A Bismarckian Approach for U.S.

In discussing my proposal last week for a Sino-Indian Convention that would define 21st century spheres of influence in Central Asia, a colleague suggested that it was an idea that Otto von Bismarck would have been proud of. They didn't mean it as a compliment.

We think of Bismarck as a caricature of the old European warlord, peering through a monocled eye while croaking about decisions forged in "blood and iron." Most of all, we see him as someone whose policies were designed for personal and imperial aggrandizement, not the betterment of the people. We distrust his approach to the world because it seems unsavory -- built on deals conducted in back rooms with no regard to the popular will.

Bismarck might appeal to autocrats who treat policy like a game of chess, but he is never cited as someone relevant to U.S. decision-makers. The democratic policymaker, we are told, must craft policies that pass the approval of higher standards: fidelity to values and a commitment to improving the plight of the common citizen. We cannot play a "Great Game" in the center of Asia, because we don't approve of treating policy like a competitive sport.

But Bismarck pursued his policies with careful goals in mind. As he saw it, the job of guiding a major international power involves improving its standing, maximizing popular welfare, and finding ways to lock in the benefits of peace and prosperity to protect them against the risk of unexpected challenges. For the United States, the ongoing commitment in Afghanistan has the potential to do serious damage to all of these interests.

Let's consider some lesser known facts about old Otto. He was not a bloodthirsty conqueror intent on finding causes for soldiers to fight, die and cause destruction. He defined limits for where and how to use force. As he put it, questions about honor and values might make for wonderful rhetoric, but they were not "interests on behalf of which it is worth our risking . . . the healthy bones of one of our Pomeranian musketeers."

He preferred to use balance of power tactics to reduce pressures for war, convincing other countries to agree to compromise settlements instead. As a result, Bismarck accumulated a healthy fiscal reserve that enabled him to press domestic economic reforms -- including health care, unemployment insurance, and other "safety net" provisions for ordinary citizens. His keen understanding of the importance of "human security" guided his push for what were the beginnings of the German welfare state. ("The actual complaint of the worker is the insecurity of his existence.") Institutions like the Imperial Physical Technical Institute were created to formulate first-class standards for industry, providing a strong technological advantage that aided both the business and military establishment by providing innovation ahead of the competition.

So adopting a Bismarckian policy that ends up stanching the ongoing hemorrhage of equipment, people and resources in Afghanistan, and banking those savings at home instead, hardly seems objectionable from the perspective of democratic principles. Indeed, redirecting funds -- and the nation's brainpower and industrial base -- to pressing new concerns that enhance the country's human capital seems a sound course of action. As former Energy Secretary James Schlesinger has noted, the country that cracks the "liquids challenge" -- i.e., finding a substitute to the hydrocarbon-driven combustion engine that currently powers our car and truck fleets -- will take an immense step ahead of other nations in economic leadership, because it will effectively set the standards for the reorganization of the land transport sector. However, the costs of Afghanistan alone right now makes the type of government support needed for America's business and scientific establishments to pursue this work untenable -- and it makes things like health care reform much more difficult to fund.

So maybe it is time to reconsider the value of Bismarck as a guide for policymaking in the contemporary world. After all, if he were alive and at the climate talks in Copenhagen today, he might be logrolling the compromises and critical concessions needed to get a deal done -- for instance, between U.S. willingness to commit direct aid to industrializing countries for cutting emissions and China's willingness to accept some sort of international supervision on its reductions. Back in his day, Bismarck's Congresses settled some of the world's most pressing international issues, and kept World War I from breaking out for another few decades. Indeed, the Great War might not have happened at all had his parting advice to Kaiser Wilhelm II been followed. Having someone consciously emulate Bismarck today is exactly what the world needs.

My advice is Bismarckian? Thanks for the compliment!