This article was first published by Stratfor Worldview and is reprinted here with permission.
North Korea’s suggestion that it may resume long-range missile and nuclear tests risks renewing tensions on the Korean Peninsula, but it could also signal an opening bid for potential negotiations. At a Jan. 19 Politburo meeting, North Korean officials accused the United States of violating commitments from the 2018 leaders’ summits, and said Pyongyang would “promptly examine the issue of restarting all temporarily-suspended activities.” North Korean leaders made a similar threat in January 2020. The most recent comments followed two sets of missile tests: one focused on the North’s hypersonic missiles, and the other on rail-launched short-range tactical guided missiles. The unusual January missile tests, coupled with the Politburo comments, raise concerns that North Korea may resume testing long-range missiles and nuclear weapons, escalating tensions to levels last seen in 2016-17. There is a chance, however, that Pyongyang is using the review to position itself for the possible resumption of talks with South Korea and the United States.
A Question of Range and Deterrence
Over the past four years, North Korea has shifted focus to strengthening its conventional deterrent capabilities, while not eliminating its existing long-range nuclear deterrent. Since 2018, Pyongyang has tested numerous regional battlefield systems, including cruise missiles, hypersonic glide vehicles, and maneuverable short-range ballistic missiles. Pyongyang has also stepped up testing and deployment of large caliber Multiple Rocket Launch Systems in recent years. Some tests (namely, those of its submarine-launched ballistic missiles and its rail-launched ballistic missiles) have demonstrated North Korea’s second-strike capability. But most of Pyongyang’s recent weapons tests have focused on systems designed to counter U.S. and South Korean missile defense systems in theater.
- In 2018, after two years of intensive testing of medium- and long-range ballistic missiles, North Korea declared a self-imposed moratorium on such tests as part of its negotiations with the United States. In return, Pyongyang demanded that Washington lift sanctions and halt large-scale defense exercises with South Korea (which North Korea characterizes as hostile actions). Following the breakdown of summitry in Vietnam in early 2019, North Korea resumed testing short-range ballistic missiles but stuck to its moratorium on longer-range systems.
North Korea’s recent threat to review its “suspended activities” — which is shorthand for nuclear and long-range missile tests — serves two purposes. First, Pyongyang has legitimate concerns about the viability of these systems, and additional testing (particularly of its guidance systems) is important to ensure their use as a deterrent. Second, North Korea may be reverting to its old method of threatening an escalation to force negotiations, and then trade away the escalation for concrete economic gains. Pyongyang doesn’t have to resume long-range missile tests, for example. It can simply maintain its moratorium on testing in return for easing sanctions.
Timing and Context
North Korea’s push to renew attention to its missile program may reflect timing constraints for restarting dialogue with South Korea and the United States. With South Korea’s March 9 presidential election looming, and the two leading candidates running evenly in the polls, Pyongyang must consider whether it wants to accept South Korean President Moon Jae-in’s offer of dialogue (and an end of war declaration), or whether it considers such a move temporary at best — similar to the last-minute summit between former President Roh Moo Hyun and Kim Jong Il. Moon is eager to strike a deal with Pyongyang before the end of his term, both to solidify his legacy and to lock the next administration into an engagement policy with the North. He has gained tacit backing from the United States and China to offer an end of war declaration to North Korea, but Pyongyang has so far considered this merely symbolic. Instead, Pyongyang demands a reduction of U.S. military activities on the Korean Peninsula and a reduction in sanctions, giving the North greater economic access to the international community. If Pyongyang intends to enter dialogue with Moon before the March elections, threatening to restart long-range missile tests would provide North Korea with an easy bargaining chip to trade away.
Pyongyang’s intent to restart tests or talks may also be shaped by its isolation during the COVID-19 crisis. In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, North Korea rapidly closed its borders and significantly curtailed diplomatic contact. Internal restrictions may have impacted North Korea’s defense industry testing and development. Ballistic missile tests were cut nearly in half in 2020 and 2021 compared with earlier years under Kim Jong Un. The restart of tests this January may reflect both the pent-up backlog in testing cycles and the natural development cycle as North Korea shifted attention from long-range systems to shorter-range battlefield systems after the collapse of nuclear talks with the United States. But Pyongyang has not only resumed missile tests. The regime has also cautiously begun reopening some borders, as the country faces a food crisis and the economic impact of two years of self-imposed quarantine. While North Korea is still insecure about a broader reopening for fear of the uncontrolled spread of COVID-19, it is clear that Pyongyang is seeking to bolster its economy, and this requires re-engagement.
Amid increased U.S.-China tensions, North Korea sees a shifting regional security environment that may limit its options in the future as well. While the United States is adjusting its defense posture in the region to counter China, the same force structure is seen as increasingly threatening by North Korea. An expansion of U.S. anti-missile systems, the increased presence of U.S. strategic aircraft and submarines, and the potential positioning of intermediate-range ballistic missiles in the region are as much of a threat to North Korea as they are to China — if not more so. Further, as the United States and its regional allies and partners set their strategic sights on China, North Korea will be seen as a Chinese ally, thus leaving Pyongyang even further isolated and increasingly constrained. Pyongyang needs to act soon to reshape its own position in the region, either through stronger defense or through some opportunistic breakthrough with the West.
North Korea’s Next Move
North Korea has long made uncertainty its ally in managing relations with its bigger neighbors and opponents. Pyongyang’s planned review of its moratorium could just as easily signal a resumption of escalatory behavior or an opening for dialogue. The ambiguity itself is an advantage, as Pyongyang is seen as unpredictable and thus potentially willing to take actions that other more “rational” countries may not. This places the risk tolerance onus on South Korea and the United States, both from the aspect of the physical risk of the weapons systems, and the political risk of the sense of rising tensions and inability to ensure security on the Korean Peninsula. North Korea’s development of a long-range nuclear deterrent and its more recent focus on an in-theater conventional deterrent enable Pyongyang to tailor its “threat” to South Korea, the United States or other regional powers — giving North Korea room to play off the priority and policy differences between these nations.
North Korea’s leadership may determine that a resumption of long-range tests is necessary to ensure the viability of its nuclear deterrence, and that it can simply re-impose its moratorium later in return for economic or security concessions. There is, after all, only a narrow window of opportunity for the North to take advantage of Moon’s final weeks in office, or risk the conservative candidate winning the March election and rescinding outreach to Pyongyang. Further, a new round of intensive testing like that seen in 2016-17 would significantly complicate the U.S. efforts to reshape the regional defense architecture to constrain China, incentivizing Washington to strike some deal with North Korea. The strengthening of its conventional deterrent may make Pyongyang more confident going into any new negotiations as well.
