Though drowned out by headlines about tariffs, Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s recent NATO visit is worth dwelling on as it represents a shift in Washington’s view of the alliance. At NATO, Rubio argued that the security weaknesses of Europe, such as Ukraine, should not be America’s global welfare problem when there are more pressing matters. Rubio’s statement raises the question: Is continued U.S. support for Ukraine truly in America’s interest?
For the U.S., Ukraine has been expensive: Congress has allocated $182 billion to Ukraine since 2022, with nearly half already spent. Meanwhile, the U.S. faces mounting defense obligations in the Asia-Pacific and the Middle East.
For Ukraine, the war has been devastating. Ukraine is losing—just slowly. While Russia expected a quick win, its patience and irregular warfare tactics in this war of attrition have proven effective, overwhelming Ukraine’s strategic units by sacrificing manpower.
Russia occupies 20% of Ukrainian territory, with Russia advancing 40 km westward in the last year. Russian troops continue pressing forward, with no signs of slowing down. Continuing to aid Ukraine means using valuable defense resources to fund its gradual demise. Every day the war drags on, Americans pay with their pockets while Ukrainians pay with their lives.
Additionally, the U.S. has higher priorities elsewhere. The Asia-Pacific should be America’s primary focus, as we remain overdependent on stability in the Taiwan Strait and uncertain about the future of bilateral relations with China—a far greater concern than attempting to give Ukraine an edge in a war it is losing. Are we stretched too thin?
The Trump administration certainly believes so. It plans to cut aid to Ukraine and reduce other European commitments such as NATO, arguing that restraint in Europe would allow the US to place a greater focus on China. Also, Russia’s capability (and Putin’s stated willingness) to use nuclear force should the U.S. deepen its involvement in Ukraine is worrisome. Avoiding a nuclear exchange will always be a higher priority than ensuring the survival of Ukrainian democracy.
One argument for continued U.S. involvement is Ukraine’s critical minerals. Yet, this is unlikely to truly help the U.S. Despite the deal’s postponement following a public spat in the Oval Office, the Trump administration is still seeking an agreement with Ukraine to “pay back” aid with its natural resources. At first glance, it seems straightforward: the U.S. needs critical minerals, and Ukraine needs weaponry. However, 40% of Ukraine’s mineral reserves lie in Russian-occupied territories, making extraction amid an invasion or prolonged occupation unrealistic. More stable alternatives exist.
Another justification for continued support is that Ukraine serves as a proxy war between Russia and the U.S. While the war has strained Russia, the U.S. faces more direct threats from Russian cyberattacks, which predate the war. Cyberattacks against U.S. infrastructure tripled between 2023 and 2024, many targeting Western aid to Ukraine. For now, the Trump administration has halted offensive cyber operations against Russia, likely as a goodwill gesture. If U.S. involvement in Ukraine has fueled Russian cyber aggression, then reducing involvement should alleviate attacks on American infrastructure.
The Trump administration seems to see little U.S. interest in supporting Ukraine–and the evidence so far supports this view. But, if the U.S. withdraws support, who will aid Ukraine? One likely answer is the E.U. While Ukraine itself may not be a core U.S. interest, its war with Russia has pushed European nations toward increased militarization. This shift could actually benefit the U.S. in the long term, as stronger European defense capabilities would lead to more reliable military partners, deter Russian aggression, and allow the US to complete its pivot to Asia.
The Trump administration’s calls for restraint have already prompted E.U. nations to reaffirm support for Ukraine and increase defense spending. European collective security is being mobilized: the European Commission’s ReArm Europe 2030 plan is historic, committing €800 billion to defense investments, including a 30% increase in weapon stockpiles.
Whether ReArm Europe materializes remains to be seen, especially given how weak European militias are, but it signals a shift toward European self-reliance. Similarly, NATO is adjusting to a future with less U.S. involvement. France, U.K., Germany, Poland, and Denmark are leading discussions on strengthening European defense, with Macron championing his vision of “European strategic autonomy.”
For decades, the U.S. has been the primary security guarantor in Europe through NATO and the nuclear umbrella. One caveat to restraint is that the U.S. will have to accept less hard power in Europe. Reducing involvement means ceding military authority to European states, which could diminish American influence. But if European states can meet the moment they may create a truly independent European security system—an outcome that benefits both the U.S. and Europe.
The cost of American restraint in Europe is worth it. Only China possesses the economic and technological power to challenge the U.S. as a peer. American interests demand a greater focus on China, not Ukraine. Russia is disruptive and a rival, but its conventional power is not a threat to the U.S., nor does indefinite support for Ukraine benefit U.S. interests. Redirecting attention to the Indo-Pacific, as a new Pentagon memo calls for, would better align with America’s strategic priorities.
Sama Noori is a foreign policy analyst. She has worked at the U.S. Department of State, NASA, and Bank of America on international relations and business governance. Sama has her BA and MA from Harvard University.
