It is time for the US to shift from its long-standing position demanding North Korean denuclearization and embrace diplomacy underpinned by the framework of competitive strategies pioneered by Andrew Marshall, the founder and long-time leader of the Pentagon’s in-house think tank, the Office of Net Assessment.
The Korean Peninsula has been riven with tensions since the end of World War II. Recently, North Korea has signaled a departure from its decades-long pursuit of reunification with South Korea. This shift, coupled with Pyongyang’s increasing military support for Russia in the ongoing Ukraine conflict, has sent shockwaves through the international community. Despite North Korea’s challenges, the US should re-embrace the direction of diplomacy embraced by then, and soon to be again, President Donald Trump.
At the time of the historic summit between President Trump and Kim Jong Un, some voices, including this author, advocated for a bold move: formalizing relations with North Korea and officially ending the Korean War. This approach, while controversial, was rooted in a pragmatic assessment of the situation. The arguments for such a strategy stem from a stark reality: North Korea’s nuclear weapons program has become an entrenched part of its national identity and security strategy. The likelihood of Pyongyang voluntarily relinquishing its nuclear arsenal under any set of circumstances or pressures that the United States would find acceptable is vanishingly tiny. This intransigence was only reinforced by the fate of leaders like Muammar Gaddafi, who gave up his nuclear ambitions only to face a violent demise – a cautionary tale not lost on Kim Jong Un.
The U.S. goal now should be to shift North Korea from its position of being “as close as lips and teeth” with China to that of a pivot player capable of triangulating between China and the United States. This doesn’t mean aiming for overwhelmingly friendly relations with North Korea – hoping for such an outcome is naïve and neither likely nor necessary. Instead, the focus should be on fostering “better” relations to improve the declining U.S. leverage in its ongoing geopolitical competition with China. This approach echoes the realist foreign policy of Nixon and Kissinger, who recognized the value of strategic realignments in shaping the global balance of power. It also draws inspiration from the work of Andrew Marshall, the legendary head of the Pentagon’s Office of Net Assessment, who pioneered the concept of “competitive strategies” in defense planning. Marshall, often called the “Yoda of the Pentagon,” was the office’s first director from 1973 to 2015, leaving an indelible mark on U.S. defense strategy.
Marshall’s approach to competitive strategies focused on identifying and exploiting an opponent’s weaknesses while leveraging one’s own strengths. This methodology included but went beyond traditional military planning, incorporating a wide range of factors, including economic, technological, and cultural aspects. At the heart of Marshall’s thinking was the importance of long-term strategic analysis and understanding an adversary’s decision-making processes. He believed that by carefully analyzing these factors, the United States could develop strategies that would force competitors to expend resources in less favorable areas, thereby gaining a strategic advantage. In the context of North Korea’s recent actions and the continuing neo-Cold War with China, applying competitive strategies should create a situation where North Korea finds it advantageous to triangulate between major powers rather than aligning exclusively with China or Russia.
A North Korea that seeks to extract gains from China while playing hard to get is ultimately more beneficial to the U.S. than one with nowhere to go but permanently into China’s strategic orbit. Moreover, the more North Korea engages in this triangulation, the more China must divert some of its strategic focus to managing its relationship with Pyongyang. This, in turn, could reduce China’s ability to concentrate solely on preparing for potential conflicts with the U.S., particularly over Taiwan. Given the atrophied defense industrial base in the U.S. and its looming national debt-induced fiscal constraints, every distraction imposed on China is strategically beneficial.
It’s important to acknowledge that this strategy has moral ambiguities. Engaging with a regime known for its human rights abuses and aggressive behavior is a delicate balancing act. It would require careful implementation and extensive consultation with allies to ensure that it doesn’t further undermine regional stability or send the signal that bad international behavior is always a ticket to better relations with the U.S. Furthermore, such a strategy would need to be unveiled, and implemented gradually, with significant diplomatic efforts to explain its rationale to both domestic and international audiences.
The status quo has already failed, leaving the U.S. in a weak, reactive posture. By adopting a modified competitive strategies approach inspired by Andrew Marshall’s work, policymakers could find creative ways to address the immediate challenges of North Korea’s actions and the longer-term challenges of creating a favorable balance of power in Eurasia with China.
Greg R. Lawson is a Contributing Analyst at Wikistrat. Follow him on LinkedIn and X @ConservaWonk.
