Congressional debates about President Biden’s $106 billion supplemental assistance request are putting Ukraine and the U.S. at risk, but not in the way policymakers think.
“The stakes are too high and the consequences too grave to allow a minority in Congress to hold Ukraine funding hostage over any unrelated issue,” U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan said in December. “It’s time for Congress to fund our critical national security priorities.”
Despite the Biden administration’s existentialist rhetoric portraying the war as a battle for global democracy, Ukraine’s statehood is not a “critical national security” interest. A Russian invasion of NATO is little more than a fantasy and extending the war through aid increases the chance that Russia secures more territory. What we should be concerned about is escalation leading to nuclear war.
Last week, Russian President Vladimir Putin declared in a televised address that Ukrainian statehood will “suffer an irreparable, very serious blow” if the war continues. U.S. officials have proven that they are not ignorant of Putin’s threats but continue to insist that more aid is the answer.
While it seems unlikely Putin would use nuclear weapons on Ukraine, in the past he has indicated he would bring them into play to protect Russia’s interest in Ukraine, particularly by attacking NATO. The threat of a confrontation between NATO and Russia is not out of the realm of possibility, especially as NATO launches its largest military exercise in 35 years involving the deployment of 90,000 troops to “demonstrate NATO’s ability to deploy forces rapidly from North America and other parts of the Alliance to reinforce the defence of Europe.”
Stymied by a lack of airpower and the intensity of Russian minefields, Ukraine’s failed summer counteroffensive has shown that aid alone cannot force Russia to abdicate its conquered territory. As Hal Brands, a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, writes for Bloomberg, “When that counteroffensive did come, its failure reflected deep weaknesses of the Ukrainian army— including its inability to carry out complex, multistage operations—as much as any shortfall of aid.”
In its current state, the war is proving increasingly deadly for Ukrainian civilians as Russia remains in control of its conquered territory. Even as Ukraine continues to strike Russian targets, including a recent drone attack on an oil depot, Russia’s ability to call up new conscripts and adapt to Ukraine’s heavy use of drones using electronic warfare systems has prevented significant gains. Russia recently took the strategic foothold of Mariinka to diminish Ukraine’s ability to seize the city of Donetsk and continues to strike Kyiv.
As the war continues, the chances that Russia’s numerical advantage in troops (as shown during the Battle of Bakhmut) and missiles overwhelms Ukraine become increasingly likely. At this point, the most prudent policy to pursue is a “Korean-style” ceasefire that freezes the conflict along present lines.
As Lyle Goldstein of the China Maritime Studies Institute at the U.S. Naval War College writes for Responsible Statecraft, “The strong virtue of this arrangement is that it puts a premium on an immediate halt to the fighting, while solidifying the line of contact as the new border for the foreseeable future.”
Reporting by the New York Times suggests that Putin could be amenable to a ceasefire that “freezes the conflict along current lines.” This move makes political sense: Putin can claim a rhetorical victory from “the eastward expansion of NATO” and avoid any future turmoil that mirrors the Wagner mutiny, which a long war might bring about.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has taken the opposite stance, however, claiming that Ukraine “will not risk” a ceasefire because it would give Russia a chance to resupply. While the reasoning behind this claim appears sound, it is a strategic misstep; Russia’s political and economic situation would make restarting the war difficult.
“Mobilizing dwindling manpower and financial resources for yet another conquest could create greater risks to regime stability,” notes Stephen Crowley, a professor of politics at Oberlin College.
Convincing Zelensky of a ceasefire’s benefits while working to understand Russian demands through back-door diplomacy should be the policy of the Biden administration. This approach helps Ukraine protect its people in the short term and rebuild its military to deter future Russian aggression while keeping the door open to a broader diplomatic solution to the conflict. For the U.S., a ceasefire would diminish the potential for escalation between itself and Russia.
Supporting a prolonged conflict is contrary to U.S. interests. The cost of aid is unpopular. Almost half of Americans agree that “the U.S. government is spending too much on aid.” And the war’s continuation increases the chances, albeit small, of nuclear war.
William Rampe is a Young Voices contributor studying Government at Hamilton College. His commentary on foreign policy has appeared in the Wall Street Journal, Reason, CFR.org, and the Organization for World Peace. Follow him on Twitter @WRampe7
