Israel's second worry is the success of the British foreign secretary William Hague in persuading the European Union not to extend its arms embargo to Syria's rebels. This means that the Assad regime will work as hard as it can to secure more territory before the "good" rebels get boosted by European arms later in 2013.
Israel's third concern is Russia's offer to complete its agreed export contract with Damascus of S-300 anti-aircraft missiles. The version likely to be sent to Syria is the extended range S-300PMU2 system with improved multiple target-tracking capability. This is not impossible to counter, but it will complicate Israeli efforts to maintain air superiority over Syrian territory (see Jeremy Binnie, "Israeli officials confirm Syria to get 'good version' of S-300", Jane's Defence Weekly, 29 May 2013).
The all-round problem
A year ago, many in Israel (as elsewhere) believed that the Assad regime would not last long and that Syria would emerge from the conflict greatly weakened - something Israel could live with, even if it preferred autocracy. Now, it is thought much more likely that Assad will survive and the less Islamist rebels will diminish in power, with European arms arriving too late. The Islamist paramilitaries will survive and probably thrive, though their support from the Saudis and Qataris may not match what the Assad regime receives from Hizbollah and Iran (the latter hugely aided in the process by its close ally in Baghdad).
A detached supporter of Israel might conclude that the probable outcome in such a case - a prolonged standoff between Islamists and Damascus - would be welcome. The problem with it, though, is the uncertainty - the circumstance that Israeli military planners like least of all.
If, later in 2013, Syria's civil war becomes an Assad-Islamist conflict and the Islamists manage to sustain their campaign, then Israel will be in a real dilemma. Would it prefer a renewed and strengthened Assad-Hizbollah-Iraq-Iran entity, or Islamist ascendancy in Syria?
Neither is attractive and this is the real reason for the Israeli government's apprehension over the way the war is evolving. Neighbouring autocrats are OK as long as they do not get too strong, but a regime adjacent to Israel that is at the centre of a Shi'a axis or represents a triumphant Islamist power-base would be most unpalatable. Israel wants to keep the future predictable. But events in Syria are making this ever more difficult.
