arms race, or the realization of an existential threat to Israel "“- acquiescence should not be an option considered by the United States.
Michael Singh, let me tell you a quick bedtime story.
Something like 1% of births in the USA are stillborn, and very often the babies are malformed. They have problems that can't let them live, like sometimes the brain is mostly missing, things like that. Sometimes they come out looking like horrible mutants. And when that happens very often the physician tries to console the mother, and says things like "We just don't know why this happens. Sometimes it's because of pollution." And because of that we're getting an increasing number of women who're opposed to pollution -- in their guts. Tell them that we can't spend money to reduce pollution or profits will be down and they don't care the least little bit. It isn't anything like a mass movement yet, but I think it will be. The only way to stop it is to pass laws to prevent obstetricians from mentioning the possibility to bereaved women.
Now here's why I'm telling that story. We've done everything we could to stop iran from getting nuclear power, short of bombing them. If we do bomb their nuclear facilities we're going to spread nuclear waste near some of their cities, and it will keep spreading. And for the foreseeable future, like maybe the next 500 years or so, every time an iranian child is born with birth defects or born dead with birth defects the physician is likely to say it might have been from the american attack.
Do you think that delaying the problems you speculate about is worth that?
OK, iran supports a couple of groups that are against israel. If we hurt iran enough that they stop supporting those groups, probably somebody else will. And if the middle east is ripe for a nuclear arms race it's probably going to happen regardless of iran, and if it isn't ripe then it probably won't happen. And likewise existential threats to israel, there are lots of existential threats to israel on the menu and this is just one of the milder of them.
The USA does not need and cannot afford this level of enmity. Far better to arrange secret sabotage. Send in a special sabotage team that takes one iranian concentration of fissionable material, and blows it up in a second Chernobyl. Make it look like an accident. Iran gets contaminated, a plume of radioactivity goes around the whole world, and for 500 years iranian obstetricians will blame it on nuclear pollution, not on the USA. Assuming we don't get caught.
Or we could wait and hope that things work out OK without our active intervention, which they might.
Attacking nuclear or enrichment sites may be a smokescreen.
Annihilating the regime in an audacious regime killing regime change may be the best deal.
Launch a massive blitz on the top 20% of Iran's ruling clerics using cruise and conventional missiles, attack aircraft and old school special ops. While Iran's rulers have some redundancy in their command and control centers, these are actually quite few in number as are the few calling the shots.
Dr Singh's concern with the Leverette's coordinated 'best frenemies' hook up brings up a ton of issues.
Like - why even tolerate a regime that fears Facebook, girls or tolerance? Even worse - the very creators of the most proficient killers and serial tormentors of Americans til 911 time - Hiz'B'Allah.
Hoping for the best seems awful suspect.
Launch a massive blitz on the top 20% of Iran's ruling clerics using cruise and conventional missiles, attack aircraft and old school special ops. While Iran's rulers have some redundancy in their command and control centers, these are actually quite few in number as are the few calling the shots.
Oh, joy.
That does sound a lot better than spreading radioactivity around. At least the direct effects won't last so long.
So, we kill off 20% of iran's clergy, and then we go home, leaving iran with an intact government and an intact nuclear program.
"Finally, a sophisticated nuclear program that stops one turn of the screwdriver away from a nuclear weapon is strategically no different for U.S. interests than actual Iranian possession of an atomic bomb. To accept the former is to say that you accept the latter. Given the potential consequences of a nuclear Iran -"“ whether the emboldening of its militant proxies, the sparking of a regional nuclear arms race, or the realization of an existential threat to Israel "“- acquiescence should not be an option considered by the United States."
Guess what chief, you better get used to the "option" as there's not going to be any way around it. It already has happened! Iran has the knowledge, it has the raw materials, and it has the tech to enrich. None of those things are bombable. All that prevents them from building bombs a la North Korea is the will ... they have not yet decided whether doing so is in their long term interest. This was all reported in the 2007 intelligence estimate, for God's sake!
That is why what the Leveretts propose is exactly right: can't stop them (Iran), so might as well join 'em. Bring them into the fold. This way, their latent ability to build bombs can merely remain latent and unused.
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