The Strategic Implications of the New U.S.-U.K.-Australia Defense Partnership

The United States, United Kingdom and Australia on Sept. 15 announced the formation of AUKUS, bringing together three Anglo maritime democracies in a mutual multilayered defense partnership, focused primarily on the Indo-Pacific, and — though not explicitly stated — against China. As part of the arrangement, AUKUS is launching an 18-month program to accelerate Australia's acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines, undercutting a French sale of conventional submarines to Canberra and ending a decadeslong Australian struggle with submarine development and procurement. As such, the United States is now granting Australia access to technologies previously only shared with the United Kingdom. 

AUKUS is designed to bring together the U.S. shift to an Indo-Pacific focus, give some clarity to the idea of Global Britain and commit Australia to a proactive security role in the Pacific. Given the initial focus on nuclear propulsion technology, AUKUS is unlikely to be the nucleus of a larger grouping. Rather, it will remain a trilateral initiative that allows greater collaboration and strategic focus without the complexities of large coalitions, which often fall victim to diverging priorities and interests.

As AUKUS takes shape, here are some of the initial questions we are exploring. 

How does AUKUS relate to the Five-Eyes partnership and the QUAD initiatives? 

• The ANZUS treaty has long fallen into disuse due to shifts in New Zealand's strategic policies, and the Five-Eyes partnership has seen strains from New Zealand-U.S. relations. Does the new AUKUS reflect a concern with New Zealand's foreign policy, or is it more an acknowledgment that Wellington has withdrawn from U.S.-led regional initiatives?
• The United States had been working through the QUAD to define its multilateral approach to the Indo-Pacific, but AUKUS appears to be a much more focused, and Anglo-centric initiative. Will AUKUS diminish the QUAD, or does it represent a shift in focus, with AUKUS being a core security relationship while the QUAD takes a more multifaceted approach that ultimately allows for more regional powers to participate? 

What are the implications for other countries in the region, particularly those balancing U.S. security assistance and Chinese economic connections?

• One of the U.S. challenges in forging a new strategic path in the Indo-Pacific is the local fear of a new Cold War mindset. Most countries in the region (and even beyond) are reluctant to pick sides, and Washington has tried to reassure them that it is not necessary. Could AUKUS ease that concern by allowing other multilateral initiatives to slide away from a military focus?
• The announcement of AUKUS is likely to be greeted with mixed views in the region. On the one hand, it is a concrete step demonstrating that the United States is finally making the shift to greater strategic attention toward the Indo-Pacific, something that has not been entirely certain. On the other hand, the clear strategic military focus of this initiative may lead to greater friction between the United States and China, and heighten Chinese efforts to force countries to slide away from cooperation with Washington.

How will China respond?

• By creating a military partnership between three Anglo countries, China is likely to interpret this partnership between three Anglo countries as a clear challenge not only to China's regional role, but as running counter to Chinese ideology and an attempt to reinforce traditional U.S./U.K.-centric ideas of democracy and economic liberalism. This is likely to intensify the ideological component of strategic competition, not only in China's periphery, but across the globe.
• China has often countered strategic or defense initiatives with economic tools. In regard to Australia, has Beijing nearly exhausted those tools, at least those that do not harm China's economy as well, e.g., iron ore imports? With the existing challenges of COVID-19 and Brexit, are there levers China can pull to exert significant pressure on the United Kingdom, which conceptually has the least immediate interest in the Indo-Pacific? Where does China see the weak link in the tripartite arrangement? 
• Beijing has applied for membership in the CPTPP trade agreement, initially an economic grouping designed to coerce change in China or exclude Beijing from a larger economic partnership. How else may Beijing try and strengthen its relations throughout the Indo-Pacific in order to insulate itself and reduce space for U.S. strategic expansion and cooperation?

With a refocus on the "Pacific" part of the Indo-Pacific, how will AUKUS shape its interaction with the Pacific Island nations over the next decade or two?

• One of the values of nuclear submarines is the ability to travel long distances relatively quickly while remaining submerged, making them less noticeable and less vulnerable. This is critical for Australia, which sits far from most things, and has interests and potential responsibilities stretching from the Indian Ocean to the North Pacific to the far reaches of the South Pacific. But even at the earliest, Canberra doesn't expect the first nuclear submarine until 2040. What are the ways AUKUS may increase its presence in the far reaches of the Pacific in the meantime? 
• China has expanded its cooperation with Pacific Island nations, reawakening Canberra's and Washington's interest and involvement, given their strategic locations. Are we likely to see an even more active competition emerge for influence in the Pacific Islands with the emergence of AUKUS, and do the strains in the Pacific Island Forum create greater opportunities for foreign interference?

Given France's comments on the abrogation of the submarine deal, will there be any ripple implications within NATO or the EU-U.K. relationship?

• The French have been rather vocal in their disappointment over the canceled submarine deal, blaming the United States primarily, but clearly recognizing the role of Australia and the United Kingdom. Will this be just a passing moment of ire, or may this spill over into the French role in EU-U.K. relations (with many thorny post-Brexit issues still unresolved), or even into the balance between France's NATO commitments and its focus on its own interests or an EU defense initiative? 
• The French are also a Pacific nation, and have recently reengaged with their territories in the region. How deep is the French-Australian spat, and does that further strain space for cooperation among the Pacific Islands?