A nuclear weapons development project is three pronged: the production of the fissile material for the core of the nuclear explosive device, the design and manufacture of the device into which the core is inserted and the weapons delivery system. For the first part, the core for an Iranian nuclear explosive device could be ready in short order, in about a year, given the instruction to do so. This was achieved because the engineers and scientists were given two things: money and sufficient time to accomplish this task.
For the explosive mechanism, Iran already had a design, received from abroad, which was proven to work in several nuclear tests.
Fitting the explosive mechanism unto a medium-range missile warhead is no mean feat, but the Iranians apparently have already worked that out. And they have their missiles.
The fly in the ointment for the Iranians was that the nuclear program had to be inspected, because of international obligations, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), in charge of the international inspections, had to be persuaded that there was no evidence that Iran was developing nuclear weapons. As things went, this was not a very difficult task, since there was little chance that a "smoking gun" could be uncovered. There were three reasons for this: a) There apparently was never a direct order, orally or in written form, given to assemble a complete nuclear weapon; b) An effort was made to conceal all evidence, direct or circumstantial (not always successfully) and; c) The inspection organization, the IAEA was powerless to do all it wanted to uncover evidence.
THE FACT that the outgoing head of the IAEA, Dr. Mohammed ElBaradei, is a lawyer and not a technical person clinched the matter for Iran. To his mind, apparently, circumstantial evidence was not evidence, not even to arouse suspicion. In an interview in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists September/October 2009 issue ElBaradei said: "Probably because I'm a lawyer, that goes against my core principles. I don't see how you can accuse someone of something without showing them the evidence. We have to apply due process and not a Kafkaesque process."
It must be noted that the very strong technical evidence collected by his own organization did not seem enough for him to even warrant an opinion that something was basically very wrong, even without any additional evidence. And so, in due course, and because international reaction was weak (not in small part because of the attitude of the IAEA), Iran achieved the capability to produce at least one deliverable nuclear weapon within a relatively short period of time. The nightmare is slowly becoming a reality.
A nuclear weapons development project is three pronged: the production of the fissile material for the core of the nuclear explosive device, the design and manufacture of the device into which the core is inserted and the weapons delivery system. For the first part, the core for an Iranian nuclear explosive device could be ready in short order, in about a year, given the instruction to do so. This was achieved because the engineers and scientists were given two things: money and sufficient time to accomplish this task.
Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA, Mohamed ElBaradei. Photo: AP [file]
For the explosive mechanism, Iran already had a design, received from abroad, which was proven to work in several nuclear tests.
Fitting the explosive mechanism unto a medium-range missile warhead is no mean feat, but the Iranians apparently have already worked that out. And they have their missiles.
The fly in the ointment for the Iranians was that the nuclear program had to be inspected, because of international obligations, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), in charge of the international inspections, had to be persuaded that there was no evidence that Iran was developing nuclear weapons. As things went, this was not a very difficult task, since there was little chance that a "smoking gun" could be uncovered. There were three reasons for this: a) There apparently was never a direct order, orally or in written form, given to assemble a complete nuclear weapon; b) An effort was made to conceal all evidence, direct or circumstantial (not always successfully) and; c) The inspection organization, the IAEA was powerless to do all it wanted to uncover evidence.
THE FACT that the outgoing head of the IAEA, Dr. Mohammed ElBaradei, is a lawyer and not a technical person clinched the matter for Iran. To his mind, apparently, circumstantial evidence was not evidence, not even to arouse suspicion. In an interview in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists September/October 2009 issue ElBaradei said: "Probably because I'm a lawyer, that goes against my core principles. I don't see how you can accuse someone of something without showing them the evidence. We have to apply due process and not a Kafkaesque process."
It must be noted that the very strong technical evidence collected by his own organization did not seem enough for him to even warrant an opinion that something was basically very wrong, even without any additional evidence. And so, in due course, and because international reaction was weak (not in small part because of the attitude of the IAEA), Iran achieved the capability to produce at least one deliverable nuclear weapon within a relatively short period of time. The nightmare is slowly becoming a reality.
A nuclear weapons development project is three pronged: the production of the fissile material for the core of the nuclear explosive device, the design and manufacture of the device into which the core is inserted and the weapons delivery system. For the first part, the core for an Iranian nuclear explosive device could be ready in short order, in about a year, given the instruction to do so. This was achieved because the engineers and scientists were given two things: money and sufficient time to accomplish this task.
Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA, Mohamed ElBaradei. Photo: AP [file]
For the explosive mechanism, Iran already had a design, received from abroad, which was proven to work in several nuclear tests.
Fitting the explosive mechanism unto a medium-range missile warhead is no mean feat, but the Iranians apparently have already worked that out. And they have their missiles.
The fly in the ointment for the Iranians was that the nuclear program had to be inspected, because of international obligations, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), in charge of the international inspections, had to be persuaded that there was no evidence that Iran was developing nuclear weapons. As things went, this was not a very difficult task, since there was little chance that a "smoking gun" could be uncovered. There were three reasons for this: a) There apparently was never a direct order, orally or in written form, given to assemble a complete nuclear weapon; b) An effort was made to conceal all evidence, direct or circumstantial (not always successfully) and; c) The inspection organization, the IAEA was powerless to do all it wanted to uncover evidence.
THE FACT that the outgoing head of the IAEA, Dr. Mohammed ElBaradei, is a lawyer and not a technical person clinched the matter for Iran. To his mind, apparently, circumstantial evidence was not evidence, not even to arouse suspicion. In an interview in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists September/October 2009 issue ElBaradei said: "Probably because I'm a lawyer, that goes against my core principles. I don't see how you can accuse someone of something without showing them the evidence. We have to apply due process and not a Kafkaesque process."
It must be noted that the very strong technical evidence collected by his own organization did not seem enough for him to even warrant an opinion that something was basically very wrong, even without any additional evidence. And so, in due course, and because international reaction was weak (not in small part because of the attitude of the IAEA), Iran achieved the capability to produce at least one deliverable nuclear weapon within a relatively short period of time. The nightmare is slowly becoming a reality.
A nuclear weapons development project is three pronged: the production of the fissile material for the core of the nuclear explosive device, the design and manufacture of the device into which the core is inserted and the weapons delivery system. For the first part, the core for an Iranian nuclear explosive device could be ready in short order, in about a year, given the instruction to do so. This was achieved because the engineers and scientists were given two things: money and sufficient time to accomplish this task.
Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA, Mohamed ElBaradei. Photo: AP [file]
For the explosive mechanism, Iran already had a design, received from abroad, which was proven to work in several nuclear tests.
Fitting the explosive mechanism unto a medium-range missile warhead is no mean feat, but the Iranians apparently have already worked that out. And they have their missiles.
The fly in the ointment for the Iranians was that the nuclear program had to be inspected, because of international obligations, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), in charge of the international inspections, had to be persuaded that there was no evidence that Iran was developing nuclear weapons. As things went, this was not a very difficult task, since there was little chance that a "smoking gun" could be uncovered. There were three reasons for this: a) There apparently was never a direct order, orally or in written form, given to assemble a complete nuclear weapon; b) An effort was made to conceal all evidence, direct or circumstantial (not always successfully) and; c) The inspection organization, the IAEA was powerless to do all it wanted to uncover evidence.
THE FACT that the outgoing head of the IAEA, Dr. Mohammed ElBaradei, is a lawyer and not a technical person clinched the matter for Iran. To his mind, apparently, circumstantial evidence was not evidence, not even to arouse suspicion. In an interview in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists September/October 2009 issue ElBaradei said: "Probably because I'm a lawyer, that goes against my core principles. I don't see how you can accuse someone of something without showing them the evidence. We have to apply due process and not a Kafkaesque process."
It must be noted that the very strong technical evidence collected by his own organization did not seem enough for him to even warrant an opinion that something was basically very wrong, even without any additional evidence. And so, in due course, and because international reaction was weak (not in small part because of the attitude of the IAEA), Iran achieved the capability to produce at least one deliverable nuclear weapon within a relatively short period of time. The nightmare is slowly becoming a reality.
A nuclear weapons development project is three pronged: the production of the fissile material for the core of the nuclear explosive device, the design and manufacture of the device into which the core is inserted and the weapons delivery system. For the first part, the core for an Iranian nuclear explosive device could be ready in short order, in about a year, given the instruction to do so. This was achieved because the engineers and scientists were given two things: money and sufficient time to accomplish this task.
Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA, Mohamed ElBaradei. Photo: AP [file]
For the explosive mechanism, Iran already had a design, received from abroad, which was proven to work in several nuclear tests.
Fitting the explosive mechanism unto a medium-range missile warhead is no mean feat, but the Iranians apparently have already worked that out. And they have their missiles.
The fly in the ointment for the Iranians was that the nuclear program had to be inspected, because of international obligations, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), in charge of the international inspections, had to be persuaded that there was no evidence that Iran was developing nuclear weapons. As things went, this was not a very difficult task, since there was little chance that a "smoking gun" could be uncovered. There were three reasons for this: a) There apparently was never a direct order, orally or in written form, given to assemble a complete nuclear weapon; b) An effort was made to conceal all evidence, direct or circumstantial (not always successfully) and; c) The inspection organization, the IAEA was powerless to do all it wanted to uncover evidence.
THE FACT that the outgoing head of the IAEA, Dr. Mohammed ElBaradei, is a lawyer and not a technical person clinched the matter for Iran. To his mind, apparently, circumstantial evidence was not evidence, not even to arouse suspicion. In an interview in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists September/October 2009 issue ElBaradei said: "Probably because I'm a lawyer, that goes against my core principles. I don't see how you can accuse someone of something without showing them the evidence. We have to apply due process and not a Kafkaesque process."
It must be noted that the very strong technical evidence collected by his own organization did not seem enough for him to even warrant an opinion that something was basically very wrong, even without any additional evidence. And so, in due course, and because international reaction was weak (not in small part because of the attitude of the IAEA), Iran achieved the capability to produce at least one deliverable nuclear weapon within a relatively short period of time. The nightmare is slowly becoming a reality.
A nuclear weapons development project is three pronged: the production of the fissile material for the core of the nuclear explosive device, the design and manufacture of the device into which the core is inserted and the weapons delivery system. For the first part, the core for an Iranian nuclear explosive device could be ready in short order, in about a year, given the instruction to do so. This was achieved because the engineers and scientists were given two things: money and sufficient time to accomplish this task.
Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA, Mohamed ElBaradei. Photo: AP [file]
For the explosive mechanism, Iran already had a design, received from abroad, which was proven to work in several nuclear tests.
Fitting the explosive mechanism unto a medium-range missile warhead is no mean feat, but the Iranians apparently have already worked that out. And they have their missiles.
The fly in the ointment for the Iranians was that the nuclear program had to be inspected, because of international obligations, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), in charge of the international inspections, had to be persuaded that there was no evidence that Iran was developing nuclear weapons. As things went, this was not a very difficult task, since there was little chance that a "smoking gun" could be uncovered. There were three reasons for this: a) There apparently was never a direct order, orally or in written form, given to assemble a complete nuclear weapon; b) An effort was made to conceal all evidence, direct or circumstantial (not always successfully) and; c) The inspection organization, the IAEA was powerless to do all it wanted to uncover evidence.
THE FACT that the outgoing head of the IAEA, Dr. Mohammed ElBaradei, is a lawyer and not a technical person clinched the matter for Iran. To his mind, apparently, circumstantial evidence was not evidence, not even to arouse suspicion. In an interview in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists September/October 2009 issue ElBaradei said: "Probably because I'm a lawyer, that goes against my core principles. I don't see how you can accuse someone of something without showing them the evidence. We have to apply due process and not a Kafkaesque process."
It must be noted that the very strong technical evidence collected by his own organization did not seem enough for him to even warrant an opinion that something was basically very wrong, even without any additional evidence. And so, in due course, and because international reaction was weak (not in small part because of the attitude of the IAEA), Iran achieved the capability to produce at least one deliverable nuclear weapon within a relatively short period of time. The nightmare is slowly becoming a reality.
A nuclear weapons development project is three pronged: the production of the fissile material for the core of the nuclear explosive device, the design and manufacture of the device into which the core is inserted and the weapons delivery system. For the first part, the core for an Iranian nuclear explosive device could be ready in short order, in about a year, given the instruction to do so. This was achieved because the engineers and scientists were given two things: money and sufficient time to accomplish this task.
Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA, Mohamed ElBaradei. Photo: AP [file]
For the explosive mechanism, Iran already had a design, received from abroad, which was proven to work in several nuclear tests.
Fitting the explosive mechanism unto a medium-range missile warhead is no mean feat, but the Iranians apparently have already worked that out. And they have their missiles.
The fly in the ointment for the Iranians was that the nuclear program had to be inspected, because of international obligations, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), in charge of the international inspections, had to be persuaded that there was no evidence that Iran was developing nuclear weapons. As things went, this was not a very difficult task, since there was little chance that a "smoking gun" could be uncovered. There were three reasons for this: a) There apparently was never a direct order, orally or in written form, given to assemble a complete nuclear weapon; b) An effort was made to conceal all evidence, direct or circumstantial (not always successfully) and; c) The inspection organization, the IAEA was powerless to do all it wanted to uncover evidence.
THE FACT that the outgoing head of the IAEA, Dr. Mohammed ElBaradei, is a lawyer and not a technical person clinched the matter for Iran. To his mind, apparently, circumstantial evidence was not evidence, not even to arouse suspicion. In an interview in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists September/October 2009 issue ElBaradei said: "Probably because I'm a lawyer, that goes against my core principles. I don't see how you can accuse someone of something without showing them the evidence. We have to apply due process and not a Kafkaesque process."
It must be noted that the very strong technical evidence collected by his own organization did not seem enough for him to even warrant an opinion that something was basically very wrong, even without any additional evidence. And so, in due course, and because international reaction was weak (not in small part because of the attitude of the IAEA), Iran achieved the capability to produce at least one deliverable nuclear weapon within a relatively short period of time. The nightmare is slowly becoming a reality.
A nuclear weapons development project is three pronged: the production of the fissile material for the core of the nuclear explosive device, the design and manufacture of the device into which the core is inserted and the weapons delivery system. For the first part, the core for an Iranian nuclear explosive device could be ready in short order, in about a year, given the instruction to do so. This was achieved because the engineers and scientists were given two things: money and sufficient time to accomplish this task.
Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA, Mohamed ElBaradei. Photo: AP [file]
For the explosive mechanism, Iran already had a design, received from abroad, which was proven to work in several nuclear tests.
Fitting the explosive mechanism unto a medium-range missile warhead is no mean feat, but the Iranians apparently have already worked that out. And they have their missiles.
The fly in the ointment for the Iranians was that the nuclear program had to be inspected, because of international obligations, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), in charge of the international inspections, had to be persuaded that there was no evidence that Iran was developing nuclear weapons. As things went, this was not a very difficult task, since there was little chance that a "smoking gun" could be uncovered. There were three reasons for this: a) There apparently was never a direct order, orally or in written form, given to assemble a complete nuclear weapon; b) An effort was made to conceal all evidence, direct or circumstantial (not always successfully) and; c) The inspection organization, the IAEA was powerless to do all it wanted to uncover evidence.
THE FACT that the outgoing head of the IAEA, Dr. Mohammed ElBaradei, is a lawyer and not a technical person clinched the matter for Iran. To his mind, apparently, circumstantial evidence was not evidence, not even to arouse suspicion. In an interview in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists September/October 2009 issue ElBaradei said: "Probably because I'm a lawyer, that goes against my core principles. I don't see how you can accuse someone of something without showing them the evidence. We have to apply due process and not a Kafkaesque process."
It must be noted that the very strong technical evidence collected by his own organization did not seem enough for him to even warrant an opinion that something was basically very wrong, even without any additional evidence. And so, in due course, and because international reaction was weak (not in small part because of the attitude of the IAEA), Iran achieved the capability to produce at least one deliverable nuclear weapon within a relatively short period of time. The nightmare is slowly becoming a reality.
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