In the unlikely event that Germans dump their popular Chancellor, Angela Merkel, in the country's election on Sept. 27, what would be the legacy of her four years in power? One key achievement, according to Volker Perthes, director of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, is the Lisbon Treaty, which was designed to reform and streamline the workings of the European Union. "Without Merkel's involvement, and the role played by Germany, there would be no Lisbon Treaty now," Perthes says. But if that's the cornerstone of Merkel's foreign policy, she could see her legacy crumble less than a week after the German polls, when Ireland holds a second referendum on whether to accept or reject the treaty on Oct. 2. Another no vote would kill the treaty. As Merkel has come to know all too well, it's one thing to make deals. It's quite another to get them implemented.
From her first appearance at an E.U. summit in December 2005, when Merkel helped break a deadlock between Britain and France on the budget, the Chancellor has gained a reputation as a shrewd and effective negotiator. Her low-key foreign policy has been in keeping with the consensual style of government imposed on her by an electoral system that forced her Christian Democrats (CDU) into a grand coalition with the largest opposition party, the Social Democrats (SPD). But it's also the manifestation of a history that has left Germany reluctant to intervene in the affairs of other countries.
Germany prefers to promote its interests behind the scenes rather than to lead in proportion to its size and economic clout. With Merkel or without her, nobody expects much change in Germany's worldview. That means a pro-U.S. and pro-Israel stance, a pragmatic approach in dealing with Russia and China, and a faith in negotiations and sanctions to bring recalcitrant countries like Iran back into constructive dialogue. Just don't look to Berlin for big ideas or robust new approaches to international problems. "There has been a passive consensus on foreign policy issues," says Jan Techau, director of the Europe Program at the German Council on Foreign Relations. "But that passivity is inappropriate now, as Germany faces increasing demands from NATO — for example, burden-sharing in Afghanistan and on the general discussion about the future of NATO."
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