Cycle of the North Korean Crisis

In this column, I have been writing for three and a half years mostly about the security issues involving North Korea's nuclear weapons programs ― with disappointment at times and optimism at others.

Before I started writing here, I had eyewitnessed what was transpiring at almost all bilateral and multilateral meetings to which the United States and North Korea were parties. In the past 15 years since 1994, there has been a vicious cycle of confrontation and negotiation between the two protagonists of the nuclear game.

Inasmuch as the fundamental nature of the game remains unchanged with no fixed rules in place, it is hard to avoid repeating myself when writing about the subject. I always wanted to make sure where we were at the time of writing, struggling to suggest some positive way forward. I will do it again this week ― in view of the strongest condemnation and the toughest sanctions the U.N. Security Council has just imposed on the North and the hardened stance the United States, South Korea and Japan have forged against the defiant leadership of North Korea.

There should be no surprise if the North would defy the new UNSC resolution 1874 and strike back with a third nuclear test and more missile firings, as it said it would. The North is reportedly preparing for the launch of an ICBM and a third nuclear test. Although it would be unlikely that the North would provoke a suicidal all-out war at this point, it may be tempted to launch limited skirmishes either on the West Sea or along the DMZ on the Korean Peninsula. Recognized or not, North Korea is already a nuclear weapons state. The North said it would use its nuclear weapons in defense. There is no assurance against its possible transfer of nuclear weapons or fissile material to a third party.