Let's, for the sake of argument, leave alone the overpowering exigencies of imperialism, which are directly responsible for the unending mess in Afghanistan and Iraq. Let's say the commonplace things instead. What do the Taliban want? They want to rule Afghanistan. And they probably aspire to outsource the government in Pakistan to a home-grown subsidiary from Waziristan. Moreover, the battle-hardened militias plan to rule by their unacceptably narrow interpretation of Islamic laws.
What does Al Qaeda want? Its leaders set out to topple the Saudi ruling family, primarily. As if the weekly chopping of hands and heads in the name of religion in the oil-rich kingdom is already not bad enough advertisement for a misunderstood faith, Al Qaeda seeks to replace it with an even more rigid doctrine. Its influence is said to straddle oceans and continents. (So much for globalisation!)
What has the world done to respond to the twin threat from Al Qaeda and the Taliban? The dominant "�world', regardless of the caution advocated by many others, for instance the Shanghai Cooperation group, has waged a "war on terror"�, and the brutality of its force has been so searing that it was shamed into changing the sobriquet, which till recently captioned the unending colossal tragedy.
Without endorsing any of the prevailing strategies to contain one category of zealots to the exclusion of others, a legitimate question may yet be asked with regard to India and Pakistan: Why is it that when much of the world is determined to deny with military might or diplomatic solidarity any comfort to Al Qaeda and the Taliban in their objective to disrupt the region's geopolitical architecture, when it comes to India and Pakistan the rules change?
In other words, why is it so embarrassingly true, and therefore scary, that these two countries, instead of scrupulously denying the Muslim extremists the joy of disrupting their peace process "“ which specifically targets religious terrorism "“ tend to fall tamely into the trap set for them?
Often the two countries are not alone in their unintended miscalculation with extremism. It was irresponsible of US Defence Secretary Robert M. Gates, for example, to suggest in New Delhi last week that India might run out of patience were there to be another Mumbai-like attack on its soil. The comments undermined a more mature policy enshrined in at least two agreements between India and Pakistan, and which need to be shored up by the international community, not ignored. One of them states that the peace process is now irreversible, a point stressed by intellectuals from the two countries who met in Delhi recently.
What Mr Gates seems to be suggesting, hopefully unwittingly, is that it's OK for India to run out of patience and, therefore, kosher for it to launch the widely feared surgical strikes across the border. On the charitable side, this may have been Mr Gates' way of trying to balance his ties between India and Pakistan "“ his publicly stated tough words pointing to Pakistan and a firm but unpublicised advice to India not to be foolish enough to take any militarist's "cold start"� thesis to heart. Whatever be the compulsions for Mr Gates to say what he said, his words must have been welcomed gleefully by those that seek to start a standoff between the two nuclear-armed neighbours in South Asia.
The response from Pakistan to Mr Gates' fulminations and to a flurry of identically menacing words from the Indian foreign minister would also have pleased the Qaeda-Taliban duo. For Pakistan to tell India tersely that it could not guarantee against another Mumbai-like terror attack seemed equally unnecessary. It is true that Pakistan continues to bear the brunt of the counter-assault by Muslim extremists in their response to the US-led attacks against them.
If Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani, as would any other leader in his place, were to find himself unable to admit to his own people the vulnerability to and helplessness of his government to the ceaseless suicide and car bomb attacks in Pakistan he ought to have considered using the same quiet discretion to deal with India's concerns. In snapping at India, Mr Gilani undermined his own achievement when he signed a forward-looking agreement in Sharm el Sheikh with Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh.
The fact of the matter is that both countries as well as their mentors across the seven seas are woefully short of good intelligence and, dare we say, common sense, in their battle with a bevy of determined non-state actors. The fact that the quarries have gathered a diverse range of ethnic DNA in their ranks is only part of the growing problem for countries like India and Pakistan and indeed the United States.
Cussedness anchored in cluelessness though should be their bigger worry. The daring attack on Pakistan's army headquarters was rooted in the advantage the militants had over the military in the field of intelligence. The attack on Mumbai was possible because of bungled and mishandled intelligence by India's premier agencies.
However, the most spectacular intelligence failure since 9/11 came over US airspace on Christmas Day last month when a young Nigerian man, whose father had cautioned the Americans of his son's increasing involvement with Muslim extremists, nearly set off a fire device he had smuggled inside his underwear into the plane. Just around then a group of CIA operatives were blown up in southern Afghanistan by a man they had trusted and had invited from Jordan to lead them to Al Qaeda fugitives. The incident was a setback to goodness knows how many intelligence agencies, including of course the usually sure-footed Jordanians. Major Nidal Hasan Malik's massacre of his own US military colleagues may have resulted from growing systemic cluelessness about the depth of the malaise that easy recourse to religion has sown in our midst.
The highly visible jumpiness in the Indian establishment, heightened by an unquestioning media, about a plot to attack Delhi and other cities with airborne devices, reflects an insecurity that comes with grossly inadequate intelligence. In any case what is the common citizen to do with the knowledge (or fear) thus transmitted? At least we were clearer in perceiving the state's machinations with the public's collective phobias when Prime Minister Vajpayee's administration placed World War II vintage anti-aircraft guns on the ramparts of the Puran Qila of Delhi. It was more to manipulate consent than to ward off some spooky evil intruder. The best we can hope for is that the present fears of hijacking and airborne attacks do not materialise.
Else the situation could be tricky. Imagine this: India fears an attack but doesn't know where or how it is going to happen. So it starts to fret publicly and looks accusingly at Pakistan. The prime minister of Pakistan, equally clueless about when and where his country would next face a suicide bomber finds himself in no position to entertain India's fears and snaps at New Delhi. Mr Gates, still smarting from a devastating bout of intelligence failures in his own backyard, mumbles something so incoherent that it could be mistaken for an endorsement of a possible military standoff between India and Pakistan.
In the middle of this dangerous brinkmanship, on the eve of India's Republic Day military parade on January 26, a turf war breaks out between the various intelligence bodies in India over the National Security Adviser's chair that has been inexplicably and suddenly vacated by M.K. Narayanan, who has been dispatched as the governor of West Bengal. The new incumbent fortunately has the wherewithal to thwart an ambitious home ministry that is keen to corner some of the powers of the most powerful security aide to the prime minister.
It may be a good omen for relations between India and Pakistan that the new Indian security chief, Shiv Shankar Menon, had served as New Delhi's envoy in Islamabad. Mr Menon was also ambassador in Beijing and Colombo on his way to becoming foreign secretary. But even more significantly for India's future ties with Islamabad, he was the man who drafted the Sharm el Sheikh document, which was predictably reviled by India's intelligence agencies.
It is this agreement that holds the key to peace in South Asia. In the absence of good intelligence a good fallback is a display of good intentions with the perceived foe. Good intelligence will follow, not precede the trust that will come from peace talks thus induced. Is there any other way to see it?
jawednaqvi@gmail.com
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