Bolivia’s Lithium Window Is Closing Rapidly
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In 2023, Bolivia signed multi-billion dollar deals for lithium extraction with Chinese and Russian state-owned companies, including the CBC consortium and Rosatom/Uranium One. Since then, despite these deals expanding further, very little progress has been made, with extraction and production stalling despite promises from all stakeholders about “rapid industrialization.” 

Given Bolivia’s increasingly friendly relationship with American adversaries, the continuous problems plaguing Bolivia’s mining sector, and the growing alternatives for lithium development, it may be time for the U.S. and other democratic states to look elsewhere. 

Contentious elections in 2025, drama with Evo Morales, and upticks in political protests in the mining region have also distracted the MAS ruling party from business, focusing on putting out political wildfires over fulfilling the lithium deal. 

Evaporation pool scandals with Russian- and Chinese-run plants also confirmed that the Direct Lithium Extraction (better known as DLE) technology offered by both countries was simply inadequate for Bolivia’s lithium industry. This was confirmed repeatedly by lithium experts, including directly by the late Juan Carlos Montenegro, who told me, “This is a geopolitical partnership, and it shows in the level of competence on display in the lithium project.” The government has simply refused to listen, to its own detriment.

Bolivia first looked to export lithium by 2026, but that is looking completely out of the question, with some believing it was never a realistic goal. Yet, indigenous communities in the mining belt were promised fast and large returns — their support being contingent on such returns. If the government under-delivers once again, it may have more social conflict on its hands, conflict which, in the past, even cost the life of a Mining Minister during the Evo Morales administration.

American firms, once eager to invest in Bolivia’s lithium potential, have largely moved on, prioritizing countries with stable governance and predictable investment climates. As Bolivia strengthens its partnership with authoritarian states, the risk may not be worth the cost for democratic states like the U.S., who are looking for stable, sound investments with a reasonable timeline and little political controversy. 

This is not new: Bolivia has always dealt with political issues and corruption surrounding its mining and energy sectors. Given its status as the largest reserve holder in the world and the growing need for lithium in hyper-technological industries including electric cars, semiconductors, and the development of AI technological products, the country had a reasonable advantage in the lithium boom starting in the last two decades. 

However, Bolivia’s position may completely vanish not only as a factor of these persistent problems but also through its weakening position within the international lithium market. While previously, Bolivia had a strong claim to attracting foreign investment, despite its issues, due to its large stake and the fact that the two other countries in the Lithium Triangle; Argentina and Chile, were already exploiting their reserves to a significant extent, that reality has shifted. 

Now, there have been significant, multi-trillion-dollar lithium reserves found elsewhere, which are either already exploitable or will be soon with predictable technological advancements. 

Most of them are in countries that are much easier to do business with, including the United States, Portugal, and Australia. At this rate, even India and China, which also recently discovered large lithium reserves, would be preferable options. China, in particular, may also be looking at its own reserves and weaken Bolivia’s terms of the deal after growing its own lithium sector, making Bolivia an increasingly desperate partner.

With the return of an America First-oriented Trump administration, doing business with Bolivia looks increasingly unattractive. The U.S. would much rather invest in exploiting its own lithium reserves, than depend on Bolivia, a Socialist country where business is unpredictable, complex, and, to an extent, unwelcoming for Americans. 

The U.S. and democratic countries are also much less likely to do business with a country with very overt and direct links with adversarial dictatorships, particularly China, Russia, Iran, and Venezuela. 

Upon this global retrenchment, Bolivia will likely be stuck with its current partners in Moscow and Beijing, who have shown time and again their willingness to renegotiate deals in their favor after exercising leverage and pressure, a sort of business bait-and-switch to get partners stuck in a bad deal. After which, Bolivia will be forced to sell its lithium to them, the only buyers, for below-market price, doing little to advance its economic development, and further angering the interest groups that were promised dividends in exchange for environmental disruption. 

If the Bolivian government wants to salvage its gains from these lithium deals, maintain its strong position of leverage for however long it can, and fulfill its economic promises to the Bolivian people — which are the backbone of the Socialist government’s survival despite an economic depression and many corruption scandals — it needs to forget the political distractions and concentrate on delivering on lithium. 

Those with field expertise in Bolivian lithium have sounded the alarm about these deals, particularly on the lack of technological readiness, personal corruption, silencing of indigenous dissent, and the prioritization of geopolitics over sound policy. The reality is, though, these deals are done, and the least-unfavorable outcome must be reached from a list of accumulating bad options. Pushing through might even win it the next election, and ensure it can keep governing in an era of global turbulence.

For Bolivia to remain competitive and attract renewed interest from the U.S. and democratic states, it would need to address its deep-rooted issues, including unreliable governance, technological shortcomings, and its growing entanglements with authoritarian regimes. However, with its partnerships with Russia and China already solidified and its credibility as an investment destination eroded, these necessary changes seem unlikely. The U.S. therefore, may find it more advantageous to focus on developing its own reserves or working with countries that offer stability, transparency, and mutual trust—leaving Bolivia to grapple with the consequences of its missteps.

Joseph Bouchard is a freelance journalist and analyst from Québec covering security and geopolitics in the Americas, with extensive reporting experience in Bolivia. His articles have appeared in The Diplomat, Le Devoir, La Razón, The National Interest, and Reason Magazine.