When Richard Nixon conceived the strategy in 1967 to open a door to the People's Republic of China (PRC), he had only a vague notion of how "success" could actually be measured. One major consideration: to take advantage of the raging Sino-Soviet feud to create an "offset" to the Soviet Union. His Foreign Affairs article on the subject—"Asia After Vietnam"—appeared in October 1967 and was largely ignored, dismissed by some as campaign rhetoric. In January 1968, 10 months before his election, he sent me to Japan and Korea to advise leaders of his long-range intentions.
Nixon did not expect an immediate breakthrough and knew he had to operate cautiously. Indeed, once in office, his basic instruction to the National Security Council staff was to "find a way to get in touch with China."
At the time, National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger, new to the Nixon circle, thought the idea "crazy." But Nixon was also keenly aware of the importance of not abandoning Taiwan, with which the U.S. maintained full diplomatic relations, and which had a seat on the five-member United Nations Security Council.
While Nixon knew that success in his efforts would bring important change, he could not have imagined the scope of change in the past 40 years. Nor would he have dreamed that the PRC would become America's main creditor. While adjusting Taiwan's status, including using Ronald Reagan as the messenger in gently dislodging it from its seat on the U.N. Security Council in favor of the PRC, he took great care to guard Taiwan's security, continuing a token troop presence and the sale of defensive weapons.
By 1979, President Jimmy Carter had suffered a string of devastating foreign-policy setbacks: the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, along with the murder of our ambassador there; the Iranian seizure of the U.S. embassy in Tehran, the taking of American hostages, and a botched attempt at their rescue; and growing revolutionary movements and violence in Central America. Mr. Carter desperately needed a "foreign-policy success" to tout in the 1980 election, yet he had only one easy prospect: full diplomatic recognition of the PRC. He could only get there by acceding to the three PRC demands—derecognition of the "Republic of China," cancellation of the Mutual Defense Treaty and the removal of all U.S. military personnel—on which his predecessors, Nixon and Gerald Ford, were unwilling to yield.
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