President Donald Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s blowup in the Oval Office was the end of what should have been an obvious chain of events. The press has reported for the past two months on what increasingly dire relations between the Trump and Zelensky administrations. Trump had been offended by a series of Zelensky’s actions, from misleading his team on his thoughts regarding the minerals deal to Zelensky’s criticism of Trump “living in a disinformation space.”
But beyond those personal differences, it also is the result of a truth which had been boiling up since as early as the Biden administration: America’s and Ukraine’s national interests simply no longer align.
Consider Ukraine’s national interests. While the period of maximum peril – when Russian tanks were miles from Kyiv – is long past, Russia, a significantly larger and more powerful country, still has managed to capture about 20 percent of Ukraine’s territory. This has included the entirety of the Azov Coast, effectively turning the Azov Sea into a Russian lake. While Ukraine has (thanks to Western weaponry and courageous soldiers) managed to hold its own, they are running out of troops and have been for some time. If the Russo-Ukrainian War becomes a war of attrition, it will end with Russia conquering more territory than it currently possesses.
Therefore, Ukraine’s national interest is clear: get as much support as possible to defend itself from Russia and join NATO. Barring either of those, get a ceasefire backed with American and European security guarantees. While the Zelensky administration has been vague as to what those security guarantees would mean, it clearly is hoping that America would agree to take some sort of military action if Russia were to break a future ceasefire.
Zelensky has been clear that he believes America must play a central role in providing security guarantees. As he said in early February, “Security guarantees without America are not real security guarantees.” On this, he is not wrong: Europe has proven itself utterly incapable of taking defense seriously. The European Union’s newest idea, 150 billion euros, is only up for discussion; even further is European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s pie-in-the-sky 800 billion euro pot, which is years from happening if ever (it is worth noting that America spends more than that on defense per year).
Unfortunately for Ukraine, America has absolutely no national interest in providing security guarantees to the beleaguered country. Our overriding interest is in avoiding a war between the U.S. and Russia.
Firstly, the United States did have a genuine interest in that region of the world during the Cold War. This is why Turkey was among the first to join NATO; the Soviet Union, with its plans for global communist revolution, was a threat to the United States’ way of life. Containment, America’s Cold War strategy, necessitated having allied forces in places like the southern Black Sea (it is no coincidence that Turkey and Greece joined at the same time).
This is where those who view the Cold War as a blueprint for today err. The United States opposed the Soviet Union because it exported communism. But Russia is not exporting communism today – in fact, it’s not exporting any ideology. It would like to control eastern Europe, as the Russian Empire once did, but that is not an ideology, and it is certainly not something which immediately impacts the United States. Which means that America is not seriously injured if Ukraine loses territory to Russia, and that its national security is not seriously impacted by where Ukraine’s border ends.
Secondly, the United States is attempting to pivot to Asia, and has been since former President Barack Obama’s second term. Becoming permanently locked down via a security guarantee – which could, by its nature, have no end date – in south-eastern Europe does nothing to advance that pivot. It would perpetually keep the United States and Russia at odds, no matter what else happens in the world. And this, in an age of increasing multipolarity, would be pure tomfoolery. The United States, if anything, should be interested in – over decades – prying Russia away from China, not pushing them together further (and worsening relations). The U.S. should want positive relations with as many “poles” as possible – not fewer.
Finally, the United States does not have a fortune-telling device. It has no idea what sort of government Ukraine will have in the coming years. Losing the war – or even just losing significant amounts of land – could engender a “stabbed in the back” feeling which could empower virulent nationalists bent on getting their land back. Does the United States want to tie itself to such a government? Alliances which are crucial to America’s national interests are worth such risks, but a permanent protection of Ukraine, a country peripheral to America’s interests, is nonsensical.
Ukraine can of course attempt to get the United States’ attention with things like the mineral deal. But even such a deal will likely not keep the attention of the United States for long. It’s just not in America’s interest.
Anthony J. Constantini is a Contributing Fellow at Defense Priorities.
