The request for additional forces by the U.S. commander in Afghanistan, Gen. Stanley McChrystal, poses cruel dilemmas for President Obama. If he refuses the recommendation and General McChrystal's argument that his forces are inadequate for the mission, Obama will be blamed for the dramatic consequences. If he accepts the recommendation, his opponents may come to describe it, at least in part, as Obama's war. If he compromises, he may fall between all stools"”too little to make progress, too much to still controversy. And he must make the choice on the basis of assessments he cannot prove when he makes them.
This is the inextricable anguish of the presidency, for which Obama is entitled to respect from every side of the debate. Full disclosure compels me to state at the beginning that I favor fulfilling the commander's request and a modification of the strategy. But I also hope that the debate ahead of us avoids the demoralizing trajectory that characterized the previous controversies in wars against adversaries using guerrilla tactics, especially Vietnam and Iraq.
Each of those wars began with widespread public support. Each developed into a stalemate, in part because the strategy of guerrillas generally aims at psychological exhaustion. Stalemate triggered a debate about the winnability of the war. A significant segment of the public grew disenchanted and started questioning the moral basis of the conflict. Inexorably, the demand arose for an exit strategy with an emphasis on exit and not strategy.
The demand for an exit strategy is, of course, a metaphor for withdrawal, and withdrawal that is not accompanied by a willingness to sustain the outcome amounts to abandonment. In Vietnam, Congress terminated an American role even after all our troops had, in fact, been withdrawn for two years. It remains to be seen to what extent the achievements of the surge in Iraq will be sustained there politically.
The most unambiguous form of exit strategy is victory, though as we have seen in Korea, where American troops have remained since 1953, even that may not permit troop withdrawals. A seemingly unavoidable paradox emerges. The domestic debate generates the pressure for diplomatic compromise. Yet the fanaticism that motivates guerrillas"”not to speak of suicide bombers"”does not allow for compromise unless they face defeat or exhaustion. That, in turn, implies a surge testing the patience of the American public. Is that paradox soluble?
The prevailing strategy in Afghanistan is based on the classic anti-insurrection doctrine: to build a central government, commit it to the improvement of the lives of its people, and then protect the population until that government's own forces are able, with our training, to take over. The request for more forces by General McChrystal states explicitly that his existing forces are inadequate for this mission, implying three options: to continue the present deployment and abandon the McChrystal strategy; to decrease the present deployment with a new strategy; or to increase the existing deployment with a strategy focused on the security of the population. A decision not to increase current force levels involves, at a minimum, abandoning the strategy proposed by General McChrystal and endorsed by Gen. David Petraeus; it would be widely interpreted as the first step toward withdrawal. The second option"”offered as an alternative"”would shrink the current mission by focusing on counter-terrorism rather than counter-insurgency. The argument would be that the overriding American strategic objective in Afghanistan is to prevent the country from turning once again into a base for international terrorism. Hence the defeat of Al Qaeda and radical Islamic jihad should be the dominant priority. Since the Taliban, according to this view, is a local, not a global, threat, it can be relegated to being a secondary target. A negotiation with the group might isolate Al Qaeda and lead to its defeat, in return for not challenging the Taliban in the governance of Afghanistan. After all, it was the Taliban which provided bases for Al Qaeda in the first place.
This theory seems to me to be too clever by half. Al Qaeda and the Taliban are unlikely to be able to be separated so neatly geographically. It would also imply the partition of Afghanistan along functional lines, for it is highly improbable that the civic actions on which our policies are based could be carried out in areas controlled by the Taliban. Even so-called realists"”like me"”would gag at a tacit U.S. cooperation with the Taliban in the governance of Afghanistan.
This is not to exclude the possibility of defections from the Taliban as occurred from Al Qaeda in Iraq's Anbar province. But those occurred after the surge, not as a way to avoid it. To adopt such a course is a disguised way of retreating from Afghanistan altogether.
Those in the chain of command in Afghanistan, each with outstanding qualifications, have all been recently appointed by the Obama administration. Rejecting their recommendations would be a triumph of domestic politics over strategic judgment. It would draw us into a numbers game without definable criteria.
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Kissinger's proposed strategy wont work. Russia is unlikely help because when it invaded Afganisthan earlier the US actively promoted and supported the MUjaheddins which led to Russsia's retreat. India is unlikely to take US help in arms/funds directed to thwart the Taliban/Afghan insurgents becasue they have seen what US Kiss is doing to Pakistan. Moreover India has no interest in wasting men and money on this. Asking Iran to help would be a cruel punishment for Obama after his posturings against Iran. China would not get into a strife which is not going to give any immediate advantage and raising the Muslim bogey is not going to draw China into this conflict. That leaves Pakistan which is already facing serious internal opposition and divide to having US on its side. Bettrer option would be to send the additional troops with a deadline (say 1 year) within which to do the job (because of Obama's earlier unwise commitment to Afghan war and his selection of Gen McChrystal to revamp the strategy which Obama is bound to support) and simultaneously give an ultimatum to Pakistan to capture Osama within 6 months (with the threat of complete withdrawal of all funds to Pakistan id that does not happen).
Gen. Stanley McChrystal is expert in covert operations...kidnapping...assaination...torturing...these are short terms operations...therefore McChrystal is not suitable for long term Afghan war I think America is running out of choice for a good Genaral to conduct the Afghan war.Henry Kissinger is creating more confusion in this article instead of giving solutions.In my opinion the best and only option for America is to exit Afghanistan with minimum loss of men and money and cosolidating the securities at home for any terror threats isnside America.....If Obama wants to get out of mess he should not listen to the people who are involved with Military Induatrial Complex of America including Mr Kissisnger(devil's advocate)...he is the member of Bilderburger and strict follower of world depopulation program like all non semitic khazariian Talmuidist jews(Zionist)....the continuation of ancient Babylonian Brotherhood from the days of Nimrod struggling to set the rule of satan(antichrist) on earth
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