Egypt and Israel currently have a confluence of strategic interests unparalleled in their histories as nation-states. And those shared interests are increasing, driven by events and trends, both positive and negative, within the region and elsewhere. These shared strategic interests also happen to be among the top priorities of both nations: Iran; Gaza-Hamas, border control, counterterrorism, and Israeli-Egyptian-Palestinian relations and the peace process.
The natural conclusion one might draw is that Egypt and Israel, acting in their own national interests, have been working assiduously to upgrade their strategic relations. There have been some notable achievements in recent years, and the current period is arguably the most productive. However, these efforts are episodic, marked by profound distrust on both sides, an unwillingness by some in the senior political and military leaderships to accept any upgrading and a weakness in the bilateral institutional framework that thwarts efforts to build on achievements.
There are a number of major constraints on translating these shared interests into tangible actions. For one, leaders and citizens of both nations remain deeply distrustful of intentions on the other side. This is so visceral that it colors virtually every conversation, every private meeting and every public commentary. While Egyptians understand the strategic value of their cold peace with Israel, they are extremely reluctant to deal with Israelis on anything beyond their most important interests. To Israelis, Egyptians remain a frustrating enigma. As for Egypt’s leadership, Israelis feel they can trust President Hosni Mubarak but wonder what will happen when he leaves the scene.
Then too, Egypt cannot be seen publicly as doing Israel’s bidding. This constraint limits dramatically what Egypt is prepared to do. It therefore is no surprise that Egyptian-Israeli intelligence cooperation is by far the most developed, the most frequent, the most institutionalized, the most personalized and without question the most productive of all bilateral ties. It is largely outside public scrutiny, and there is always plausible deniability by either side. Military-to-military ties have some institutional framework, but they are extremely weak and limited largely to liaison. There is no ongoing cooperation in this area of any major significance.
Further, Israel does not devote priority to nurturing the relationship with Egypt. Israeli leaders occasionally “rediscover” Egypt, but all too often that is provoked merely by negative trends in the relationship. Sustained ties are simply not pursued. And even when they are by individual Israeli leaders, Egyptian leaders, who stay in place for decades, see their Israeli counterparts changing as political coalitions keep changing. There are no parliamentary ties, and comments from the Knesset, when they are made about Egypt at all, are usually negative.
Egypt is not even a priority to the Israel military. This may seem a harsh assessment, but it’s a fact. The Israeli military spends the majority of its attention on Israel’s northern border, with longer-range concerns like Iran gobbling up attention. Particularly devastating was a downsizing of the Israeli military three years ago that led to the shifting of the liaison staff from the Operations Directorate to the Planning Directorate and the abolishment of the only flag-rank officer devoted exclusively to liaison. In fact, because of the crushing demands on the understaffed Planning Directorate, even the colonel ostensibly assigned for liaison is often required to devote time to other tasks. In contrast, the Egyptian liaison staff recently had three flag-rank officers at the top; it currently has two.
Personal relationships are also lacking. Personal relationships are vital both for mutual understanding and for any hope of sustained achievements. While such relationships do exist between some key intelligence officials, they rarely exist elsewhere. Israeli officers and officials at all levels rotate far too quickly.
Despite these constraints, some of which cannot or will not be overcome, there is an urgent imperative to move as far and as quickly as politically possible to strengthen the strategic relationship. I am concerned that with the frequent transitions in Israel and the lack of an institutionalized dialogue, Egypt cannot benefit fully from achievements in its interest. Similarly, this lack of institutionalization of security ties as well as the failure on Israel’s part to place a high priority on upgrading security ties may well prove a costly mistake for Israel’s interests as Egypt draws closer to its first senior leadership transition in a generation.
With these thoughts in mind, both sides need to act:
First, the Israeli leadership must make clear that upgrading the security relationship with Egypt is a key short- and long-term national security priority, and be prepared to devote the necessary time and human resources on a sustained basis. There should be a holistic approach, starting with the leaders themselves but bringing together all elements at all levels, within and outside the government.
Second, Israel’s armed forces should establish a true liaison office, in the Operations Directorate, headed by a flag-rank officer. That office should retain key staff as long as possible, allowing for the building and maintaining of personal and professional relationships with Egyptian counterparts. If necessary, retired officers with existing ties should be brought into the office.
Third, Egypt should accept the institutionalization of military-to-military ties, especially between operational officers at all levels, recognizing this is not only key to building trust during a time of transition but is also essential for any prospect of achieving the longer-term goal of replicating what Israel has with Jordan: no demilitarized zone and no foreign forces.
Fourth, Egypt should be open to expanding bilateral intelligence cooperation, to include intelligence agencies that have a key role in the Sinai and other border areas.
Fifth, Israel should consider ways to ease the burden of Gaza on Egypt, perhaps through the establishment of a border crossing regime that ensures that Gazans have sustained access to needed goods and services. In exchange, Egypt must convincingly do all it can to stop smuggling of certain items into Gaza.
Sixth, both sides should expand their dialogue over their shared border, with regular biannual meetings chaired by senior operational military leadership and quarterly meetings at the technical level.
And seventh, all of the above should be carried out with a full appreciation for sensitivities of both sides. While maximum secrecy should be the watchword for ongoing discussions, it must be conveyed to outside observers when any steps are agreed upon and implemented that they are in each country’s individual national interest.
We have already entered a historic window of opportunity for a meaningful and sustained upgrading of bilateral Egyptian-Israeli security cooperation based on shared and individual interests. Let there be no misunderstanding: significant constraints will limit the scope of this cooperation. That said, there are steps that can be taken within those constraints today to fulfill what so many had hoped would be key fruits of the Camp David treaty.
James A. Larocco served from 2004 until July 2009 as director general of the Multinational Force and Observers in Sinai. He is distinguished professor, Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Washington, DC. This commentary first appeared at bitterlemons-international.org, an online newsletter.
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