A U.S. foreign policy of realism and restraint is more popular than ever with the American public. After seeing the costly failures of interventionist foreign policy, Americans are far more skeptical of military intervention.
So it should come as no surprise that departing Secretary of State Mike Pompeo is now adopting realism and restraint as his own, stating on Jan. 1 that both concepts “helped us make Americans, and the world, safer.” But just because Pompeo claims restraint as his lodestar doesn’t make it true. While the Trump administration exhibited tendencies that could be construed as restraint-friendly, its overall foreign policy was largely an extension of its predecessors going back to the early 1990’s.
Realism and restraint are all about knowing your limitations, appreciating that the world is a messy place with few “Made in the USA” solutions, and being just as cognizant of what you can’t achieve as what you can. A foreign policy of restraint takes the lessons of the past and applies them to the future. It bases U.S. policies on the geopolitical dynamics of the day and recognizes when policies don’t work, when investments are counterproductive, and when relationships must be recalibrated. It is, in many ways, a doctrine where common sense outweighs the temptation to do something merely for the sake of acting.
Judging by these crucial principles, the Trump administration’s foreign policy record was hit-and-miss for restraint advocates.
In Afghanistan and the Middle East, advocates of restraint have a very clear position: The United States is devoting too many precious lives, resources, and attention in these areas for little security benefit. The solution is equally clear: Reposition the bulk of U.S. ground forces out of the Middle East and continue withdrawing U.S. troops from Afghanistan by May 1, 2021 as stipulated in the U.S.-Taliban agreement. Implementing these redeployments would provide U.S. combatant commanders with greater flexibility to deploy forces when vital U.S. security interests are truly threatened.
President Trump’s decision-making on both counts, however, is spotty. To his credit, the U.S. troop presence in Afghanistan will soon reach its lowest level since the 20-year war began. This is no small achievement, particularly when one considers the fierce criticism in Washington to withdrawals of any kind. But it is important to note the ongoing withdrawal only occurred after Trump first agreed to increase U.S. troop presence in Afghanistan upon the recommendations of his more hawkish security advisers, a decision he admitted was against his own instincts. Trump has regretted this decision ever since.
On Iran, realists have long recognized how futile and dangerous it is for Washington to continue implementing a maximum-pressure campaign that has heightened tension in the Persian Gulf, pulled the United States further into the region’s internal power contests, and made it practically impossible for Trump to remove U.S. forces. Rather than prioritize de-escalation and diplomacy, maximum pressure has escalated the situation and given Iran an excuse to boost its nuclear program along the way. Restrainers would not be flying B-52s into the Persian Gulf or rerouting aircraft carriers simply to send a message to a country whose entire economy is smaller than the U.S. defense budget.
If the Trump administration’s foreign policy actually prioritized restraint, it would have adopted a far more groundbreaking U.S. shift in Europe, where the U.S. force posture is frozen in the Cold War. Trump’s brusque campaign to push Washington’s NATO allies toward larger defense budgets was laudable and long overdue. But it came at the same time as his administration added $21.7 billion to the European Deterrence Initiative, cemented a deal with Poland that added more U.S. military infrastructure in the country, and supported Montenegro and North Macedonia’s NATO membership. While each of these decisions was supported by the Washington foreign policy establishment, they also made Trump’s cost-sharing efforts in Europe look more like a penny-pinching exercise than a genuine attempt at burden-shifting.
There are other examples. While Trump constantly spoke about establishing dialogue with Russia (a reasonable policy prescription respected Russia watchers have also called for), his actual policy on Moscow was conventional, if not hawkish. U.S.-Russia relations, characterized by mutual recriminations, sanctions, stalled strategic stability talks and the occasional military flare-up between U.S. and Russian forces, are worse off now than they were four years ago. For restrainers, a stable, semi-productive working relationship with Moscow is an endeavor worth exploring.
As realism and restraint gain even more prominence with the American public, policymakers in the Beltway will continue to hijack the term for their own ends. Those of us who truly care about guiding U.S. foreign policy in a more productive direction must do our part to ensure the idea’s true principles are protected—even as we continue to explain to policymakers why restraint provides the United States with more security at less cost.
Daniel R. DePetris is a fellow at Defense Priorities and a columnist at Newsweek. The views expressed are the author's own.
